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EMPIRICAL STUDIES  
OF PHILIPPINE  
RICE FARMING  
AND TENANCY

# View from the Paddy

VIEW FROM THE PAADDY

INSTITUTE OF PHILIPPINE CULTURE

PSR 20(1-2) January-April 1972

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CORRECTION for the "Note on Orthography" (page 50 and elsewhere)

In line 4, between "only one sound," and "with few exceptions," please insert the following:

for even the compound letter ng (or "eng"; distinct from the word-abbreviation ng, pronounced "nang") stands for a single sound, the so-called velar n. Letters and words are pronounced as they are written,

# PHILIPPINE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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Volume 20, Numbers 1 and 2, January and April 1972

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## APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PHILIPPINE RICE FARMING

FRANK LYNCH

September 8, 1972

This is a book about rice farming and agrarian reform, with emphasis on the latter. To place the volume and its contents in proper perspective, allow me first to review the various ways in which we *might* have approached the subject, then explain why we took the route that we did.

### *The Agrarian Structure and Rice Farming*

A helpful preliminary will be to describe the agrarian structure as we shall understand it and, more particularly, to state what we mean by the rice-farming structure. A commonplace definition is that provided by the United Nations Department of Economic Affairs. In their terms the agrarian structure is

... the institutional framework of agricultural production. It includes, in the first place, land tenure, the legal or customary system under which land is owned; the distribution of ownership of farm property between large estates and peasant farms or among peasant farms of various sizes; land tenancy, the system under which land is operated and its product divided between operator and owner; the organization of credit, production and marketing; the mechanism through which agriculture is financed; the burdens imposed on rural populations by governments in the form of taxation; and the services supplied by governments to rural populations, such as technical advice and educational facilities, health services, water supply and communication (United Nations 1951: 4-5).

Thus the notion of agrarian structure is comprehensive: it includes all aspects of the farming enterprise. Moreover, in unmodified form it embraces the whole range of agricultural crops – in the Philippines, especially rice, sugarcane, coconut, corn, abaca, root crops, and fruits. But since in the present volume our paramount interest is the nation's agrarian-reform program – a program which for all practical purposes has to date been limited to the rice-farming population within the agrarian structure – we shall be concerned here with just one portion of the overall framework, namely, the rice-farming structure or, in short, rice farming.

### *Approaches to Philippine Rice Farming*

To understand the approach taken to a topic under study, one should know both the subject matter and the viewpoint from which it is considered. We shall first discuss these two elements of approach relative to rice farming, then catalogue the most commonly used approaches. In a following section we shall speak of the approaches employed within this volume.

#### *Rice-farming topics*

The rice-farming structure, like the agrarian framework in general, has three main sectors, any one of which, alone or in combination, may be the object of study and reporting. The first is *tenure*, which includes in its extension all provisions for, and characteristics of, riceland ownership. Legal matters abound in this category. The second major sector is that of *production*. Here are subsumed all considerations pertinent to the actual growing of rice (infrastructure, production inputs, credit, technical advice, marketing facilities, and so on). The third sector, which encompasses arrangements for the

use of riceland by nonowners, is called *tenancy*.<sup>1</sup> Under this category would fall the range of agreements made between landlords and tenants or lessees regarding mutual rights and obligations relative to production and the division of the final product. It is about these three topics that one generally speaks or writes in the domain of rice farming: tenure, production, and tenancy. The first step in describing a particular approach is to specify to which of these three sectors the author addresses himself.

### Viewpoints

But there are various ways of looking at the same subject matter. Take the question of the landlord-tenant relationship. Depending on what it is I hope to accomplish, I may describe it as it is or tell you what I think it should be. In either case the topic will be the same – tenancy and the landlord-tenant relationship.

On analysis we find that the most commonly encountered viewpoints can be satisfactorily described by using three pairs of mutually-opposed adjectives: normative-empirical, moral-technical, and descriptive-comparative. With these three sets one can erect a three-dimensional space within which to locate almost anything said or written about rice farming (Fig. 1). This plotting procedure (to use a navigator's term) can help us to think more clearly and, as a consequence, to have more appropriate expectations of the various kinds of rice-farming documents which come our way.




Fig. 1 – Coordinates for the plotting of commonly encountered points of view on aspects of rice farming

The *empirical-normative* distinction is probably the most important of the three, for when one fails to make it he is liable to mistake another's statement of policy for a statement of fact, or a simple description of the way things are with a compliant acceptance of the status quo. The difference between the empirical and the normative viewpoints is as simple as it is significant: a topic discussed empirically is seen *as it is*, while a topic discussed normatively is viewed *as it ought to be*.



Because oughtness is not univocal, but comes in several forms, we must add a second set of adjectives, giving us the *moral-technical* distinction. Slightly more difficult to make than the empirical-normative distinction, this difference is a good one to keep in mind if you have a tendency to confuse blundering with bad will. The technical viewpoint concerns itself with correctness; the moral viewpoint, with goodness. The technically disappointing performance is inaccurate, erroneous, or irrational, and the agent, incompetent; the morally reprehensible act is sinful or indecent, and the agent, an evil human being. In Tagalog, the first transgression is an error or a slip, *mali*; the second is a sin or moral fault, *sala*.

A third difference is that between description and comparison. The *descriptive-comparative* distinction is easy to make, since it involves merely the difference between a one-time-one-place treatment and something more elaborate. Thus if an author describes patterns of rice cultivation in a particular place and time, his viewpoint is descriptive. But if his observations cover two or more places or time periods, his viewpoint is comparative.

These, then, are the three parameters of viewpoint: normative-empirical, moral-technical, and descriptive-comparative. In conjunction with the three-way division of rice-farming subject matter (tenure, production, and tenancy), they can be used to define common approaches to the study of rice farming.

### Approaches

A cursory survey of available literature on rice farming (tenure, production, and tenancy included) leads me to conclude that authors commonly follow one of six different paths. These ways are conveniently divisible into two sub-categories, the normative and the empirical.

*Normative.* The three normative routes I call, respectively, the field-manual, legal, and moralist approaches. They differ from one another especially in the kind of norm which each stresses — technical, legal, or moral-religious. But there is also a tendency for field manuals to deal with the production sector rather than tenure or tenancy, while legal and moralist documents are more likely to be concerned with the latter.

Examples of the *field-manual* approach are easily found. Indeed, for farm management technicians, agronomists, and similar support personnel, documents of this kind serve as omnipresent references and indispensable guides to competence in the rice-growing process. The norms throughout are technical, not legal or moral, and the goal is generally higher and more profitable production. A notably attractive example of such a publication is K. E. Mueller's *Field problems of tropical rice* (Los Baños, Laguna: International Rice Research Institute, 1970).

The *legal* approach characterizes above all the codes, laws, and acts which relate to Philippine agriculture in general and to rice farming in particular. The Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (R.A. 6389) is the most recent in a series of these documents and is referred to frequently throughout this volume. Yet this viewpoint is found outside the legal text and commentary. It is favored as well by apologists for the government's efforts in agrarian reform: their narrations of what this department, that bureau, or some office or other is doing for the farmer often turn out to be, on closer examination, descriptions of what these entities are by law *supposed to do* for the farmer.

The *moralist* approach is equally normative, but here the offender is declared, not an incompetent or a scoff-law, but a wicked human being. Churchmen are especially prone to this viewpoint, as one might expect, but they are frequently outclassed by zealous laymen. As a group (there are exceptions), moralists tend to be high on indignation, low on facts.

*Empirical.* There are another three approaches that emphasize the empirical rather than the normative: the field study, the evaluation, and the history. All aim to report matters as they are, the

evaluation adding to its empirical review a normative judgment, the historical approach being unique in that it is by definition comparative rather than descriptive.

The *field-study* approach, frequently embodied in a survey, is basically empirical and generally descriptive. When normative statements are found in studies of this kind they are those of the study's informants or respondents and not the author's. For examples of descriptive surveys (of farming practices or socioeconomic conditions) the reader is referred to the *Philippine Agriculturist*, published by the University of the Philippines College of Agriculture, or to the selections from Lewis' *Ilocano rice farmers* reprinted in this volume.

The *evaluative* approach ideally starts with a careful description of the facts of a situation (in tenure, production, or tenancy), then introduces norms for assessment; finally, a judgment is made. Where the production sector is under review, these norms will tend to be technical; where tenure or tenancy is the subject, legal or even moral standards will be invoked. The so-called Hardie report (the summary of which is reproduced in pp. 243-46 of this volume) is an example of this approach.

The *historical* approach looks at one or more sectors of the rice-farming structure over a period of time, generally with a view to tracing continuity or noting change. As in the field-study approach the author will ideally avoid normative statements except insofar as he reports those of others. Pelzer's *Pioneer settlement in the Asiatic tropics* (1945) incorporates this approach among others.

*Summary.* What we have said about approaches in the preceding paragraphs can be summarized in tabular form (Table 1). It should be noted that the entries in the subject-matter and viewpoint columns of the table may express either absolute characteristics (set in small capital letters) or general tendencies (set in italics).

*Table 1*  
Subject matter and viewpoints characteristic of six common  
approaches to the study of rice farming

Approach	Subject matter <sup>1</sup>	Characteristic viewpoints <sup>1</sup>		
		Normative/ empirical	Moral/ technical	Descriptive/ comparative
<b>A. Normative</b>				
1. Field-manual	<i>Production</i>	NORMATIVE	TECHNICAL	<i>Descriptive</i>
2. Legal	<i>Tenure/tenancy</i>	NORMATIVE	LEGAL/MORAL	<i>Descriptive</i>
3. Moralist	<i>Tenure/tenancy</i>	NORMATIVE	MORAL	<i>Descriptive</i>
<b>B. Empirical</b>				
1. Field-study	<i>Production</i>	EMPIRICAL	<i>Technical</i>	<i>Descriptive</i>
2. Evaluative	<i>Prod/ten/ten</i>	EMP + NORM	<i>Tech/moral</i>	<i>Comparative</i>
3. Historical	<i>Tenure/tenancy</i>	EMPIRICAL	<i>Tech/moral</i>	COMPARATIVE

<sup>1</sup>In the subject-matter and viewpoints columns entries in *italics* are to be taken as observed tendencies; entries in small capital letters as invariable, or absolute, characteristics of the approach. The slant line (/), as in "Tenure/tenancy," is to be read as "or"; in the example given, "Tenure or tenancy."

## RELUCTANT REBELS: LEASEHOLD CONVERTS IN NUEVA ECIIJA

ROMANA PAHILANGA-DE LOS REYES and FRANK LYNCH

June 1, 1972

The article reports on a 1971 study of 1,010 randomly selected rice-farm operators of Nueva Ecija — owners, lessees, and share tenants — and 73 landlords of the same province. Findings lead to several conclusions, among them the proposition that share tenants are more often attracted to leasehold status for positive than negative, or escapist, reasons. Under the present rule of law, moreover, land reform is unlikely to succeed without the widespread cooperation of landlords.

Especially since July 1, 1970, Nueva Ecija has received an extraordinary amount of attention from a great number of government agencies, the aim being to make of this province a show-case of the land-reform program. One reason behind this concentrated effort is the realization that land-reform efforts in the Philippines have a poor record at best, and a resounding success — at almost any cost — is a psychological necessity. Another moving consideration is the expectation that if one province is given extensive and intensive attention, the likelihood is great that effective procedures will be discovered applicable to a variety of conditions found in other provinces as well.

### HISTORY OF THE STUDY

In the month of June 1970, Lewis Gleeck, USAID consultant, had several informal discussions with Frank Lynch, resident consultant of the Institute of Philippine Culture. The context in which they spoke was the imminent inauguration of the two-year Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP). Aware that the NELRIDP was scheduled to begin at the beginning of the following month, they talked above all about the desirability of instituting a companion program of social-science research in Nueva Ecija as soon as possible. More particularly, they concluded that where there was such great interest in the effective promotion

of land reform, and where large-scale investments were soon to be made, it seemed reasonable to do two things: (a) establish the baseline conditions which obtained when the major investment process began; and (b) seek guidance for the most effective management of this investment. By July 6, 1970, after discussion with a number of government people engaged in the Nueva Ecija program, Fr. Lynch drew up a brief proposal for the consideration of the local USAID office.

The goals of the research proposed in this three-page statement were two, and they paralleled the two goals decided upon in the discussion with Mr. Gleeck. Proceeding further, Fr. Lynch explained that the understanding sought in the research would not rely merely on hard data such as that already gathered in Nueva Ecija by personnel of the National Land Reform Council (NLRC) and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon). Though these items were of course seen as essential, the proposal was for an examination as well of those aspects of living and working which had equally important, perhaps paramount, roles to play in the farmer's response to the government's drive for equity and increased production. Mentioned were such variables as the mutual expectations had for one another, for example, by landlords, lessees, share tenants, farmer leaders, government officials, and extension workers; attitudes toward tenure and security; aptitude for management

and planning (among future leaseholders); psychological components of "bossism" and dependence; how the social-class system functioned, its benefits and disadvantages, and how it was perceived by those within it; the different types of farmers, landlords, and tenants; the life-goals and felt needs of these various kinds of farmers; the role in their lives (and production goals) of kingsmen and others who sought to share their surplus; the *meaning* of surplus, and the meaning — in the concrete — of the good life.

The USAID, while expressing interest in the project, had no funds readily available to undertake it at the time for which it was proposed, namely, October 1970 onwards. At Mr. Gleck's initiative, a series of discussions followed, involving members of the Agricultural Plans and Programs Office and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon), both of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the local office of the Ford Foundation, and the Institute of Philippine Culture. As a result of these conversations, an agreement was signed on October 1, 1970, between the Agricultural Plans and Programs Office (represented by the BAEcon) and the Institute of Philippine Culture. By the terms of this agreement the BAEcon was to gather and process certain preliminary information for the IPC during the October 1970 round of the BAEcon's Integrated Agricultural Surveys in Nueva Ecija. The IPC in turn agreed to analyze these processed data in order (a) to determine what variables should be used to draw a sample of 1,000 farmers to be interviewed by the IPC at length, and (b) to actually draw this sample. Further, the IPC agreed to analyze important previous studies of Nueva Ecija rice farmers. These tasks, taken together, comprised the activities known as Phase One of the project.

The first step was to specify for BAEcon the information we needed regarding each of the respondents the BAEcon would interview in its October 1970 round. These specifications were transformed by BAEcon into a brief supplementary interview schedule to be added to the regular schedule used by BAEcon field personnel. BAEcon presented the completed schedules, numbering 1,329 in all, to the IPC on November 2, 1970. The IPC in turn studied the schedules,

eliminating a number of them for various reasons, ultimately arriving at a sample of 1,195 rice farmers.<sup>1</sup> The stage was set for Phases Two and Three.

Phase Two, the interviewing of nonlandlord rice-farm operators began January 17, 1971, when the senior author and project director, Mrs. de los Reyes, went to Cabanatuan City with copies of the English, Tagalog, and Iloko interview schedules to be used in the survey. Interviewing began a few days after that and continued for a period of five weeks. While data from Phase Two were still being analyzed, Phase Three, the interviewing of landlords, was begun. The interviewing was begun and completed in the month of July 1971.

Phase Four included the final analysis of the data derived from the earlier steps of the research and the preparation of this report. This occupied the months of August and September. A preliminary summary of findings was submitted on September 30, 1971, and the final report, a month later. The present paper is a revision of the latter document.

Contained in this essay are sections on the history of the study, the way in which it was done, its limitations, the findings that emerged, and the conclusions and recommendations that seem indicated by these data. In the three appendices that follow (A-C) are a list of the barrios included in the research, the names of the project staff, and tables to accompany the text of the article.

## DOING THE SURVEY


### *Sampling Procedures*

*Rice-farmer sample.* This study utilized the sampling frame which the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon) had developed and was using for its agricultural surveys of Nueva Ecija, namely, a 10 percent sample of the farming households in a 25 percent random sample of farming barrios (Table 1).<sup>2</sup> At first we proposed to stratify the sample further by tenure and productivity. But analysis of the BAEcon respondents' tenure status, area of farm harvested, and productivity for the 1969 wet and dry

cropping seasons indicated that the average Nueva Ecija farmer, regardless of tenure status, tended to harvest the same area of land and to get the same yield per hectare.<sup>8</sup> Our sample therefore accepted and preserved the percentage

representation of the various categories found in BAEcon's October 1970 survey round (the last available data before we went into the field; Table 2).

*Landlord sample.* Experience gained in a sur-



vey of Negros Occidental sugarcane farms (Lynch 1970a, 1970b) indicated that any study of landlord-tenant relations should be approached from both sides, independently; that is, one should interview both the landlord and his worker or tenant, but on different occasions and in distinct sites. Such a procedure improves one's chances of getting a relatively unclouded picture of the interpersonal aspects of the industry under study. For this reason, we decided to interview in depth a randomly selected sample of our Nueva Ecija respondents' landlords. Though we would like to have spoken with more of them, pressures of time limited us to just 75, selected as follows.

When those members of the farm-operator sample who were share tenants or lessees were interviewed, they were asked to name their landlords. Although not all of them remembered the complete names of their landlords, 888 farmers gave us the names of their landlords as they knew them. Only five refused to reveal who their landlords were.

A series of checks with the Nueva Ecija Provincial Assessor's Office and the Land Reform Project Team Offices revealed that some of the tenant respondents had named the wives, sons, and administrators of their landlords.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, earlier tabulation had also revealed that a number of the tenant respondents had the same landlords. The final list of landlords was 798. Of these, only 354 could be identified in terms of area of rice lands and total number of tenants.

The basic hypothesis in studying landlords was that there would be a significant difference between landlords who had share tenants and those who had lessees. However, some landlords had both lessees and share tenants. Since only 25 landlords out of 798 were in this category, these landlords were randomly assigned to one or the other category. Fifty-five percent of the 798 landlords turned out to be share landlords; the remaining 45 percent, lessee landlords. When the 354 fully identified landlords were classified, 59 percent were found to be share landlords and 41 percent were lessee landlords. Because of the small difference in tenure percentages between landlords for whom data were known and the

original population, the sample of 75 was drawn using the percentage found in the population, as is shown in the accompanying table.

Type of landlord	Population		Landlord with data		Sample	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Share	442	55%	208	59%	41	55%
Lessee	456	45	146	41	34	45
TOTAL	798	100%	354	100%	75	100%

The 354 landlords whose total riceland area were known were further classified using the following categories: very small area (5 has. and below); small area (5.1 to 39.9 has.); medium area (40.0 has. to 99.9 has.); and large area (100 has. and above).<sup>5</sup> The sample landlord respondents (41 share and 34 lessee) were then drawn, preserving the percentage representation of landlords in each of these categories (Table 3).

#### Field Procedures

Interviewing with respondents occurred in two separate field periods. During both Cabanatuan City was used as the operations base.<sup>6</sup>

*Interviewing of non-landlord rice farmers.* A structured interview schedule was used, its administration generally requiring from one to one-and-one-half hours. Language used was the respondent's mother tongue (Iloko or Tagalog).

For purposes of the fieldwork the province was divided into four sections, each section assigned to a five-man team, a team leader and four interviewers. The night before a team left for the field, the team leader had to prepare the following:

1. A list of names (with tenure status) of farmer respondents assigned to each member of his team;
2. The proper number of interview schedules of each kind expected to be used the following day; and
3. The expected route of the jeep assigned to the team.

The average work day called for the teams leaving Cabanatuan City at an hour which the team leaders reckoned would enable their groups to reach the day's sample barrios early enough in the morning to catch the farmer respondents before they had left their homes. If a farmer respondent was already in the field on the team's arrival (common enough among those who had a second rice cropping and/or *bakod* — vegetable plots), the interviewer had to walk to the field to contact the respondent.

There were times, of course, when the respondent's house could not be reached by the jeep, and here too the interviewer had to walk to reach the farmer's house. In several cases, the interviewers had to walk one to five kilometers (in two instances, about six kilometers back and forth) to contact a respondent. The team leader usually accompanied interviewers, especially girls, when they had to walk long distances. The following is a brief description of the typical work day.

*Morning and afternoon (in the field).* Each interviewer started by trying to locate and interview one of the two or three farmers assigned to him for the day. If the first one could be found, he would interview him and then try for the next respondent. If not, he would try his luck with one of the other two possibilities. If the interviewer finished his quota in the morning, he spent the afternoon translating unfamiliar replies into English and editing the completed interviews. However, if he had failed to locate his second respondent in the morning, he spent the late morning translating and editing the first interview, hoping to interview the second respondent after lunch.

Since each field interviewer was required to interview two respondents in one day, it was the team leader's responsibility to see to it that the available respondents in a sample barrio were properly distributed among the interviewers. After each interviewer had met the requirement for the day, the team leader could still assign an interviewer to interview the other respondents available in the barrio which the team was visiting that day. Although a third interview meant additional pay for him and the leader, the average interviewer usually preferred not to take on the extra respondent — even when a sample farmer was available. In fact, we had interviewers who *refused* to conduct a third interview, since to do so meant staying late that evening, working in the office after the team had returned from the field, doing the third job of translating and editing.

*Evening (in the office).* When a team returned from the field late in the afternoon or in the evening, the team leader edited the interviews completed that day by the members of his team. Sometimes, he had already edited some of the interviews in the field. However, this

was impossible on days when one of his interviewers was absent, because the team leader then generally interviewed so as to complete the team's daily requirement of eight interviews.

The project director and one research assistant also read the completed interviews before the responses were analyzed. In general, therefore, the field staff worked more than eight hours daily.<sup>7</sup>

Except for the barrios in Gabaldon and Carranglan, all sample barrios were reached by daily trips from Cabanatuan City. Because of the distance from Cabanatuan City of these two towns, the teams assigned to them had to spend two nights there.<sup>8</sup>

As a whole, the field operations went smoothly. But we were not able to contact 102 regular respondents, for reasons outlined in Table 4.

*Interviewing of landlords.* The landlord respondents were interviewed throughout the month of July 1971. IPC research associate Normando de Leon, together with one part-time and two full-time research assistants from Nueva Ecija, assisted the authors in this, the Third Phase.<sup>9</sup> All had interviewed rice farmers during the January-March fieldwork, and were knowledgeable about conditions in Nueva Ecija. These four assistants contacted all landlord respondents who were residing in Nueva Ecija. Another research assistant was hired to interview landlords who lived in the Greater Manila area.

In contacting a landlord respondent, the research assistants carried a letter explaining the purpose of the study. The letter of introduction was necessary in the Greater Manila area, but in Nueva Ecija the landlords readily agreed to be interviewed when we explained that we were "conducting a research." In several instances, in fact, the interview had been completed before the interviewer gave the letter to the landlord. Nor were the landlords dismayed by the formal trappings of the interview, as they reportedly were elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> We freely and openly used a printed interview guide and wrote down responses in the presence of respondents. Some respondents even asked the interviewers if everything they said had been written down, to make sure that it had been.

The depth interviewing of landlords was completed in two sessions. The first session, which

lasted from two to 2½ hours, was concerned with the topics outlined in the interview guide. After it, the project director and a research associate went over the recorded replies. Responses that were not clear were marked, along with those opinions of the landlords that needed further clarification. They were examined more closely during the second session, but only after the respondent had been given a 30-minute Thematic Apperception Test in which we probed for certain psychological dimensions which we hypothesized might be related to a positive or negative attitude toward conversion of share tenants to leasehold status.<sup>11</sup>

We sought substitutes for 16 regular landlord respondents for the following reasons: outright refusal, 2; no time for interview (Manila residents), 2; out of town (one is abroad and the others live in various provinces, 6; difficult to reach because of bad roads, 4; and had moved from last known address, 2.

#### LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The survey technique, by means of which most data were gathered in this study, has been criticized as leading to shallow, superficial findings. The main criticism against it is that a brief, one or two hours' encounter between an interviewer and a respondent does not permit the questioner, assuming he is a stranger, to gain the respondent's confidence. Aware of this limitation, we made sure that the questions included in the structured interview schedule were phrased and presented in such a way that they rarely asked information that could possibly embarrass or compromise the respondent. Our schedules underwent a series of revisions, first after we received comments from several persons whom we consulted in the matter, and again after the pretests had been conducted in Nueva Ecija.

While the survey technique was the principal procedure for gathering data, it was supported by other approaches. We interviewed in depth 73 landlords and numerous informants who were knowledgeable about conditions in Nueva Ecija — from government officials to barrio captains and perceptive farmers. Besides, the project

director visited Nueva Ecija continually from October 1969 to July 1971, living and staying in Cabanatuan City for about three months of this period. She also made trips to several barrios of all municipalities except Carranglan, each time gaining additional understanding of conditions in the province, not only through personal observation but also from conversations with different people during these trips.

Like any statement prepared so soon after the fieldwork was completed, this one does not exhaust the possibilities of the data which were gathered. For instance, we are sure that we will learn a great deal more about the landlords in our sample when we crosstabulate their characteristics and replies by the size of the farms they own. Again, it is likely that the classification of farm operators (owners, share tenants, and lessees) by the two major variables that the BAEcon used in deriving its sample will also yield important new information. A third possibility is a consideration of rice-farmer respondents by barrio of residence — there may be regional differences which have escaped us in this study. It is not the IPC's intention or ours to let these possible modes of analysis remain untried. They will be incorporated in a comparative study of rice and sugar farming to be published in the near future.

#### FINDINGS

##### *The Sample Actually Interviewed*

*Rice-farmer sample.* The original plan had been to interview 1,000 rice farmers. However, we actually interviewed 1,028. The circumstances that led to our interviewing the extra respondents are worth reporting.

The operating procedure we adopted in the location of farmer respondents was one commonly used in surveys of this kind. If, after three tries, a team could not locate or make a successful appointment with a regular respondent, the project director would approve his replacement with a substitute respondent, a number of whom had been randomly chosen at the same time the 1,000 regulars were selected. However, after the substitute had been found and interviewed, it



occasionally happened that the regular respondent then appeared and expected to be interviewed. It would have been indelicate to do anything but interview this latecomer. This was the first source of extra respondents.

A second source was a misunderstanding in the first few days of the surveys. Before the actual fieldwork began, a respondent log book was prepared for each of the four teams. All respondents assigned to the team were listed in the log book, each respondent marked as *R* or *S*, i.e., regular or substitute. At the start of the fieldwork, however, the project director failed to instruct the team leaders regarding this code. Since she was preoccupied with trips to the field, observing how the field staff conducted their daily interviews, and editing the completed schedules in the evening, it was not until the fourth day that she noticed that the four teams had completed 10 interviews of substitute respondents.

By March 1, 1971, we had completed 1,028 interviews. However, 18 were disqualified for various reasons. One respondent, listed as a farm operator, reported he was actually a paid laborer of the farm; five were classified poor interviews because of a language barrier, i.e., the interviewer was Tagalog-speaking while the respondent's native tongue was Iloko; four were extra substitute-respondents interviewed by mistake; two who were interviewed were not actually the operating-farmers, but the wife and son of the farmer; there were also six poorly conducted interviews (inconsistent dates occurred in the farming history of respondents). The resulting sample of 1,010 preserves the original percentage of households in each of the categories used by BAEcon sampling variables. Hence, our analysis considers the responses of 1,010 rice farmers.

The final sample is 6 percent of the farming households in 24 percent of the farming barrios. By our estimate, then, there are in Nueva Ecija a total of about 70,800 rice farmers, classified as follows: 8,200 owner-cultivators (12 percent), 28,900 lessees (41 percent), 26,100 share tenants (37 percent), 4,800 part-owners (7 percent), and 2,800 lessee-share tenants (LSTs; 4 percent).<sup>12</sup>

*Landlord sample.* Our time table required that we complete interviewing of landlords in a month's time. Since our fieldwork was done in the month of July, the beginning of the rainy season, operations were hampered by rainy days and muddy roads. Moreover, most of the landlords living in the province were in their fields the whole day — supervising the transplanting or other farm work of the tenants. We were able to contact 73 out of the planned 75 landlords.

A slight problem arose when we compared each landlord's self-identification with the earlier categorization furnished by his lessee(s) or share tenant(s). The discrepancy is best seen in tabular form.

Landlord category	According to tenant		According to landlord	
	N	%	N	%
Share	46	63%	34	46%
Lessee	27	37	18	27
Lessee-share	0	0	21	27
TOTAL	73	100%	73	100%

Our solution to this problem was to create a third category of landlord, namely the "lessee-share landlord," or LSL. This is a landlord who reports having both share tenants and lessees. The other two kinds of landlord remain the share landlord and the lessee landlord.

### Background Characteristics

#### Rice farmers

*Demographic variables.* The rice-farmer respondents can be described in modal terms as male, married, and Catholic. When the ages of the different tenure groups are compared, the owner-operators emerge as the oldest group, their median age being 50 years. The median age of the other groups are these: share tenants, 40 years; lessees, 43 years; part-owners, 41 years; and lessee-share tenants, or LSTs, 42 years.

*Educational attainment.* Fewer than two out of 5 (38 percent) of the rice-farmer respondents have finished elementary school, but there are differences by tenure status. Five out of 10

(52 and 49 percent) owners and part-owners have completed grade six, while only three out of 10 lessees, LSTs, and share tenants have done so. The median educational attainment of owner-operators and part-owners is grade six; of share tenants, grade five; and of lessees and LSTs, grade four.

*Housing facilities.* In general, owner-operators appear to have better housing and housing facilities than lessees and share tenants. While only one out of 10 tenants (whether lessee or share) has a house made of concrete materials, four out of 10 owner-operators have these durably built homes. Owner-operators also tend to have larger houses and house lots than others do (Table 5). Moreover, while the respondent's most common fuels for lighting and cooking, respectively, are kerosene and wood, 14 percent of owner-operators report that they have electric power and 5 percent say they use gas.

If we compare lessees and share tenants, we find that lessees tend to be better off. More than half of the lessees (54 percent) have houses made of mixed (light and strong combined) construction materials, while most of the share tenants have houses made of light (45 percent) or mixed materials (42 percent).

Our study includes two general indicators of health and sanitation, namely, the reported source of water supply and type of toilet facilities. Nine out of 10 rice farmers have a private force pump installed in their homes. Only 3 percent use a public artesian well, while fewer draw water from a spring, or from an open well. Two-thirds of the respondents have open-pit toilets. Of the remaining, 15 percent have water-sealed (Antipolo) toilets, 6 percent have flush systems, and 1 percent uses a public toilet. One out of 10 respondents reports that he has no toilet facilities at all.

*Residence and farming history.* Rice-farmer respondents come from farming families — nine out of 10 report that their father was also a rice farmer. Most have also spent a large part of their lives living in the barrio where they presently reside. Thirty-nine percent have lived in the same barrio since birth, and another 9 percent moved into the present barrio with their parents

before the age of 12 years. Of those whose families settled in the barrio after they were 12 years old, 38 percent have lived there for more than 10 years and 8 percent for more than five years. Briefly, it is a safe generalization that rice farmers of Nueva Ecija are deeply entrenched in farming as a means of livelihood and have very low mobility in terms of residence.

By another indicator of mobility, number of different farms cultivated, owner-operators are less mobile than the tenants on two scores. That is, owner-operators tend, significantly more than lessees and share tenants, to continue farming parcels of land which their grandparents and parents (29 vs. 5 and 6 percent; 0.001), or relatives (30 vs. 19 and 24 percent; 0.05) worked before them.<sup>13</sup> By contrast, more than two-thirds of the lessees and share tenants are currently farming land which neither their parents nor grandparents tilled in the past.

If we compare how share tenants and lessees move from one parcel of land to another, we find that share tenants tend, significantly more than lessees (45 vs. 34 percent; 0.001), to have cultivated farms other than the parcels they are currently tilling. While the average share tenant has farmed his present land for 14 years, the corresponding figure for lessees is 17 years; the average lessee spent the first 13 of these years as a share tenant and became a lessee only within the last four, as a consequence of the land-reform program in Nueva Ecija.<sup>14</sup>

Lessees and share tenants give as reasons behind their moving from one farm to another the same list of explanations, and in substantially the same order of frequency (significant at the 0.001 level by the Spearman rank correlation test). The reason most often mentioned by tenants is a break-down in the good relations they had with their landlords. Second was the great distance between the farms and the residences. Third, the farms' low productivity, usually traced to deficiencies in the soil. Other reasons given are these: the landlord sold, or mortgaged the farm; the farm was too small; tenant sold his *powesto*, or right to farm, or gave it to a relative; tenant lost his carabao or palay; and last, tenant had to move because of the war (World War II).

### Landlords

*Demographic variables.* An average landlord is male (although 25 percent are females), married, Catholic, and about 57 years of age, some 15 years older than the average tenant.

*Educational attainment.* Almost all landlords attended Philippine schools; only two reported having gone abroad for schooling. Share landlords have a lower median educational attainment than lessee and lessee-share landlords (junior high school vs. senior and junior college, respectively).

*Indicators of social status.* More than share landlords, lessee and lessee-share landlords tend to have visited Baguio (64 vs. 83 and 86 percent; 0.01); Hongkong (0 vs. 28 and 26 percent; 0.01); Tokyo (0 vs. 28 and 26 percent; 0.001); Europe (0 vs. 17 and 21 percent; 0.01); and the United States or Canada (0 vs. 22 and 21 percent; 0.01).

More than share landlords, lessee and lessee-share landlords tend to have more than one residence (15 vs. 50 and 67 percent; 0.01). Lessee and lessee-share landlords also tend more than share landlords to own at least one passenger vehicle (71 and 76 vs. 29 percent; 0.001). It should be noted, however, that half of those who own private vehicles have only one jeep, generally a war-surplus item.

*Mass-media exposure.* Almost all landlords listen to the radio every day. But more than share landlords, lessee and lessee-share landlords tend to read a newspaper daily (29 vs. 72 and 62 percent; 0.02); to watch television every day (21 vs. 61 and 38 percent; 0.05); and to read a magazine at least once a week (45 vs. 78 and 80 percent; 0.05). However, while lessee landlords tend to read a newspaper and watch TV daily, lessee-share landlords report reading a newspaper twice or three times a week, and watching television three to five times a week.

*Involvement in politics.* Only about a fifth (19 percent) of the landlords is politically inclined. Thirty-five percent of lessee landlords, 15 percent of share landlords, and 14 percent of lessee-share landlords have run for public office. And of those who campaigned for public office, about two-thirds (64 percent) were elected.

Only about half of the landlords state that they have relatives who have held public office. Most of the positions are at the local level, the kinsmen of only four of the 73 landlords having held elective offices at the national level. When asked if they have actively supported political candidates, only three out of 10 report that they have, referring in particular to personal participation in the candidate's campaign or the contributing of money to his campaign fund.

### Landlord's Holdings and Farming Agreements

*Area of rice land owned.* Hectares of rice land owned by share landlords range from one-half to 100 has.; by lessee landlords, from 12 to 330 has.; and by lessee-share landlords, from 11 to 2,300 has. The median area of land owned by share landlords is about 10 has. (9.5), of lessee and lessee-share landlords about 38 has. (38.7 and 38.1, respectively).

*Fragmentation of rice-land holdings.* All three kinds of landlord have rice lands situated in different locations — the range is from one to 10 parcels. The median number of parcels, or locations, of rice lands owned by share and lessee landlords is three, by lessee-share landlords, four.

*Date and manner of acquisition.* About two-thirds (64 percent) of these parcels were acquired after World War II, and about a fourth of these post-war acquisitions were made only recently — in 1964, after the promulgation of the 1963 land-reform code. One-fourth of all landlords (share, 21 percent; lessee, 39 percent; and lessee-share, 19 percent) report having inherited all the rice lands they own. About two out of five (36 percent) own rice lands, portions of which were bought and other portions inherited. The same proportion of landlords reports that they bought all their rice lands (but while 41 and 48 percent of share and lessee-share landlords bought their land, only 28 percent of lessee landlords did so).

Four out of five landlords who bought lands used their savings or earnings. Only one out of five bought lands with a bank loan added to his savings. Other financial sources reported by landlords in buying rice lands are a pension, back-pay, and the sale of other properties.

Our data further show that once landlords own a piece of land, they seldom part with it. Only about one-fifth (18 percent) report having sold a parcel of land, the rest declaring that they have not sold any portion of their holdings. The reasons given for selling are that the land was inaccessible, or that capital was needed to buy another piece of land judged to be more productive, to pay debts, or to meet critical family needs.

*Types of ownership.* Half of all landlords report their rice land as conjugal property, but another fourth (23 percent) say they own it themselves (individual ownership). Other than an additional 8 percent who state the land to be communal property, the rest describe their rice lands as held under a combination of individual and conjugal ownership, or of conjugal and communal ownership.

*Number of tenants.* Tenants of share landlords range from one to 15 persons; of lessee landlords, from five to 61; and of LSLs, from four to 154. The median number of tenants under share landlords is 4.1; under lessee landlords, 14.2; under LSLs, 13.7.

*Kinds of farming agreements.* With one exception, respondents with share tenants report that they make the same agreement with all these tenants; that is, the same sharing arrangement and other specifications of mutual assistance are offered to everyone who works for them as a tenant. Landlords differ among themselves, however, in the arrangements which they adopt as their own. Differences in the matter of loans, food allowances (or ration), and participation in farming costs vary according to the agreed-upon share which landlord and tenant will have in the anticipated harvest. These agreements are generally expressed in percentage ratios, and vary in frequency as shown in the table at the head of the next column.

Agreements between landlords and lessees, which concern above all the rental fee to be paid by the leaseholder, are generally expressed in a written contract: seven out of 10 lessee landlords and six out of 10 LSLs use such documents for all their lessees. It is, after all, a requirement of the law, they explain. Besides,

Landlord-tenant division of harvest	Percentage of land- lords who say they use this ratio	
	Share	Lessee-share
50:50	67%	55%
45:55	19	25
40:60	3	5
25:75	0	5
No data	12	10
No. of landlords	32	20

it protects the landlord against the lessee's non-compliance, and, in turn, gives the lessee the evidence he needs to apply for a government loan.

The balance of lessee landlords and LSLs (29 and 35 percent) use a written contract for some of their lessees and an oral agreement for others. In defense of the verbal contract they say that they are on such good terms with their tenants that no written, legalistic forms are required as evidence of good faith — some lessees even refuse to sign documents of this kind. Again, they state that the very smallness of some rice lands make a written agreement in their regard seem ludicrous.

#### *How Landlords and Tenants View One Another*

Since landlords, tenants, and (where they are found) overseers are the basic components of the team that runs most farms in Nueva Ecija, it is important to understand what they expect of one another, and how highly they rate one another's performance. From this information, as well as from their complaints about deficiencies in their own and others' behavior, we can hope to learn more than a little about what it takes to be a successful landlord, overseer, share tenant, or lessee.

#### *Procedure*

Speaking more formally, we shall be dealing with *role expectations* for the best possible landlord, overseer, or tenant, then with *ratings* given the average such person known to the respondent and, finally, with the *reasons for the failure* of these persons to attain the respondent's ideal.

*Role expectations.* Respondents are at different points in the interview asked to describe in their own words, and without restriction, the qualities they associate with the "best possible" landlord, share tenant, and so on. The number of analytically distinct qualities which are discovered when creating the code to be used for these replies will vary from status to status: for landlord, for instance, we distinguished 12 of them; for share tenant and lessee, 17.

However, when we wished to judge to what extent raters belonging to one group agreed among themselves or with those of another group regarding these expectations, we had to consider only those qualities which occurred in the replies of *all* the groups being compared. This is so because what we compared was the *ranking* which each group gave to various qualities; hence each group must have given a rank to *every* quality in the set that is being used for the comparison. For the expectations of an ideal landlord, for example, we chose eight expectations and ranked them: the one mentioned most frequently was ranked first, the one mentioned next most often, second, and so on.

The rationale behind this ranking operation is twofold: (a) high frequency of mention is assumed to reveal saliency in thoughts and desires; and (b) agreement in ranking is assumed to signify shared norms. Using these rankings, we are then able to judge whether or not various respondents have the same standards for the performance of a particular role. We can apply this test to any two groups of respondents, e.g., to farmers belonging to different tenure groups, or to landlords and tenants.

Our discussion will focus on the agreement or disagreement found in this regard among the three types of landlord (share, lessee, and lessee-share), between landlords and tenants, and among the three major rice-farmer tenure groups, namely, owner-operators, lessees, and share tenants. Any significant similarities or differences among these groups are basic to our interest in locating points of consensus and variance in the expectations, opinions, and attitudes existing among them. When these points have been identified, we shall have an added factual basis for dis-

cussing the relationships among these people whose common enterprise is rice farming. Moreover, we shall also know to what extent the actual relationships found among and between the members of this sample of farmers and landlords bears out or casts doubt on the assumptions implicit (and often explicit) in the position taken by officials promoting the land-reform and related programs.

*Ladder ratings.* To find out how landlords, overseers, and tenants regarded themselves and one another in view of the ideals they had expressed, we used the 11-point self-anchoring scale first developed by Hadley Cantril. This measure of esteem had previously been used by the IPC in interviews with over 5,000 rural Filipinos.

As Lynch has observed (1970a: 19-20) there are several ways in which one can interpret the ratings obtained by means of this instrument. The first is to compare the average or median rating given by one rating group to various rated groups, thus locating the *rated group* that received the highest and lowest mean or median rating. In this manner one can tell which rated group or groups are well or badly esteemed by a particular group of raters. Another way is to find which rating group rates a particular rated group high, and which group rates it low. This method will identify that *group of raters* which has high or low esteem for a given rated group.

The third way is to *rank* the average scores given by a rating group to the various groups they rated. Thus the group they gave the highest score to will be their number-one group, the next highest, their second-ranked group, and so on. Use of ranks instead of absolute scores enables one to more easily and validly compare the esteem felt by poorly educated respondents (who tend to give *higher* absolute ratings) with the esteem felt by well educated respondents (who tend to give *low* absolute ratings). With the added protection of this procedure, one can still make the two kinds of comparisons mentioned above, answering the questions (a) who *get* high or low ratings, and (b) who *give* high or low ratings.

*Common failings.* Every time a respondent rated the average member of some group as less

than 10, or perfect, he was asked to explain why he did so. Why, in other words, did he feel the average landlord, for instance, was not living up to the ideal which he (the respondent) had for him? Answers to this question led in each case to a list of the common failings of members of each group, as perceived by themselves or those of other groups. Agreement was tested for in the manner described above for role expectations.

#### *How the landlord is viewed*

*Role definition of the ideal landlord.* Rice-farmer respondents are in close agreement (0.001) in the expectations they have of a good landlord.<sup>15</sup> For all farmers, regardless of tenure, the most important quality of the best possible landlord is that he shares the farm expenses (Table 6). Second, this person is pleasant, cordial, soft-spoken, or *mabait at may pakikisama*. Next, he provides fringe benefits, which include free medicine and medical services, school facilities for tenants' children, free housing and house lot, food ration (*abasto*, or *bugnòs*, i.e., subsistence food allowance), pre-threshing allowance of rice, or *agad*, and other similar extras. He is also just in the interest charged on tenants' loans; specifically, our respondents want a landlord to charge low interest on their debts. The other expectations in the order of frequency of mention are these: a good sharing or lease agreement, i.e., a farming arrangement agreeable to both landlord and tenant, the terms of which are abided by; being law-abiding, that is, following the provisions of the land-reform code, specifically by allowing share tenants to become leaseholders; being willing to extend credit; and being solicitous, or helpful, which means always being willing to help tenants in any problem or difficulty that the latter may encounter.

When we compare the frequency with which farmers belonging to different tenure groups mention the selected expectations discussed above, owner-operators and share tenants show close agreement (0.05), but lessees disagree with both types of farmers.<sup>16</sup> We shall discuss these differences after a brief review of the goals of the land-reform code.

*Legal expectations for landlord and lessee.* The Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844) promises that lessees, in contrast to share tenants, will "achieve a dignified existence . . . free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices . . . to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens . . ." (Sec. 2). In terms of personality traits, it is implied that lessees, by that very status, will show less deference and dependence than they did as share tenants, while their landlords will manifest less compulsion to assist them. In simpler terms, the leasehold arrangement is supposed to make the tenant psychologically less subservient to, and less dependent on the bounty of, his landlord, and to make the landlord less concerned about "doing things for" this tenant.

The obligations of the lessees, as specified by the Land Reform Code (Sec. 26), concern his duties that relate to properly cultivating the land. Only on two or three occasions is the lessee obliged to contact the lessor, or landlord, namely, when a third party illegally trespasses on the farm, when the lessee informs the landlord of the date when harvesting and/or threshing will begin, and when he pays the lease rental.

For the lessor, the law specifies only two obligations: "(1) to keep the agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of his landholding; and (2) to keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at the start of the leasehold relation as irrigation and drainage systems and marketing allotments . . ." (Sec. 30).

*Lessee-share tenant differences on the ideal landlord.* Findings in this survey indicate that, as the provisions of the law implied they should be, lessees are indeed less concerned than share tenants about special consideration from their landlords. This is perhaps aptly illustrated by the fact that, whereas lessees rank the granting of fringe benefits seventh, share tenants place it second among the desirable qualities they want to find in a good landlord. Again, whereas the lessee is greatly concerned that the landlord be law-abiding (rank four), for share tenants this quality ranks eight. And while lessees place a

good farming arrangement in third place, share tenants mention it infrequently enough for it to be ranked sixth. Thus the rankings given by lessees to these three expectations suggest that the average lessee has a concept of the ideal landlord that agrees with the role as legally (R.A. 3844) defined for the lessee landlord.

Yet in *one* expectation (the sharing of farm expenses), lessees are much like the share tenants — they want the landlord to finance their farming. Now, that the landlord should shoulder part, if not all, of the farm expenses, particularly the transplanting costs, has always been the arrangement in *share tenancy*. This practice is in fact sanctioned by the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. 1199, Secs. 32–33). But when a tenant opts for *leasehold*, it is implied that he breaks this close tie with his landlord, abandoning in particular his right to loans and advances for farming expenses. The ideal lease system envisioned in the land-reform code supposes instead that a lessee, if he is a member of the local farmers' cooperative, can acquire production and subsistence loans from the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), which funds are (ideally) disbursed through local cooperatives. Why then do so many lessees still hope for loans from their landlords?

To begin with, many lessees are not members of local cooperatives, nor have they been able to get the loans they needed even when they were members.<sup>17</sup> Half of the lessees who report that they are currently indebted to others for loans related to farming expenses say they patronized private money lenders. Only two out of 10 lessees who are in debt state that they borrowed from either the ACA or the Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association (Facoma). In other words, many lessees hope to borrow from their landlords because they *need* this assistance and can get it nowhere else.

Other lessees who mention this expectation are probably *still receiving* loans of this kind. Contrary to the popular belief that landlords and lessees have no "special relationship," 61 percent of the landlord respondents who have lessees report that at least one of their lessees has asked to borrow money. Eight out of 10 of the

landlords so approached say that they have granted the loan, at least in part. Very few explain why they continue to lend money to their former share tenants and current lessees, except to say that they cannot refuse, and that they give loans and help their lessees in any way they can.

*Landlord-lessee differences on the ideal landlord.* As a group, landlords are in agreement (0.05) on the behavior of an ideal member of their group. But not all landlords agree with the tenants. While landlords and share tenants have closely similar definitions of the best possible landlord, lessee landlords and their tenants barely agree. Also, landlords (LSLs) who have both share tenants and lessees tend to disagree with both the share tenants' and the lessees' definitions of an ideal landlord (Table 7).

In contrast to the relatively universalistic, legal-minded position of the average lessee, their landlords give low rankings to both law-conscious conduct in tenure relations and to a good farming arrangement. Like other landlords, lessee landlords give a prominent place to paternalism when they define the ideal landlord. Yet when asked point blank if a landlord should provide a lessee with "extras" beyond the requirements of the law, seven out of 10 lessee landlords say they feel no obligation to do so (about eight out of 10 LSLs say the same) and five out of 10 (six out of 10 LSLs) are positively opposed to it.

Despite this ambiguity in matters of loans and other matters, however, lessee landlords are in fact now giving their lessees that enlarged role in the farming process which the latter are supposed by law to have. Consider these details.

1. *Choice of variety to plant.* More than lessee landlords, share and lessee-share landlords tend to decide alone (6 vs. 27 and 11 percent) or together with their tenants (12 vs. 35 and 47 percent) what variety of seed will be planted for the rice crop. Eight out of 10 lessee landlords leave the matter entirely in the hands of their lessees.
2. *Choice of fertilizer.* Again share tenants are allowed much less participation in fertilizer choice than lessees are. Share and lessee-share landlords, compared with lessee landlords, more often make the decision without consulting the tenant (33 and 16 vs. 7 percent), or in consultation with him (30 and 37 vs. 0 percent).

Nine out of 10 lessee landlords leave the choice to their tenants. Only two report they seek the advice of an agriculturist.

3. *Time of planting.* As a rule, landlords allow their tenants to decide when to plant.
4. *Harvest time.* Tenants, alone or in consultation with landlords, set the harvesting date.
5. *Second crop.* No lessee landlord reports deciding on the second crop, but about one-fourth of share landlords and one-sixth of LSLs do so.

In brief, then, lessee landlords give continual opportunities to their lessees to make those choices that are necessary in the rice-farming cycle. And this has become a part of the lessees' way of thinking about the landlord's role. This helps explain why lessees are less particularistic than share tenants in the expectations they express for the ideal landlord.

On the other hand, landlords of all kinds have more personalistic norms for their own behavior than tenants do, the degree of paternalism varying among them. One way of showing the variations that occur is a table which indicates general agreement or disagreement on the ranking of ideal qualities (with the level of significance added) and which of the two groups being compared scores higher in paternalistic expectations ("High P"). A matrix comparing the various kinds of landlords with share tenants and lessees might look like the following, it being understood that a wide variety of alternative illustrations would be equally acceptable.

Landlord	Share Tenant		Lessee	
	In general	High P*	In general	High P
Lessee-share (LSL)	Disagree (n.s.)	LSL	Disagree (0.05)	LSL
Share (SL)	Agree (0.05)	SL	Disagree (n.s.)	SL
Lessee (LL)	Disagree (n.s.)	LL	Agree (n.s.)	LL

\*Higher in paternalistic expectations

Share and lessee landlords are both in general agreement with their tenant opposite numbers, share landlords significantly so. But like LSLs, they are more paternalistic than both kinds of tenant. Further study of the text table above, along with related information not given here,

leads to the conclusion that, in terms of paternalistic tendencies the order of descending strength is not from share landlords to LSLs to lessee landlords, as one might expect, but from LSLs to share to lessee landlords. Hence the question: Why should LSLs emerge as more paternalistic than share landlords? While any answer must at this point be conjectural, allowing for alternative explanations both now and when more data become available, one likely explanation is this: landlords who have "lost" to lessee status as many as one half of their former share tenants (the LSLs have in fact lost this many) will tend to make increased efforts at paternalism in order to retain those share tenants they still have. Share landlords who have experienced no such threat will presumably feel no compulsion to step up, as it were, their fatherly concern to an equally high level.

*Landlords' common failings.* In the esteem ratings he received, the "average landlord" fared poorly, except when rated by landlords. The arithmetic means of the scores he received from various groups (on the 0-10 scale explained above), and the rank of those means among all those given by the rating groups to the groups they rated, are as follows.

Rater	Placement of average landlord	
	Av. score on 0-10 scale	Rank order
Share landlord	7.0 (31) <sup>a</sup>	1.5 (of 4) <sup>b</sup>
Lessee landlord	7.5 (14)	1 (of 4)
LSL	7.5 (19)	1 (of 4)
Owner-operator	7.3 (108)	3 (of 4)
Lessee	6.7 (402)	5 (of 5)
Share tenant	7.5 (356)	4.5 (of 5)

<sup>a</sup>Numbers in parentheses in this column are absolute frequencies of respondents who rated the average landlord.

<sup>b</sup>Others rated by landlords were the average overseer, lessee, and share tenant; by owner-operators, overseer, farm management technician (FMT), and leader of a farmers' organization; lessees and share tenants, each rated the average member of their own groups and those others rated by owner-operators.

From the rice farmers' viewpoint, the three most common failings of undesirable landlords are (a) asking unjust interest on tenants' loans, (b) being harsh and strict, and (c) offering undesirable contract terms. Owner-operators and



lessees, on the one hand, and lessees and share tenants, on the other, are in significant agreement on these failings (both at the 0.05 level). Owner-operators and share tenants disagree, however, the differences between them apparently being related to their immediate experience with the actual behavior of landlords. Share tenants rank fourth the landlord's failure to share farm expenses; owner-operators rank it a tie for seventh (7.5). Again, owner-operators report the landlord's unwillingness to give loans as his third most common failing, but share tenants consider this the average landlord's least often encountered deficiency (Table 8).

In general, landlord respondents tend to say very little about the common failings of undesirable members of their group or indeed of other groupings. To the 59 percent of them who specify some complaint about the average landlord, the most common failing mentioned is discourtesy and strictness in dealing with tenants. Second is the unwillingness to extend credit at all, or at reasonable rates. Unlike lessees and share tenants, who often speak of undesirable landlords as evaders of the land-reform code, landlords do not think of it as one of their serious offenses. In fact, only three of the landlord respondents feel that the average landlord evades the land-reform law (Table 9).

#### *How the tenant is viewed*

*Role definitions of the ideal lessee and share tenant.* The data indicate that lessees and share tenants define their roles in the same manner and even agree (0.05) on the rank order of the qualities they should have (Tables 10 and 11). Most frequently mentioned by lessees and share tenants as desirable for themselves are honesty, especially in fulfilling the obligations they have toward the landlord, and industriousness.<sup>18</sup>

Honesty demands above all that the good lessee or share tenant should report with accuracy the yield which he got from the land he is working for the landlord, because it is this harvest that becomes the basis for his payment to the landlord. To understate the harvest is to cheat the share landlord out of part of what is

due him. The common expression for this is to "steal" or "conceal" one's harvest (*magnanakaw o magtatagò ng sariling ani*).

In the case of lessees, this demand for honesty has special reference to prospective lessees, and to the requirement of the law regarding the fixing of the lease, or rental, fee. The law provides that, as a general rule, the lease of the land is to be a percentage (not to be more than 25 percent) of the "average normal harvest during the three agricultural years immediately preceding the date the leasehold was established after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling, and processing" (R.A. 3844, Sec. 34). When landlord and tenant cannot agree on the amount of rent, the case may be brought to the agrarian courts set up precisely for the adjustment of such differences. Honesty on the part of both can make this recourse unnecessary.

In addition to honesty and industriousness, courtesy to the landlord is another salient virtue. For share tenants it is in third place; for lessees, in fourth place. Technical know-how, which lessees put in third place, share tenants rank fifth. The tendency complementary to this, namely, accentuating dependency ("being a good subordinate") is ranked fourth by share tenants and seventh by lessees. Other qualities are seen in Tables 10 and 11.

*Landlord-tenant differences on the ideal tenant.* The expectations that share landlords have of share tenants may be compared with the expectations share tenants have of themselves. In the most highly ranked qualities, there is close agreement. Thus both are agreed that industriousness comes first, followed closely (in terms of absolute frequency of mention) by honesty in complying with the sharing agreement. In third place landlords place technical know-how, whereas tenants list courtesy to the landlord; for tenants technical know-how comes fifth. There is, in other words, solid agreement on the paramount importance of working hard and reporting the crop honestly. Beyond that, share landlords stress technical competence where their tenants think more of being courteous and deferential (Table 12).

Share landlords were also asked if they thought the ideal lessee should be like the ideal share tenant or different from him. The data indicate that 94 percent of share-landlord respondents (along with 76 percent of lessee landlords and 84 percent of LSLs) think that the best possible lessee should behave like, and possess the qualities of, the ideal share tenant. Only 16 percent of all landlord respondents expect the ideal lessee to be different from the ideal share tenant. Pursuing this question, those landlords who thought the two kinds of tenants should be different were asked what qualities the lessee should have that the share tenant need not possess. Other than expecting an ideal lessee to have his own capital to finance the farming operation, these landlords feel that the lessee should be just like a share tenant. However, they think he should be even more industrious and honest than the latter, because (slipping again into thoughts about the prospective lessee) they are conscious that the farm's rental fee will be based on the harvest reported by the tenant for the year's preceding the establishment of the leasehold.

*Tenants' common failings.* If landlords give high esteem to the average landlord, tenants are just slightly less kind to themselves. They rate only the average farm management technician (FMT) and farmers' leader better than the average number of their own group (lessee or share tenants). Also notable is the fact that, of the three kinds of landlords, only the LSLs rate lessees lower than share tenants. Average scores on the 11-point scale, with the ranks they merit within each rating group's set of scores, are seen in the table at the top of the next column.

Lessees and share tenants agree that dishonesty, especially in reporting the actual yield of the farm they are tilling, and laziness are their most frequent offenses. But they disagree on the weight of the other failings they report. While lessees rank second the problem of poverty, or lack of capital to meet farming expenses, share tenants consider this sixth in importance. Lessees also show relatively less concern about being bad subordinates to the landlord or unpleasant to other people in general (fifth and sixth places, respectively), failings which share tenants put in

Rater	Placement of average tenant			
	Av. score on 0-10 scale		Rank order	
	Share	Lessee	Share	Lessee
Share landlord	6.4 (32) <sup>a</sup>	7.0 (28)	4 (of 4) <sup>b</sup>	1.5
Lessee landlord	5.8 (14)	6.4 (18)	3 (of 4)	2
LSL	6.2 (20)	5.8 (19)	3 (of 4)	4
Lessee	-	8.7 (402)	-	2 (of 5)
Share tenant	8.4 (351)	-	2.5 (of 5)	-

<sup>a</sup>Numbers in parentheses in this column are absolute frequencies of respondents who rated the average lessee and/or share tenant.

<sup>b</sup>Others rated by landlords were the average landlord and overseer; by lessees, the average landlord, overseer, FMT, and farmers' leader; by share tenants, same as by lessees but substituting the average share tenant for the average lessee.

third and fourth places (Table 13). Landlords agree with tenants that laziness and dishonesty are the latter's most common failings. But they put next in order the having of bad habits such as excessive drinking or gambling, and being discourteous in words and actions.

#### *How the overseer is viewed*

*Role definition of the ideal overseer.* Regardless of tenure status, all rice-farmer respondents are in agreement (0.001 level) regarding what they expect of the ideal overseer, or *katiwala*. Above all, they expect him to be courteous, or *mabait*. Second, they think he should have the technical know-how needed for rice farming and be a competent farm manager, supervising the tenants' year-round activities on the farm, guarding the landlord's property and other interests, such as his share of the harvest, and performing other related tasks. Third, he is expected to be a good mediator. This is defined to include telling the landlord to lower the rate of interest on loans made to tenants, asking the landlord to comply with provisions of the Land Reform Code (especially by allowing share tenants to become lessees), and threshing out any disputes that might arise between landlord and tenants. Other qualities which respondents desire in the

ideal overseer, listed in the order of importance, are the following: being solicitous, or helpful; being a good subordinate to the landlord; being fair in his treatment of the tenants, that is, treating all tenants equally; and being honest with the landlord, specifically by not conniving with the tenants to steal from the landlord's share of the harvest (Table 14).<sup>19</sup>

Landlords have the same expectations of a good overseer as those reported by rice-farmer respondents above, but they differ in the importance they give to the various qualities. Landlords emphasize the overseer's honesty as most desirable, a trait ranked seventh by the rice farmers. Nevertheless, rice farmers agree with landlords that the second most important quality of the overseer is competence. Pleasantness in dealing with people, particularly with tenants, a quality that rice farmers rank first, landlords put in third place. What may be significant, given the nature of the overseer's role, is the fact that the mediating competence of the overseer, ranked third by rice farmers, is less salient in the thinking of landlords, where it is ranked in the fifth place (Table 15).

*Overseers' common failings.* The average overseer is nobody's hero, it seems. The LSL does well by him (second place among those rated by LSLs on the scale of esteem), but all other raters put him down.

Rater	Placement of average overseer	
	Av. score on 0-10 scale	Rank order
Share landlord	6.2 (27) <sup>a</sup>	3 (of 4) <sup>b</sup>
Lessee landlord	5.7 (15)	4 (of 4)
LSL	7.1 (19)	2 (of 4)
Owner-operator	7.1 (84)	4 (of 4)
Lessee	7.2 (341)	4 (of 5)
Share tenant	7.5 (234)	4.5 (of 5)

<sup>a</sup>Numbers in parentheses in this column are absolute frequencies of respondents who rated the average overseer.

<sup>b</sup>Others rated by landlords were the average landlord, lessee, and share tenant; by owner-operators, landlord, FMT, and farmers' leader; lessees and share tenants, each rated the average member of their own groups and those others rated by owner-operators.

Rice farmers are in solid agreement (0.001) that the strictness of overseers is their most un-

desirable trait. Landlords, however, consider this the least serious offense of overseers. But landlords and rice farmers agree that dishonesty is a serious defect of the imperfect overseer. A corrupt, or dishonest, overseer is said to steal either the landlord's or the tenant's share of the produce, accept bribes from tenants to whom, in return, he gives special treatment, or in general, try to enrich himself by misuse of his position. Landlords further complain about the incompetence of the average overseer, while tenants speak of unjust treatment they often suffer (Table 16).

#### *Rice Farmers and Formal Organizations*

In the section just concluded we made a passing mention of farm management Technicians (FMTs) and leaders of farmers' organizations. Here we will speak of them more at length, first describing to what extent Nueva Ecija rice farmers are aware of such formally organized assistance, then explaining their view and evaluation of them.

#### *Awareness of FMTs and organizations*

*Knowing an FMT.* A key factor in the farmer's transition from share tenant to lessee is the farm management Technician, or FMT.<sup>20</sup> His function is to assist those new lessees who need help in some aspect of running their farms under the new arrangement (R.A. 3844, Sec. 124). He furnishes, as it were, a temporary continuation of the landlord's role, but his job is to lead the lessee gradually to the status of an independent owner-operator who is capable of handling all regular farm business — including applications for credit — by himself.

Although about 95 percent of the rice farmers are willing to describe the best possible landlord, far fewer feel able to describe the best possible FMT. The percentages are these: owner-operators, 65 percent; part-owners, 63; lessees, 59; share tenants, 52; and LSTs, 68. Relatively fewer farmers felt they could rate the "average FMT" on the 11-point scale: owner-operators, 49 percent; lessees, 50; and share tenants, 38.<sup>21</sup> It would appear that at most one half of Nueva Ecija rice farmers have worked with an FMT.

*Knowing a farmers' leader.* The respondents are more confident when it comes to describing the ideal leader of a farmers' organization. This also can be explained in a number of ways, but the fact are that the percentages of rice farmers who offer to describe the best possible leader are much higher than those willing to describe the ideal FMT. The figures are these: owner-operators, 83; part-owners, 84; lessees, 86; share tenants, 80; and LSTs, 80. The percentages of those willing to *rate* the "average leader" were lower: owner-operators, 68; lessees, 70; and share tenants, 54. Farmers' leaders are apparently more widely known in Nueva Ecija than the FMTs are.

*Knowing a farmers' organization.* Rice farmer respondents were asked whether or not they knew of any farmers' organization in the barrios where they lived. To be able to evaluate the answers we received, we obtained from the North and South Nueva Ecija Land Reform Branch Offices a copy of the master list of farmers' associations covered by each Land Reform Project Team. We also checked the records at the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP) Office to find out the names of those barrios in which the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) had organized credit unions, buying clubs, and other similar associations. Further, we obtained from the office of the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (Masaka) in Cabanatuan City the list of barrios where locals had been organized.<sup>22</sup>

The responses of the rice-farmer respondents were then validated against the actual absence or presence of a particular organization in the barrio. A farmer's response was taken as correct if a particular organization which he claimed to be in his barrio was in fact there, according to the above records, and if his report that there was no farmers' organization in his barrio was similarly borne out. A farmer's response was taken as incorrect when he reported the existence of an organization which was not listed for his barrio, or when he had no knowledge of an organization that was so listed.

Only half the rice farmers tended to report correctly the presence or absence of a farmers'

organization in their barrio residences. The remaining half either did not know that a farmer's organization existed in their barrio, or reported the presence of an organization that was actually located in a neighboring barrio of the same municipality or in the poblacion, e.g., the Facoma. By far the most common error is ignorance of an organization that (by our lists, at least) is to be found somewhere in the respondent's barrio. Only 13 percent of part-owners and 8 percent of the other farmers mistakenly claimed that their barrio had a nearby barrio's organization, and only 8 percent of all rice-farmer respondents reported that the poblacion's Facoma was located within their barrio.

Among the farmers, lessees and owner-operators tend more than share tenants (59 and 59 vs. 43 percent; 0.01) to be aware of the presence of organizations located in their barrios. Further, lessees report, more than owner-operators and share tenants (63 vs. 57 and 48 percent; 0.02), that they are members of these organizations. Yet, the majority of those who know of no farmers' association in their barrio say they wish to have one in their barrio. In this regard, lessees and share tenants show greater enthusiasm than owner-cultivators (82 and 82 vs. 66 percent; 0.01).

All rice farmers who wish to join an organization agree (0.001) that it is needed to develop unity among them. They feel that they should act as a group in airing their grievances, whether to the landlords or to the government. Second, they feel that an organization can assist them in their problems, which range from family-life difficulties to farming dilemmas. Third, it is hoped that an organization will attend to the welfare of the rice farmers, that is, will push for the improvement of the farmers' lot. Other expectations voiced by the rice farmers are these: such an organization will help them acquire loans for farming expenses; to develop their cooperation in farm work; to arbitrate, or mediate, in landlord-tenant disputes; and to create cordial and pleasant interpersonal relations among the barrio rice farmers (Table 17).

The rice-farmer respondents who say they would not welcome such an organization in their

barrios reason that they do not think it will be of benefit to them. Besides, the demands that would be made, such as attendance at meetings, would disturb their work schedule. Other negative reasons given are these: fear of the possibility that conflict among landlords and tenants will develop, because the leaders will make demands on the landlords; the fact that landlords in their barrios are already meeting the needs of their tenants, hence an organization is not needed; and lastly, the fact that farmers have other sources of income, and hence do not need an organization through or from which to acquire loans (Table 18).

#### *How the FMT is viewed*

*Role definition of the ideal FMT.* Rice-farmer respondents are in overall significant agreement (0.01) on the relative importance of the qualities they associate with the best possible farm management technician. Further, when the rankings given to these qualities by any two of the five tenure groups are compared, the members of only two pairs, owner-operators and LSTs, and lessees and LSTs, fail to agree. The remaining eight possible correlations of rankings given by any two groups compared show significant agreement (levels of significance range from 0.05 to 0.01 levels).

The highest-ranked quality of a good FMT is competence: all respondents expect that the ideal FMT will be well-versed in modern agricultural practices. Second, he will be in frequent contact with the farmers, which they think requires his living in the barrio where he is assigned. The third quality desired of a good FMT is his being a good adviser. He is also expected to be courteous and friendly; solicitous, or helpful in general; industrious and efficient in fulfilling his duties in the barrio; able to provide for farm needs; and a good mediator.

As a good mediator, the FMT is expected especially to speak to the landlords in the tenants' names, asking that the latter be granted leasehold status. He is also expected to intercede with the Facoma and ACA officials for loans, and to mediate with other government officials for the acquisition of farm machinery

and irrigation facilities. It is not clear from the data what is implied when it is said that an FMT should provide for farm needs. He may or may not be expected to give, or provide gratis, fertilizer and seeds, especially high-yielding varieties, or other farm inputs (Table 19).

If we compare the respondents' expectations with the official duties and responsibilities of an FMT, we find that the behavior specified by our respondents is close to that prescribed in the official statement of an FMT's duties.<sup>23</sup> For instance, respondents say that they want an FMT to be a good adviser, or consultant. Actually, it is officially stated that an FMT should

- a. Disseminate technical information to farmers and demonstrate improved farm management practices and techniques (and/or help subject matter specialists in conducting applied researches); and
- b. Work with individual farmer in farm planning and budgeting, guide them in the proper conduct of farm business (and recommend approval of the lessee of loan and work out schedule of re-payment).

We have explained above the range of mediating functions that respondents expect an FMT to perform. The official statement of this expectation is found in the provision that an FMT is to "assist farmers in securing the services or assistance of other agencies," i.e., agencies co-operating with the NLRC. The respondents' expressed desire to have the FMT in contact with them reflects the regulation that the FMT should "visit newly established independent farm operators either singly or collectively and give them the necessary technical advice on all aspects of farm activities." As well, though rice farmers rarely mention any felt need for it, the FMT was, until the passage of R.A. 6389 in late 1971, also officially instructed to "conduct educational activities that will acquaint leaseholders and other independent farm operators with their rights and privileges under the Agricultural Land Reform code and other applicable laws" (R.A. 3844, Sec. 124[5]). Only five rice-farmer respondents say that they expect the FMT to orient them regarding the land-reform program.

*FMTs' common failings.* The respondents who rated the average FMT give him moderately high average scores on the 0-10 scale, 8.2 or above. The details are as follows.

Rater	Placement of average FMT	
	Average score on 0-10 scale	Rank order
Owner-operator	8.2 (56) <sup>a</sup>	2 (of 4) <sup>b</sup>
Lessee	8.5 (208)	3 (of 5)
Share tenant	8.4 (142)	2.5 (of 5)

<sup>a</sup>Numbers in parentheses in this column are absolute frequencies of respondents who rated the average FMT.

<sup>b</sup>Others rated by owner-operators were the average landlord, overseer, and farmers' leader. Lessees and share tenants each rated the average member of their own groups and those others rated by owner-operators.

All farmers agree (0.001) that the greatest failing of the average FMT is that he lacks contact with the farmers with whom he is supposed to work. Second, he is lazy in fulfilling his duties and, third, has no commitment to his job. In fact, some farmers allege that the average FMT stays on his job only for monetary reasons and even accepts bribes from farmers. His being incompetent is also mentioned (Table 20).

#### *How the farmers' leader is viewed*

##### *Role definition of the ideal farmers' leader.*

Obviously, what is expected of the leader of a farmers' organization will depend, in part at least, on what is expected of the organization itself. We can assume, for instance, that a credit-union leader will more likely be expected to facilitate loans than will a Masaka leader. The latter, on the other hand, will more likely be expected to lead farmers in petitioning for leasehold status, or to organize rallies to speed up implementation of the land-reform program.

During the interviews we asked respondents to tell us the qualities they would like in a leader of some specific organization of which they were aware. Of the majority of respondents (52 percent), who knew of no such farmers' organization, we simply asked a description of the behavior they expected of the leader of any farmers' organization. Since fewer than half of our respondents were aware of a specific farmers'

organization, what we present in Table 21 are the respondents' expectations of the ideal leader of any farmers' organization.

Respondents concur (0.001) on the relative importance of the various elements of the ideal behavior expected of a farmers' leader. A good leader should above all be a skillful mediator in matters of landlord-tenant relationships. He is supposed to ask the landlord to lower the rate of interest on tenants' loans, to persuade the landlord to grant leasehold status to share tenants, to request the landlord to provide farm implements, machinery, and other inputs needed by tenants, and to discuss and negotiate with the landlord amicable settlements of landlord-tenant, land, tenure, sharing, and other disputes.

Second, a good leader is expected to be solicitous, or helpful, especially during crisis periods in the tenants' families. Third, a good leader should be courteous, slow in talking, and not snobbish; he should behave as one of the farmers, and not be too consciously aware of his being a leader. The fourth quality desired of the best possible leader is the ability to provide leadership for unified decision and activities. In this expectation, our respondents think a leader should call meetings often, so that the organization will be abreast of the problems in their locality, and so that they can help one another in solving these problems. The three remaining most frequently mentioned expectations of a good leader, given in their order of importance, are the possession of technical agricultural know-how, beyond that of the members; intelligence and literacy; and the ability to represent the organization and the members in those dealings with government officials in which requests are made for farm equipment or other needed goods, above all an irrigation system for the locality.

*Farmers' leaders' common failings.* Among rice farmers, the leaders of farmers' organizations apparently have a very good image. For though the various runners-up have average scores that come close to theirs, these leaders are in first place with all three rating groups. The figures are in the table at the head of the next column.

Owner-operators, lessees, and share tenants concur (0.05) on the importance of the average

Rater	Placement of average leader	
	Av. score on 0-10 scale	Rank order
Owner-operator	8.5 (80) <sup>a</sup>	1 (of 4) <sup>b</sup>
Lessee	8.8 (287)	1 (of 5)
Share tenant	8.9 (201)	1 (of 5)

<sup>a</sup>Numbers in parentheses in this column are the absolute frequencies of those who rated the average farmers' leader.

<sup>b</sup>Others rated by owner-operators were the average landlord, overseer, and FMT. Lessees and share tenants each rated the average member of their own groups and those others rated by owner-operators.

leaders' various failings. The average leader, they say, lacks the ability to unite the organization's members and lead the group to plan solutions for their problems. Neither do they willingly offer help to farmers who are in need. In fact, they scheme to improve their own lives by using their positions for self-aggrandizement. Moreover, they do not treat all farmers equally, nor mediate in solving problems that arise among farmers or between landlords and tenants. Leaders also tend to become snobbish once they are in office (Table 22).

#### *Opinions on Share Tenancy and Leaseholding Rice farmers*

*Procedure.* The rice farmers' views were derived from two sections of the interview schedule. In the first section, the respondent's opinion was solicited only if he currently was, or had once been, a share tenant or lessee. As might be expected from information given earlier in this report, ex-sharecroppers far outnumber today's sharecroppers: 47 percent of owner-operators, 93 percent of lessees, and 88 percent of part-owners, were once share tenants. All were asked if they thought share tenancy was a good thing. Owner-operators and part-owners who had formerly been lessees or LSTs, and tenants presently farming as lessees were asked their opinions regarding the leasehold system.

In the second section, the farmer respondent was asked to choose one opinion of two presented as paired statements. These paired items were developed after the technique used by Guthrie

(1970) in his study of the psychology of modernization of rural Philippines. He explained (1970: 91) how the method worked in these terms.

... items were developed in which the respondent was asked to choose between two opinions or solutions to problems . . . The alternatives were designed to be equally attractive or reasonable except that one was a justification for traditional behavior, the other for behavior considered more characteristic of men in a modern, industrial setting. Each item dealt with an issue which could reasonably fall within the experience of the respondent or his friends.

For this study, two alternatives, one clearly compatible with leaseholding, the other with share tenancy, were presented to the respondent. Selected in view of the assumptions of the land-reform code regarding expectable differences between share tenants and lessees, the items were pretested among Nueva Ecija rice farmers and subsequently modified before use in the survey.

*Opinions on share tenancy.* Four out of 10 farmers who have been share tenants say that it is a good system; three out of 10 say it is not. Most of the remaining respondents (26 percent) report that it may be good or bad, depending on a number of conditions. There are, however, intergroup differences: those who are currently share tenants, significantly more than lessees (54 vs. 31 percent; 0.001, .23), tend to rate share tenancy as good.<sup>24</sup> Yet one cannot safely say that lessees think sharecropping is bad. About one third of them say it is good, and another fourth say it depends on the conditions.

One of the reasons often heard to explain why share tenants find sharecropping a satisfactory farming arrangement and why they remain share tenants in spite of the government's drive to make them lessees, is that most share tenants, if not all, are kinsmen of their landlords. As a matter of fact, this is not the case. The data show that only 15 percent of the tenants (share and lessee combined) are blood kinsmen of their landlords, 6 percent are related by marriage, and 2 percent ritually: fewer than one out of four tenants is related to his landlord. While it is true that share tenants are more often kinsmen of their landlords than lessees are (32 vs. 11 percent; 0.001, .59), kinship with the land-

lord is not significantly associated with a favorable attitude toward share tenancy.

Respondents who say share tenancy is good are in complete agreement (at the 0.001 level) on the reasons why it is good. The first reason is that there is a landlord who shares the farming expenses, or who provides the inputs and other expenses needed when the tenant cannot fulfill his part of the agreement. The second most commonly mentioned reason is that sharecropping is the only way of life for which the respondent is prepared. The third reason given is that landlords are generally good. Current share tenants specifically state that they have harmonious relationships with their landlords. The other reasons are these: there is always the possibility of having a large share when the harvest is good; sharecropping is a substitute for having one's own land to farm; and some landlords provide fringe benefits.<sup>25</sup>

However, members of the various tenure groups disagree somewhat on the ranking of these reasons. For instance, owner-operators say that the third most important advantage of share tenancy is the large share the tenant gets when the yield is good. Share tenants rank this fourth, and lessees put it in fifth place. Again, while lessees indicate that the fringe benefits provided by the landlords rank fourth among the advantages of sharecropping, owner-operators and share tenants rank it sixth.

Three out-of-10 rice farmers who were or are share tenants indicate that they do not like share tenancy, and they closely agree (0.001) on the disadvantages involved in share tenancy. Primarily, they say, share tenants usually get a share that is insufficient to support their families through the year. Second, they express dissatisfaction with the way their landlords deal, or dealt, with them. Next they report that most landlords do not share farm expenses as they are supposed to. The other explanations offered by farmers who do not like sharecropping are these: the landlord or overseer usually interferes in the way the share tenant conducts his farming activities; the landlord charges usurious rates of interest on tenants' loans; the leasehold system is better in general; and as a share tenant one

incurs debts that keep on increasing, even doubling, every year.

The remaining one fourth of those respondents who were or are share tenants agree among themselves on their reasons for not being sure whether share tenancy is good or bad. These farmers frequently mention seven reasons, four of which depend on the landlord, and two, on the tenants; the seventh reason concerns the yield produced in a given cropping season.

They report that share tenancy will be satisfactory provided the landlord maintains smooth social relations with his tenants, and lends money for farm operations, or inputs in kind; further if he actually pays for his share of the expenses as agreed upon, and provides some fringe benefits, primarily the *bugnós*, or subsistence food allowance.

Respondents further agree that share tenancy can be a good way of life if the tenant can support his operation to the extent that he will not be forced to keep on borrowing money at high interest. It can also offer a good livelihood if one has no other source of income. Finally, respondents state that as long as the yield is good, share tenancy will be a good thing.

From the findings reported in this subsection, one can see that for most respondents their opinion about share tenancy will depend closely on the kind of landlord involved in the relationship. *Relatively few object to the system as such.* Rather, the more closely a landlord approximates the ideal type described in the previous section, the more desirable share tenancy will be. It is important to note, however, that four specific desirable traits of a landlord recur, no matter what opinion a respondent may have about sharecropping: fulfillment of obligations contained in the farming agreement, i.e., sharing the farm expenses, and if possible, helping the tenant meet his own share of the expenses when the latter fails to do so; lending money at low interest; providing fringe benefits; allowing tenants to go about their farming as they decide. The first three traits are also highly rated among the rice farmers' expectations for the ideal landlord: the first trait is ranked first, and the second and third traits tie for third rank.



*Opinions on leaseholding.* Eighty-nine percent of rice farmers, who have farmed as lessees, or who are currently leasing their farms, express a favorable opinion towards the lease system. Nine percent say it depends on the terms, and only two percent (10 respondents) report outright dissatisfaction with this type of farming arrangement.

Lessees and other rice-farmer respondents are in solid agreement (0.001) on why they think leasehold is a satisfactory farming arrangement. The most satisfying reward of the lease system, they say, is that tenants get a big share of the harvest. Second, neither the landlord nor any of his representatives can interfere in the tenant's work. In fact, the tenant has no obligation to his landlord beyond paying the rent for the land after every cropping period. As a whole, leaseholding is further perceived by current and past lessees as the route to an improved or progressive way of life. To be free of any problems with a landlord also makes leaseholding a desirable farming arrangement. Moreover, they say that they are forced to develop thriftiness and industriousness if they are to finance their own farming and have a good yield.

The 10 respondents who are not satisfied with leaseholding give the following reasons for their dissatisfaction: high rent, having to pay the rent even if there is crop failure because of some nature disaster, frequent lack of capital, and that landlords' not lending money to lessees.

Only 9 percent of former and present lessees say that leaseholding is sometimes good but sometimes bad. They name three factors on which this depends, namely, the yield, the tenant's financial capability, and the amount of rent to be paid.

It appears, then, that tenants are attracted to the leasehold system mainly because they believe they will get a larger share of the harvest. Even those who oppose leaseholding, and those who cannot decide whether or not they like it, are similarly concerned about the lessee's share of the yield. Dissatisfied lessees are worried that they might have to pay the rent for the land in spite of a crop failure, while uncertain lessees are concerned about the possibility of their

getting only a small share of the harvest, especially during poor cropping seasons.

*To remain a share tenant or not.* Slightly fewer than half (45 percent) of today's share tenants intend to remain in that status. Twenty-three percent are determined to get out, and another 31 percent are not sure what they want to do.

Of the reasons given for intending to remain a sharecropper, the one given by half the share-tenant respondents is simply that farming in general is an honorable means of livelihood. Two respondents put this feeling in these terms.

It's good to farm and this is the wealth of the country.  
Mainam ang magasa at ito'y kayamanan ng bansa.  
Can help the country . . . participate in the progress of the country.  
Makakatulong sa bansa . . . makakabahagi sa kaunlaran ng bansa.

One respondent expressed the idea that farming enables him to help others:

At any rate, we can help others. When our produce is good, we can hire many people.  
Udiy kasano makatulong kami ití kaadduan. Nu napintés ti ani, ad-adi ti matangalanami nga agrabaho.

Half the respondents also say they have to be share tenants because they are not owners. One out of five of those who intend to remain share tenants report that this is because of the good relations he enjoys with his landlord. The other reasons given, arranged in the order of frequency, are these: they are contented with their present life; it is good to have a landlord to whom they can always run for help; it is their fate to be farming as share tenants; and lastly, they do not know of a farm available for leasing.

It is often said, especially by land-reform fieldmen, that share tenants resist conversion to leasehold status because they are embarrassed or *nahiyá*, to do so because their landlords are, more often than not, their kinsmen. Now, data mentioned earlier show that share tenants do tend, more than lessees, to be kinsmen of their landlords, a fact confirmed by the replies of landlord respondents: more than lessee landlords, share landlords claim kinship with their tenants (67 vs. 35 percent; 0.02). Moreover, while 42 percent of share landlords say that at

least one of their tenants is a kinsman whom they grant special privileges, only 19 percent of lessee landlords report this.<sup>26</sup>

However, despite any favors that might be given to kinsmen-tenants, we find that whether or not they are related to their landlords, the same percentage of share tenants express the intention to remain share tenants. The intention to remain share tenant shows no significant association with being a kinsman of the landlord.

Among those who say they *intend to get out of sharecropping*, the reason most commonly given is the desire to own their own farm — a motivation mentioned by 18 percent of these respondents. Second, they plan to seek other jobs. They further reason that they might as well change status, since their landlords do not attend to their needs, whether for farming or for their families. The other reasons, given in the order of importance, are these: they receive a small share; they do not have the freedom they desire to make their own farming decisions (8 percent); and lastly, they simply want to become lessees (7 percent).

More than one third of the share tenants who are *not sure whether or not they will remain share tenants* say that what they do will depend on what the landlord will do; that is, they will stay share tenants if allowed to do so, or if the landlord is not too strict with them, or if he stays on good terms with them (37 percent).

The other reasons on which their staying share tenants will depend are these: whether or not the government strictly enforces the land-reform law and requires every tenant to become a lessee; whether or not they will, by some stroke of luck, be able to buy or inherit a farm, or find some other job. Some merely state they do not know what their future will be.

*To remain a lessee or not.* Whereas among share tenants 45 percent intend to remain sharecroppers, 66 percent of lessees say they expect to go on being lessees. Another 26 percent are not sure what they will do; only 8 percent have definite intentions to get out of leasehold status.

The reason most frequently given by lessees for *intending to remain in that status* is that

leaseholding enables them to get a big share of the harvest. This reason is also ranked first by all those respondents who think leaseholding is good. The second and third most important reasons are these: lessees are free to decide what steps to follow in farming, since landlords can no longer interfere with them; lessees have the approval of their landlords to be lessees. The prominence given to this third reason is surprising, since it is often said that most landlords are against leaseholding.

Other frequently mentioned reasons, presented in the order of importance, are that lessees tend to be more progressive in life than share tenants, that they must be lessees since they do not have their own land to cultivate, and that conversion to leasehold is provided for by the current law.

Three-fourths of the lessee respondents who *do not intend to stay lessees* give as their reason that they wish to have their own farm. Six percent say they prefer share tenancy. They do not, however, say why. Other reasons given for wanting to leave the lessee status are that the rent on the land is too high, and that as lessees they have not attained as comfortable a life as they thought they would.

Four out of 10 lessees who express *uncertainty about staying a lessee* reason that it is the landlord who will decide whether they will remain lessees or not. For instance, the landlord can sell his farm, or have it subdivided, or he might become too strict to suit the lessee.<sup>27</sup> Three out of 10 further say that it depends on how the law will be implemented. In fact, one of our respondents thinks there may be another policy on land tenure when a new President gets elected. The other reasons on which lessee respondents' decisions in this matter will depend are whether or not they will be able to buy a farm, whether or not they will find other jobs, and whether or not they can obtain enough capital for farming expenses.

To summarize this subsection and the one before it, while share tenants who intend to remain so will do this because they believe that sharecropping is a good source of income and a decent means of livelihood, lessees intending to

stay lessees will do so because they expect to receive a large share of the harvest. Share tenants further reason that since they do not own lands they must remain share tenants. Moreover, they are on good terms with their landlords. On the other hand, lessees point out that they wish freedom from their landlords, a condition that they can attain only if they remain lessees. But lessees also admit that they will stay lessees because their landlords have agreed to that farming arrangement. Although it is only their third most frequently mentioned reason, it is clear therefore that both share tenants and lessees are aware that the relations they have with their landlords will condition their keeping or changing their status.

Those share tenants and lessees who want to change their tenure status express a desire first of all to own or buy a farm. Second, they think of getting a non-farm or off-farm job (share tenants), and returning to share tenancy (lessees).

Share tenants and lessees who are in doubt about what they will do in the future see their relations with the landlord as a factor to reckon with. Other influencing considerations will be the manner in which the land-reform program will be implemented, and the possibilities of new jobs or the purchase of a farm.

*Opinion differences between lessees and share tenants.* When asked to choose between two courses of action, one of which is compatible with leaseholding, the other with share tenancy, lessees differ significantly from sharecroppers in a number of ways. For one, they show a distinct preference for paying a fixed rental for the farm they are tilling. Beyond this, they also express a preference for other social arrangements that have an especially good fit with the leasehold system.

- a. More than share tenants, lessees prefer going to a government agency for a loan rather than borrowing from the landlord (85 vs. 51 percent; 0.001, .62);
- b. More than share tenants, lessees wish to own the farm they are cultivating rather than have security as tenants (53 vs. 45 percent; 0.05, .15);
- c. More than share tenants, lessees opt for good

relations with co-farmers rather than with the landlord (92 vs. 86 percent; 0.01, .31);

- d. More than share tenants, lessees opt for lessee status over good relations with the landlord (79 vs. 51 percent; 0.001, .56), and
- e. More than share tenants, lessees reject share tenancy as no good (54 vs. 16 percent; 0.001, .72).

To review, while lessees show a preference for the leasehold system and for many of the social arrangements that go with it — this we gather from their responses to the paired items just reported — still their replies to the open-ended questions presented earlier show that lessees, almost all of whom were formerly share tenants, do not think that share tenancy is altogether bad. Less than half of them, it will be recalled, take an absolutely negative view of share tenancy; 24 percent say it depends on the conditions of the arrangement, and 31 percent favor it.

We have also found that at least half of the present share tenants find acceptable the sharing arrangement they currently have with their landlords. The following evidence supports this statement:

- a. Fifty-five percent of share tenants prefer farming under a good sharing arrangement to farming as a lessee;
- b. The same proportion of share tenants also prefers assured tenancy to owning the land they farm;
- c. More than half of the share tenants think sharecropping is good; only 19 percent think it is not good; and 27 percent say it depends on the conditions agreed upon with the landlord; and
- d. About half (45 percent) of the share tenants intend to remain tenants.

It should be remembered that a share tenant's tendency to approve of sharecropping is not significantly associated with the kin relationship he may or may not have with the landlord. Landlords' kinsmen and nonkinsmen share tenants show an equal tendency to state they like sharecropping, or to intend to persevere as share tenants.

#### *Landlords*

*Attitudes toward tenants' becoming lessees.* Landlords with share tenants were asked if they wanted their tenants to become lessees. More

than half of the *lessee-share* landlords (56 percent) say they favor their share tenants' becoming lessees; the remaining 44 percent state either that they do not want their share tenants to become lessees (34 percent), or that the tenants themselves are opposed to the change (10 percent). About half (49 percent) of the *share* landlords are against their tenants' becoming lessees. Three out of 10 favor the shift. The remaining 17 percent feel the share tenants are contented with the present arrangement.

Even if a landlord personally wants his share tenants to become lessees, he reasons that the tenant has the final decision in the matter. Some landlords believe the lease system will save themselves from many of the worries associated with share tenancy; e.g., farm expenses, subsistence loans, and similar expenses and fringe benefits expected by share tenants. Others, however, are attracted not so much by what they will gain as by what they will avoid, namely, legal prosecution for violating the terms of the land-reform law.

Landlords who are against leaseholding argue that the lease system not only diminishes their share of the produce but sometimes even deprives them of their rightful portion. When a lessee suffers a crop failure, they say, the rent that he should pay for use of the land is either not paid at all or paid only in part. And while lessees get a larger share of the produce, the landlords pay the land tax — many landlords complain that the rent they get for the land is sometimes barely enough to pay that tax. Other landlords oppose the lease system because they have small landholdings; they would rather cultivate the land themselves than lease it. Still other landlords report that they want to supervise the farmwork, or have a say in the farming cycle — a participation that they cannot have once their share tenants become lessees.

Those landlords who say they think their share tenants do not want to become lessees contend that consideration of the privileges and fringe benefits of share tenancy restrains share tenants from changing status. Also, most share tenants have neither capital nor credit sources for farming expenses. A few landlords also claim

that their share tenants are contented with the present arrangement.

*Opinion regarding eventual conversion of all share tenants to leaseholders.* Whether or not he had any share tenants, every landlord respondent was asked if he thought all share tenants would eventually become lessees in the future. Lessee and lessee-share landlords (all those who have lessees) tend more than share landlords to think that all share tenants will inevitably become lessees (88 and 72 vs. 50 percent; 0.05, .40).

Landlords who predict this widespread acceptance of the lease system point out that it is a law, and hence will eventually be followed. Others argue that many share tenants, especially the younger generation of farmers, will try leaseholding because it promises several advantages, such as a large share, independence from the landlord, and a generally better life. The influence or threats of co-farmers may likewise play a part, they say, in moving share tenants toward leaseholding. Moreover, the government's campaign to convert share tenants to lessees will also have an inevitable effect.

Some landlords think that not all share tenants will become lessees, because few share tenants have enough money to meet farming expenses. In the sharing system, landlords generally lend money for, or themselves pay, the farm expenses. Where will lessees find a substitute source of credit? It is well-known that many landlords stop extending credit once the tenants opt for lessee status. It is also common knowledge that today's lessees find it difficult to acquire loans from government agencies, an experience that has led many lessees to lose trust in the government's promise of adequate funding. Other landlords further point out that some landlords will refuse to have their lands leased, and will find means to circumvent the law.

*Opinion regarding lessees' stability.* If eight and seven out of 10 lessee and lessee-share landlords, respectively, and five out of 10 share landlords think share tenants will inevitably become lessees, seven out of 10 landlords from each landlord group feel that lessees will eventually return to share tenancy. Only 18 percent of all land-

*lords think lessees will remain in their present status.*

Like those landlords who feel not all share tenants will opt for leasehold, some landlords think many lessees will revert to share tenancy because of difficulty in acquiring money for farm expenses. Others consistently argue that lessees will soon realize the advantages they had in share tenancy, particularly, the loans and fringe benefits given by landlords. But some lessees will remain leaseholders because largely by luck, they will produce well and get a larger share than usual. Other lessees, they say, will enjoy being independent from the landlords. Still others will remain lessees in spite of financial difficulty, either because of the law or because they feel too much shame to approach their landlords again, especially if they have brought their landlords to court.

#### *Landlords' Opinions on the Land-Reform Program*

*Objectives of the program.* More than three-fourths of the landlords say that the idea behind the land-reform program is "towards equal distribution of the land," "to improve the living conditions of the farmers," or "to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor." The equity motive is clearly seen.

Fifteen percent think the program aims to motivate farmers to work hard and learn the scientific method of farming so that a country-wide increase in rice production will be attained. This is the productivity motive. Sixteen percent, however, think that the authors of the land-reform code are "politicians who do not have land to protect and would like to get more votes from the masses — only a political gimmick."

Will the program succeed? More than one-third (37 percent) of landlords think that the shift of all share tenants to the lease system will never take place. But the rest think it will eventually occur. When will this be? Four out of 10 landlords have no idea, but the median number of years from now, according to those who predict the shift, is about six years.

*Effects of the program.* About six out of 10

landlords (59 percent) complain that the land-reform program has only created animosity among landlords and tenants, especially among those who had to go to court to settle their contest for the land. While several explanations are given on how ill-feelings between landlords and tenants come about, the opinion of a Nueva Ecija city mayor, himself a landlord, is most enlightening.

When land reform was introduced and the government agents convinced tenants of the advantages of leaseholding, tenants approached their landlords to request for leaseholding. Of course, the landlords were angry because they have treated the tenants well. When the landlord became angry, the tenants were angry, too. Now they're angry at one another.

Nang dumating ang *land reform* dito at na-convince ng government agents ang mga kasamá ukol sa kabutihang buwisán, ang mga kasamá ay lumapit sa propetaryo, para humaling ng buwisán. Siempre nagalit ang propetaryo dahil mabuti naman ang pakikitungo niya sa kanyang kasamá. Nang magalit ang propetaryo, nagalit na rin ang kasamá. Ngayon galit silá sa isa't isa.

Some landlords resent the fact that while the land-reform program has diminished their own share of the produce and "robbed" them of jurisdiction of their own land, the program personnel nonetheless often refer to *landlords* as the "oppressors." Other landlords feel that the agrarian counsels and other land-reform officials even *force* tenants to become lessees.

To some landlords, the program definitely favors the tenants. Many tenants, they say, have in fact become conscious of this — they have become aggressive and proud. But the program has also caused difficulties for a number of tenants. Without the landlord's support, especially in finances, tenants can hardly continue their farming. Those who turn to usurers for loans soon find themselves heavily indebted.

*Benefits of the program.* When asked specifically whether or not landlords benefit from the land-reform program, only three out of 10 share and lessee landlords and about two out of 10 (19 percent) of the LSLs feel they have been benefited. Half of the share landlords, three-fifths of lessee landlords, and three-fourths of the LSLs consider the program favorable rather to the tenants. The rest refuse to give an opinion.

Complementing these views is the fact that about half of all landlords (share, 39 percent; lessee, 50 percent; and LSL, 67 percent) think acquiring rice land is no longer a good investment; the main reason given for this change is the land-reform program.

Those landlords who feel benefited by the land-reform program are happy that they are free of the worries and problems related to share tenancy, e.g., providing farm expenses, giving various kinds of loans, supervising the farming process, and attending to the many needs of tenants. A few landlords say they will devote their time to other business or perhaps sell their rice lands and put the money in other investments. In fact, eight percent of the landlord sample plan to sell part of their holdings, and 11 percent will do so if the price is good. Four out of 10 landlords, however, do not intend to sell any portion of their holdings. Four out of 10 do not know whether they should sell or not.

Dissatisfied lessee landlords repeat the fact that their share of the harvest is less than it would be if they were operating under share tenancy. Others, less concerned about the share, stress dissatisfaction with the fact that they can no longer participate in the farming cycle, or express the fear that they will lose ownership of their rice lands. This has made some landlords stop investing in their farms. Finally, still others are unhappy that relations between landlords and tenants are no longer cordial.

While most landlords claim that the land-reform program is "for the tenants but against the landlords" (about seven out of 10 landlords say this); six out of 10 oppose it also because they feel the program is not benefiting the tenants as it should. In what way do they think it *does* benefit the lessee? The most frequently mentioned advantage for lessees is the larger share of the produce they receive — increased income, in other words. Next, lessees are given the chance to make their own decisions. It also frees some lessees from the abusive and unjust landlords who control them. The program even gives the lessee an opportunity eventually to own the lands they till. Other landlords feel that the lease system is good for tenants because it

gives them incentives to be industrious, to learn scientific methods of farming, to be thrifty, and to be self-sufficient.

How does the program hurt the lessee? Some landlords argue that the lease system is only beneficial to those lessees who have capital. In fact, numerous landlords think the land reform is disadvantageous to tenants because many of them lose the support of the landlords once they opt for leasehold. Since the government has not yet demonstrated that it can adequately provide loans, and since private credit sources are either unavailable or usurious, many lessees are likely to find leaseholding very difficult.

*Suggestions to improve the program.* The most frequently suggested step is for the government to provide the lessee the loan he needs as "conveniently as landlords give it" and also to subsidize some needs like "certified, high-quality seeds, low-priced fertilizer, or second-crop seeds to allow diversification."

Second, landlords suggest that small and large landowners should be treated as two different groups. One landlord suggests that "leaseholding should not be applicable to small landlords; share tenancy should be allowed among small owners." But other landlords want to see the land-reform program abolished and the "tenants and landlords . . . given the right to choose their own agreement, to include sharing arrangement."

Other suggestions given are these: yearly evaluation of the rent should be made and a penalty imposed on delinquent lessees; the government should provide an improved irrigation system; the land tax should be lowered or the lessees asked to pay part of the tax; and the farmers should be properly educated about the purposes of land reform, rather than "brainwashed" to the effect that landlords are exploiting them.

#### *Indebtedness Among Rice Farmers*

The rice farmer's view of the good life, to be discussed below, will be colored by the conditions in which he lives. And if there is any condition that is traditionally linked to tenant farming it is indebtedness. Hence, before we report on the aspirations that rice farmers

express, we first examine the state of indebtedness of tenants and other small rice farmers in Nueva Ecija.

*Debts and credit sources.* The main questions relevant here are the following: (1) What percentage of the various kinds of farmers (share tenants, lessees, lessee-share tenants, part-owners, and owners) report being in debt? (2) From whom have they gotten their loans? (3) For what purposes has each group borrowed, and to what extent are they indebted in cash or kind? (4) On the average, what interest have they agreed to pay to these various creditors for the different kinds of loans they have received?

*Sources of credit.* The easiest question to answer is the first, namely, the percentage of debtors in each of the tenure groupings.

Tenure grouping	Percentage in debt (any kind)
Owner (N = 117)	70%
Part-owner (N = 68)	69
Lessee (N = 413)	71
Lessee-share tenant (N = 40)	68
Share tenant (N = 372)	65

In general, more than two-thirds of all farmers are currently indebted to others,<sup>28</sup> the share tenant group, surprisingly perhaps, having the smallest percentage of debtors.

What are the small farmers' sources of credit? To begin with, our data show that 87 percent of our respondents have only one current source of credit, 12 percent have two

sources, and the remaining 1 percent, three. The percentages by tenure status are as follows.

Tenure status	Sources of credit		
	One	Two	Three
Owner	92%	8%	0%
Part-owner	93	7	0
Lessee	85	14	2
Lessee-share tenant	85	11	4
Share tenant	87	12	1
TOTAL	87%	12%	1%

From what sources do farmers borrow? Six out of 10 owners and part-owners borrow from credit institutions, e.g., Facoma, ACA, rural banks, and other banks. By contrast, 33 percent of lessees, 14 percent of share tenants, and 41 percent of lessee-share tenants (LSTs) get loans from these institutions.

Individuals, mostly moneylenders, furnish credit to about half of the lessees, one-third of the share tenants, one-fourth of the part-owners, and one-fifth of the LSTs. One out of two share tenants borrows from his landlord; by contrast, only one out of five lessees, one out of four LSTs, and one out of 14 part-owners report having loans from their landlords.<sup>29</sup> Kinsmen (excluding kinsmen-landlords) are credit sources for 12 percent of owners; 19 percent of lessees, 20 percent of share tenants, 11 percent of part-owners, and 33 percent of LSTs.<sup>30</sup> A tabular summary follows.

Tenure status	Institution	Kinsman	Landlord	Other private moneylender	TOTAL N
Owner	60%	12%	-	37%	82
Part-owner	66	11	7	23	44
Lessee	33	19	20	45	285
Lessee-share tenant	41	33	26	18	27
Share tenant	14	20	47	33	264
TOTAL	32%	18%	28%	37%	702

The data above suggest that while landlords are the most popular source of credit for share tenants, for lessees this role is played by private persons, especially moneylenders. However, the evidence also indicates that institutional credit facilities serve the lessee far more than they do the share tenant. The same differential tendency is noticed when creditor-combinations are considered, as in the table immediately below.

*Kinds and size of loan.* Respondents were asked how they used the loan they received (not the reason they gave the creditor when

borrowing). Their replies indicate that owners and lessees tend more than share tenants to spend their loans on production matters (Chi-square  $p < 0.001$ ). The figures are in the lower table, below.

Clearly nonproduction, or subsistence, loans are a necessity of life, especially for share tenants. When the size of debts (cash or kind) owned by each tenure group is considered, we find that owner-cultivators tend to have greater debts than other kinds of farmers. Broadly speaking, debt is proportionate to the available

Creditor/creditor-combination	Owner (N = 82)	Part-owner (N = 44)	Lessee (N = 285)	Lessee-share tenant (N = 27)	Share tenant (N = 264)
Institution	54%	59%	22%	33%	10%
Kinsman	8	9	15	30	15
Landlord	—	7	13	15	38
Other private moneylender	29	18	34	7	24
Landlord-other	—	—	2	4	4
Landlord-institution	—	—	2	4	2
Landlord-kinsman	—	—	*	—	2
Institution-other	5	5	5	—	2
Kinsman-other	2	—	2	4	1
Institution-kinsman	1	2	1	—	1
Landlord-institution-other	—	—	1	4	*
Landlord-kinsman-institution	—	—	—	—	*
Landlord-kinsman-other	—	—	*	—	*
Institution-landlord-other	—	—	1	—	—

\*Less than 0.5 percent

Tenure status	Kind of loan reported				Total N	No info (N)
	None	Prod.	Nonprod.	Both		
Owner	30%	51%	32%	8%	117	0
Part-owner	35	46	32	10	67	1
Lessee	31	49	39	9	412	1
Lessee-share tenant	32	58	28	15	39	1
Share tenant	29	36	48	9	369	3
TOTAL	31%	45%	21%	9%	1004	6



collateral. The median total debts are shown in the table below.

The median total loan reported by the different tenure groupings also varies by creditor. Owners, for instance, obtain large cash loans (P1,600) from credit institutions both for production and nonproduction purposes. Lessees obtain about P600 from credit institutions for both production and nonproduction use; from landlords, about P600 for production and P500 for nonproduction. Share tenants borrow about P600 from credit institutions for production purposes, P400 for nonproduction; from landlords, about P400 for production and about P550 for nonproduction purposes.

Other private persons, mostly moneylenders, have lent sums to farmers ranging from P250 to P550 for both production and nonproduction purposes. The median amounts borrowed are summarized in the table on p. 38.

*Interest charged.* What interest are small farmers charged by their creditors? No simple answer is possible, since rates differ according to the kind of loan made (for production or nonproduction purposes, in cash or in kind), who the creditor is, how repayment is to be made, and whether the debt is new or old (repayment

overdue). Moreover, generalizations are best presented against the background of traditional lending arrangements.

The traditional rates tend to be high, even usurious. For loans *in kind*, the most commonly mentioned practices of long standing are these three: *takipan*, asking two cavans of palay for every cavan borrowed (100 percent interest); *talinduwa*, three cavans for every two cavans of palay borrowed (50 percent); and *tersiahan*, four cavans of palay for every three cavans of palay borrowed (33 percent). In all cases the loans are generally collectible at harvest time, some five-six months after their being granted.

*Cash* loans may traditionally be repaid in cash or in kind. If the latter arrangement is made, the interest will usually turn out to be higher, for the current rate is two to three cavans of palay (worth P25-30 each) on a principal of P100. This amounts to 50-90 percent. If the loan were made five-six months before the harvest using the two-for-P100 formula and collected at harvest time, the arrangement would be somewhat like the usual cash loan (to be repaid in cash). Here cash is lent at interest of 10 percent (of the original principal) per month and is usually collected at harvest

Tenure status	Production		Nonproduction	
	Cash	Kind <sup>a</sup>	Cash	Kind <sup>b</sup>
Owner	P1,435	32	P1,080	13
Part-owner	625	12	650	22
Lessee	475	30	435	18
Lessee-share tenant	300	15	585	21
Share tenant	400	16	375	16

a. In cavans of palay (44 kilos each). Not included here are seven bags of fertilizer borrowed by one owner-operator; three bags of fertilizer, by two lessees; and 16 bags, by one lessee-share tenant.

The official, or standard, weight of one cavan of palay is 44 kilos (see Tables of Equivalents elsewhere in this volume). However, local conventions generally prevail for newly harvested palay. Thus in certain parts of Nueva Ecija the accepted weight is 50 kilos for rainy-season palay and 46 kilos for the dry-season harvest - because "undried palay weighs more, especially in the rainy season."

b. In cavans of palay (44 kilos).

Tenure status and creditor	Production		Nonproduction	
	Cash	Kind <sup>a</sup>	Cash	Kind <sup>b</sup>
<b>OWNERS</b>				
Institution	P1,650	—	P1,625	—
Kinsman	300	12	200	—
Landlord	—	—	—	—
Other (mostly moneylenders)	350	32	385	15
<b>PART OWNERS</b>				
Institution	660	—	850	—
Kinsman	400	22	550	—
Landlord	2,100	—	600	—
Other	525	—	575	22
<b>LESSEES</b>				
Institution	575	—	625	—
Kinsman	260	53	350	11
Landlord	600	32	475	22
Other	410	32	290	21
<b>LESSEE-SHARE TENANTS</b>				
Institution	475	—	550	—
Kinsman	290	—	575	—
Landlord	250	15	500	5
Others	100	—	—	22
<b>SHARE TENANTS</b>				
Institution	580	8	400	—
Kinsman	260	15	330	11
Landlord	390	20	530	22
Other	250	10	240	15

a. In cavans of palay (44 kilos each). See note a in preceding text table.

b. In cavans of palay (44 kilos).

time. Hence for repayment in cash the total interest (after five-six months) will be 50–60 percent — the traditional talinduwa (Kaut *et al.* 1956: 1401–05; Takahashi 1969:88; Fegan 1972: 113–27. If the three-for-P100 rate were charged, the arrangement would approximate the traditional takipan (100 percent).

Data derived from our Nueva Ecija study can be summarized in a single admittedly concentrated table, shown on page 39.

Among the salient conclusions on interest to be derived from this table, as well as from other sources, are these four. These conclusions refer to current loans, and not to unpaid loans carried over to next year's harvest.

1. Individuals likely to charge lessees and share tenants no interest on loans are kinsmen-nonlandlords, landlords, and

- others (in descending order of likelihood).
2. Where interest is charged, the currently least expensive source of credit will be an institution such as the Facoma or a rural bank (12 percent per year).
3. Among those *individuals* charging interest, landlords charge both lessees and share tenants less than others do for production loans; for nonproduction loans, they charge about the same as others.
4. The most commonly reported rates are still the traditional tersiahan (33 percent) and talinduwa (50 percent). However, the more exorbitant takipan (100 percent or more) occurs in a minority of cases.

These statements make it clear that loans from individuals, even landlords, are about as

Creditors and debtors	Production		Nonproduction	
	Cash	Kind	Cash	Kind
<b>LANDLORDS (KINSMEN OR NONKINSMEN)</b>				
Percentage of debtors given interest-free loans				
Lessees	6% (31) <sup>a</sup>	38% ( 8)	12% (16)	50% (12)
Share tenants	26 (51)	58 (12)	38 (47)	58 (48)
Rate of interest generally charged				
Lessees	2 cav./P100 <sup>b</sup> (28)	tersiahan ( 4)	3 cav./P100 (12)	talinduwa ( 6)
Share tenants	2 cav./P100 (38)	tersiahan (54)	2 cav./P100 (27)	talinduwa (20)
<b>KINSMEN-NONLANDLORDS</b>				
Percentage of debtors given interest-free loans				
Lessees	61% (28)	80% ( 5)	69% (16)	67% (15)
Share tenants	42 (12)	75 ( 4)	64 (25)	53 (17)
Rate of interest generally charged				
Lessees	3 cav./P100 (17)	talinduwa ( 1)	2 cav./P100 ( 5)	talinduwa ( 3)
Share tenants	2 cav./P100 ( 7)	talinduwa ( 1)	4 cav./P100 ( 9)	talinduwa ( 8)
<b>OTHER INDIVIDUALS</b>				
Percentage of debtors given interest-free loans				
Lessees	12% (60)	0% ( 0)	12% (51)	35% (43)
Share tenants	34 (35)	33 ( 6)	31 (29)	29 (28)
Rate of interest generally charged				
Lessees	3 cav./P100 (49)	talinduwa (14)	3 cav./P100 (40)	talinduwa (18)
Share tenants	3 cav./P100 (23)	tersiahan ( 4)	3 cav./P100 (20)	talinduwa (20)

a. Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases reported in a particular category (e.g., landlord creditor-lessee debtor-production loan-cash).

b. Interest on cash loans (production and nonproduction) is consistently presented as if repayment were to be made in kind (cavans of paly). However, the cases referred to in parentheses below the entry (see note a, above) include instances of repayment in cash. In general, a rate of "2 cav./P100" will be in cash 50 percent or higher; a rate of "3 cav./P100" will be in cash 75 percent or higher — both for a repayment period of five-six months.

expensive as they ever were in Philippine history. Because of legislation passed since 1954 (R.A. 1199, 3844, and 6389), however, these traditional rates are explicitly illegal for landlords and, recently, for others. Thus under R.A. 1199 (Secs. 15-18, 48), the allowed ceiling for both production and subsistence loans was 8 percent per calendar year and 10 percent on any balance. Under the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844, Sec. 15 [3]), nothing is said about ceilings, but compulsory loans or repayment in kind are declared "contrary to law, morals or public policy." The Code of Agrarian Reforms of 1971 (R.A. 6389, Sec. 1) explicitly states that neither landlords nor moneylenders must charge more than 14 percent per calendar year, all fees included. This is a far cry from the prevalent *talinduwa* and *tersiahan*, to say nothing of the *takipan*.

*Rice farmers as creditors.* While two-thirds of rice-farmer respondents report that they currently are in debt to others, about one-eighth (12 percent) say they are creditors. Compared with other tenure groupings, lessees and share

tenants have a larger percentage of creditors (38 and 35 percent, respectively). They also have a larger percentages of debt-free creditors. These two facts are shown in the first table, below.

To whom do these farmers give loans? Twenty-eight percent report they lend only to kinsmen; 66 percent, only to nonkinsmen; and the remaining 6 percent, to both kinsmen and nonkinsmen. The percentage of each tenure grouping lending to kinsmen or nonkinsmen is indicated in the lower table, below.

Just as the debt incurred by our farmer respondents was seen to be proportionate to the collateral they had, so the size of loans they extend to others is also proportionate to their resources. Owners, whether they lend to kinsmen or nonkinsmen, give out larger loans (in cash or in kind) than other tenure groups. The table on page 41 shows the median size of loans extended by the different kinds of farmers.

What rate of interest do the farmers charge others? Lessees and share tenants tend to give loans interest-free to about half or more of

Tenure status of creditors	Percentage who are creditors	Percentage of creditors who are not debtors
Owner	14%	12%
Part-owner	8	22
Lessee	38	52
Lessee-share tenant	6	43
Share tenant	35	51
TOTAL	12%	44%

Tenure status of creditors	Percentage of creditors who lend to:		
	Kinsmen	Nonkinsmen	Both
Owner (N = 16)	19%	69%	12%
Part-owner (N = 9)	33	66	0
Lessee (N = 44)	36	59	4
Lessee-share tenant (N = 7)	14	86	0
Share tenant (N = 41)	24	68	7
TOTAL (N = 117)	28%	66%	6%

Tenure status of creditors	Lent to kinsmen		Lent to nonkinsmen	
	Cash	Kind <sup>a</sup>	Cash	Kind <sup>b</sup>
Owner (N = 16)	P 200	25 cavs.	P 300	100 cavs.
Part-owner (N = 9)	-	7 cavs.	P 400	30 cavs.
Lessee (N = 44)	P 150	10 cavs.	P 200	10 cavs.
Lessee-share tenant (N = 7)	-	10 cavs.	P 200	7 cavs.
Share tenant (N = 41)	P 100	10 cavs.	P 150	10 cavs.

a. In cavans of palay (44 kilos each).

b. In cavans of palay (44 kilos).

their nonkinsmen debtors, and to about three-fourths of the kinsmen who have borrowed from them. They report themselves as somewhat more lenient in this regard, in other words, than those from whom they themselves borrow. The rates they report for those debtors whom they do charge interest are the traditional ones, *tersiahan* or *talinduwa*, more commonly the latter (50 percent for five-six months).

#### *Rice Farmer's View of the Good Life*

Rice-farmer respondents were asked on open-ended question about their life goals. It was phrased in these terms.

Everyone wants to have a good life. However, every man has a different opinion about what will give him a good life, or what he means by a good life. The kind of life that you want - can you tell us what you would like it to be? What would you like to be or to have for yourself and your family in order to attain the good life that you want?

We obtained a variety of responses to the above questions. Most of our respondents indicated a desire to have an improved life in general. Many mentioned their specific goals in life, while some gave specific items that they wanted to have or own. A few, but only a few, wished to enjoy a state of life that could perhaps occur only in their dreams, e.g., to be rich overnight, especially by winning in a sweepstakes lottery.

While nine out of 10 want to have a better life in general, only one out of 10 wishes to enjoy a small taste of the leisure of wealthy living. The response of a rice farmer from San

Leonardo is an example of this dream. He said, "To sit on a rocking chair and be served coffee." (*Yung umupo na lang at kumukuyakoy at may magdudulot nang kapé.*)

In general, however, rice farmers are realistic in their life goals. A farmer from Talavera, for instance, answers, "As long as I will not run out of something to cook." (*Bastá't hindi mawawalan ng maisasaing.*) Two farmers from Guimba give similar responses, but in more specific terms: "I want to eat meat and fish so that I will have a healthy body." (*Kayát ko koma ti agsidá ití karne ken lames tapón pumigá ti bagk.*); "I want to have money to buy meat once a week." (*Kayát ko nga addá igatang ti sidá a karne maminsán ití maysá a domingo.*)

The manner in which respondents agree or differ in their views about the good life can be compared by using the technique we earlier employed to analyze role expectations. By looking at the frequencies with which specific items constituting the good life are freely mentioned, we can isolate eight items that appear more often than others (Table 23). Proceeding in this fashion, we find that rice farmers are in close agreement (0.001) on the rank order of the items that constitute the good life. All give first place to food and money for subsistence.<sup>31</sup>

Second, they want to be able to send their children to school, if possible to college. After that, they think in terms of jobs other than farming.<sup>32</sup> The other items that rice farmers feel will give them the good life are these: not to be indebted, to have money for farm

expenses and to buy farm implements, to have a better harvest, to own a farm, and to be able to do something about their housing needs, i.e., to remodel their present house, to own a new house, to own a house lot, or to buy household appliances.

All respondents may agree on what constitutes the good life, but members of one tenure group do not necessarily agree with those of another on the order of importance to be given to various items. Thus, we find that owner-operators disagree with lessees and share tenants on the importance of four life goals. Share tenants give greater importance than owners do to being able to pay off current debts and avoid borrowing in future, to educating their children, and owning a farm. Lessees agree with share tenants that being free of debt and owning a farm are priority items for the good life, but they feel that having money to buy farm equipment and to spend for farming expenses is more important than the schooling of their children. Owner-operators, however, tend to agree with share tenants in giving priority to the education of their children.

#### CONCLUSIONS

In conducting this study of farmers and landlords, it was the IPC's intention above all to assist the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP). In particular, we hoped to contribute to the accomplishment of these two objectives which the NELRIDP had set for itself.

1. To solve, in the pilot area, those problems which have been identified as obstacles to full and rapid implementation of the ongoing national program; and
2. To evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing government machinery and legislation for carrying out the national program.

Conclusions reached after analysis of the study's findings might conceivably have been presented in the framework provided by this twofold goal, but we have chosen another approach. The alternative frame of reference is processual, or developmental, in that we present what we have learned about conditions

favorable (or unfavorable) to the process of (1) becoming a leaseholder, (2) not reverting to share tenancy, and (3) moving on to owner-cultivator status. Our concluding statements will be grouped under one of these three stages on the road to ownership.

But an acknowledgement is in order. On completing the field research and stating the project findings, we of course had our own conceptions, necessarily limited, about factors that facilitated or inhibited the desired tenurial change. To gain greater perspective, we distributed to a group of people likely to have ideas on the meaning of the data copies of a version of this report which did not contain any interpretation of the data nor any conclusions. The written comments of some, and the opinions expressed by others in a series of discussions, have contributed significantly to the interpretation that follows.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Becoming a Leaseholder*

*1. The move to leasehold status need not be based on rejection of share tenancy as such.*

As a matter of fact, a relatively small proportion of tenants, whether they have become lessees or not, take a negative view of the share system. Consider the following findings.

- a. More than half (54 percent) of current share tenants express satisfaction with their tenant status and another fourth (27 percent) favor it, but with reservations; only 20 percent express outright rejection of the system;
- b. Even among lessees, about one-third say share tenancy is a good system, while a fourth (24 percent) say it *can* be good, given the right conditions; fewer than half of all lessees (45 percent) take the position that sharecropping is simply no good;
- c. Where share tenants say share tenancy is not good, the reasons given most often represent *abuses* of the share-tenant system, rather than integral or essential elements of it.

*2. The share tenant's kinship with his landlord is not ordinarily an impediment to leasehold conversion.*

While some share tenants experience genuine embarrassment at the prospect of asking their landlords for approval of their change to lessee status, this is not more likely to occur among kinsmen than nonkinsmen. Whether the question at issue be a favorable attitude toward share tenancy or the intention to remain in that status, those who are the landlord's relatives and those who are not show about the same inclination toward it. This inclination is apparently more psychological than genealogical in origin, derived from individual characteristics and created relationships, rather than from some inevitable law based on blood or marriage.

3. *Since farmers opting for share tenancy or leasehold status place primary emphasis on positive reasons for their choice, a strategy of turning share tenants against their landlords will be ineffectual and perhaps even counter-productive.*

Whichever choice a share tenant expresses — to remain as he is or to become a lessee — the grounds for his decision are *positive*, not negative. In either case, "pull" factors are notably more important than "push" factors. Farmers generally want to remain share tenants because they are at least reasonably content with the landlord's way of dealing with them. When they opt for leasehold status, they do this less by way of escaping an intolerable relationship, than because of the positive advantages they see in a lessee's life.

The first fact, namely, that interpersonal harmony with the landlord is the primary consideration in the average share tenant's favorable attitude toward share tenancy, is suggested by several findings, among them the following.

- a. The reason most often given (34 percent of cases) for remaining a share tenant is the satisfaction the respondent feels with the existing landlord-tenant relationship.<sup>34</sup>
- b. Those share tenants who rate landlords higher than average (8 or above on the 0-10 ladder scale) tend more than others to give unconditional approval to the share-tenant system: whereas 84 percent of the high raters give unqualified ap-

proval, only 57 percent of the low raters do so.

The second fact, namely, that leasehold is desired for positive reasons rather than as a refuge from an oppressive landlord, is supported by several other findings.<sup>35</sup>

- c. Today's lessees say that leasehold status is desirable, first, because of the larger share it assures them (84 percent gave this answer) and the added freedom they have in making decisions in matters of farm management (69 percent).
- d. Those share tenants who say that share tenancy is not a good way of life give as the primary reason their failure to find in it the two positive attributes which others say is characteristic of leasehold status, namely, a larger share and greater autonomy of decision.

Under these conditions it follows that the energy expended in trying to foment bad feeling between a share tenant and his landlord might better be spent in convincing both landlord and tenant of the positive value of leasehold status for both of them. The desired action will likely follow upon acceptance of the superior advantages of this new form of tenure. On the other hand, it is likely that attempts to stir up discontent will not only often fail to convince the share tenant, but will also make the landlord more adamant than ever against the tenant's conversion (see Lopez 1971: 287).

4. *The landlord's approval is, in fact, probably the single most important factor in the leasehold conversion of most tenants.*

It is a matter of record that in Nueva Ecija, where proportionately much more money was available for loans than elsewhere in the Philippines, only about one-third of lessees received even a small amount of help from the government. The expectation is, then, that in the great majority of cases share tenants will be in a position to make the shift to lessee status only if their landlords agree with the plan and continue to deal with them as considerately as they previously had. Nor is this to compromise the law. The new Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 3844, Sec. 4 as amended by R.A. 6389, Sec. 1) specifically provides for a

continuation of the old lending patterns in these terms: "The credit assistance traditionally extended by a landowner and a local lender to a tenant under the share tenancy systems in agriculture . . . may be continued by said landowner and local lender: . . ." (*ibid.*). However, the interest ceiling is fixed at 14 percent per annum.

On the other hand, the Code explicitly forbids collusion between tenant and landlord whereby they continue to operate by the norms of share tenancy (e.g., 50-50 sharing of the harvest) after becoming signatories to a leasehold contract (R.A. 3844, Sec. 167, as amended by R.A. 6389, Sec. 33). It is common knowledge, nonetheless, supported by the testimony of field personnel and formal studies of the question (for instance, Lopez 1971) that a large percentage of so-called lessees are actually "compromise" lessees, who either have no written leasehold contract, or have one which has little relation to the actual agreement they have reached with their landlords.<sup>36</sup>

The fact that the landlords of most lessees did in fact approve their conversion is indicated by a variety of facts. To begin with, we note that lessees have as their landlords the same landowners for whom they earlier worked long years as share tenants. Had bad feeling existed when the change in tenurial status was made, the tenant predictably would have severed his relationship with the landlord and gone elsewhere. This we know from the farming histories collected from respondents.

Second, although they are not required to do so, about half of the landlords still lend money to at least some of their share-tenants-turned-lessees.<sup>37</sup> This continued support implies in the landlord a favorable attitude toward the change in tenant status.

Finally, landlords who have only lessees think very highly of them, rating the average lessee second only to themselves and higher than the average share tenant. However, an exception to this general trend of approval is found among landlords who have both share tenants and lessees. They tend to express low esteem for lessees, placing them lowest among the groups they rate.<sup>38</sup>

Where approval is given, the transition to leasehold status, whether compromise or genuine, can be relatively easy. Where the assent is lacking, the conversion may be extremely stressful or even effectively blocked; the ultimate outcome may well be the ejection of the tenant, or his gradual reduction to an intolerable state of penury — all within the law.<sup>39</sup> When landlord and tenant are of one mind on the conversion, they will likely reach agreement on the amount of rent to be paid (or at least written into the contract) without recourse to the agrarian court. Where no such agreement has been reached, the likelihood is that there will be a protracted legal dispute resulting either in an ill-tempered fixing of the rental fee, the ejection of the tenant, or his abandonment of all hope of change.<sup>40</sup>

Ejection can and does occur. The most easily established grounds for it were provided by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844). It allows the landlord (with notice or disturbance compensation) to dispossess his tenant if the landlord "or a member of his family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding . . . into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . . ." (Sec. 36 [1]).<sup>41</sup> That tenants have indeed been ejected from the land is evidenced, not only by available court records, but also by the roadside scene as one travels along the main highway from Gapan to San Jose City. Vast tracts of old rice land have been converted into residential subdivisions, in many cases with only token house construction underway or completed.

If he does not lose his right to till the landlord's soil, the tenant who goes to court will very likely lose any claim on the landlord's good will. For in local eyes one of the most serious offenses that a tenant or landlord can commit against his partner is to bring him to court. One often hears something like this: "His landlord is angry with him because he brought his landlord to court" (*Galit ang kanyang kasama dahil binatís niyá*). This action predictably leads to strained relations, a suspension of any existing extra-legal assistance and ultimate-



ly, to the departure of the tenant to find a new landlord.<sup>42</sup>

5. *As a rule, the more wealthy and better educated a landlord is, the more likely he will be to approve his tenant's shifting to leasehold status.*

Lessee and lessee-share landlords, compared with others, tend to have higher educational attainment, more frequent exposure to mass media, and greater wealth — the latter measured by travel, number of residences, and number of passenger vehicles.<sup>43</sup> The connection between these various factors and favorable attitude toward leasehold conversion is multiplex. Involved as well are greater awareness of the law and the government's land-reform goals, greater likelihood of being the target of land-reform teams, and less likelihood of depending solely on farm income.

#### *Not Reverting to Share Tenancy*

From what we have just said, it is clear that for many, perhaps most, of today's lessees the problem is not so much how to *remain* genuine lessees, but how to move *into* that status from their present compromise leasehold position. In either case, the solution is the same: finding an alternative to the landlord's support, generally a private moneylender, a kinsman, or the government, or somehow convincing the landlord (or agreeing) to follow a genuine lease-rental arrangement while still receiving the landlord's credit assistance.

6. *The government's agrarian-reform program (R.A. 3844, amended by R.A. 6389), as planned, contains all elements necessary for the successful and permanent shifting of share tenants to leasehold and owner-operator status.*

In overall conception, the agrarian-reform program is well thought through. It provides the legal framework and promises all those support services which experience indicates the share tenants must possess in order to become independent of his landlord and, ultimately, free of government help as well. There are a number of details which need amendment, as Basilio de los Reyes points out elsewhere in this volume, but by and large the plan is a sound one.

7. *If the government is to prevent genuine lessees from reverting to clandestine share tenancy, and to assist large numbers of compromise lessees to become truly independent, it must dramatically accelerate the implementation of its land-reform program.*

Implementation of the government's land-reform program has been such — even in the showcase province, Nueva Ecija — that only a minority of lessees are genuinely so because of government support. The remainder are either genuine lessees thanks to private moneylenders or lenient landlords, or both, or are lessees of the compromise variety.

That the government has not been able to implement with real vitality its land-reform plans and programs is well known. If the findings of our study were not enough, we need only ask the government representatives themselves. Well-trained technocrats in positions of authority are especially likely sources of undoctored information on the present state of the program.<sup>44</sup> Some common observations follow.

As of February 1971, the *credit program* in Nueva Ecija had assisted a minority of lessees. In fact, only 24 percent of lessees reported having received any fund from the ACA or Facoma. In the next crop year (1971–72) the coverage was raised to only about one third of the lessees (see B. de los Reyes 1972). As we have seen, the majority of both lessees and share tenants still patronize the traditional sources of credit (landlords, kinsmen, moneylenders) and still pay the same interest charges (*tersiahan*, *talinduwa*, and even *takipan*) that their great-grandfathers did. This failure to serve a greater number of prospective borrowers is due in part to a shortage of appropriated loan funds and in part to failure in the machinery designed to bring lessees and funds into effective contact with one another — and at the time when funds are needed.<sup>45</sup>

The principal element in the program's service-delivery system is the *extension worker*. We take the farm management technician as an example. Only 50 to 60 percent of lessees have had any kind of work-relationship with an FMT — a figure which is actually *high* when one

considers the proportionately small numbers and low salaries of these crucial personnel. Yet the FMT is supposed to be one of the lessee's strongest links with the land-reform program and its services.

Lessees are aware of the possible advantages of belonging to *farmers' organizations and cooperatives*. In fact, 63 percent reported that they were members of one or more such associations. The possible advantages are in fact frequently not realized. Among the principal reasons for membership in the Facoma, for instance, is the expectation of a commodity loan, yet red tape, lack of funds, and misuse of available funds very often leaves the lessee with no recourse other than the private individual, especially the moneylender (45 percent) or the landlord (20 percent).

Not finding in the government program the aid they need, great numbers of "lessees" rely on their landlords for the various kinds of assistance they used to get as share tenants. They look for help with farming expenses (Table 6) and for a variety of other needs, and expect the leaders of farmers' organizations to play the role of mediators to win such concessions from their landlords (Table 21). By and large, *they are lessees by the landlord's leave*.

This puts the compromise lessees in what must be a very uncomfortable position. In fact, the notable antagonism expressed by lessees in rating the average landlord (6.7 on the 0-10 scale; ranking them fifth out of the five roles) is probably a reflection of this sensed ambivalence: by legal fiction on their own, many lessees are forced nonetheless to depend on the voluntary bounty of those from whom they were supposedly freed. As share tenants they had a claim in law on the assistance of their landlords; as lessees, their claim is one in charity. Compared to the share tenant, the lessee is clearly more concerned that he get the kind of help that will make his farm more productive (Table 23) — he is more businesslike in mentality — but to get that help he must still assume the same subservient posture he did before his change of status. Under such circumstances, and until the average lessee gets his

credit and connections elsewhere, or has his intermediate status legitimized and regulated by law, he will remain, as he is today, a *reluctant rebel*.

### *Leasehold to Ownership*

A stereotype prevalent among those who are concerned about land reform but not very close to those most involved in it is that every tiller of the soil yearns for the day when that good earth will be *his*. The fact is that some do but most do not. What all of them do want, however, is *security*.

8. *The desire to become a landowner should not be presumed in a lessee or share tenant. It is a fact to be ascertained in each case.*

Asked an open-ended question about their intentions to remain in their present status, farmer-respondents answered, in general, Yes, No, or Not sure. Those who said they definitely wanted to change their status, to become something or someone else, were only 8 percent of lessees and 24 percent of share tenants. Those who further said they wanted to become landowners were only 6 percent of lessees and 4 percent of share tenants.

The desire of share tenants and lessees to own their farms was probed in two other contexts: one was an open-ended inquiry regarding the good life, while the other was an explicit question as to which they preferred, to own the land they worked or to have an assured continued right to farm it. As a part of the good life, landownership was mentioned by 25 percent of lessees and 20 percent of share tenants, a goal that trailed after the desire to stay solvent (100-90 percent) and to find some means of support other than farming (31-33 percent).<sup>46</sup>

When the question was put to them another way, offering them the alternatives of owning the land they worked or having an assured right to continue farming it, a greater percentage opted for ownership — 53 percent of lessees and 45 percent of share tenants.

Considering the three sets of replies together, we judge that neither lessees nor share tenants are terribly excited, as a group, about "land for the landless." Those who seriously

want farm ownership are likely to be a rather small minority, at least at this point in time, realistic prospects of ownership being what they presently are.

9. *There are in Nueva Ecija relatively few precedents for the transition from lessee to ownership status under land-reform conditions.*

Land reform was proclaimed in Gapan in 1964, and the remaining municipalities of Nueva Ecija between 1968 and 1970 (see Note 14). Hence land reform was official and widespread (not necessarily effective) for only three years (1968-71) before our study was made. Of the 117 owner-operators among our respondents, only seven, or 6 percent, had become owners in that period, and only one of these owners definitely bought his way into ownership status. The other six say they are working land that their parents tilled, so the alternative is present that they inherited the land they now own, but had earlier been share tenants or lessees elsewhere.

#### DISCUSSION

The nation's current Code of Agrarian Reforms has its share of flaws and legal loopholes, but it does seek the twofold objective of social justice and productivity. Specifically, lawmakers have taken as the criterion of their success the replacement of rice share tenancy by landownership. For if all farms are owned by those who till them, they argue, how can average productivity fail to rise? Will not the farmer who owns or leases his land work much harder than a tenant who must, if he raises more, pay more to the owner? <sup>47</sup>

This way of thinking leads to a strategy which is simplicity itself: by any effective means, let share tenants become owners — or at least lessees — and all else will follow. Since the mere fact of status change is the solution to pressing problems of equity and production, then even unilateral measures, forcefully taken, become laudable tactics. Two of them, one the dictate of a Republic Act and the other a *modus operandi* characteristic of many land-reform personnel, are now in effect.

By the first (R.A. 6389, Sec. 3 [1]), share

tenants throughout the Philippines were in 1971 declared lessees by fiat. By the second, pressure is being put on share tenants, despite misgivings they may have, to take laggard landlords to court to get a legal decision on the rental fee they will henceforth pay. Both tactics make two big assumptions — Assumption One and Assumption Two — which postulate no change in current agrarian-reform laws.

Assumption One is basic; it supposes that conversions to leasehold and to ownership will take place under the rule of law as we now know it. It can be stated thus: *Lessees will pay rent for the land they till.* This in turn implies they may need loans to enable them to meet this annual obligation while also paying for farm inputs and subsistence needs. From this derived need comes the second assumption.

Assumption Two may be stated in these terms: *The government can and will back up its land-reform laws with the funds releases necessary to make them effective.* The need for funds is obvious, for it is illusory to think that becoming a lessee is the mark of success; remaining one is what counts, and this requires something quite different from legal fiats, Constitutional amendments, or personal zeal. The highest stack of legal proclamations, ignited by the fiercest fieldman's oratory, will not of itself (under the present rule of law) generate enough power to keep one lessee out of debt for a single day. What are needed are funds, materials, and the skillful, honest, administration of well-instructed, well-paid land-reform personnel who are dedicated to their jobs. But the necessary root of all good is money.

Unfortunately, an analysis of the pertinent statistics leads us to the distressing conclusion that the money needed to support large-scale conversion to leasehold status will not be available from the government in the foreseeable future, and even if it were, it would not be lent to the average new lessee. To begin with, a study of the available data indicates that, if past performance is any norm, we can expect land reform to receive only about one percent of all national funds budgeted and released. In Fiscal Years 1965-69 (final figures are not yet ready for 1970 or 1971), the funds actually released to

one agency or another for land-reform purposes rose from ₱32.4 million to ₱52.3 million per year; however, the percentage that this represented of all national expenditures sank steadily from 1.9 to 1.3 percent.<sup>48</sup> The trend will presumably continue downward.

In view of this pattern, and in the context of the Philippine economy (which is breaking no records for rate of growth), how long will it be before the nation can afford to implement land reform as presently planned? Think first of Nueva Ecija alone: if all of the 70,000 actual or potential lessees found there today were to be given even the inadequate technical field-service support available in 1970-71 (one FMT for every 145 lessees), and even the relatively small loans (an average of ₱717) which lessees received in the same year, the cost would be about ₱51.9 million per year. All this for inadequate and partial funding of the program *in just one province*.

At the same rates, the pan-Philippine cost of technical services and loans would be ₱1,112.7 million per year.<sup>49</sup> If in view of the percentage trend observed earlier, we assume that this amount, when actually expended, will represent no more than one percent of all national expenditures, we must expect that it will be available only when Philippine national expenditures total about ₱111.3 billion. Since releases in 1969 totaled only ₱4.1 billion, it is likely to be a long, long time (not earlier than 2000 A.D.) before we shall have the funds needed to implement the present Code of Agrarian Reforms even in the inadequate fashion to which the present discussion has been restricted.

But let us suppose that sufficient funds were available, at least for loans. Would they reach the average lessee? Would they meet his needs? Probably not. We know that the economic insecurity of the average new lessee (Christenson 1972; Fegan 1972) makes him a poor credit risk unacceptable to conservative government lending agencies (see NELRIDP credit guideline 1971). Furthermore, there is no provision for the subsistence loans which may be for him, if not a matter of life or death, at least one of sickness or relative well-being. In

either case, he will not long survive. Government loan funds, though available, will not be lent to the average poor-risk lessee.

If, on the one hand, lessees (or amortizing owners, for that matter) are to pay for their land and if, on the other, government loans are unlikely to be forthcoming in the huge amounts that will be needed to assist these new lessees and owners, then a source of auxiliary support must be found. Our task is to find new ways to finance leasehold conversion, ways to supply for the predictable inadequacy of government measures. There is hope, we believe, that under the rule of law as we know it, a course of action may be plotted which will prove more realistic than that currently pursued, less stressfull as well, and ultimately of more permanent benefit to share-tenants-turned-lessees.

The details of this alternative are not clear to us, but we suggest that the following be included among its guidelines; (a) the land-reform program will be prosecuted more vigorously than ever; (b) widespread *secure* land-ownership will remain a major criterion of success; (c) emphasis will be placed, however, on the *positive* advantages of leasehold for both the lessee and the landlord (hence fieldmen will be inhibited from setting tenants against landlords by a "shotgun-divorce" strategy, and urged to think and speak in terms of "legal separation with continuing support"); (d) landlords will not merely be *permitted* to lend money to their lessees (as they presently are under R.A. 6389, Sec. 1), but will be *encouraged* to do so, and even *rewarded* somehow for this behavior, provided they desist from the presently widespread practices of the *tersiahan*, *talinduwa*, and *takipan*, and limit their charges to the legal ceiling; (e) government funds will be available to otherwise poor-risk lessees if a preferred-risk landlord or several good-risk lessees are co-signers of the loan instrument; (f) the current ceiling of 14 percent per year for loans to lessees will be investigated to see if this figure needs adjustment in view of the real cost of money<sup>50</sup>; and (g) no matter what the final rate may be, landlords will be strictly

monitored in their collection of the loans they have made to lessees.

In brief, then, our plea is for more light, less heat; more union, less division; a positive rather than a negative approach to agrarian reform. We are not blind to the ways in which some landlords have abused and continue to abuse their tenants. But the data collected by ourselves and others indicate that these are not the majority. If they are indeed a minority, then it seems only reasonable to capitalize on this multitude of generally supportive landlords by urging them to play a more positive rôle in agrarian reform. If we can win greater support from landlords of good will — meanwhile moving forcefully against those who are delinquent — we can expect to supplement existing government personnel, materials, and funds with the combined human resources of tenants and their partners, their *kasamá*. This dependence on cooperative landlords may persist for a while, but because it is publicly acknowledged and its mechanisms monitored, there is hope that excesses may be curbed and ultimately eliminated.

#### APPENDIX A: LIST OF SURVEY BARRIOS (All in Nueva Ecija)

In the list below, the name of the municipality is printed in capital letters, e.g., ALIAGA. Following it in alphabetical order are the names of those of its barrios in which we interviewed respondents. Spelling of the names of units existing in 1960 follows the national census of that year. For more recently created units, we follow the BAEcon lists.

ALIAGA: Betes, Bucot, Poblacion West District 4, San Pablo Bata, Santo Tomas, Sunson

CABANATUAN CITY: Bantug Norte, Cabu, Ibabao-Bana, Kalawagan, Macatbong, Pamaldan, San Josep Norte, Valle Cruz

CUYAPO: Bentigan, Burgos, Butao, Cacapasán, Calancuasan Sur, District 1, District 4, Loob, Paitan Norte, Paitan Sur, Piglisán, Rizal

BONGABON: Cruz, Larcon, Rizal District

CABIAO: San Roque

CARRANGLAN: Burgos, Piut, San Agustin

GABALDON: Bagong Sikat, Bantug Luma, Ligaya, Macasandal

GAPAN: Sto. Cristo Sur

GEN. NATIVIDAD: Kabulihan, Magasawang Sampaloc

GEN. TINIO: Pias

GUIMBA: Ayos-Lombay, Bacayao, Bagong Barrio, Balingag East, Balingag West, Bunol, Faigal, Lenec, Macapabellag, Manacsac, Narvacan II, Partida 1st, San Miguel

JAEN: Lambakin, Langla, Pamacpacan, Pitak, San Roque

LAUR: Nauzon, San Isidro, Siclong

LICAB: San Cristobal, Sta. Maria

LLANERA: Gen. Ricarte, Ligaya, Mabini, San Felipe

LUPAO: Agupalo Weste, Balbalugiao, Burgos, Cordero

MUÑOZ: Bagong Sikat, Bantug, Calabalabuan, Curva, Mangandingoy, Pandalla, Poblacion West, Rizal, San Andres, San Felipe

NAMPICUAN: Cabawañgan, San Ricardo, Tony

PANTABANGAN: Cumbitala, Sampaloc, Villarica

PEÑARANDA: Callos

QUEZON: Bertese, Ilog Baliwag, San Andres, Sta. Rita

RIZAL: Curva, Pag-asa, Poblacion, Sta. Monica, Villa Paraiso

SAN ANTONIO: Luyos, Panabifigan, Sta. Cruz

STO. DOMINGO: Cabugao, Comitang, Concepcion, San Fabian, San Francisco, Sto. Rosario

SAN ISIDRO: Alua, Malapit, San Roque, Tabon

SAN JOSE: Abar 1st, Kaliwanagan, Parang Manggo, San Agustin, San Mauricio, Santo Niño 1st, Santo Niño 3rd, Sibut, Sinipit-bubon

SAN LEONARDO: Mambangnan, Nieves, San Anton, San Roque, Tambo-Tabuating

STA. ROSA: Cojuangco, La Fuente, Liwayway, Soledad

TALAVERA: Bagong Silang, Bakal 3, Bantug, Calipahan, Casulucan Este, Homestead 1, Kinalangayan, Lombay, Mabuhay, Minabuyok

TALUGTOG: Cenense, Culliat, District 2, District 3, Maasin, Mayamot II, Patola, Saverona

ZARAGOSA: Gen. Luna, H. Romero, Macarse, Sta. Lucia Bata

APPENDIX B: PROJECT STAFF AND  
RESOURCE PERSONS

*Project director:* Romana Pahilanga-de los Reyes

*Project consultants and resource persons:* Frank Lynch, S.J. and Susan M. Bennett, *consultants:* Cornelio van der Aar, M.S.C., Glicerio S. Abad, S.J., Diosdado Alberto, Wilfredo F. Arce, Milton Barnett, Bernardo Basi, Potenciano Belza, Mauro Capinpin, John J. Carroll, S.J., Gelia T. Castillo, David Christenson, Hedefonso Cruz, Mamerto Damasco, Frank Denton, Arsenio Exconde, Lewis Gleeck, Mary R. Hollensteiner, Ben Kerkvliet, Gerald Korzan, Jose Lawas, Jose Medina, Jr., Francis J. Murray, Cesar Nalundasan, Jerry Ogawa, Leonardo Paulino, Basilio de los Reyes, Severino Santiago, Eipidio Sta. Romana, David Szanton, Oscar Tobias, and Levy Trinidad, *resource persons.*

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Ferrer, Aurora Francisco, Milagros Gabriel, Cesar Gamboa, Simeon Ganao, Romeo Israel, Angelito Notarte, Pastor Reyes, Jr., Lydia Salmansa, Lolita Salvatierni, and Francisca Samson, *rice-farmer study:* Nestor Eugenio, Bienvenido Ferrer, Simeon Ganao, Angelito Notarte, and Inocencio Sagun, Jr., *landlord study.*

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*Office services:* Fermina T. Dumaul, Purificacion I. Roca, and Mila Njewa-Serion, *secretarial services:* Thelma G. Padero and Carolina V. Carabuena, *accounting:* Apolinario M. Borja, William E. Chan, and Jesus B. Lazarito, *supplies.*

#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Pilipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "mangá"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (ˆ). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Pilipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## APPENDIX C: TABLES FOR "RELUCTANT REBELS"

Table 1. Farm barrios of Nueva Ecija, sample barrios, and sample farm households, classified by type of barrio (August 1969)

Type of barrio	All farming barrios		Sample barrios		Sample households	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Irrigated (one harvest)						
Less than 151 has.	92	15%	23	15%	210	13%
151 - 400 has.	77	12	19	12	166	10
401 has. and above	27	4	7	4	121	7
Irrigated (two harvests)						
Less than 151 has.	129	20	32	20	294	18
151 - 400 has.	40	6	10	6	170	11
401 has. and above	14	2	3	2	57	4
Non-irrigated						
Less than 151 has.	70	11	17	11	81	5
151 - 400 has.	107	17	27	17	227	14
401 has. and above	70	11	17	11	278	17
All other barrios	11	2	2	1	13	1
TOTAL	637	100%	157	99%	1,617	100%

Table 2. BAEcon Nueva Ecija October 1970 sample and IPC/BAEcon sample, classified by type of barrio (February 1971)

Type of barrio	October 1970 BAEcon rice-farmers sample		IPC/BAEcon 1971 rice-farmers sample	
	N	%	N	%
Irrigated (one harvest)				
Less than 151 has.	154	13%	132	13%
151 - 400 has.	137	11	110	11
401 has. and above	84	7	69	7
Irrigated (two harvests)				
Less than 151 has.	213	18	184	18
151 - 400 has.	120	10	105	10
401 has. and above	42	4	39	4
Non-irrigated				
Less than 151 has.	64	5	50	5
151 - 400 has.	172	14	141	14
401 has. and above	200	17	172	17
All other barrios	9	1	8	1
TOTAL	1,195 <sup>a</sup>	100%	1,010 <sup>b</sup>	100%

<sup>a</sup>See note 1.<sup>b</sup>See text, pp. 12-13.



Table 3. Landlords of IPC/BAEcon February 1971 tenant respondents, classified by size of palay farms reportedly owned, crossclassified by whether they are share or lessee landlords (July 1971)

Size of farm	Share landlords				Lessee landlords			
	Population		Sample		Population		Sample	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Large	13	6%	2	5%	27	18%	6	18%
Medium	14	7	3	7	20	14	5	15
Small	115	55	23	56	79	54	18	53
Very small	66	32	13	32	20	14	5	15
TOTAL	208	100%	41	100%	146	100%	34	101%

Table 4. IPC/BAEcon substitute-respondents interviewed in place of the regular respondents, classified by reason for dropping the regular respondents (February 1971)

Reason for dropping respondent	Number	Per cent
Not located during three visits in their barrio residences <sup>1</sup>	17	17%
Had transferred residence, or was out of barrio for off-farm job	61	60
Otherwise unavailable for interview <sup>2</sup>	23	22
Incomplete interview (respondent hostile)	1	1
TOTAL	102	100%

<sup>1</sup>We believe this was because of the misspelling of names.

<sup>2</sup>Reasons for this unavailability varied: had died, 3; in hospital, 1; had become mentally disturbed, 1; in jail, 1 (accused of stealing a carabao); language difficulty, 1 (mother-tongue Pangasinan speaker who knew neither Tagalog nor Iloko); had ceased farming, 7; refused interview, 9.

The nine refusals involved two barrios. In one barrio, four of the eight sample farmers refused to be interviewed, insisting that the permit to interview granted by the Mayor's representative was insufficient evidence of official approval. Caught in the middle, the interviewers chose the better part of valor. These respondents were dropped. In the second barrio, the barrio captain did not allow us to interview the sample farmers, all of whom were his tenants. Since the barrio captain had a reputation for physical violence, the team did not return to the barrio.

Table 5. Median area of house and house lot of IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents classified by respondent's tenure status, crossclassified by area of house and house lot (February 1971)

Tenure status	Area of house (sq. m.)	Area of house lot (sq. m.)
Owner-operator	32.15 (116) <sup>a</sup>	599.95 (116)
Part-owner	29.35 (68)	512.95 (67)
Lessee	27.15 (413)	411.95 (411)
LST	27.55 (40)	374.95 (40)
Share tenant	24.35 (371)	346.95 (365)
All respondents	26.95 (1008)	404.95 (999)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the number of respondents for whom we have data on area of house or area of house lot.

Table 6. Rankings given to selected role expectations of an ideal landlord freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Owner-operator (N=111)	Lessee (N=402)	Share tenant (N=365)	Part-owner (N=64)	LST (N=38)
1 Shares farm expenses	2 (53) <sup>a</sup>	2 (171)	1 (227)	1 (41)	1 (30)
2 Is courteous, or pleasant	1 (64)	1 (212)	3.5 (155)	2 (39)	2 (21)
3.5 Provides fringe benefits	3.5 (36)	7 (104)	2 (159)	3.5 (21)	5.5 (9)
3.5 Asks a just interest on loans	3.5 (36)	5 (132)	5 (108)	5 (15)	3 (17)
5 Has good farming arrangement	5 (35)	3 (139)	6 (79)	6 (13)	4 (11)
6 Is law-abiding	7.5 (26)	4 (136)	8 (52)	3.5 (21)	5.5 (9)
7 Extends credit	6 (27)	6 (131)	3.5 (155)	8 (11)	7 (8)
8 Is solicitous, or helpful in general	7.5 (26)	8 (72)	7 (74)	7 (12)	8 (5)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was, freely mentioned.

Table 7. Rankings given to selected role expectations of an ideal landlord freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-landlord respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by type of landlord-ranker (July 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Share (N=34)	Lessee (N=18)	LSL (N=21)
1	Provides fringe benefits	1 (24) <sup>a</sup>	3 (8)	1.5 (12)
2	Is courteous, or pleasant	2 (23)	2 (13)	4 (10)
3	Paternalistic	5 (15)	4 (7)	1.5 (12)
4	Extends credit	3 (19)	6.5 (5)	3 (11)
5	Shares farming expenses	4 (17)	1 (14)	8 (5)
6	Asks a just interest on loans	6 (8)	5 (6)	6 (7)
7.5	Is solicitous, or helpful	7.5 (7)	8 (3)	5 (8)
8	Has good farming arrangement	7.5 (7)	6.5 (5)	7 (6)
9	Is law-abiding	9 (6)	9 (2)	9 (1)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 8. Rankings given to selected common failings of imperfect landlords freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by failing, crossclassified by tenure of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Common failing	Owner-operator (N=64)	Lessee (N=269)	Share tenant (N=201)	Part-owner (N=44)	LST (N=30)
1	Ask unjust interest on loans	2 (20) <sup>a</sup>	2 (87)	1 (79)	1 (16)	1 (12)
2	Are discourteous, or unpleasant	1 (33)	1 (98)	2 (68)	3 (12)	2 (11)
3	Have undesirable farming arrangement	3.5 (12)	3 (75)	3 (46)	2 (14)	4.5 (4)
4	Do not share farm expenses	7.5 (5)	6 (39)	4 (40)	4 (9)	3 (7)
5	Do not extend credit	3.5 (12)	5 (43)	8 (23)	5.5 (7)	6 (3)
6	Do not follow the law	6 (7)	4 (64)	5 (35)	7 (6)	8 (1)
7	Do not provide fringe benefits	5 (8)	7 (27)	6 (31)	5.5 (7)	7 (2)
8	Are solicitous, or helpful in general	7.5 (5)	8 (25)	7 (24)	8 (3)	4.5 (4)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a common failing was freely mentioned.

Table 9. Selected common failings of imperfect landlords freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-landlord respondents, classified by frequency of mention and rank order (July) 1971)

Common failing	Frequency of mention	Rank order
Are discourteous, or unpleasant	16	1
Do not extend credit	14	2
Ask unjust interest on loans	13	3
Have undesirable farming arrangement	8	4
Are not solicitous, nor helpful in general	6	5
Do not follow the law	3	7.5
Do not share farm expenses	3	7.5

Table 10. Rankings given to selected expectations of an ideal share tenant freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon rice-farmer respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Share tenant (N=366)	Part-owner (N=36)	LST (N=7)
1	Is industrious	1 (192) <sup>a</sup>	1 (20)	2 (4)
2	Is honest, especially in complying with sharing agreement	2 (100)	3 (11)	1 (6)
3	Is courteous to superior	3 (128)	4 (10)	3 (3)
4	Is a good subordinate	4 (122)	2 (14)	5.5 (1)
5.5	Has technical know-how	5 (104)	6 (7)	5.5 (1)
5.5	Is a good farmer in general	6 (87)	5 (8)	5.5 (1)
7	Is courteous to others in general	7 (70)	7 (6)	5.5 (1)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.



Table 11. Rankings given to selected expectations of an ideal lessee freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Lessee (N=407)	Part-owner (N=29)	LST (N=33)
1	Is honest, especially in complying with lease agreement	1 (388) <sup>a</sup>	1 (29)	1 (33)
2	Is industrious	2 (202)	2 (8)	2 (16)
3	Is courteous to superior	4 (92)	3 (7)	3 (11)
4	Has technical know-how	3 (102)	4.5 (5)	4 (9)
5	Is a good farmer in general	5 (72)	4.5 (5)	5.5 (4)
6	Is courteous to others in general	7 (51)	6 (4)	5.5 (4)
7	Is a good subordinate	6 (57)	7 (1)	7 (3)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 12. Rankings given to selected role expectations of an ideal share tenant freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-landlord respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by type of landlord-ranker (July 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Share (N=34)	Lessee (N=16)	LSL (N=21)
1	Is industrious	1 (28) <sup>a</sup>	2 (11)	1 (19)
2	Is honest, especially in complying with share agreement	2 (22)	1 (13)	2 (17)
3	Has technical know-how	3 (17)	3.5 (5)	3 (7)
4	Is a good farmer in general	4 (14)	3.5 (5)	5.5 (4)
5	Is a good subordinate	5 (11)	5 (3)	4 (5)
6	Is courteous to superior	6 (6)	6 (2)	5.5 (4)
7	Is courteous to others in general	7 (5)	7 (1)	7 (2)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 13. Rankings given to selected common failings of imperfect lessees and share tenants most frequently mentioned by IPC/BAEcon rice-farmer respondents, classified by failing, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Common failing	Lessee (N=147)	Share tenant (N=157)
Are dishonest, especially in complying with farming agreement	1 (84) <sup>a</sup>	1 (61)
Lack farming capital	2 (31)	6 (10)
Are lazy	3 (30)	2 (60)
Are discourteous to superior	4 (16)	5 (12)
Are subordinates	5, (13)	3 (24)
Are discourteous to others in general	6 (6)	4 (22)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a common failing was freely mentioned.

Table 14. Rankings given to selected expectations of an ideal overseer freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Owner-operator (N=94)	Lessee (N=355)	Share tenant (N=284)	Part-owner (N=52)	LST (N=34)
1	Is courteous, or pleasant	1 (87) <sup>a</sup>	1 (274)	1 (208)	1 (30)	1 (26)
2	Is competent	2 (43)	2 (173)	2 (132)	4 (17)	2 (14)
3	Is a good mediator	3 (33)	3 (153)	3 (108)	2.5 (18)	4 (12)
4	Is solicitous, or helpful in general	4 (24)	4 (81)	6 (57)	2.5 (18)	5 (8)
5	Is a good subordinate	5.5 (19)	5 (70)	4.5 (62)	6 (11)	6 (7)
6	Is fair in treating tenants	5.5 (19)	6 (66)	4.5 (62)	6 (14)	6 (2)
7	Is honest to landlord	7 (14)	7 (58)	7 (42)	7 (9)	3 (13)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 15. Selected expectations for an ideal overseer freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-landlord respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by frequency of mention and rank order (July 1971)

Expectation	Frequency of mention	Rank order
Is honest to landlord.	59	1
Is competent	52	2
Is courteous, or pleasant	46	3
Is solicitous, or helpful in general	12	4
Is a good mediator	9	5
Is a good subordinate	8	6
Is fair in treating tenants	3	7

Table 16. Rankings given to selected most common failings of imperfect overseers freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by failing, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Common failing	Owner-operator (N=55)	Lessee (N=196)	Share tenant (N=132)	Part-owner (N=23)	LST (N=21)
1	Are discourteous, or unpleasant	1 (22) <sup>a</sup>	1 (76)	1 (41)	2 (8)	1 (14)
2	Are corrupt	3 (13)	4 (35)	3 (23)	1 (11)	3 (4)
3	Are unjust in treating tenants	2 (19)	2 (71)	2 (38)	4.5 (3)	4 (3)
4	Are not solicitous, nor helpful	4 (6)	3 (39)	4 (21)	4.5 (3)	2 (5)
5	Are incompetent	5 (5)	5 (32)	5 (15)	3 (7)	5 (2)
6	Are "squealers"	7 (1)	6 (15)	6 (11)	6.5 (2)	6 (1)
7	Are poor mediators	6 (2)	7 (11)	7 (5)	6.5 (2)	7 (1)

The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a common failing was freely mentioned.

Table 17. Rankings given by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents to selected reasons why they wish to have a farmers' organization in their barrio residences, classified by reason, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Reason	Owner-operator (N=38)	Lessee (N=145)	Share tenant (N=172)	Part-owner (N=34)	LST (N=15)
1	To develop unity	2 (9) <sup>a</sup>	1 (65)	1 (59)	1 (13)	1 (5)
2	To assist in solving problems	1 (14)	2 (31)	2 (38)	4.5 (5)	3 (3)
3	To help towards the progress of farmers	3.5 (8)	5 (19)	3 (35)	2 (8)	4 (2)
4	To help in acquiring loans	6 (2)	3 (26)	5 (21)	3 (7)	2 (4)
5	To develop cooperation among farmers	3.5 (8)	4 (20)	4 (27)	4.5 (5)	5.5 (1)
6	To mediate in landlord-tenant disputes	7 (1)	6 (12)	6 (11)	6.5 (1)	5.5 (1)
7	To develop cordial relations among farmers	5 (3)	7 (11)	7 (7)	6.5 (1)	7 (1)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a reason was freely mentioned.

Table 18. Rankings given by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents to selected reasons why they do not wish to have a farmers' organization in their barrio residences, classified by reason, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Reason	Owner-operator (N=18)	Lessee (N=29)	Share tenant (N=35)	Part-owner (N=6)	LST (N=6)
1	Will not benefit farmers	1 (6) <sup>a</sup>	1 (9)	3.5 (4)	2 (3)	1.5 (2)
2	Will disturb work	3 (3)	2 (6)	5 (3)	1 (4)	1.5 (2)
3	Farmers in barrio are not united	2 (4)	3.5 (4)	3.5 (4)	3 (1)	4 (1)
4	Will develop conflict between landlords and tenants	4.5 (2)	5.5 (2)	2 (9)	5 (1)	4 (1)
5	Landlords meet tenants needs	6 (1)	5.5 (2)	1 (14)	5 (1)	4 (1)
6	Have other sources of loans	4.5 (2)	3.5 (4)	6 (1)	5 (1)	6 (1)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a reason was freely mentioned.



Table 19. Rankings given to selected expectations of an ideal farm management technician freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Expectation	Owner-operator (N=76)	Lessee (N=242)	Share tenant (N=193)	Part-tenant owner (N=43)	LST (N=27)
1	Is competent	1 (57) <sup>a</sup>	1 (217)	1 (181)	1 (40)	1 (27)
2	Contacts farmers frequently	3 (36)	2 (115)	2 (69)	2 (20)	2 (14)
3	Is a good adviser, or consultant	2 (37)	3 (100)	3 (68)	3 (15)	3.5 (6)
4	Is courteous, or pleasant	5 (11)	4.5 (34)	5 (23)	4 (6)	5 (3)
5	Is solicitous, or helpful in general	4 (16)	4.5 (34)	4 (25)	7.5 (2)	6.5 (2)
6	Is industrious, or efficient	7 (7)	6 (27)	6 (21)	5 (4)	8 (1)
7	Provides farm needs	6 (9)	8 (14)	7 (19)	6 (3)	6.5 (2)
8	Is a good mediator	8 (6)	7 (21)	8 (15)	7.5 (2)	3.5 (6)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 20. Rankings given to selected common failings of imperfect farm management technicians freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by failing, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Common failing	Owner-operator (N=25)	Lessee (N=82)	Share tenant (N=55)	Part-owner (N=12)	LST (N=8)
1	Lack contact with farmers	3 (12) <sup>a</sup>	1 (49)	1 (37)	1.5 (8)	1 (5)
2	Are lazy	1 (18)	2 (40)	2 (27)	1.5 (8)	2.5 (4)
3	Are corrupt	2 (13)	3 (30)	3 (22)	3 (7)	2.5 (4)
4	Are solicitous, or helpful	4 (5)	4.5 (10)	6 (5)	4.5 (2)	7 (2)
5	Are unfair in treating tenants	7 (1)	6 (8)	8 (1)	4.5 (2)	4 (3)
6.5	Are poor advisers, or consultants	8 (1)	4.5 (10)	7 (4)	7.5 (1)	5 (1)
6.5	Are discourteous, or unpleasant	6 (2)	7 (5)	4.5 (6)	7.5 (1)	7 (2)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a common failing was freely mentioned.

Table 21. Rankings given to selected expectations of an ideal leader of a farmers' organization freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by expectation, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971).

Average rank order	Expectation	Owner-operator (N=87)	Lessee (N=308)	Share tenant (N=259)	Part-owner (N=53)	LST (N=32)
1	Is a mediator to landlord	3 (37) <sup>a</sup>	2 (146)	1 (140)	1 (25)	1 (18)
2	Is solicitous, or helpful in general	2 (43)	1 (155)	3 (116)	3 (21)	2 (15)
3	Is courteous, or pleasant	1 (44)	3 (136)	2 (118)	4 (17)	4 (8)
4	Provides leadership for unified decision and activities	4 (23)	4 (77)	4 (94)	2 (22)	2 (9)
5	Has technical know-how	6 (13)	5.5 (60)	5 (36)	5 (13)	6 (3)
6	Is literate	5 (14)	7 (39)	6 (35)	6 (11)	7 (1)
7	Is a mediator to government	7 (7)	5.5 (60)	7 (31)	7 (8)	5 (6)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an expectation was freely mentioned.

Table 22. Rankings given to selected common failings of imperfect leaders of farmers' organizations, classified by failing, crossclassified by tenure status of farmer-ranker (February 1971)

Average rank order	Common failing	Owner-operator (N=32)	Lessee (N=91)	Share tenant (N=64)
1	Lack leadership qualities	1 (12) <sup>a</sup>	1 (38)	1 (27)
2	Are not helpful, or solicitous	2 (9)	4 (12)	2 (19)
3	Are corrupt or materialistic	3 (8)	3 (20)	3 (9)
4	Are unjust in treating members	4.5 (3)	2 (24)	5 (5)
5	Are discourteous	4.5 (3)	5 (8)	6 (1)
6	Poor mediator	6 (2)	6 (7)	4 (6)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which a common failing was freely mentioned.

Table 23. Rankings given to selected items that mean a good life, freely mentioned most frequently by IPC/BAEcon Nueva Ecija rice-farmer respondents, classified by item, crossclassified by tenure status (February 1971)

Average rank order	Selected item	Owner-operator (N=114)	Lessee (N=403)	Share tenant (N=363)	Part-owner (N=66)	LST (N=40)
1	Enough food and money for subsistence	1 (56) <sup>a</sup>	1 (281)	1 (247)	1 (54)	1 (26)
2	Education for children	2 (46)	8 (54)	4 (94)	2 (28)	2 (22)
3	Job other than farming	3 (35)	3 (127)	2 (125)	6 (12)	5 (8)
4	Not being indebted	5 (26)	2 (149)	3 (109)	5 (14)	6 (7)
5	Money for farm expenses and equipment	7 (14)	5 (79)	8 (44)	3.5 (16)	3.5 (13)
6.5	Owning a farm	8 (9)	4 (103)	5 (75)	7 (11)	3.5 (13)
6.5	Bigger harvest.	4 (28)	6 (63)	6 (65)	3.5 (16)	8 (5)
8	Improvement of house	6 (15)	7 (56)	7 (55)	8 (5)	7 (6)

<sup>a</sup>The figure in parentheses is the frequency with which an item was freely mentioned.

## Notes

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The authors express their special appreciation to Dr. Leonardo A. Paulino, Director, and to all participating BAEcon personnel in the home office (Quezon City) and in the Region III and Nueva Ecija provincial offices (Cabanatuan City). They are also grateful for the assistance of Director Jose C. Medina, Jr., Plans and Programs Office of the National Land Reform Council (NLRC) and all the NLRC fieldmen and officers who helped in the study. The names of many others who gave assistance of one kind or another are mentioned in the notes.

The senior author, Mrs. de los Reyes, is a research associate of the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila. She received her M.A. in anthropology from the Ateneo in 1970. Before becoming director of the Nueva Ecija project reported here, she had been deputy-director of the IPC's study of sugarcane workers (see Lynch 1970a and 1970b, Pahlilanga-de los Reyes 1971). Fr. Lynch is the program coordinator, IPC, and professor of anthropology, department of sociology and anthropology, Ateneo de Manila.

1. Our analysis showed that there were some BAEcon respondents who were no longer rice farmers, had stopped farming altogether, or had three tenure statuses during a single cropping season. We eliminated these respondents (134), leaving a total of 1,195 rice farmers.

2. In August 1969 there were 637 farming barrios (out of 654 revenue barrios) in Nueva Ecija. Twenty-five percent sample barrios were proportionately drawn from these farming barrios which were classified into four major types based on (a) whether or not the barrio was irrigated, and (b) the number of harvests in one crop year. Each category was further divided according to its hectareage planted to rice (a) barrios having an area of 150 hectares or less, (b) barrios with 151 to 400 hectares, and (c) barrios with 401 hectares or more. The sample households were randomly selected among households in the sample barrios (BAEcon 1969: 2-4). See Table 1, Appendix C.

3. BAEcon specified that the area reported as harvested might not be the total area cultivated. It could refer exclusively to the area for which a harvest was reported.

4. We are thankful to Atty. Lazaro Villarosa, head of the Provincial Assessor's Office, and to Mr. Alfredo Parungao, deputy assessor, for helping us look at the records.

5. Key informants in Nueva Ecija agreed on this manner of classifying types of landlords based on total area of palay farms.

6. We wish to express heartfelt thanks to Mr. Ildefonso Cruz, Regional Director, BAEcon Region III and his staff in Cabanatuan City for giving us various forms of assistance during the field work, especially by allowing us to hold office in the BAEcon Cabanatuan office. The project director is also grateful to Dr. and Mrs. Antonio Abesamis, with whom she stayed during the fieldwork.

7. During this fieldwork period, research associate Amabel Briones made a special contribution to the smoothness of our operations. She added to her efficient handling of routine duties an effective concern for the morale and physical well-being of the field personnel.

8. We are thankful to Barrio Captains Epifanio Mendoza and Jacinto Segulg at Bo. Burgos and Bo. San Agustin, Carranglan, respectively, and Catalino Camus, a farmer and relative of the team leader assigned to Gabaldon, who generously offered temporary quarters for the teams. We also wish to acknowledge the assistance of the following data collectors of the BAEcon Nueva Ecija office who helped our field staff in locating farmer respondents: Corazon Andres, Pablo Fermin, Antonio Mariano, and Guillermo Salvatierra.

9. Normando de Leon, a sociology graduate student of Ateneo and research associate of this study, supervised the interviewing of Nueva Ecija landlords. Mr. de Leon had worked with the project since it began, and hence had been involved in all its aspects. The project director is personally indebted to him because he volunteered on several occasions for difficult field tasks he might legitimately have declined.

10. Bernal's (1967) study of Quezon, Laguna, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija landlords reports that in most cases she and her staff interviewed the landlords "without the benefit of printed questionnaire before them" because they anticipated that the landlords would refuse a formal interview.

11. We are grateful to Marie Constance Yuchengco, a Filipino senior psychology major of Newton College of the Sacred Heart (Newton, Mass., U.S.A.). Home for the summer holidays, she volunteered to administer the TAT to the Greater Manila area landlord respondents and to score the protocols. We would also like to thank the following: Dr. Patricia B. Licuanan, chairman of the department of psychology, Ateneo de Manila, and Alfred B. Bennett, Jr., visiting research associate of the IPC, for their suggestions regarding ways of handling the psychological aspects of the study, and Bertha Valisno-Nuke, for helping score the TAT protocols. This substudy is not yet completed.

12. A lessee-share tenant is a farmer who cultivates two or more parcels of land, at least one of which he leases and one or more he farms as a share tenant. A part-owner is a tenant who also owns some land.

13. Percentages in parentheses follow the same order as the categories of respondents mentioned in the statement which these statistics follow. The level of

significance, generally placed after a semi-colon, is derived from the chi-square test for two independent samples.

14. While only one municipality, Gapan was proclaimed a land-reform town in August 1964, 22 municipalities were so proclaimed in April 1968. These municipalities were Guimba, Cuyao, Nampicuan, Llanera, Talavera, Sto. Domingo, Licab, Quezon, Muñoz, San Jose City, Gen. Natividad, Cabiao, San Isidro, Aliaga, Jaen, San Antonio, Sta. Rosa, San Leonardo, Bongabon, Laur, Zaragosa, and Cabanatuan City. In June 1969, Lupao became a land-reform municipality. Then in July 1970, the remaining towns, namely, Carranglan, Rizal, Talugtug, Palayan City, Gabaldon, Peñaranda, and Gen. Tinio were added. Only Pantabangan, the site of the Upper Pampanga River Irrigation Project and a large part of which will be submerged when the irrigation dam is completed, has not been proclaimed a land-reform municipality.

15. The Kendall Coefficient of Concordance  $W$  was used. It was also used to measure agreement among the five tenure groups in their expectations of a good lessee, share tenant, overseer, farm management technician, and leader of farmers' organizations. "A high or significant value of  $W$  may be interpreted as meaning that observers or judges are applying essentially the same 'standard' in ranking the  $N$  objects under study. . . . If one accepts the criterion which the various judges have agreed upon (as evidenced by the magnitude and significance of  $W$ ) in ranking the  $N$  entities, then the best estimate of the 'true' ranking of those entities according to that criterion is provided by the order of the sums of ranks" (Siegel 1956: 237-38).

We are reminded by this note to thank Susan M. Bennett, visiting research associate of the IPC and one of the consultants of this study, for her continual help in statistical matters.

16. The following other pairs of rice-farmer tenure groups show varying closeness of agreement in ranking the expectations of an ideal landlord: owner-operators and part-owners, 0.05; owner-operators and LSTs, 0.01; part-owners and LSTs, 0.05; and lessees and LSTs, 0.01. The Spearman rank-correlation coefficient  $r$  was used for all these comparisons, as well as to test the measure of association for the ranking of expectations between any pair of groups reported below.

17. Data supporting the first half of this statement are found in a later section, on awareness of farmers' organizations.

18. Lessees, part-owners, and LSTs are also in close agreement (0.01) on their expectations of the ideal lessee. The share tenants', part-owners', and LSTs' expectations of a share tenant also agree significantly (0.05).

19. The degree to which the various kinds of respondents agree on this average rank order of qualities varies little: owner-operators and lessees, 0.01; owner-operators and share tenants, 0.05; owner-operators and part-owners, 0.05; and lessees and LSTs, 0.05.

20. The role of the FMT is included in the list of functions prescribed for extension workers who will assist in the implementation of land reform (R.A. 3844, Sec. 124, as amended by R.A. 6389, Sec. 27).

21. The replies of only these three tenure groups were analyzed here for the purposes of the present report.

22. Officials of the Masaka office, Cabanatuan City, were helpful when we were identifying the barrios where Masaka had been organized.

23. A copy of this statement of duties was obtained from the Personnel Division of the National Land Reform Council, Quezon City. For this and for various forms of assistance we are thankful to Mr. Jose C. Medina, Jr., Director of the Plans and Programs Office of the NLRC.

24. Of the figures in parentheses, the first one following the semi-colon is the usual level of significance derived from a chi-square test for two independent samples. The figure that follows this (with no zero before the decimal point) is the Gamma value. The Gamma test measures strength, or magnitude, of association, whereas the chi-square test measures the significance of association. For further information, see, for example, Zelditch 1959: 183ff.

25. It is worth noting (both here and in sections that follow) how share tenants confuse being a share tenant with being a farmer. The alternatives open to them are apparently not perceived as realistic possibilities.

26. This special treatment means especially fringe benefits other than the usual subsistence allowance. Included here would be giving the tenant a greater share than usual of the harvest, not demanding the full landlord share when production is small, not asking a share of the tenant's backyard plants, or vegetable production, and giving money for crisis rites. See Brian Fegan, "Between the lord and the law: Tenants' dilemmas," elsewhere in this volume, for further examples of benefits and their withholding.

Aside from these benefits, the landlord's kinsmen often get easy credit terms - in most cases, the landlord asks no interest on such loans. In general, landlord respondents claim that they try to keep kinsmen-tenants in any way they can.

27. The freedom of the landlord to subdivide his property in this manner was severely curtailed (in law, at least) by an amendment included in the new Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 6389, Sec. 7), but this code went into effect months after the interviews reported here.

28. This is about the same percentage of rice farmers (among 5,144 farmers in 25 provinces) that de Guzman (1958) found had gotten some form of credit in the period April 1954 to June 1955.

29. As a confirmatory aside, it may be noted that

half of both the share and lessee landlords and three-fourths of the LSLs report having given loans to their tenants. In fact, of these lenders, 100 percent of share landlords, 50 percent of lessee landlords, and 75 percent of the LSLs lend to all their tenants. The loans are generally paid at harvest time, any amount left unpaid being carried over to the following harvest. Most landlords lend to tenants because they intend to be of help: "I want to help them in their needs and, most of all, I treat them as one of the members of my family." (*Nais kong makatulong sa kanilang pangangailangan at una sa lahat tulad ng isang pamilya ang aming pagtingin sa kanila.*) "I cannot bear not to lend them especially after harvest time, when they don't have any work or job." (*Hindi ko naman sila matititi na hindi pahiram in lalo na't wala ng trabaho pagkatapos ng anihan.*)

Some specifically say that loans are given only for subsistence and farm needs. Other landlords feel extending loans is a sign of good will towards tenants, and they hope that these loans will give the tenants incentive to work harder and produce more.

30. It will be recalled that 32 percent of share tenants and 11 percent of lessees reported that they are kinsmen of their landlords, or in cases where they had more than one landlord, of at least one of them. A comparison of the debt-dealings of kinsmen-landlords with those of nonkinsmen-landlords reveals that share tenants (not lessees) are more likely to have received loans from nonkinsmen-landlords, repeat nonkinsmen-landlords, than from kinsmen-landlords (37 vs. 24 percent; chi-square  $p < 0.02$ ). Lessees are about as likely to have borrowed from kinsmen-landlords as from nonkinsmen landlords (13 vs. 14 percent; n.s.). The rates charged by kinsmen and nonkinsmen are about the same for lessees; for share tenants, kinsmen-landlords charge somewhat less than nonkinsmen (for instance, *tersihan* [33 percent] for kinsmen's loans in kind and *talinduwa* [50 percent] for nonkinsmen).

31. When we noticed during the field work that food was mentioned so often, we asked our respondents, whenever possible, the kind of food they had had at their latest breakfast, lunch, and supper. We asked this of only 16 respondents, but our limited data indicate that respondents tend to eat only vegetables and rice during the three regular meals. At most, they may have dried fish for viand. Only one reported having had meat for lunch, and another, chicken for supper.

32. On this last point our data are not clear, however. Very few replies clearly indicate that the respondent wants to leave farming in favor of some other job. Most answers can also be interpreted to mean that the respondent merely wants to have a secondary, off-farm occupation as well. This interpretation is supported by data presented in the Takahashi-Fegan exchange elsewhere in this volume.

33. For their willingness to read and comment on the findings of this study in spite of their many commitments, we are grateful to the following: Glicerio S. Abad, S.J., acting director, IPC; Dr. John J. Carroll,

S.J., research director, National Secretariat of Social Action (NASSA); Dr. Gelia T. Castillo, associate professor of rural sociology, College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines; David Christenson, USAID land reform adviser, NELRIDP; Dr. Frank Denton, deputy program officer, USAID; Lewis Gleeck, consultant, USAID; Mary R. Hollnsteiner, professor, department of sociology and anthropology, Ateneo de Manila; Dr. Gerald Korzan, project specialist in agriculture, Ford Foundation; Dr. Francis J. Murray, Jr., anthropologist and visiting research associate, IPC; Dr. Basilio de los Reyes, project director, NELRIDP; and Dr. David L. Szanton, anthropologist and assistant to the Ford Foundation representative in the Philippines.

The comment of David Christenson is printed in full under the title "Reflections on the IPC/BAEcon study," elsewhere in this volume.

34. Mindajao's (1971: 64-65) study of 60 share tenants and 60 lessees in Bulacan showed that three-fourths of share tenants who did not become lessees gave as their reason the fact that they were on good terms with their landlord.

35. Mindajao (*ibid.*) further reports that only one out of 10 of those who were currently lessees gave bad tenant-landlord feeling as their reason for leaving share tenancy.

36. The meaning of "compromise" lessee is explained in Note 37.

37. Another recent inquiry found that 47 percent of lessees remain dependent on their landlords. In his study of landlord-tenant relations in Central Luzon, Lopez (1971: 145) discovered that of the 58 lessees in his sample, 25 were not even genuine lessees according to the law (they were thinly disguised share tenants still following the old share system). Further, two of the 33 "genuine" lessees were still receiving some paralegal support from their landlords. These 27 dependent lessees he aptly calls "compromise" lessees. We accept and shall employ these two classifying terms in this paper.

Our data from lessee and share-tenant interviews indicate that lessees and share tenants, respectively, borrow from the following: from kinsmen, 19 and 20 percent; from credit institutions, 33 and 14; from landlords, 20 and 47; and from other individuals, especially moneylenders, 45 and 33 percent.

38. This negative attitude is perhaps explainable by a resentment and fear which leads to both a positive and negative reaction. The negative aspect is this low rating for the average lessee; on the positive side is increased solicitude and paternalism for those share tenants who have not opted for any change of status.

39. For a vivid portrayal of ways in which this harassment of tenants can be accomplished, see Brian Fegan's article, referred to in Note 26, above.

40. Mindajao also reports (1971: 60-61) that among respondents who had perceived the relative advantage



of agricultural leasehold, those who feared ejection were less likely to adopt it (chi-square  $p < .001$ ).

41. Following the completion of our fieldwork, this provision was amended by the 1971 Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 6389, Sec. 7): "The landholding is [to be] declared by the department head [of the Department of Agrarian Reforms] upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: . . ."

42. Takahashi's (1969: 76) data from Bulacan confirm the difficulties met by a tenant who opts for leasehold.

. . . tenant farmers who have learned about the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 and have asked that their relations with landlords be changed from *kasama* to *buwisang* have had their land taken over on the ostensible reason that landlords would farm the lands themselves . . . (other) tenant farmers have succeeded . . . but later have been forced to ask the landlords to revert . . . because of discriminatory treatment by landlords . . . Many tenant farmers mutter that "The Court of Agrarian Relations can do nothing but proprietaryo can do anything they want."

43. Lopez (1971: 259) has made a similar observation regarding his landlord sample.

44. See, for example, the article of Dr. Basilio de los Reyes ("Can land reform succeed?"), elsewhere in this volume. His report, written in late January 1972, is based on data gathered more recently than ours and sees land reform mainly from the administrator's viewpoint. His findings are what one would reasonably have expected, given the inadequate action that followed the passage of R.A. 6389.

45. For detailed information on problems relating to credit, see NELRIDP credit guideline 1971:4-10.

46. These replies on the good life are distinct from those giving reasons for the respondent's not definitely wanting to remain in his current tenure status (see Note 32). Some clearly and spontaneously mentioned full-time, year-round jobs (e.g., as government employees) incompatible with full-time farming. But most just said they wanted "another source of livelihood" (*ibang kabuhayan*). Unfortunately, we did not probe the meaning of this answer.

47. The answer is in fact, probably *not*, but this is beside the point here, since equity alone is sufficient reason for land reform. The fact is that, by and large, tenants on average-sized farms (about two hectares) raise more rice than owner-operators with holdings of the same size. The national data found in the 1960 Census of Agriculture (Bureau of the Census and Statistics 1965: 36) indicate that the average yield per hectare for such farms (lowland, first crop) was 33 cavans of palay for share tenants and lessees, 29 for those who owned some land but were tenants on one or more other parcels, and 28 for those who owned all the land they worked. In Nueva Ecija, where inputs have been especially abundant, the net outcome in

1970 was nonetheless the same for tenants, lessees, and owners: about 50 cavans of palay per hectare (lowland, first crop). As Christenson (1972) has observed, "There is no proof that increased productivity is a direct result of tenure transition in the Philippines."

48. Land-reform releases are taken from *Accomplishments of the land reform project administration: A terminal report (June 1964 - September 1971)* furnished by the Plans and Programs Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Quezon City. Data on national expenditures were provided by the General Auditing Office, SSS Building, Quezon City.

49. For calculations in this and the preceding paragraph, the following figures were used: number of rice farmers in the Philippines, 1.5 million; average salary for land-reform field personnel, ₱3600 per year.

50. One cannot easily dismiss the fact that rural credit regularly costs 10 percent per month for the five months of the first-crop rice-growing season, and that petty vendors gladly pay 20 percent interest on cash capital lent them at the start of each day. The rate appears to be, and most likely is, usurious. But the difference between 14 percent per year and 50 percent per half-year may be explained in part by the sheer unrealism of those who make 14 percent the legal maximum. For this observation we are indebted to Dr. W. F. Arce, chairman, department of sociology and anthropology, Ateneo de Manila.

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#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Pilipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "mangá"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (ˆ). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Pilipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## CAN LAND REFORM SUCCEED?

BASILIO N. DE LOS REYES

February 3, 1972

The Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP) was undertaken July 1970 as an intensified program to overcome problems and identify factors involved in more rapid implementation of land reform and increased agricultural production. After one and one-half years, it has an impressive record of achievement, but the following measures must still be taken or intensified: (1) increase available credit funds; (2) increase capable legal assistance; (3) increase technical manpower; (4) implement the continued training of field staff; (5) make reliable information available to all concerned — farmers, landowners, land-reform workers, and politicians.

Two disparities, painfully evident in developing nations and growing greater year by year, have shown themselves to be closely interrelated. The widening gap between population and food supply, it is now realized, will not be closed with any semblance of permanence unless at the same time effective means are taken to reduce the growing distance between the rich and the poor. Productivity and equity must proceed hand in hand.

Historically, both in the Philippines and elsewhere in southeast Asia, initial efforts to deal with the population-food gap were aimed at the attainment of self-sufficiency through the introduction of high-yielding staple varieties and improved farm practices. This pragmatic policy ignored the issues of social and economic equity in favor of a single-minded emphasis on aggregate productivity. Instead of concerning themselves about patterns of landholding or land distribution, or even about the productivity of most farms, those who implemented this strategy concentrated on *selected* farms — those run by progressive operators more receptive than others to suggested changes in farm practice. The need for a fast increase in overall productivity, to be achieved with limited capital and staff, made this selective tactic a reasonable one.

This was the case in the Philippines when in

1966 the nation launched its intensified rice-production program using the "miracle rice" developed at the International Rice Research Institute. New varieties and improved practices were introduced through the National Rice Action Group (NRAG), whose members included big rice producers, and whose activities affected the farm practices of selected operators in specific areas. The government, through the Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council (RCPPC), provided the necessary support in terms of both credit requirements to buy the needed fertilizers and pesticides and, through extension agents, complementary technical assistance. Following this single-minded plan we were able, in just two and one-half years, to attain self-sufficiency in rice and, in fact, to export some. However, as early as 1970 it was becoming evident that the gains in production were again being outpaced by population growth. As a result of a series of typhoons and outbreaks of pests and diseases, the nation was forced to import rice in 1971 and now, in 1972, we are again importing more of this staple.

These reverses demonstrate that the policy of highly selective development is at best a short-run solution to the food-population gap. In the long run, the growing demand for food by the people and industry's need for raw

materials will have to be met by assistance extended to small and large farmers alike. Reinforcing this argument for general, rather than selective, development of farms is another consideration; namely, the need for broadening the nation's consumer base. Small farmers and their dependents constitute the majority of our people, and unless they have the necessary purchasing power to support other sectors of the economy we cannot have national advancement.

Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that major social problems will arise to cripple all efforts at increased productivity unless the issue of the great disparity in income between the haves and the have-nots is dealt with effectively. The full benefit of recent technological breakthroughs will be felt only when we have managed to enlist the active and enthusiastic participation of all those engaged in agriculture. This can be assured only if we accomplish genuine reform in the agrarian structure, accompanied by a simultaneous build-up of those supporting institutions needed to assure widespread participation in more dignified, more productive farming.

Several countries have successfully implemented land reform programs of this scope. Among them are Japan and Taiwan. The success of the program in Taiwan has been attributed to the introduction of modern technology and the provision for conventional and new agricultural inputs, development of skills and managerial abilities in farm organization and operation, and the availability of those statistics and maps relating to the productivity, location, and ownership of land that are required for effective program development and organization. Furthermore, the Taiwan government successfully generated the requisite national discipline and determination to make progress.

In Japan, as in Taiwan, certain prerequisites were present, and positive steps taken, to define a national agricultural policy. Among them were conditions allowing relatively easy land redistribution, and other factors such as the reclamation of land for agricultural use, various kinds of subsidies for increasing agricultural production, programs for the establishment and maintenance of owner-farmers by loan-financing and

subsidies, the setting up of agricultural associations and cooperatives, and the subsidy of a program of technical guidance through agricultural associations. Externally, moreover, there was also pressure on post-war Japan to democratize the rural sector. Skeptics viewing the accomplishments of post-war Japan and Taiwan have asked if land reform of this magnitude could possibly succeed in the Philippines.

## LAND REFORM

### *Definition*

Answering that question requires that I first state what I understand by the term. Land reform has been defined in several ways. In its narrow sense, land reform is taken to mean tenurial change, or the change of the legal relationship of man to land. This concept prevailed in the country before the 60s, during the years when the emphasis of land reform in the country was mainly in the area of land resettlement and the legal aspects of land tenure. Thus, the land-resettlement notion is embodied in such pieces of land-reform legislation as the Magsaysay Agrarian Tenancy Code, where it is given as the second objective, and in the Land Reform Code of 1963 (fifth objective). Agencies created to implement the concept include the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (Lasadeco), and the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (Narra).

The land-tenure emphasis is found in a series of legal documents that started with the expropriation and redistribution of friar lands. Regulations governing relations between landlords and tenants are embodied in the Rice Tenancy Act (Commonwealth Act 578), the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1946 (Rep. Act 34), and the Tenancy Act of 1954 (Rep. Act 1199, amended in 1959 by Rep. Act 2263).

The currently more widely accepted view, incorporated in recent Philippine legislation, sees land reform as encompassing more than mere tenure change or resettlement. Thus the United Nations (1962) takes it to include institutional innovation as well.

[Land reform means] changes in land tenure system and the accompanying change in other (mainly rural) institutions that are necessary to achieve the objectives by which the changes in land tenure are sought.

Froelich (1961:8) related his definition of land reform to a wide interpretation of land tenure.

[Land tenure includes] all these arrangements by which farmers' or others hold or control land and which determine its occupancy and use. In this context, "land tenure" covers not only right in the land; it encompasses agricultural institutions generally including land ownership and tenancy, land rents, taxation of agricultural land or income from land, and even rural credit facilities. The term "land reform" usually covers the changes in these agricultural institutions which as a rule improve the economic, social, and political change and/or general economic development.

T. F. Carrol (cited in Weitz 1966:248) indicates the broad spectrum of available definitions when he states that land reform

to many people . . . means only taking land away from someone to give it to someone else, while to others it includes a wide field of overall improvement activities such as rural credit and extension services, often embracing the whole field of agricultural development. Indeed, land reform can be all this. In many ways it is as broad as the concept of government from which it always derives its power.

Land reform has had many definitions. For our discussion I accept those broad definitions which see land reform as directed toward the full development of the farmer. For I agree that the farmer should be viewed as a total person interacting with his physical and social environment, and that we must consider his relation, not only to the land that he tills, but also to the society in which he lives and his involvement in it. Therefore, land reform should be viewed as a broad activity encompassing a series of programs (tenure change as well as agrarian, economic, and social development), each a point on a continuum, all directed to the improvement of the farmer as a person and a factor in national development.

#### *Objectives of Land Reform*

The three main objectives of land reform are political, social (equity), and economic (productivity). The political and social goals have had a place in the Philippines for decades. Farm owner-

ship, for instance, has long been recognized as a matter of state policy. Further, the promotion of social justice has been an underlying political principle since the time of President Quezon (1935-44). The late President Magsaysay emphasized it by making it a political slogan, and since that time (1953-57) it has been the stated basis of all development programs. The productivity objective has of late been given more and more emphasis in land-reform programs. It stems from the recognition, mentioned earlier, that traditional agricultural practices will not produce the quantities of food and raw materials needed for the increasing population and growing industries, nor will the old farming ways encourage the emergence of that breed of strong, self-reliant farmer required for broader national development. This kind of farmer needs more than a legal claim on the land. He also needs capital, technical assistance, and rural institutions for organized action.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (Code of 1963), like the Code of Agrarian Reforms of 1971 (Code of 1971) places equal emphasis on all three objectives. Specifically the 1963 code has the following aims (parentheses indicate the 1971 amendments):

1. To establish owner-cultivatorship (cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers) and the economic family-sized farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, to divert landlord capital now in agriculture to industrial development;
2. To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmer, free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices;
3. To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity and higher farm incomes (through a cooperative system of production, processing, marketing, distribution, credit and services);
4. To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural wage earners;
5. To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land distribution;
6. To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant, and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society;
7. (To give first priority to measures for the adequate and timely financing of the Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to House Joint Re-

solution Numbered Two, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Social Justice and Economic Freedom; existing laws, executive and administrative orders, and rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding);

8. (To involve local governments in the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program); and
9. (To evolve a system of land use and classification).

### *Programs of Implementation*

Land reform aims to recast the old tenant-landowner relationship, providing the tenant such necessary supports as credit, the advice of trained extension agents, legal assistance, market outlets, and conveniently supplied agricultural inputs. He is also to be offered the opportunity to participate in the rural development effort. In the pursuance of these goals, five components have been accepted as integral to an effective land-reform program; namely: (1) land-tenure improvement, (2) agricultural productivity, (3) credit services, (4) institutional development, and (5) integrated administrative machinery. What provisions exist *in law* under each of these categories will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Below, under "The Nueva Ecija Experience," we shall move on to provisions *in fact*.

#### *Land-tenure improvement*

The ultimate goal of the land-reform program is to establish economic-size farms which are owned and cultivated by the farmers. This phase of the program is carried out in three ways: (a) promoting the shift from share tenancy to leasehold status; (b) transfer of ownership; and (c) land settlement.

*Shift from share tenancy to leasehold.* Share tenancy nourishes paternalistic tendencies and dependence among our farmers, and it is quite difficult to break these patterns. The tenant depends on the landowner for many of his needs and so, because of the requirements of interpersonal dealings (*pakikisama*) and inner debts of gratitude (*utang na loób*), the landowner dominates not only the tenant's economic life but his social and political life as well. Should

the tenant struggle against this old way of living, not honoring reciprocal obligations, conflict could easily arise, making things very difficult for both parties. The desire to become a lessee may be nipped in the bud by an understandable feeling of obligation to the landlord, who has kept the tenant and his family afloat through many a stormy year.

But the tenant is not likely to substantially raise his income until he moves out of his present status. For under the share-tenancy system, the landowner gets a proportionate share of the increased harvest which can be due to the increased effort of the tenant.

In view of the difficulty of effecting tenurial change voluntarily in the face of such hindrances, the Codes of 1963 and 1971 declared all forms of share tenancy null and void and instituted leasehold arrangements whereby the tenant pays a fixed rent. Under this program, the tenants are informed of their rights and assistance offered to help determine the proper lease arrangement and rental. In case of conflicts between the landowner and the tenant, the Office of the Agrarian Counsel (OTAC) provides legal assistance.

*Transfer of ownership.* In general, there are two ways in which leaseholders can acquire ownership of the farms they till. The first is through the purchase of lands offered for sale by the landowner, provided it has been pre-empted by the (newly created) Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The second is through expropriation of lands which are larger in area than the statutory limit of 24 hectares (formerly 75 hectares). The Land Authority (now the DAR) assists in conducting surveys and the Land Bank finances the acquisition and sale of land.

*Land settlement.* This involves resettling farmers from high density tenancy areas to public agricultural lands. The farmers are given lands and the Department of Agrarian Reform provides assistance to transport them and their belongings to the new site. Arrangements are also made for securing agricultural equipment, housing and accommodations, and loans.

*Agricultural productivity*

An essential goal of the land-reform program is to increase the small farmer's income and well-being. The chosen vehicle for this is the development of new tenure arrangements which provide the farmer with a greater net payback for his efforts, thereby giving him an incentive to increase production. This he will achieve through more intensive labor use, the adoption of high yielding varieties (HYV) of crops and improved breeds of livestock, improved farm practices, and intensive cropping with the planting of crops with higher net returns per unit area.

The new leaseholder assumes enlarged responsibility when he acquires and manages a farm. The Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC) helps him to improve both his farm- and home-management practices.

*Credit services*

Credit is indispensable to land reform. Tenants generally lack capital to finance their operations and depend largely on the landowner for support. But once the tenant shifts to leasehold the tendency of the landowner is to withdraw his credit, leaving the tenant with no other source of capital.

The Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) provides production credit to the farmers, as well as commodity/marketing and facility loans to the cooperatives.

*Institutional development*

The success of the land-reform program is then dependent upon a number of factors, such as land tenure, administration, agricultural credit, marketing facilities, education, and the like, without which the desired development will not be achieved. But the implementation and continuity of these programs can only be insured if strong rural institutions are developed to meet the needs of the farmers.

The Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC) undertakes the organization of farmer associations and cooperatives. The Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) provides credit assistance and management assistance to the cooperatives.

*Integrated administrative machinery*

Often cited as a cause of the failure of land-reform programs in the past has been the lack of coordination among the different implementing agencies. Under the Code of 1963, land reform is implemented under the concept of unified administration; that is, the different agencies created for specific but complementary purposes and each having its own independent organizations, are placed under one administrative machinery.

The agencies involved are the Land Authority, Agricultural Productivity Commission, Agricultural Credit Administration, Land Bank, and the Office of the Agrarian Counsel. At the national level, the heads of the different agencies, together with a representative of the minority political party, constitute the National Land Reform Council (NLRC), with the Land Authority Governor as Chairman. This is the highest policy-making body, and its decisions are binding on all members from the national level to the field units. The National Land Reform Council has its structure duplicated at the Regional, Provincial, and Team (municipal) levels except for the representative of the minority party. At all levels, the groups act as collegiate bodies and decisions are implemented through the group head, who is a Land Authority representative.

## THE NUEVA ECIA EXPERIENCE

In early 1970, representatives of the National Economic Council (NEC), the National Land Reform Council (NLRC), the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted a review of land-reform operations which disclosed that the national program had not been very effective. In almost seven years of operation, that program had brought less than 3 per cent of the nation's farmers under leasehold and an even smaller percentage had become amortizing owners. Among the various problems cited for slow implementation were lack of transportation, communication and office equipment, an inefficient administrative struc-

ture, and insufficient travel and administrative funds.

It was decided that a one-province pilot effort should be undertaken, designed to overcome the problems identified. The project would be given broad support and would be charged with determining if and how the national land-reform and agricultural production programs could be greatly accelerated.

The Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP) became, and is, a joint undertaking of the NLRC, NFAC, and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Government (NEPG). It calls for the integration of the resources and efforts of all the agencies involved. The NEC and USAID provide necessary technical, financial, and commodity assistance. The project officially started on June 30, 1970, but substantial work did not start until November of the same year.

The broad objectives of the project are stated as follows:

1. To implement an integrated provincial land-reform program, and to evaluate the strength and weaknesses of existing government machinery and legislation for carrying out the national land-reform program; and
2. To test alternative approaches for simultaneously accelerating land-tenure transitions and agricultural productivity.

The program is designed to change the land-tenure system from share to leasehold; thence, to amortize ownership and, ultimately, to achieve owner-cultivatorship — all phases to be supported by a package of services such as agricultural extension, credit assistance, and cooperatives. We now consider the *de facto* status of those five components, the *de jure* provisions for which we discussed under "Programs of Implementation," above.

#### *Land-Tenure Improvement*

*Shift from share tenancy to leasehold.* There were about 59,000 palay farmers in Nueva Ecija in 1964. Of this number 45,924 or 78 per cent, were share tenants. From 1964 to 1970, it was reported that 17,147 tenants, or 37 per cent of all these share tenants, had shifted to leasehold.

As of December 1971, an additional 18,815

share tenants had shifted to leasehold, making a total of 35,962 lessees, or about 78 percent of the original total number of share tenants. Of the total number of about 40,000 lessees, 6,512 have registered contracts, 6,173 have contracts pending registration, 2,954 have compromise contracts, and 20,223 have oral agreements.

What about the *national* scene? As of September 1971 the national land-reform program had covered 236 municipalities in about 20 provinces, with about 173,568 palay share tenants. Of this number 53,420 had shifted to leasehold. This means that 69 percent of all conversions had taken place in Nueva Ecija, and only 31 percent, or less than one third, had occurred outside the province. Nueva Ecija is surely the capital and center of the land-reform program.

*Shift from leasehold to ownership.* Government efforts in Nueva Ecija were directed primarily at the acquisition of those agricultural estates where both the landlord and his tenants desired a change-over to the leasehold arrangement. As of June 30, 1970, just before the NELRIDP was inaugurated, 12 agricultural estates and three residential estates covering 4,344 hectares had been acquired in Nueva Ecija.

Since the Program's inception, seven estates have been acquired by the Land Bank in Nueva Ecija. Involved are 310 lessees, an area of 988 hectares, and a cost of ₱5.9 million. In addition, 55 agricultural estates, involving 1,759 lessees (5,868 hectares) have been *approved* for acquisition by the NLRC; further, 66 agricultural estates with 728 lessees (2,550 hectares) have undergone a feasibility study, a credit investigation, and a survey.

In order to upgrade the landed estates the Program has released nine Nibbi tractors to 45 allocatees, making an overall total of 96 tractors issued, benefiting 377 allocatees; 31 portable irrigation pumps have been leased to 155 allocatees, making an overall total of 144 pumps issued to 720 allocatees.

#### *Agricultural Productivity*

*Rice production.* In order to increase rice



production, Nueva Ecija farmers were encouraged to plant high yielding varieties (HYV) and to follow improved farm practices. During the regular crop of Crop Year (CY) 1969-70, the area planted to HYV was 104,858 hectares; in CY 1970-71, it was 123,543 hectares, an increase of 22 percent in a one-year period. Unfortunately, because of typhoons and heavy damage from pests and disease, the per-hectare yield was 60 cavans in 1969-70 and only 54 cavans in 1970-71.

During the *palagad* (second) crop, the area planted to HYV increased from 91 to 99 percent in the same period. Production per hectare increased from 61 to 64 cavans.

*Feedgrains production.* A viable provincial livestock program depends on sources of animal feed. For this reason, farmers were encouraged to produce feedgrains such as yellow corn, soybeans, and sorghum. The overall target for the dry-season CY 1970-71 was 200 hectares for corn, 350 hectares for sorghum, and 100 hectares for soybeans. The actual area harvested was 230 hectares for corn, 410 hectares for sorghum, and 109 hectares for soybeans, exceeding the goals by 15 percent, 17 percent, and 9 percent, respectively. The yields per hectare were rather low: 23 cavans for corn, 18 cavans for sorghum, and 15 cavans for soybeans. This disappointing performance was attributed to difficulty in securing seeds and to the fact that planting was delayed.

The overall target for 1971-72 is 480 hectares for corn, 540 hectares for sorghum, and 140 hectares for soybeans. So far 291 hectares of corn have been planted, 406 hectares of sorghum, and 154 hectares of soybeans.

#### *Agricultural Credit*

Loans were extended to Nueva Ecija farmers to finance their farm operations. In 1970-71, ₱6.2 million were lent, out of ACA regular funds and NECUSAID wholesale loan funds, to 8,643 farmers, or about 27 percent of the lessees converted at that time. This fiscal year (July 1971 to June 1972) ₱18.5 million of the U.S.-derived "Public Law 480," or "PL480," funds were

made available for credit purposes through the ACA. This regular crop season, ₱8.3 million were lent out for production purposes to 11,584 Nueva Ecija lessees, or 32 percent of the present number of lessees. This amount is equivalent to the total ACA loans *throughout the country* during a comparable period in 1970.

The collection of ACA in Nueva Ecija for 1970-71 was ₱4.2 million for production loans, ₱1.0 million for commodity loans and ₱1.8 million for marketing loans. This totals ₱7.1 million, compared to ₱4.6 million of last year, an increase of ₱2.4 or 52 percent.

No collection reports can be cited for the loans extended this year (1971-72) because the crop is still in the field or in storage. However, it is anticipated that collections will be much lower than expected because of the crop damage caused by typhoons and the tungro crop infestation.

#### *Development of Farmers' Cooperatives/Associations*

Three farmers' cooperatives have since July 1, 1970, been reactivated, two cooperatives re-vitalized, and two newly organized and affiliated with ACA. This brings to 28 the total number of farmers' cooperatives in the province, with a total membership of 19,145 farmers.

Project investigations aimed at identifying the sources of cooperative weakness disclosed that the farmers' cooperatives lacked the base necessary for strong membership. There were no existing organizations at the barrio level linking the farmers to the municipal farmers' cooperatives. Promotional and educational efforts were therefore directed towards organizing farmers into local production groups with shared liability. There were 1,244 such groups organized, with a total membership of 6,102 members, each group composed of 5-10 farmers.

In the year 1970-71 102 barrio and district farmers' associations were organized in Nueva Ecija with a total of 4,540 farmer-members. This brings the total number of such associations organized to 173, with a total membership of

almost 7,299 members. In 1970-71, there were 132 Rural Improvement Clubs with 1,452 members. It is through these organizations that most of the organized activities of the technician are conducted.

#### *Implementing Machinery*

The integrated administrative machinery for land reform was modified for Nueva Ecija. The highest policy-making body is the Joint Council, composed of the members of the National Land Reform Council (NLRC), the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC), and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Government (NEPG). This Joint Council is headed by the Chairman, National Land Reform Council.

In order to facilitate and expedite action on matters covered by established policies, a Management Committee was created. This committee is composed of the ACA Administrator as Chairman, the Executive Director, NFAC, as Vice-Chairman, and as members, the Special Assistant to the NLRC Chairman-Administrator, the Chairman of the Joint Technical Staff, and the Project Director of the Nueva Ecija Special Project. This committee acts for and in behalf of the Joint Council in threshing out problems involving policies and field implementation.

From the national level, implementation is direct to the provincial level, by-passing the regional office except on matters that are specified by law. The representative of the Joint Council in the province is the Project Director, assisted by the Deputy Project Director.

At the beginning of the Program, the existing organization in the province was maintained. There were two Land Reform (NLRC) Branch Committees, each headed by a Branch Manager. Each branch directly supervised a number of Land Reform Project Teams covering one or two municipalities. Later the two Land Reform Branch Committees were placed under the Project Director as Chairman.

#### RELATED STUDIES

Independent studies have shown the effects

of land reform. In before-after studies made by Sandoval *et. al.* (1971) in land-reform areas in seven provinces, it was found that out of the 366 pre-reform share tenants three became owners; seven, part-owners; 36, lessee-share tenants; and 205, lessees. Only 117, or about one third of the share tenants, remained as they had been. At the time of the study (1968-69) only two of the newly made lessees had reverted to share tenancy.

It is interesting to note that while there was no significant difference in the increase in yield per hectare reported by lessees and share tenants, the intensity of double cropping was greater on the leasehold farms. The effective crop area for lessee-share tenants and lessees increased by about three and two hectares per farm, respectively.

The Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon), in a study of land reform in relation to rural levels of living (Hiwatig 1971) reported that average investments, especially in work animals, tools, and equipment, were larger on leasehold farms than on share-tenant farms, suggesting that these farmers had greater motivation to increase farm productivity. The share tenants, on the other hand, were disposed to channel their savings into dwellings. Herrera (1970) reported that in 1968, paly production in the two provincial land-reform provinces of Nueva Ecija and Pampanga increased over 1967 by 3.2 and 3.5 percent, respectively.

Preliminary reports from a 1970-71 study of the socioeconomic conditions of farmers in Nueva Ecija (Pahilanga-de los Reyes 1971) showed that the owner-operator had better housing facilities than the lessee or share tenant. While only one out of 10 tenants (leasehold or share) had durably-built houses, four out of 10 owner-operators had these more solid homes. On the other hand, the percentage of lessees (54 percent) who had houses made of mixed light and strong materials, was almost 20 percent greater than the corresponding percentage for share tenants.

According to the same report, lessees and other rice-farmer respondents were in solid agreement on why they thought leasehold was a satisfactory farming arrangement. The most

satisfying reward of the lease system, they said, was that tenants got a bigger share of the harvest. Second, neither the landlord nor any of his representatives could interfere in the tenant's work. In fact, the tenant had no obligation to his landlord, they argued, beyond paying the rent for the land after every cropping period. As a whole, leaseholding was further perceived by current and past lessees as the route to an improved or progressive way of life. Freedom from any problems with a landlord also made leasehold a desirable farming arrangement.

One of the reasons cited why tenants intended to get out of sharecropping is that they did not have the freedom they desired to make their own farming decisions. Those intending to remain as lessees cited as the second most important reason the fact that lessees were free to decide what steps to follow in farming, since landlords could no longer interfere with them.

It should be noted that many farmers are well aware of their rights, and have brought pressure to bear on politicians and administrators to formulate favorable laws and policies. An example of this kind of forceful action was witnessed during the last session of Congress. Farmers from the Federation of Free Farmers and other farmers' organizations in land-reform areas such as Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija demonstrated for weeks in order to make their point. Many of them have a clear understanding of what rights they have as men and as citizens.

#### PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of land reform is a complicated process. Unlike other development programs, in which all sectors of society can be counted on to provide support, land reform is divisive. Most landowners offer persistent opposition to any change in tenurial relationship.

The Codes of 1963 and 1971 are bold and serious attempts to change these tenurial relationships. These laws declared all forms of share tenancy null and void and in their place instituted a system of leaseholding. However, the policy expressed in the Code of 1963, providing

for the declaration of only *selected* areas as land-reform districts, has proved to be a deterrent to rapid conversion to leasehold as well as to agricultural production. This policy has been defended on the basis of the limited availability of economic resources. The farmers, however, are not convinced that a government handling billions of pesos can do no better than to bring less than 2.5 percent of the nation's land under the provisions of the Code each year. The farmers see it, not as inevitable expediency, but as unequal dispensation of justice, because some are enjoying the provisions of the law while others may have to wait 25 years or more. Furthermore, as a consequence of the provisions of the law regarding rent payments, farmers in non-land-reform areas have become reluctant to increase productivity, knowing that eventually this will result in their having to pay higher lease rental.

The problems have been remedied by the Code of 1971 by providing automatic conversion to leasehold throughout the country. It also provides that the court should determine the fixed rental 30 days after the petition is submitted for decision.

The land-reform program envisions a two-phase approach. The first involves the shift from share tenancy to leasehold and the second, the transfer of ownership to the leaseholder. The lease rental is based on an average annual harvest for the previous three years "after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling, and processing" (Code of 1963, Sec. 34). The determination of the lease rental becomes a tedious operation considering the conflict of interest. The landowner would like to raise the production, while the tenant tries to understate production data.

In land-reform areas, support has been directed primarily toward the leaseholder. This selective support is geared to encourage farmers to shift to leasehold and to enable those already on leasehold to increase their production and income so that eventually they may have the capacity to buy the land they till. Unfortunately, the field staffs of the different implementing agencies and cooperatives are having difficulty

in providing the support they should because the law allows oral contracts (in Nueva Ecija about 56 percent of the total number of lessees are governed by oral contracts). These contracts do not meet the specification of the Codes, and thus do not provide the farmer with adequate legal protection, security, and other benefits of this tenure status.

One of the reasons why a tenant is hesitant to shift to leasehold is because of fear of being ejected. To a small farmer, the farm is his only source of livelihood, and to take away his right to cultivate is to create untold suffering for him and his family. The Land Reform Code of 1963 provides that the farmer can be dispossessed of his farm if the landowner would like personally to cultivate the land, or will convert the landholding, if it is suitably located, into a subdivision, or use it for other non-agricultural purposes. The threat of these provisions has in the past been used to prevent the tenant from shifting to leasehold. Furthermore, the landowner can stop providing the farmer's credit needs, and the farmer becomes helpless unless the government provides the necessary production and subsistence loan.

The Code of Agrarian Reforms of 1971 eliminated personal cultivation as admissible grounds for ejecting a tenant. It also provides that landholdings could only be converted to residential or other non-agricultural uses upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission. In such instances, the lessee is entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest during the five preceding calendar years.

#### *Defects in the Law*

The failure of the Codes of 1963 and 1971 to specify the effective dates for determining the retention limit of landholdings (75 has. in 1963 and 24 has. in 1971) will sharply reduce the number of holdings expropriated. In Nueva Ecija alone, there were 197 landowners with 75 hectares or more in 24 municipalities declared before 1970.

The provision that expropriation proceedings

require the submission of a written petition of at least one third of the lessees may further delay expropriation for the same reasons, for the petitioners may be ejected or harassed by the landowners. Furthermore, the failure of the Codes to specify the different factors to be considered in determining the fair market value makes land valuation very cumbersome and difficult.

The unified concept of administration, whereby different agencies, each with its own organization and functions, are placed within one overall administrative organization, has several limitations. It is the experience in Nueva Ecija that some agency heads are not willing to exercise their supervisory powers through people other than their own. They by-pass the new Program administrative set-up and deal directly with their field staff. Administrative issuances and logistic support are given directly to their field staff, ignoring prescribed lines of communication. Similarly, the field staff often go directly to their mother agencies, without the permission of their appointed supervisors under the unified set-up. It was felt that this problem would be minimized if the operational budget could be controlled by the Project Director. However, attempts to consolidate different agencies' operational expenses (other than salaries) into a provincial budget under the Project Director did not materialize owing to legal impediments.

The Code of Agrarian Reforms of 1971 established the Department of Agrarian Reform and created staff bureaus such as the Bureau of Farm Management, Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Bureau of Land Acquisition, Distribution and Development, and Bureau of Resettlement. However, the Code did not make any provision regarding the status of the Agricultural Productivity Commission or the Office of the Agrarian Counsel, whose functions are similar to those of the Bureau of Farm Management and Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, respectively. Unless this overlap can be resolved by agreement or by the Reorganization Commission, it is likely that there will be duplication of functions and consequent confusion.

The Code of 1971 also provides that local governments should be involved in the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. However, the present arrangement, which gives the Regional Director direct responsibility over the implementation of agrarian reform in his area of coverage does not fit well with this policy. Furthermore, the Code failed to identify in what aspects of the agrarian reform program the local government is to be involved.

#### *Lack of Funds*

Bottlenecks encountered in implementing land reform are a lack of funds to carry out the program and a recurrent inability to effect timely release of allocated funds. The field staff is frequently immobilized for lack of traveling expenses. In some instances, in fact, the minimal amounts due them are received once every six months or year.

As was mentioned earlier, there is a tendency for the landowner to withdraw credit support when the tenant shifts to leasehold. Replacing the landlord, as it were, the government is supposed to provide production loans to the lessee through the Agricultural Credit Administration. However, funds are not sufficient to meet the great and growing needs. As has been pointed out, the Nueva Ecija Program (NELRIDP) released for production loans about ₱8.3 million for the regular crop in 1971 (the first time that special loanable funds were available) compared to ₱8.6 million over a similar period in 1970 for the country as a whole. However, despite the fact that loan availabilities to leaseholders in Nueva Ecija were far greater than in other areas, only about a third of the lessees in Nueva Ecija were financed during the period. This raises the question of just how far leasehold conversion can be pursued without greatly increasing the amount of loan funds necessary for credit purposes. It has been the farmers' sad experience that because of competition for the limited funds, releases are often made very late in the crop season, and in amounts far below that needed to assure optimum production.

The government has to rely on voluntary sales by the landowners because the Land Bank does not have the capacity to implement in vigorous fashion the acquisition of private agricultural lands. Moreover, even the small number of offers made cannot be rapidly accommodated because of fund limitations.

The 1971 Code provides additional financial support for the reform operations of the various agencies. There is appropriated under Republic Act No. 6390 (the Agrarian Land Reform Special Fund) ₱50 million in addition to existing appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972. ACA and the Land Bank will receive ₱20 million each, while ₱10 million has been set aside for land development, resettlement, survey, subdivisions, and the issuance of titles by agrarian reform agencies. After June 30, 1972, another ₱20 million will be added to the Agricultural Loan Fund and ₱10 million assigned to each of the above mentioned agencies and purposes.

Though these measures brighten the land-reform picture somewhat, experience warns us to temper optimism with caution. It has been the sad experience in Nueva Ecija that in spite of the support given to the Project at the highest levels and the moral compulsion to fulfil international commitments made in behalf of the Project, only one-half of the approved amount of financial support was actually released, and late at that.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Land Reform is a long-range program that requires continuous support at all levels. Unless this can be assured, it will never succeed. *First*, there should be assurance that credit will be available. This is a must because the tendency is for landowners to withdraw credit whenever the tenant signifies his intention to shift to leasehold. *Second*, there should be assurance that farmers will receive the best legal assistance in the event of disputes. In Nueva Ecija, Task Force *Hukom*, composed of the best lawyers of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel, was launched in December 1970 to intensify legal counselling

and facilitate disposal of court cases. In one month's time 148 cases, or 9 percent of the cases received, were terminated. It seems that this had a psychological effect as evidenced by the increase in leasehold conversion. It could have been greater and more sustained had additional judges or commissioners of the Court of Agrarian Relations been available. As it happened, there were two or more lawyers for every judge or commissioner. Furthermore, unfortunately, some members of the task force were pulled out after only four months of operation, and the court cases were again left to the original complement of lawyers found in the province.

Another instance is Operation *Ipagtibay*. At the request of the Program, additional lawyers were assigned to Nueva Ecija to assist tenants in perfecting their contracts and having them registered. Unfortunately, after a few month's stay in the province they also were pulled out to be assigned elsewhere.

*Third*, the manpower requirements in land reform are tremendous. In Japan, 400,000 workers were required to purchase and transfer about two million hectares of land and prepare about four million lease contracts for the transfer of that land. This yields a ratio of one worker for every five hectares or every 10 lease contracts. In Taiwan, it required 33,000 persons to purchase and transfer 200,000 hectares, or one worker for every six hectares.

In Nueva Ecija, by contrast, there are 45,974 share tenants with a total of 132,254 hectares. With only 382 people at all levels working in the land-reform program there, we have about one worker for every 120 tenants or 346 hectares.

*Fourth*, there is need for the continuous training of field staff at various levels. The technicians, for example, need training in even the basic technical aspects of crop and animal production. As one team leader reported, some of his technicians do not even know how to detect tungro. They should be convinced of the importance of realistic farm plans and budgets, and be trained in their preparation. Too many technicians are inclined to work on them in their

offices without even visiting the farms for which they are being prepared.

The team leaders and the extension supervisors should receive regular instruction in program planning and supervision. A group of team leaders and provincial agency heads in Nueva Ecija expressed this view after going through a two-day management seminar.

The statisticians play an important role in gathering statistical information, and making it available to the members of the team and to program planners and evaluators. However, current statistics are unreliable at best. The statisticians should be made aware of the importance of their job and should be taught to be critical of the data they get.

Corresponding training programs should be conducted for cooperative and credit officers. They should also be trained to work as a team. It has been reported that the cooperative managers were better trained than some of the government personnel who were supposed to be supervising them.

A significant deterrent to training programs is the lack of technical expertise in the province. This fact is related to two others, namely, the low government salary scale and the frustration experienced by those who work in the government bureaucracy. For these reasons it is extremely difficult to recruit first-rate people from the private sector into government programs. In fact, the better government technicians are constantly being drained off by private companies.

*Fifth*, the lack of information and studies for planning and evaluation presents problems in land reform. Information on extent of land-ownership, kinship among tenants and between tenants and landowners, sources of credit and usage, farmer attitudes, and production data are either lacking or limited. If accurate records could be kept, it would reduce, if not eliminate, the conflicts that arise. For example, the Code of 1971 provides that if the landowner wishes to convert his farm to a subdivision or turn it to other non-agricultural purposes the lessee is entitled to disturbance compensation based on previous harvests. It will be easy to determine

this pay if production records are available. There is some information of this kind now available in the field, it is true, but it is not properly summarized nor kept up-to-date. An example is the Basic Farmer's Card, the data for which are collected by the different land-reform teams. The cards themselves are stored in the individual team offices and some summaries made for the main office of the National Land Reform Council. But this valuable information could be summarized in various ways and made available to many agencies at the provincial, regional, and national levels. Furthermore, the Basic Card should be regularly updated.

#### CONCLUSIONS

*Man* is the key to the land-reform program. This includes especially the farmer, the landowner, the land-reform worker, and the politician.

The success of land reform depends on their involvement, and *involvement depends on understanding*. This understanding must include above all an appreciation of the national importance of land reform, on the one hand, and of the difficulties involved in the transfer of landownership, on the other.

Arrangements should be made to help people understand the program and to help them become involved. There should be forums, for instance, for exchange of information and group undertakings. Grouping of farmers into associations and cooperatives, while it is an arduous task, paves the way for mutual action. Local officials could be involved in mediation work.

Understanding is needed, but most of all *man needs to change*. A farmer in Nueva Ecija, after hearing a government official give a pretty speech on the need for change, said, "We are willing to change, but are *you* willing to change?" The same question can be asked of others.

Can land reform succeed? There exists, as a matter of fact, solid evidence that land reform *has* succeeded — at least in some respects and in some areas — despite the restrictive difficulties

under which the program has been forced to operate. There is reason to expect that it will succeed to a more significant degree once these difficulties have been removed. To achieve this goal, serious study and whole-hearted applications of men, money, and materials are absolutely necessary.

#### Note

This is the slightly revised version of a paper presented at a session of the Philippine Sociological Society's public lecture series entitled "Social Issues '72." It was read by the author at the meeting held February 3, 1972, at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati. Dr. de los Reyes, an agricultural economist, is Project Director, Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP), Bitas, Cubanatuan City. He is concurrently a professor, department of agricultural economics, University of the Philippines College of Agriculture, College, Laguna.

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## Comment on the B. de los Reyes Paper

DAVID CHRISTENSON

February 3, 1972

Dr. de los Reyes addressed himself to the question "Can land reform succeed? The answer, of course, is Yes. He pointed out that such programs have succeeded in other countries, and that there are success stories, on a limited scale, even within the Philippines. He then addressed himself to the harder question, "Will land reform succeed in the Philippines?" Again the answer given was Yes, but only on the condition of renewed dedication. For land reform to be successful, he said, the people must understand and appreciate the national importance of the program and the difficulties involved in carrying it out.

I was with Dr. de los Reyes in that remote barrio when a farmer leader stepped forward and said "We are willing to change, but are *you* willing to change?" How much time is left before that question becomes a demand and that demand becomes an ultimatum? It would be tragic if the situation were allowed to degenerate to that point.

Abraham Lincoln said of the United States more than 100 years ago that "This nation cannot long endure half slave and half free." A slave is a man with no freedom or opportunity to make choices. How much freedom or opportunity for making choices does a man living at the subsistence level have? The majority of the

Filipino people live at, or within a few hundred pesos of, that level while a small minority control and enjoy the national wealth. How long can this nation so endure? I believe that this nation will endure, not because it will be forced to make choices out of fear, but because it will freely choose the path of progress, progress which Dr. de los Reyes defined as "the improvement of the life of all the people through the full development and utilization of available human resources."

In discussing progress, we must begin with the basic fact that a sizable proportion of the Philippine population is engaged in agricultural production. Most of these people are tenant farmers who would benefit little from increasing their productivity. How can the nation prosper if there are no incentives for increased productivity among the bulk of the people in the nation's largest business enterprise? Clearly, national development depends heavily upon finding ways to stimulate the development of this sector.

The agricultural enterprise, as any other, is made productive through a mixture of three basic inputs, namely, land, labor, and capital. Over the years, the Philippines has not been very much concerned about increasing the productivity of these three elements, but rather has



ected to increase production by simply adding traditional mixes of capital and labor to new lands being brought under cultivation. The country has now extended its agriculture to essentially all of the economic lands, and a continuation of this expansionist policy is no longer a possibility. More intensive cultivation of existing lands is now required.

Intensive agriculture can be brought into being by increasing either labor or capital input or both. Those looking at U.S. models suggest that investments in capital goods and increased reliance on machinery and chemicals is the proper alternative. But it is not reasonable to assume that a model which evolved in a country where land and capital were relatively cheap and labor dear is appropriate for a nation where the opposite situation exists.

Machines and other labor-saving inputs which increase productivity are readily available, and could easily be imported into the country. On the other hand, developing agriculture not by displacing labor but by strengthening the productive capacities of labor is a much more difficult task. But it is the task which must be faced, for how can we talk of development if the great human resources, the real capital of the country, are not utilized.

You may say, "Granted, national development is dependent upon the mobilization of labor, but what does this have to do with land reform? After all, Dr. de los Reyes cited a study which indicated that productivity per hectare was about the same regardless of whether the farmer was a share tenant, a leaseholder, or a small owner-operator."

The question is excellent. Why not simply channel resources towards increased productivity and ignore tenurial questions?

The answer has to come from the experience of other countries. For Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, tenurial change has been an extremely important stimulus for the increase of both agricultural and industrial productivity. The fact that it has not yet proven to be a major stimulus in the Philippines derives from other factors, I believe. The Philippines has allocated relatively small amounts of resources to realize

the productivity potential of changed tenurial status. Its support systems are still geared to traditional and commercial agriculture, and until these are changed, tenurial transition will have little effect on productivity. When Japan, Korea, and Taiwan undertook programs of land reform, they created whole new systems to support the undertaking. No resources were spared in developing these systems and making them functional.

Three essential elements of such a system are credit, marketing, and technical support. The Philippines has not yet developed the capability of providing the small independent farmer with the credit required for optimum production, nor has it developed a marketing system which assures the small farmer a reasonable return for his labors. His alternatives continue to be the red tape, delays, and underfinancing of government lending institutions, on the one hand, or, on the other, a timely but very expensive loan from the moneylender. In marketing, he continues to face the problems of consumer-oriented government policy and the manipulations of the large rice traders, both of which forces tend to push the return to the farmer to minimal levels. Though well-trained extension agents are found in government service, they are given an impossible workload and minimal support. The small farmer is unlikely to see these technicians more than once or twice a year. As a result, rats, insects, or disease can destroy large expanses of crop hectareage before the delay causes are identified and brought under control. The recent tungro epidemic, which may have destroyed up to 40 percent of the 1971 Nueva Ecija palay crop, is the latest manifestation of this. Dr. de los Reyes described other deficiencies in the existing support system. In sum, the systems are not farmer-oriented, and the farmer is not receiving the support and stimulation needed to make him more productive.

In order to design a functional support system, it is necessary to learn more about the small farmer, to understand his problems and his attitudes better. This, in large part, is what the Nueva Ecija Project has been all about, to determine what support the farmer requires to

be more productive and to develop effective delivery systems to meet these needs.

An effective land-reform program is not something a nation can have cheaply. Dr. de los Reyes pointed out the relative magnitude of technicians, a key element of the Japanese and Chinese support systems. The number of workers in those programs (per hectare of reformed land) was more than 50 times the number available in the Nueva Ecija Project, which is supposedly an intensive development effort.

It is acknowledged that land reform is costly, but if the Philippines vigorously develops and pursues a strong program, support will be given through international assistance agencies, as happened in the cases of Taiwan, Japan, and Korea.

### Comment on the B. De los Reyes Paper

JOSE D. DRILON, JR.

March 7, 1972

Can land reform succeed? In answering this question, Dr. de los Reyes described in some detail the background, objectives, and implementing programs of the land-reform movement in the Philippines. Then he focused on the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP) which he administers as Project Director, discussed operational problems in this project, and, understandably, came to a cautious conclusion.

According to Dr. de los Reyes, the land-reform implementing programs have centered on (1) land-tenure improvement, (2) agricultural productivity, (3) credit services, and (4) administrative machinery integration. He explained the rationale of these activities and then established their relevance to the political, social, and eco-

Change is difficult, but the Philippines has withstood adversity in the past. Land reform will succeed if renewed national commitment to land reform can be generated, for as Dr. de los Reyes has made clear, the elements of success are known.

The important question to be asked is not whether land reform can succeed, but rather, whether the Philippines can afford *not* to have a successful land-reform program.

#### Note

Mr. Christenson is a member of the Philippine mission of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 1970 he has been Land Reform Adviser to the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (NELRIDP).

omic objectives of the land-reform law.

In focusing on the NELRIDP, Dr. de los Reyes presented a sample package of land-reform activities — probably the best sample available. As such, the sample is not representative of what is happening in most places in the country, but it does give a reasonable indication of what can be expected of (1) the integration of land-reform-related activities and (2) alternative approaches aimed at hastening the attainment of land-tenure and productivity goals. The sample seems to suggest that if land reform does not succeed in Nueva Ecija, it will probably not succeed elsewhere in the country. Or, to be more conservative, it will probably have rougher sailing elsewhere.

But the Nueva Ecija experience is both recent

and short, too short to serve as a reliable basis for a clearly certain answer to the question of whether or not land reform can succeed in the Philippines. Land reform is a long-term and highly complex movement, and the point in time where a real view of its progress will be possible is a long way off in the future. What we are looking for now are really some indications of what might be expected in the long run. Another thought: the movement is a continuing one; hence we might wish to see it in stages, judging success or failure at each stage.

If we see the Nueva Ecija experience as one such stage, we may well conclude that it has been at least moderately successful, for there is evidence that great strides have been made. Dr. de los Reyes has provided the concrete indications of this progress, concluding as follows:

There exists . . . solid evidence that land reform has succeeded — at least in some respects and in some areas — despite the restrictive difficulties under which the program has been forced to operate. There is reason to expect that it will succeed to a more significant degree once these difficulties have been removed.

There will always be problems and difficulties, of course. As they get resolved, other problems and difficulties will arise. But this is the way of progress.

The land-reform movement is a relatively new phenomenon in the country, and the difficulties associated with it are those related to major adjustments in an aged agrarian system under the pressures of a fast-changing environment, high expectations, and the constraints of limited resources.

*Changing environment, high expectations, and limited resources* — these are the catch phrases that explain our concern over the success or failure of land reform in the country. They also hold the key to a realistic view of land reform as a program, its nature, what it can do, the pace of progress of which it is capable, and what it takes to get it moving.

There are numerous forces of change in our rural environment, and their interaction and their impact upon the traditional situation create, not only immediate benefits or the promise of permanent advantage, but also disloca-

tions and discontentment which, hopefully, will be temporary. In ferment, the environment is not easy to control, and because of the way it affects people, it does not easily make for consensus. Individuals and groups who see their interests threatened, however temporarily, tend to oppose at least certain aspects of land reform. Similarly many of those who stand clearly to benefit from the reform are impatient, inclined to cry out against the inadequacy of support for the program and the slow speed of its implementation.

Expectations are high, not only on the part of those directly affected by land reform. They are also high, perhaps higher, on the part of those who would like to claim credit for it and so fetch some political advantage. Expectations, like ambition, we must have. But, when they go too far beyond reality, they contribute to disappointment and erode the faith of people.

We are a developing country. As such, our resources for change and development in agriculture are limited. We must realize that this is so. More important, we must recognize that in a situation where we find other needs that demand increasingly greater allocations of resources, adequate support for any of these needs becomes a big question mark. The ordering of these needs is a highly important but ticklish responsibility of the policy makers, but once decisions are made by them, implementing action takes the front seat, so to speak, and becomes the decisive factor.

Making do with what we have, or optimization, is the requirement. Within this framework, the formulation and pursuit of strategies for counteracting the devisiveness of land reform and for consolidating utilization rather than ownership of land, must be the major means for achieving land-reform objectives. Simply put, this calls for hard work and a lot of competent, convincing leadership among those who are responsible for results. This also means that those who will be affected by implementing action, as well as those participating in the action, should be "educated" regarding what should be done, and what can possibly be done.

There's the rub. Education is a relatively

slow process. And learning is usually attended by errors, sometimes even enhanced by errors.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I am an optimist. I think land reform *can be made to succeed* in the Philippines.

### Comment on the B. de los Reyes Paper

AKIRA TAKAHASHI

February 18, 1972

Since Dr. de los Reyes referred to the land-reform program of Japan as a successful precedent, let me start by commenting on it. Many Western and Asian scholars have overrated the role of General Headquarters, Allied Occupation Forces, in initiating land reform in post-war Japan. As Dr. De los Reyes noted, other factors were much more significant as preconditions: a series of tenancy laws passed in the pre-war period; direct government control of the marketing of agricultural products and limits placed on landlord shares during World War II; national demand for an expansion of the domestic market as the basis for industrial development, especially during the period when exports were limited; and a move to channel capital from agriculture to industry.

A more direct and critical factor enabling the accomplishment of land reform within a few years was the effective functioning of lower-level administrative machinery set up to implement the program. In every village (about one-fourth or one-fifth the size of the average Philippine municipality) an Agricultural Land Committee was formed, its members representing landlords, owner-farmers, and tenant-farmers. This group played an important role in the program, since farm land was expropriated and redistributed by the decision of this committee. All its members were naturally so familiar with each piece

### Note

Mr. Drlon, formerly Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Republic of the Philippines, is now Director, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (Searca), Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines.

of land and with every individual concerned that reform procedures such as the abolition of absentee landlords were notably successful. The activities of peasant organizations at this period also accelerated the progress of land reform. Moreover, social confusion and widespread disturbances in the traditional value orientations of Japanese society also helped to minimize any counterblow by the landed class.

Most distinctive of the Japanese case, however, is the fact that expropriation and redistribution did not result in a heavy burden for either the government or the newly-created owner-farmers. Except in those socialist countries which simply confiscate private property without compensation to its former owner, paying for expropriated land is the most serious hindrance to the implementation of land reform. In the case of Japan, though the transfer of land was compensated for, the tremendous monetary inflation experienced in the late 1940s and early 1950s made the payments asked of new owners and the land bond issued by the government relatively light obligations. Under these conditions the land was rather confiscated than expropriated. In the late 1960s, in fact, the government made amends by appropriating additional compensation to the ex-landowners. It is a well-

known fact that the land-reform program paved the way for the rapid growth of both the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of Japan.

The second point I wish to make is the significance of an integrated program in mobilizing the agricultural structure. In Baliuag, Bulacan, where I stayed from 1963 to 1964 and am now spending most of my time, I have observed drastic changes in agriculture and in the life of the villagers within the last few years. As regards agriculture, palay yields have been raised remarkably; new techniques, such as the planting of high-yielding varieties, the use of levelers and markers before transplanting, straight-row planting, the use of rotary weeders and sprayers, and the construction of improved ditches and durable inlets for irrigation water, have become popular practices among farmers. The villagers' level of living has been improved notably — housing, clothes, diet, and the amount of money in circulation are all at higher levels. Changes are also obvious in the behavior patterns of farmers. They are now more concerned with their land and take good care of their crops. This is a very impressive fact for an observer who used to see farms neglected even in the growing season. In 1962 4 farmers minimized their labor input on the farm in order to be free to seek off-farm income. Now they are inclined to spend more time on their farms and to get other members of the family involved as well.

These changes seem to have been brought about by a series of institutional transitions that occurred successively in the years 1966–70; namely: a widespread shift in tenurial status from share tenant to leaseholder, intensive extension service offered by a group of Taiwanese agriculturists who demonstrated improved methods of rice cultivation in each barrio, arrangement for a satisfactory water supply by the renovation of an irrigation network, and the activation of the Facoma under the land-reform program. The offices of the Land Reform Project Team and Office of the Agrarian Counsel are located in the municipality and easily accessible

to farmers. It is clear that neither administrative measures nor technical progress alone will result in a great change in the agriculture structure; it is the combination that counts.

Another point on which I can agree with the speaker is the indispensable role of farmers' political organizations in the land-reform movement. Legislative and administrative efforts will be fruitful only when they are supported by the spontaneous response of cultivators, and this in turn is dependent on the confidence which farmers have in themselves. Peasant movements, I think, should be considered an integral part of the program, even though they may not be sympathetic to the administration. The land-reform program in the Philippines was started at the initiative of the administration, and can be categorized as of the so-called "from-above" type. Hence it is necessary that the administration bend every effort to acquire a profound understanding of the demands of the peasantry. As I have observed in Bulacan, the legal services offered by the Office of Agrarian Counsel are highly appreciated, but if farmers are not confident of the powers they themselves have because of the provisions of the law, the land-reform program will find it difficult to maintain its progress.

The lack of information and studies related to the agrarian problems of the country was also emphasized by the speaker. I believe that urgent action by the administration and by individual scholars is called for, with a view to hastening the program's accomplishments and deepening our understanding of the Philippine economy and society. For example, we still have no accurate knowledge about the stratified composition of landownership. Since census data and statistics on landownership are collected by municipality, it is hard for us to know who are the owners of large-sized holdings covering several municipalities. To give a general picture of land relations in the country, detailed surveys should be carried out at the national level. At the same time systematic and intensive descrip-

tions should be made of the land systems in key regions, with emphasis on interrelations of the economic, social, and cultural aspects. These studies will lead to a better appreciation of regional variations in agrarian conditions. Otherwise we shall hardly understand the regional significance of the transition from share tenancy to leasehold or of the limit placed on landholdings. The Basic Farmer's Card, prepared by the Land Reform Project Teams, can help us acquire a picture of the individual cultivator and the agrarian situation in an area. Sufficient resources should be allocated to ensure the accuracy and updating of the information in this card.

Lastly, allow me to draw on my observations in a Bulacan barrio to present a few of the new trends which I believe will result from the progress of the land-reform program. One is the possible emergency of twofold tenancy, or sub-tenancy. Even before land reform, intermediaries like *inquilinos*, *arrendadores*, and *administradores* were seen on the larger holdings. But now similar intermediaries are appearing on smaller farms. Although the larger portion of new leaseholders are gradually intensifying the labor input on their farms, some agricultural workers regularly hired by other leaseholders are becoming in effect subtenants. For the return from the

leased farm is now big enough to support an intermediary between the lessee and the tiller of the soil.

Such a trend is re-enforced by two factors. One is the increasing pressure of overpopulation in the rural area. Another is the gradual diminishing of the communal tradition of mutual help in the form of sparing some portion of harvest for the villagers. As a result, the equilibrium that once existed in the village community is now at stake. Hitherto, under the share-tenancy system, social and economic differences between farmholders and nonholders were not pronounced. But under the leasehold system landholding has now brought about notable improvements in the economic conditions of the lessee's household. It is possible that disintegration of communal unity may be accelerated in the near future, and if this occurs we may expect changes in the economic and social structure of the rural Philippines.

#### Note

Dr. Takahashi, a geographer, is an associate professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, and has done research in Baliuag, Bulacan (1963-64 and 1971-72). He has a lengthier article elsewhere in this volume.

### Comment on the B. de los Reyes Paper

ASSA MAROM

April 23, 1972

As I listened to the speech of Dr. de los Reyes, I discovered that he feels as I do about the work we are trying to do in the municipality of General Ricarte. The basic task is that of develop-

ing the small farmer so that he can use the resources available to him in a more productive way. According to my experience, this is best done when farmers are brought together to work

cooperatively. To do this, however, we must, as Dr. de los Reyes has said, understand the thinking of the farmer and see his problems as he sees them.

In Israel we had to face many of the same problems that the Philippines is facing now. The people of Israel came from many parts of the world with different backgrounds. It was necessary to see that each farmer obtained full production from the piece of land he tilled, and meanwhile to instill the idea of nationhood and a sense of belonging. To attain these goals we found that it would be necessary not just to allocate a piece of land to a family, but also to provide them with some credit, tools, and other inputs. It was necessary to develop new ways of thinking, both technical and social.

One of the means which we devised for achieving these objectives was the moshav, or cooperative. The moshav is a way of life. It stresses the benefits to be derived from joint efforts, not just when planting and harvesting, but in all phases of agriculture and even in community life outside of agriculture. Through the moshav both economic and social problems are solved. It is a form of organization that allows the people of a community to participate in broad self-development, the guiding principle being the common good.

One of the economic advantages of the moshav is that it reduces some of the risks inherent in agriculture undertaken by farmers alone. Small farmers tend to minimize risks, concentrating their resources on a single crop which will provide them with the maximum amount of security. For most Filipino farmers, this means rice production, even though it may not always be the most economical crop. Farmers encouraged to grow soybeans instead will say, "What if there is no market - I can't feed my family on soybeans." When risks are shared, however, the farmers can diversify without fear. Through such diversification it becomes possible for the village to develop its own self-protection. If the price of palay is low, they will have other crops or livestock which they can market. The moshav then provides the security needed to

enter into diversification, an important element in agricultural development.

Each moshav is an independent organization, but may federate at a higher level with other moshavs in order to benefit from economies of scale in such activities as marketing, handling storage, input procurement, and machinery pools. Through these organizations Israel was able to achieve a nation based on strong, productive, self-reliant farmers who, though coming from many backgrounds, have been united as loyal citizens. The moshav, with its emphasis on mutual aid, has provided strength in overcoming hardships.

The Philippines is going through a major transition. In this connection we are discussing the question, "Can land reform succeed?" Dr. de los Reyes has said it can, but he also feels that far greater national concern will be required if this success is to be achieved. He pointed out that land reform meant much more than simply changing the tenurial relationship. In this I agree with him.

In the share-tenancy relationship, the farmer is totally dependent on those who own the land. The landlord provides him with production requirements and assures him of food for subsistence in case of crop failure. When the farmer becomes a leaseholder, the ties are destroyed and the farmer must find new sources of support. I believe it is important for the country to understand that a horizontal support system among the farmers must be established to meet this need. This support system should be a cooperative relationship which provides mutual aid among equals.

The experience that I have had in General Ricarte indicates that the moshav type of cooperative relationship can be made to work in the Philippines. We hope that after a few years the results of this experiment will demonstrate that it can be an important tool for Philippine development as it has already been for the development of Israel.

Regardless of how closely the moshav method of farmer organization is followed, I believe that the development of Philippine agriculture will depend on the strengthening of small-farmer

cooperation and collective action. Land reform can be made to work if the necessary support is given to small farmers, particularly if they are united by bonds of mutual assistance.

*Note*

Mr. Marom is an Israeli expert in moshav organization and management. He is completing two years as a technical adviser to farmers of General Ricarte, Nueva Ecija.

**NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY**

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Pilipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *mga*, pronounced "mangá"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (^). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Pilipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.



## SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF IRRIGATION

GEKEE Y. WICKHAM

July 12, 1972

Based on fieldwork accomplished in January-March 1970, the study investigates some sociological aspects of irrigation in the light of the increasing importance of irrigation in agricultural development. Irrigation planning is seen not only as a physical water problem, but also a people problem. The study focuses on what farmers do when water is scarce, their communication patterns with the irrigation body, their degree of cooperation, their attitudes toward group organization, and what the irrigation body, as a potential change agent, can contribute toward providing a better service to these people. It uses the case-study approach, and covers 10 sites in Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna. In all, 133 farmers were interviewed.

Irrigation is an infrastructure requirement in agricultural development. It can also be an instigator of change, as when it enables two or more crops to be grown in place of one, or when land values appreciate because irrigation has been introduced. But for our immediate purposes the most important characteristic of irrigation is that it involves people.

### *Irrigation is a People Problem*

When people share a common water service, social interaction will take place. Decisions, overt or tacit, must be made about water apportionment. Delivery-scheduling programs affect farmers over large areas, and mutual impingements inevitably become vital considerations in any irrigation effort. To cite only one obvious social fact: the farmer served at the tail-end of a gravity irrigation system cannot hope to get any water without at least the tacit compliance of farmers upstream from him. In other words, irrigation is not only a water problem; it is also a people problem. Specifically, it is a problem affecting three kinds of people: the farmers who use the water, the irrigation personnel who deliver it, and the general public whose taxes are invested in the construction of government irri-

gation facilities. Here our main concern will be the farmers and the irrigation personnel.

### *New Demands on an Old System*

Gravity, or diversion, systems of water distribution were introduced or developed in the Philippines in pre-Spanish times — the Ifugao rice-terrace complexes being the outstanding examples. Even today the gravity system remains the most commonly employed irrigation arrangement found here.<sup>1</sup> As of 1970, in fact, there were 13 major gravity networks in Central Luzon, each serving an irrigable area of 3,000 to 27,000 hectares. In such a system, the point of origin is the diversion of an unregulated streamflow at a point higher than the service area. The water then proceeds downward by gravity, to be distributed by the canals, laterals, and ditches of the network. This kind of arrangement obviously involves an ingenious adaptation to soil, topography, and rainfall regime. Indeed, for the purposes for which most were constructed, namely, to assure above all the success of rainy-season crops which might otherwise be adversely affected by insufficient precipitation at a critical growth stage, these systems have generally been satisfactory.

However, even under traditional conditions of rice cultivation there have been problems. A major drawback of gravity systems anywhere is their inability to store water.<sup>2</sup> But this defect is compounded in the wet tropics because, first, irrigation planning is generally more difficult here and, second, one frequently has too much of a good thing — water in the irrigation system at the same time that the rice fields are flooded. The special difficulties facing irrigation planners in the humid tropics derive from the fact that in this environment irrigation is supplemental to rainfall, which in turn is relatively unpredictable, often dependent on typhoons and other tropical weather phenomena. In arid zones, by contrast, the almost complete absence of rainfall makes irrigation schedules much easier to plan for.

To summarize, gravity systems, despite the defects just mentioned, have served the Philippines well under traditional patterns of rice cultivation. However, times have changed. While these irrigation systems have remained basically the same for centuries, rice technology has recently made major strides. Thus in the 10 years that have passed since the introduction of the new high-yielding rice varieties, demands have grown for more sophisticated techniques of water delivery, techniques permitting accurate regulation of the amount and timing of irrigation inputs. These new requirements arise from the recently achieved possibility of growing two and even three rice crops in a single year where formerly only one could be grown, and that during the rainy season. With the new rice varieties, which are not so sensitive as traditional strains to the length of daylight hours during the growth period, but more sensitive to fertilizer inputs and other improved farming practices, new ideas of water control and apportionment are necessary.

Hence, unless it is revolutionized, gravity irrigation will here be seen more and more as an old system struggling with a new technological environment. Recent on-farm studies (T. H. Wickham 1971) have helped shed light on some of the problems, but it is evident that further studies must be made. Thus the recently concluded pilot projects of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and the Asian Develop-

ment Bank (ADB), based on the Taiwan-style "rotational irrigation," seem to suggest that in a vastly different sociopolitical environment this type of irrigation may not function satisfactorily without some modifications.<sup>3</sup> Guidelines for any such changes will be derived, in part at least, from a better understanding of how farmers relate to one another and to irrigation arrangements.

### *Plan of the Study*

#### *Objectives*

The overall objective of the study is primarily to explore the social aspects of irrigation by means of a case-study approach. Specific objectives include the following: (1) to investigate and describe each study site with reference to the following variables: communication between the NIA and the farmers it serves; cooperation among farmers; farmer fee payments; adoption of improved practices; farmer satisfaction with yield and water adequacy; and farmer evaluation of the irrigation services provided by the NIA; (2) to discover if there are any relationships between pairs of the variables mentioned in objective 1; (3) to explore farmers' attitudes toward group-oriented activities relevant to irrigation, including rotational irrigation supplemental irrigation (pumps), group-buying of water from the NIA, and farmers' acceptance of responsibilities for some irrigation subactivities such as ditch-clearing; and (4) to compare farmers in different study sites and different locations (relative to an irrigation canal) with respect to the variables mentioned in objective 1.

#### *Areas covered*

The 10 study sites (see note to Table 1) are found in Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna provinces, all situated in the major rice-growing area of the Philippines. The first two provinces are just north of Manila, and the third, south. Comparatively, Luzon has better than average rice yields, ranging from 30 to 40 percent higher than national figures.<sup>4</sup> The area experiences two pronounced seasons, the wet from June to October (during which time the South-west trade winds blow) and the dry, from November to May. Rainfall averages recorded

Table 1

Mean scores and ranks achieved by farmer respondents (N = 133) on selected variables, by variable and by site (Philippines, January-March 1970)

Variable	Nueva Ecija			Bulacan		Laguna			All sites	H value	Signif.
	SR	Bgd	Po	PB	Ag	SJ	Vic	PBL			
<b>a. Communication with the NIA (max. score, 12.00)</b>											
Mean score	10.44	7.67	9.45	8.54	6.86	6.18	6.77	8.13	7.72	26.89	0.01
Rank	1	5	2	3	6	8	7	4	-		
<b>b. Cooperation among farmers (max. score, 21.00)</b>											
Mean score	15.30	12.90	13.30	11.60	13.80	13.50	13.40	11.40	13.00	38.56	0.01
Rank	1	6	5	7	2	3	4	8			
<b>c. Satisfaction with yield and water (max. score, 4.00)</b>											
Mean score	1.45	2.84	1.77	2.00	1.65	1.95	2.16	2.56	2.18	30.26	0.05
Rank	8	1	6	4	7	5	3	2			
<b>d. Adoption of improved practices (max. score, 9.00)</b>											
Mean score	4.67	7.10	4.83	4.89	2.28	7.99	8.03	7.44	6.24	76.86	0.05
Rank	7	4	6	5	8	2	1	3			
<b>e. Propensity to pay irrigation fees (max. score, 6.00)</b>											
Mean score	4.00	1.92	2.82	2.54	2.69	1.75	1.96	2.19	1.94	26.64	0.05
Rank	1	7	2	4	3	8	6	5			
<b>f. Evaluation of irrigation services (max. score, 16.00)</b>											
Mean score	8.99	12.78	13.18	13.17	14.10	11.88	9.26	11.19	12.83	27.47	0.01
Rank	8	4	2	3	1	5	7	6			

Abbreviations: SR - San Ricardo (N=9); Bgd - Bangad (N=33); Po - Pulo (N=11); PB - Pulong Bayabas (N=13); Agn - Agnaya (N=14) and Barangka (N=2); SJ - San Juan (N=22); Vic - Victoria (N=13); PBL - Pinagbayanan (N=9) and Linga (N=7); H - The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic.

Table 2

Intercorrelations among six main variables of study (Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Laguna; January-March 1970)

Variable <sup>a</sup>	2	3	4	5	6
1. Communication	0.072	0.051	-0.077	0.184*	0.053
2. Cooperation		-0.123	-0.047	0.029*	-0.075
3. Satisfaction			0.139	-0.223**	0.472*
4. Adoption				-0.332**	-0.157*
5. Propensity					-0.136
6. Evaluation					-

<sup>a</sup>For full titles of variables, see Table 1 or text.

\*Significant at 0.05 level (Spearman's  $r$ )

\*\*Significant at 0.01 level (Spearman's  $r$ )

over a 20-year period at the Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija) weather station show a mean monthly rainfall of 383 mm. in August and 4.8 mm. in January. Sites chosen for the study are limited to irrigated areas which are well-bounded, to enable physical measurement of all water entering and leaving the area. Within the area so defined we attempted to interview all farmers. However, for various reasons several could not be interviewed and our total number of respondents in the 10 sites was 133. These farmers were interviewed about social aspects of irrigation, while a technical study conducted jointly with this project covered two entire cropping seasons, with daily monitoring of soil and water conditions and other agronomic data (T. H. Wickham 1971).

#### *Methodology*

The research area was delineated with the help of air photos, maps, and actual visits to the area prior to the survey. A complete enumeration of farmers within this delineated area was made with the help of the ditch tender,<sup>5</sup> and a sketch map drawn identifying the area farmed by each farmer. The major research tool was the interview schedule, and trained interviewers mainly from the Farm and Home Development Office of the U.P. College of Agriculture were used. In the method of analysis, apart from descriptive statistics such as percentages, two major non-parametric tests were used. One was the Spearman's  $r$  employed to test correlations of two variables at a time, and the other was the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. For the variables discussed in this paper, a composite scoring system was used, utilizing an *arbitrary* point-system. In the "adoption" variable, for example, points were given to the respondent for weeding, pest control, straight-row planting, seed testing, and so on, usually one point for each improved practice.<sup>6</sup> The sites were then ranked in the Kruskal-Wallis test, while the individual farmers were ranked in the Spearman's  $r$  technique. Tests of significance were then run in each case.

#### *Findings and Conclusions*

This section is divided into three parts, the first covering descriptive data and farmers'

attitudes toward certain activities, and the second and third, the six major variables explored in this study. Conclusions, where made, are added to the findings with which they are most closely connected.

#### *Descriptive data*

*Tenurial arrangements.* In the sites covered, there is a relatively high proportion of share-tenancy (46 percent). Among these tenants the most common sharing arrangement (reported by two-thirds of them) is the 50-50 system. Under this system, the landlord usually advances payment<sup>7</sup> of inputs such as fertilizer and insecticide, recovering this advance in kind at harvest time, in addition to his 50 percent share of the harvest. Other expenses such as weeding and harvesting are usually borne by the farmer, while the costs for land preparation may be the farmer's or the landlord's responsibility, depending on the arrangement; if the latter pays, he collects it in kind at harvest time.

With regard to irrigation-fee payment, the most common pattern (36 percent of all farmers interviewed) is one in which the farmer pays an agreed amount to the landlord (the amount varies according to the contractual arrangements), and the landlord then pays the NIA. The official irrigation fee is ₱60 per hectare per year (₱35 in the dry season and ₱25 in the wet). By another pattern the farmer pays the whole amount (26 percent); by still another, the landlord pays the whole amount (26 percent). Eleven percent of respondents say they do not know who is responsible for paying the irrigation fees.

*Fee payment.* A total of 86 percent of all farmers interviewed say they paid their irrigation fees, either to the NIA (55 percent), or to the landlord (29 percent), or to some unspecified person (2 percent). About one out of five respondents has suggestions to make regarding fee payment. Of these, 23 percent suggest that fee payment be direct to the NIA (and not through the landlord), while another 17 percent suggest how this should be done — by the NIA's sending someone out to the field to collect from them. It is a common practice that, at harvest time, the landlord (or his representative), the hired laborers (weeders, harvesters, threshers, and

others) and often the private moneylenders appear right there to collect their payment from the farmer. Under present NIA policy, it bills the landlord and not the farmer, although under leasehold agreements it sometimes deals directly with the farmer. Given this system of "first-come, first-paid" the NIA loses out in the collection of its fee payment, since it is not physically present at the harvest site to collect its due.

Farmers feel that P60 per hectare per year is "unreasonable," but are willing to pay P35 per hectare per year for an assured double crop. Although actual fee payment varies significantly by respondent's farm location relative to the source of water, propensity to pay shows no significant association with this variable. This suggests that, in general, farmers are willing to pay, provided they have adequate water.

*Farmer attitudes towards group-oriented activities.* Farmers acknowledge that cooperation is needed in any irrigation activity. Although they feel that farm ditches should be the NIA responsibility, still most farmers do in fact help to clean them, and show a positive willingness to partake in irrigation subactivities. An example of farmer participation took place during the survey, when a group of about 45 farmers were rounded up by the local ditchtender to rehabilitate a disused dam in order to alleviate an acute water problem in their area.

However, there is a strong preference to perform most irrigation activities — for example, fee payment (93 percent), water scheduling (73 percent), water control (60 percent) and ditch-clearing (56 percent) — individually. Only one site has an irrigators' association, and only 6 percent of all farmers interviewed belong to one. About two-thirds of all respondents (65 percent) belong to no other farmer associations. Farmers were also asked whether they would join a rotational irrigation system where water was rationed to each farmer, with an assured amount coming to him. An overwhelming 90 percent say they will participate in a scheme for rotational irrigation, if water is assured. The reasons given for wanting to participate pertain mainly to this assuredness of water: 61 percent say, "Because everyone would have a chance of receiving water" and 27 percent say they "Would not have to

worry about getting water, if everyone took turns."

Group buying of water was also explored. In order to give farmers more control over the distribution of water, one way would be for the NIA to sell water to farmers as a group, and leave the distribution in their hands. About 46 percent of the farmers like the idea, a further 37 percent are uncommitted, while the remaining 17 percent dislike the idea. Most farmers who favor group-buying of water give reasons pertaining to their "benefiting" from it, and that "water will not be a problem" if they handle the distribution. Those who dislike the idea state that it might be "confusing." Group-buying of water is often conceptualized together with a measured amount of water to be sold, although it need not necessarily be so. Farmers were asked their opinion about buying water on a volume basis as opposed to a per-hectare basis, and 63 percent of the total reject the idea, saying that it "Might be more expensive" or that it is too complicated, or "My farm uses a lot of water because of sandy soils." About one-third support the idea, while 8 percent remain uncommitted.

Those willing to participate in rotational irrigation are also those high in innovativeness; it follows that any new idea in irrigation may be better received in an area where adoption of improved practices is high. Regarding supplemental pump irrigation, about 54 percent of the total are willing to pay more for assured water from pumps. Farmers (60 percent) feel that they should have more control over the distribution of water and feel this can be effected by controlling the turnouts. In general, farmers feel that irrigation enables them to make more profit, and estimate that given adequate water they would show a yield increase of 39 percent in the wet season ( $N = 115$ ) and 50 percent in the dry ( $N = 70$ ). Most farmers (65 percent), however, regard fee payments as taxes, rather than as production inputs.

*The ditchtender.* The ditchtender occupies a central position in matters pertaining to irrigation, since it is he who in most cases decides water-allocation. Most farmers (80 percent) say they go to see the ditchtender whenever they

have an irrigation problem, and about half (45 percent) say they prefer to deal with the ditch-tender regarding irrigation matters, even given a choice of other people. Communication with the ditch-tender is frequent, but the content of this communication is seldom irrigation; he tends to be identified more with the farmers than with the NIA personnel. After the ditch-tender, interaction with other NIA personnel is rather limited, suggesting that relatively little communication therefore takes place between the NIA and the farmers at these levels.

*Water adequacy.* From the data obtained in the study, there is some indication that below a certain level of water adequacy,<sup>8</sup> yields are adversely affected. Above this critical point, there is no appreciable difference in yield for different adequacy levels.

An important factor affecting water distribution is the topography of the land. At the present time, there is no guaranteed method of water distribution whereby those needing water will get it at the appropriate time. The common field situation is such that farmers located along the first 50 percent of the distance of the canal often receive not only earlier water, but more of it. Further, these farmers can often easily avail

themselves of the water flowing in the canal, thus depriving farmers farther along the canal.

Four major location classifications were drawn up, to explore the attitudes of farmers in these various positions (see Figure 1). The results are presented in Table 3. The following responses classify the farmers into two distinct groups, those in the A and C locations (that is, those in the first portion of the canal as it leaves the system headwork) and those in the B and D groups, in the lower portions (positions farther away from the source of water). Thus a system whereby the lower reaches get water first suggests a more equitable distribution, and might encourage better levels of fee payment. However, since the water has first to pass through the farms in A and C, there is a need for some social organization by which farmers are in agreement on the method of water apportionment. Farmers in the A and C regions report better satisfaction with yields and water adequacy than those in the B and D regions. In communication with the NIA, they rank lower, but tend to rate their systems higher.

*Social variables: Variation by site*

Although it is recognized that people can effect changes in the design or structure of an




Fig. 1 - Diagram showing farm locations distinguished in this study. Symbols: A - first half of lateral, within 300 meters from bank of lateral; B - second half of lateral, within 300 meters from bank; C - first half of lateral, over 300 meters from bank; D - second half of lateral, over 300 meters from bank.

Table 3

Mean scores and ranks achieved by farmer respondents ( $N = 133$ ) on selected variables, by variable and by farm location along irrigation lateral (Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna; January-March 1970)

Variable	Location along lateral				H value	Signif.
	A	B	C	D		
<b>a. Communication with the NIA (max. score, 12.00)</b>						
Mean score	7.15	8.76	6.95	7.95	33.4	0.01
Rank	3	1	4	2		
<b>b. Cooperation among farmers (max. score, 21.00)</b>						
Mean score	13.61	13.21	13.10	11.79	37.4	0.01
Rank	1	2	3	4		
<b>c. Satisfaction with yield and water (max. score, 4.00)</b>						
Mean score	2.31	1.98	2.48	2.24	n. s.	0.05
Rank	2	4	1	3		
<b>d. Adoption of improved practices (max. score, 9.00)</b>						
Mean score	5.10	5.97	7.52	6.55	n. s.	0.05
Rank	4	3	1	2		
<b>e. Propensity to pay irrigation fees (max. score, 6.00)</b>						
Mean score	2.25	2.62	1.81	2.40	n. s.	0.05
Rank	3	1	4	2		
<b>f. Evaluation of irrigation services (max. score, 16.00)</b>						
Mean score	12.70	11.60	12.50	12.10	30.4	0.01
Rank	1	4	2	3		

Symbols: A - first half of lateral, within 300 meters from bank of lateral; B - second half of lateral, within 300 meters from bank; C - first half of lateral, over 300 meters from bank; D - second half of lateral, over 300 meters from bank; H - Kruskal-Wallis test statistic.

For diagram of farm locations, see Figure 1.

irrigation system, for the purposes of this study the design or structure of the system is treated as the independent variable, and the social factors associated with the irrigation system as the dependent variables.

Some of these dependent variables are communication between the NIA and the farmers, cooperation among the farmers, farmer satisfaction with yield and water adequacy, farmer fee payment, farmer evaluation of irrigation services, and adoption of improved rice-production practices. The discussion following is divided into two parts: the first treats the site as the unit of

analysis (see Table 1), and the second, the farmer (see Table 2). The first method ranks each site according to the average score for that area; in other words, a site-profile is drawn. This site-profile will hopefully guide proposers of projects as to what they can expect, given the characteristics of the site, and what further inputs will be necessary to ensure some degree of success in the project. The second method ranks each farmer according to his score, irrespective of site. It attempts to draw a farmer-profile; for example, what kind of farmer would tend to be high in adoption scores? Although the sites

chosen were all double-cropped sites, it is emphasized that they all experienced some degree of water shortage over two cropping seasons. The comparisons, therefore, are relative in this respect.

*Communication between the NIA and farmers.*

Communication is important insofar as by it the farmers can understand the objectives of the irrigation agency at the farm level (as when it schedules water in some places and not in others), and each side can better appreciate the problems of the other. It was found that if the NIA were to regard communication as an input, (see Table 1) it might recognize significant returns in many areas, especially that of fee collection. As with any field situation, there is the danger of a communication lag, so it is necessary for the irrigation agency to be out in the field evaluating the changing situation for itself. If they found, for example, farmers planting earlier than they should, they would be in a better position to prevent a disruption of the water schedule if they caught this early, and took action.

The site at San Ricardo has the highest mean score in communication with the NIA. Although there are only nine farmers in this area, farm size is nevertheless relatively larger (2.7 ha.) than the average in the study (1.8 ha.). In the period under survey, this site suffered a very bad drought in the dry season. The farmers as a result approached the NIA agency to explore means of getting water to their fields; this could account for the high communication score. The site which ranks second, Pulo, has an Irrigation Association in the area. This is the only site with such an association, formed on an experimental basis. Through this organization the farmers pay a reduced irrigation fee in exchange for some duties such as ditch-clearing. Thus in each area there is a unique historical factor which contributes to the greater communication between the NIA and the farmers, one negative, and the other, positive.

*Cooperation among farmers.* While attitudes towards cooperation may be socialized from childhood, to a certain extent cooperation may emerge in times of stress or necessity. In the

rural-urban construct (Redfield 1947) it has been theorized that people in rural areas, compared with urban residents, tend to work more closely together in groups and communities. However, as technology develops and infrastructure increases, and mass media and other types of exposure are brought into the rural areas, and as agriculture becomes more commercialized, there will tend to be less and less of the traditional type of cooperation, such as the *bayanihan* in the Philippines, where farmers group together to do a common piece of work. In straight-row planting, for example, where the technique is specialized, groups of trained people sometimes sell their expertise in exchange for cash or a share of the harvest. This pattern is found to be common in the Laguna sites. But a new form of cooperation is called for. Where water is scarce, for instance, complete independence and noncooperation is not conducive to successful water-management practices in irrigation (where water has to be divided systematically among farmers). Decisions have to be made regarding water schedules, and unless there is some cooperation among farmers there may be a form of "anarchy" where each farmer helps himself to the water at the expense of others.

It was hypothesized that below and above a certain level of water adequacy, there would be negligible cooperation among farmers. Where water is so scarce that farmer survival depends on it, the pressures will be so great that there will be hardly any cooperation, and there will tend to be an "anarchistic" situation. Where water is abundant, there will not be great pressure to cooperate since there is enough water for everyone and group decisions are not really essential. In between these two extremes, there will be pressure which is somewhat "bearable"; as a result there will be a greater tendency toward cooperative efforts and group decisions regarding water. The above hypothesis was not confirmed in this study; rather, it was found that in the site where water shortage was most acute, cooperation was strongest. Moreover, the forms of cooperation among farmers were found to vary from highly informal discussions to highly structured meetings and formalized group action. It is conjectured that the level



and type of cooperation may in some cases reflect the locality's level of development.

The site which ranks highest in this variable is San Ricardo. This finding seems to indicate that there is more cooperation where there is greater shortage of water. Other factors, such as the existence of a closely-knit community, may also account for this high degree of cooperation.

*Farmer satisfaction with yield and water adequacy.* In any farming operation, yield obtained is an important factor, since it represents the gross income of the farmer. Satisfaction is a relative value, and a subjective and changing one. Dissatisfaction can be exploited by a change agent in many ways, for only when a person is dissatisfied will he want a change. As aspirations rise, expectations change, which may result in the persons who are further ahead on a "development" scale being more dissatisfied than those who are behind them. Satisfaction viewed this way can, to some extent, indicate the potential for change.

Although farmers' satisfaction with yield and water adequacy depends on their aspirations and expectations, it was found that, generally, farmers who had high yields were more likely to be satisfied, when compared with farmers who had low yields. Also, farmers who had inadequate water were lower in satisfaction.

*Fee payment.* The question of fee payment has been of interest for some time, both to administrators and politicians, as well as to farmers. Fees are collected by the NIA with the stated aim of covering the cost of operations and maintenance, so that the gravity systems will be able to run on a self-supporting budget once the other physical inputs (such as dam construction) have been made. However, there are several factors which complicate the picture, such as social equity (who should pay, for example), and other factors, such as when is the best time to collect, in what form, and how "delinquent payers" should be treated.

Leaving aside the question of the actual amounts to be paid, some payment for the use of water is reasonable in modernized agriculture, if only so that the farmer will regard the water

input as an economic entity. In other words, in commercialized agriculture, nothing should be given out of charity. Rural welfare as explained by Mosher (1969) calls for putting the farmer on a competitive basis rather than offering him "charitable" assistance.

Among the sites, propensity to pay irrigation fees is highest in San Ricardo, which also ranks first in communication with the NIA, and in cooperation among farmers. It is notable that among the sites with high adoption mean scores, there is a rather low propensity to pay fees. This may reflect increased aspirations on the part of the farmers who perhaps look for better irrigation services and are less inclined to pay the irrigation fees if they feel the water and other services are inadequate. In contrast, the San Ricardo case suggests that where water is short, farmers probably realize its worth more, in terms of input, and are more ready to pay for it.

*Farmer evaluation of irrigation services.* This variable includes answers to questions on the supply and timing of water, as well as ditch-clearing, and whether farmers feel the NIA personnel are interested in them. The site which ranks lowest in adoption of improved practices ranks highest in the evaluation of irrigation services. This seems to indicate that adopters probably high in aspirations will tend to rate the systems lower, since they expect better services.

*Adoption of improved practices.* This variable was explored on the assumption that adequate irrigation can be combined with the adoption of improved practices (use of HYV, fertilizers, weedicides, and other inputs) to increase production. However, it is also recognized that irrigation may act as a negative input, as when excess water and poor drainage result in plants being flooded and destroyed.

The sites with the highest adoption mean scores are those in Laguna: Victoria, Pinagbayan and Linga, and San Juan (Table 1). The other site with a mean score higher than 7.0 is Bangad, in Nueva Ecija. The remaining sites have relatively low adoption scores. In areas where the adoption score is low, however, many of the farmers are aware of the improved

practices, but for various reasons, primarily economic, the practices have not been adopted.

In Laguna there seems to be a special pattern by which groups of people sell their expertise, such as straight-row planting, instead of the farmer's having to do it himself; there was also a similar pattern in rotary weeding, where the farmer usually does not own the equipment himself, but hires a group to do this. By the usual oral contract, the hired group agrees to weed the fields at specified times, in return for the option to harvest. Generally the same group also handles the harvesting and threshing after making a package deal. Thus these groups may have contributed to the higher rates of adoption of the above-mentioned practices.

*Site profile.* From the above, it is seen that sites with relatively more water shortage tend to manifest better cooperation, more communication with the NIA, and a higher propensity to pay fees. They also show, however, low yields and low rates of adoption.

*Social variables: Variation by farmer*

In this section, relationships between the six variables were tested, using the Spearman's  $r$  technique. The variables were run two at a time, using the farmer as the unit of analysis, the result being a "farmer profile," summarized in Table 2.

*Communication and propensity to pay fees.* This pair of variables shows a significant, positive correlation of 0.184 suggesting that the greater the communication between the NIA and farmers, the greater will be the farmers' propensity to pay irrigation fees.

*Cooperation among farmers and propensity to pay irrigation fees.* Here we find a significant, positive correlation of 0.209. This seems to indicate that the higher the cooperation among farmers, the more likely they will be to pay fees. However, since cooperation has been found to be higher in water-short areas, it follows that in those areas there will be a greater tendency for farmers to pay, perhaps because they are more appreciative of whatever water they receive. However, this may be applicable only up to a point, since too severe a water shortage will affect yield, which may in turn affect ability to pay (since farmer income will then be reduced).

Thus there is some indication that where water is limited and has to be shared or used efficiently (as opposed to a situation in which an abundant supply of water is poorly controlled) there will be a greater chance that farmers will be willing to pay fees.

*Farmer satisfaction with yield and water adequacy, and propensity to pay irrigation fees.* There is a significant, negative correlation of 0.223 between these variables; that is, where there is less satisfaction with yield and water adequacy, there is more willingness to pay irrigation fees to get the water. In the mean scores attained (see Table 1), areas which score high in satisfaction also show a low propensity to pay, and vice-versa. Perhaps the part which rainfall plays is also important, since in those areas where there is considerable rainfall, the contribution of irrigation is not so apparent to farmers, and hence there will be less willingness to pay in such areas reporting "satisfaction."

*Adoption of improved practices and propensity to pay fees.* This pair shows a significant, negative correlation of 0.332. It indicates that the farmer higher on the adoption scale is less willing to pay irrigation fees. It also hints at the higher aspirations of adopters, who demand better services of irrigation systems.

*Adoption of improved practices and farmer evaluation of irrigation services.* There is here a significant, negative correlation of 0.157. Again this reflects the fact that adopters have much more to be critical about, and are therefore not likely to evaluate irrigation systems highly. Conversely, those who rate the system highly are not so likely to be the adopters. Therefore, the irrigation agency can expect mounting criticism even of the best-run systems as adoption of improved practices spreads and as farmers become more demanding of better and better services.

*Farmer satisfaction and farmer evaluation of irrigation services.* Between these two variables there is a significant, positive correlation of 0.472. This indicates that the more satisfied the farmer is with his yields and water adequacy, the more highly he will tend to evaluate the irrigation services. This seems to contradict the previous indication that adopters will be more

critical (assuming that adopters have higher yields). Two factors complicate the picture: one is that not all adopters have higher yields; the other is that not all those with high yields are necessarily "satisfied."

*Farmer profile.* In summary, these findings picture the farmer in the water-short areas as more willing to pay fees to get the water, but less likely to be an innovator, since his attention is focused on the problem of just getting enough water. Conversely, to facilitate the adoption of improved practices, there must be good supply and control of water. Also, the finding that those who evaluate the irrigation system highly have a low propensity to pay fees may indicate that some farmers with good water supplies probably take the situation for granted. Pushed to an extreme, this finding seems to suggest that the more the NIA provides sufficient water, the less willing farmers will be to pay irrigation fees. This is partially correct, at least in the short run. However, as other correlations indicate, the propensity to pay increases with increasing communication between the NIA and farmers, and with more farmer cooperation, and that farmer satisfaction increases with yield increases, which are linked to the timely provision of water.

#### Notes

This article is a revised and shortened version of the author's unpublished Master of Science thesis (in rural sociology) entitled "Sociological aspects of irrigation." It was submitted in June 1970 to the department of agricultural education, University of the Philippines College of Agriculture, College, Laguna. Mrs. Wickham is currently residing with her husband (T. H. Wickham, an agricultural engineer) at the International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños, Laguna, while continuing her research at the UPCA. She wishes to acknowledge in particular the assistance she received from personnel of the NIA.

1. According to the National Irrigation Administration the first government-built diversion system was inaugurated in 1912.

2. A major storage dam at Pantabangan is now under construction, but this will irrigate essentially only one Philippine province, Nueva Ecija. After the water leaves the dam site, there will still be problems of water distribution.

3. The NIA-ADB report is still in draft form: this remark is the author's opinion based on informal discussions with some of the field personnel.

4. Compiled from 1968-69 data provided by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Philippines.

5. Ditchtenders report to a watermaster who heads a division comprising about 2,000 hectares. Each ditch-tender is in charge of cleaning the canals within an area of 150 hectares.

6. Adapted from the scale used in the study of De Guzman and Dimaano (1968).

7. This works out to fifty-fifty sharing with regard to these inputs; there are other sources of credit, but the landlord is viewed as a "convenient" source. The "interest" obtained here is less obvious, but it is realized through the palay price, which is lower at harvest time.

8. This "adequacy" is as perceived by farmers (that is, a subjective evaluation).

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## TABLES OF EQUIVALENTS

### Units of Length (Metric and English Systems)

<i>Metric Unit</i>	<i>In Meters</i>	<i>English Equivalent</i>
Millimeter (mm)	.001 meter	0.0394 inch
Centimeter (cm)	.01 meter	0.3937 inch
Decimeter (dm)	.1 meter	3.937 inches
Meter (m)		3.2808 feet
Dekameter (dkm)	10 meters	32.8083 feet
Hectometer (hm)	100 meters	328.0833 feet
Kilometer (km)	1000 meters	0.62137 mile

### Units of Area (Metric and English Systems)

<i>Metric Unit</i>	<i>In Sq. Meters</i>	<i>English Equivalent</i>
Sq. millimeter (mm <sup>2</sup> )	.000001 m <sup>2</sup>	6.0015 sq. in.
Sq. Centimeter (cm <sup>2</sup> )	.0001 m <sup>2</sup>	0.155 sq. in.
Sq. decimeter (dm <sup>2</sup> )	.01 m <sup>2</sup>	15.5 sq. in.
Sq. meter (m <sup>2</sup> )		10.7639 sq. ft.
Sq. dekameter (dkm <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>b</sup>	100 m <sup>2</sup>	3.9537 sq. ft.
Sq. hectometer (hm <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>c</sup>	10,000m <sup>2</sup>	2.471 acres
Sq. kilometer (km <sup>2</sup> )	1,000,000 m <sup>2</sup>	0.3861 sq. mi.

### Units of Weight or Mass (Metric and English Systems)

<i>Metric Unit</i>	<i>In Grams</i>	<i>English (Avdp.) Equivalent</i>
Milligram (mg)	.001 gram	0.0154 grain
Centigram (cg)	.01 gram	0.1543 grain
Decigram (dg)	.1 gram	1.5432 grains
Gram (g)		0.0353 ounce
Dekagram (dkg)	10 grams	0.3527 ounce
Hectogram (hg)	100 grams	3.5274 ounces
Kilogram (kg)	1000 grams	2.2046 pounds
Metric ton (t)	1000 kg	1.1023 short ton (0.9842 longton)

a. Also known as a centare (ca).

b. Also known as an are (a).

c. Also known as a hectare (ha).

## BETWEEN THE LORD AND THE LAW: TENANTS' DILEMMAS

BRIAN FEGAN

April 13, 1972

The tenant must choose between two strategies. If he goes to law, he can hope for a low, legally-determined rental for the land he operates; however, he will probably lose the landlord's confidence and either be refused credit or pay dearly for it. If, on the contrary, he remains a share tenant (or merely goes through the motions of becoming a lessee, to satisfy the law), he will have gained nothing or have to pay high nonlegal rent, but will also have the continued good will of the landlord and its accompanying credit arrangements. How the local ecology affects the choice which a tenant makes, and some pressures the landlord may bring to bear on him are first listed and then illustrated in several composite cases.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize the kind of problems that face farmers attempting the first and main step demanded by Philippine land reform, the shift to leasehold. As well, it will enumerate difficulties to be met in organizing the local machinery needed to support that shift. To make the message as vividly concrete as possible it will close with the presentation of illustrative composite cases.

The point of view is predominantly that of the tenant or lessee himself, the little man who in April 1972, before the planting season, was concerned about, and frequently discussing with others, how best to get the benefits promised by the new system under law. For this little man fears the retaliatory action of his landlord. He is afraid he will be denied those customary arrangements and understandings that make the familiar agrarian system, despite its inequities, one in which he knows how to get by.

This was the theme of countless conversations in which I participated, and others I merely overheard, in the municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in March and April 1972. This was a subject at barrio and municipal-level meetings of the Land Reform Farmers' Association, the focal point of problems and queries raised there by members, sometimes left unanswered, but generally observed or recorded by myself.

Among those who provided detailed information on these hopes and problems were tenants who had made the shift to leasehold several years ago under the former amendment (R.A. 3844, 1963), others who were among the earliest and most enthusiastic to make the change under the latest amendment (R.A. 6389, September 1971), and still others who knew little about the reform or were unwilling for various reasons to make the change it demanded. Added information and extensive vicarious experience were contributed by a number of remarkably able and energetic individuals, some connected with the Department of Agrarian Reform, others with the Land Reform Farmers' Association, and still others without such formal ties. My informants, in other works, were many and varied.

Before the new crop year begins in the period May to July, those represented by these informants will have to grapple with a complex, new, and untried set of government agencies and regulations in an effort to get credit that is badly needed in the wake of a disastrous crop failure caused by tungro in the 1971-72 season. The failure of past reforms to carry through, the failure of past cooperatives and government credit sources, the weakness of farmers' associations arising from village feuds, and the still

ranking disputes of the November 1971 local and January 1972 barrio elections, plus the familiar history of past landlord retaliation against applicants for leasehold, tend to aggravate and enlarge the problems and inhibitions of tenants. It is fair to add that many of these problems are being energetically and imaginatively tackled by the local officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and its ancillaries, but it remains to be seen whether their inadequate manpower and, above all, insufficient credit resources will be increased by the central government to that degree and on that schedule needed to cope with the crucial first crop year of the reform.

#### *Ecological Zones and Problems*

The crux of the agrarian reform is the shift from share tenancy to fixed-rent leasehold, and the replacement of landowner credit by credit provided by cooperatives, the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), or the rural bank. Yet fixed-rent leasehold will be of advantage to the lessee only if yields are consistently higher than they were in the base years. For while under share tenancy he paid a percentage of whatever he manage to reap in a particular year, good or bad, under leasehold he must pay the same amount whether the harvest is abundant or not, and what he cannot pay at harvest time will accrue as debt to be paid at the next crop harvest.

Getting credit is another big problem. Even if special allowances are made in the setting of the level of rent, adjustments that take into account the greater likelihood of crop failures in certain ecological zones, there remains the possibility that government sources may refuse to refinance a farmer who cannot repay past production loans. An owner, on the contrary, will usually continue both subsistence and production credit to ensure a future crop against which he can claim. For landowners inevitably gain at least in noncash ways from the extending of credit — submission, loyalty, gratitude, flattery, and the like — while the impersonal lending institution has no such alternative incentives.

The San Miguel area has three ecological zones devoted to riceland, and the above problems have different impacts in each. The zones are

based on altitude and topography variations which affect the all-important problems of irrigation and drainage in a rice-landscape. They may have relevance for other parts of Central Luzon.

*Zone 1: Low-lying swampy zone subject to seasonal flooding.* In Candaba swamp and its fringes, rainy-season floods cannot be drained; in the dry season the area is at the end of gravity irrigation, hence worst served. Rice is the main crop but yields are unpredictable because farmers cannot control water levels. Deeper floods wipe out crops about two years out of five, and farmers are unwilling to risk cash investment. The short-stemmed, early-maturing, nonseasonal, high-yielding varieties of rice developed at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), which do best with high inputs of nitrogenous fertilizer, are not well adapted to the swamp. They may be drowned when young, or yield very poorly if immersed during flowering or panicle stages, while fertilizer is as likely to be flushed out by a flood as to benefit the crop. The traditional long-stemmed, long-maturing, seasonal varieties are less prone to be drowned, and flower after the season when floods can be expected. The strategy of planting the lower-yielding traditional varieties appears to make good sense. But even so, in only three out of five years can a reasonable harvest be expected.

On the other hand, this area is probably best favored for subsistence. Fish, frogs, and shellfish are in good supply, and some are sold for cash in the town market. The house lots along river levées provide bamboo, firewood, and fruit trees; in the dry season, vegetables are grown on the sandy loam stream banks and cucumber cash crops in narrow strips irrigated by pump from streams backed up with weirs. Farmers tend to adopt a subsistence rather than a cash strategy.

The share tenancy and debt systems have been made easier on tenants in the swamp because of the history of agrarian unrest. Landowners and *katiwalâ* (estate overseer) are disinclined to acquire a reputation for being harsh in supervision of harvest and crop-division, or collection of debts, for fear of reprisals. Transfer to leasehold is not attractive to tenants in the

swamp. They say they do not think yields will rise in the near future, they would lose by having to pay the lease-rent even in bad years, and the ACA credit cannot give them rice for food in the long dry season, or after a crop failure, and may close off production credit if they are unable to pay after a bad year or two.

*Zone II: Flat, nonflooding area with some gravity and pump irrigation.* This zone is basically one-crop, rainfed land, although some parts have supplementary irrigation from private or government schemes to guard against the fields drying out. Drainage or flooding are not general problems. The limited area in the north served by a branch of the Peñaranda River Irrigation Scheme is scheduled to receive enough water for two crops one year in three. A second crop can also be grown in narrow strips close to more reliable streams by pump irrigation from a system of weirs. In the dry season some barrios now pump river water to labor-intensive cucurbit cash crops. The area is closest to the main North-South highway, and transport to jobs is convenient. Subsistence is neither as practicable nor as necessary as in the swamp; farmers are cash-oriented. This is the area most favorable to rice-farming; farmers have a degree of control over water, and are ready to risk cash inputs. The high-yielding IRRI varieties and varying degrees of the associated technology have already increased yields, and farmers generally are optimistic that yields can be further raised.

Here the transfer to leasehold is attractive in the abstract to most farmers. The special area problems concern the forms which landlord resistance can take. The meaning of "principal" and "second" crop in the various Republic Acts is not clear. Farmers in this area regard the principal crop as the rain-fed one planted in July-August in a one-crop year or in September in a two-crop year, and the second crop as the extra crop planted *first* with irrigation in about May. Owners may threaten to dispute this at law so as to include a high-yielding first crop as the "principal" crop for the calculation of "normal" harvests. On the other hand, the second crop is often smaller than the principal crop, where differences in height, or distance

from the water source make part of a farm un-irrigable. Some farmers fear they would lose by having to pay the same rent for each crop. It appears that in law they are entitled to continue paying 25 percent shares on the secondary crop until a separate rental can be fixed, but this is not yet known to all.

Owners trying to induce tenants to agree to a higher rent than that calculable in accordance with the new law may threaten to dispute such calculation at law, or to deny would-be lessees the use of the estate gravity irrigation, or irrigation pumps, to surcharge for that use, or to deny or surcharge for use of an estate tractor to speed land preparation between first and second crops, then forbid any other tractor to pass through their land to work a lessee's holding. Again, they may deny lessees or their landless relatives permission to plant auxiliary crops during the dry season, or deny them the (paid) use of estate irrigation for such crops, whereas share tenants and those who agree to a higher negotiated rent get such permission, and may not have to divide the proceeds with the owner.

The principal problem in the way of increasing harvests remains water control and extension. Progressive deforestation of the mountains has resulted in an earlier drying up of the shorter streams used for pump irrigation, and caused more devastating floods than in previous years. The Peñaranda River Irrigation Scheme schedule provides sufficient water for two crops only one year in three, while poor maintenance, favoritism, and anarchy in the distribution of water along sublaterals often causes water shortage, particularly near the extremities of the system. Certified seed is difficult to obtain within 50 kilometers of the area, and is double the standard price. Agricultural chemicals are only now beginning to have intelligible recipes and precautions, common measures, and meaningful names or descriptions of pests and diseases printed in Tagalog on the package. Lack of information about economical and practicable methods is the main barrier to change; only in the case of rats are there important cultural resistances to pest control.

*Zone III: Rolling rain-fed land.* This area has

no drainage problem, but is nonirrigated one-crop land depending on rain trapped in irregularly-shaped paddies following the contours of low hilly country. Soils are generally more permeable, and fields dry out more quickly than on the clay lowland. Dry season crops are at present unimportant, but recent experiments by IRR show promise.

Subsistence here is poor. Streams are intermittent, and home lots on slope land dry out quickly. The result is that tree crops are not vigorous and vegetables must be laboriously handwatered from the pump. Because there are few jobs in the area, there are relatively few landless workers. Further, during the long dry season even farmers go away to work and send back remittances. However, the farmers are cash-oriented and have taken enthusiastically to the use of chemical fertilizer and certain high-yielding varieties of rice, notably IR-5, which proved unexpectedly productive despite occasional drying out of the fields.

The area is mostly second-class land, for which the legal crop shares were 25 percent for the owner and 75 percent for the farmer (R.A. 1199, Sec. 35) if the latter bore all expenses. Much of the riceland has been converted from brush, poor pasture, and sugarland since the 30s, and small recent absentee and cultivator-owners are more frequent than in the swamp and flat land (Zones I and II). The greater frequency here of tenants who became lessees even before the latest amendment (R.A. 6389) may be because of the difficulty small or medium owners with dispersed holdings had in supervising and collecting shares, the freedom from debt given by dry-season off-farm earnings, and the nondependent example of the owner-cultivators.<sup>1</sup> Despite ecological problems tenants here have a favorable attitude toward leasehold in the abstract, but credit and landlord sanctions inhibit some.

*Submarginal farmers.* In all three areas those farmers with larger farms have had higher absolute harvests, hence have been better able to make the necessary cash inputs to improve per-area yields, and to retain enough to self-finance the next crop. In the flat land (Zone II), espe-

cially if it is nonirrigated, a farm under about two hectares is submarginal, in the sense that under present standard yields of about 50 cavans per hectare, it is insufficient to support a normal-sized household. The required area may be above two and one-half hectares in the rolling terrain (Zone III), three hectares in the swamp (Zone I). Farmers in those zones with less land, unless they have off-farm sources of income that permit sufficient time off for farming in season, tend to be trapped in a cycle of debt and dependency on owners, to have poor yields because they cannot afford or risk cash inputs, and to be the least willing to transfer to legal leasehold.

#### *Landowner Resistance*

Landowners are aware that the land-reform program does not favor them economically, and threatens to cut off the social, political, and psychological rewards of standing in the top position in a patron-dependent relationship to a number of tenants.<sup>2</sup>

Under the previous law, the owner's share stood at 30 percent of the net harvest on first-class land, if the tenants bore all costs; in fact, some owners continued to draw 40 percent, 45 percent, and a few 50 percent, whatever the sharing of costs.<sup>3</sup> The new law makes the transfer to leasehold compulsory and sets the rent at 25 percent of the last three normal years' average net harvest; this represents an immediate loss, and if yields continue to rise the loss will increase. Moreover, the high interest on short-term production loans secured by a lien on the crop will be lost to them. Security of tenure given lessees may make land harder to sell and reduce its market price, while the possibility of capital appreciation by conversion to subdivisions, etc., has been closed off. If tenants are allowed to gain confidence in their ability to act in concert in their own interests and against those of the owners, they may petition for expropriation of larger estates.

Some landowners appear to have accepted the new dispensation — particularly those small owners with scattered, personally administered parcels of land, owners who feel they are not in danger of expropriation, and who have found



the collection of shares and loans at harvest difficult. On some medium and larger estates, owners who cannot or are disinclined to fill the patron role delegate management to an *encargado*. The *encargado* is not a patron, as his powers are limited by appeal over his head to the owner. He tends to run the estate on strict but legal lines, emphasizing rights and duties, rather than privileges. His social position and power are not so much at stake if tenants shift to leasehold, so that though he drives a hard economic bargain, he is less inclined to vindictiveness in the use of sanctions, and will agree to leasehold.

However, some medium and large owners, particularly those who live in a neighboring estate house or town, or visit frequently from Manila, maintain the old patron-dependent ties as part of a way of life; they enjoy the power they have over the lives of tenants, their capacity to reward or punish by granting or withholding resources at will, and they guard it jealously, treating any attempt to replace dependency privileges with rights as a personal affront and challenge. The reforms have left intact enough power, based on the control of land and wealth, for them to punish a challenge directly or, with the aid of estate spies and overseers, to file harassing cases in court.

When a tenant says he does not want to transfer to leasehold because of respect (*alang alang*) or a debt of gratitude (*utang na loób*), or because he is embarrassed or shy (*nahihiyá*), or because his owner is kind (*mabait*), or has a good relationship (*mabuting pagsasama*) with him, these culturally-praiseworthy phrasings must be understood in context. The statements imply that the tenant assumes or knows that the owner will resent the tenant's filing for the transfer, or having the calculation of rent set in accordance with the law, or cutting dependency ties, and that the tenant's desire to do so is inhibited by his apprehension of how the owner will react. In a number of cases reported to the writer and well known among tenants, on whom the lesson is not wasted, owners retaliated by calling the tenant shameless (*walang hiyá*) or an ingrate (*walang utang na loób*), but proceeded

from these cultural criticisms to more potent sanctions. Some sanctions used or threatened are listed here, and no doubt others could be added to the list. These are some of the more common retaliatory steps that vengeful landlords may take.

1. To deny the would-be leaseholder agricultural or subsistence credit available to share tenants, or to charge him higher rates. Under R.A. 1199, loans for both production and subsistence had a ceiling interest of 8 percent per calendar year, and 10 percent on any balance (Sec. 15 to 18 and 48); R.A. 3844, Sec. 15 (3) ruled out loans or repayment in kind. R.A. 6389, Sec. 1 recognizes insertion of various fees that, together with interest, must not exceed 14 percent.

In practice, however, production and consumption loans by landlords were handled differently. Production loans were in cash at 8-12 percent, consumption loans in palay at 50 percent, both payable at next harvest, i.e., in less than five months. Cash consumption loans were usually 10 percent per month. Balances vary widely - 10, 30, or 50 percent - all may exist within one barrio, or a landlord inclined to the patron role may vary all interest rates from zero to 50 percent or more to reward or punish individual dependents. Where loans are at illegal rates, it is common for documents to record principal and interest together as *hirám*, i.e., a loan without interest so that the books cannot be used as evidence in court. Loans *sa labás* ("from/to the outside"), i.e., by village moneylenders, are commonly at 50 percent interest until harvest in palay or 10 percent per month on cash. Some owners have given out that all lessees will be treated as *sa labás*, with a minimum of 50 percent on both production and consumption credit, or in some cases, three *cavans* on ₱100.00, which is 90 percent at current prices.

2. To deny him the use of estate gravity or pump irrigation, or charge more than the rate given to tenants.

3. To deny him, or surcharge for, the use of the estate tractor at land cultivation, and forbid other tractors to cross estate land.
4. To refuse to produce records of past harvests, or challenge the validity of records held by the farmer.
5. To dispute which is "regular" and which the "second" crop.
6. To enforce the 1,000-square-meters home-lot limit which has continued unrevised since R.A. 1199, Sec. 22 (3). This opens a number of sanctions which basically derive from the lessee's having only conditional rights to plant, attend to, pick, cut, or otherwise derive benefit from permanent trees within the boundaries of his farm but outside the inadequately-sized house lot (e.g., R.A. 1199, Sec. 46 [b]).
7. To forbid or charge the tenant in court with cutting bamboo or firewood trees planted by the tenant and customarily his, but outside the strictly-defined house lot.
8. To send in the *katiwalá* to cut down all such trees.
9. To charge the tenant with planting vegetables outside the house lot in nonriceland, or in riceland in the off-season. Under the law such planting requires notice, permission, and 20 percent of net to owners (R.A. 1199, Sec. 30, 46 [d], 50 [d]; R.A. 3844, Sec. 36 [3]); verbal notice is easily denied.
10. To force the lessee to shift his house to a new spot designated by the owner at any point in the estate (R.A. 1199, Sec. 26 [a]).
11. To refuse or withdraw permission for the tenant's siblings, children, or other landless relatives to have a house on the tenant's farm or elsewhere on the estate. Although all rural land is owned, there is no provision in the laws for house lots for the landless, despite their contribution to agriculture. Their houses, animal pens, permanent and annual plants exist by permissions begged (*huming?*) from an owner, hence pressure can be exerted on the tenant through them; where rents (usually one cavan of palay per house per year) are paid, receipts are rarely given.
12. To charge with theft the tenant who has been denied use of nonriceland within his farm, but outside the 1,000 square meters, if he tries to convert such land to riceland with his own labor.
13. To deny that the would-be lessee is the tenant-at-law. A number of farmers have passed on farming duties to a son, brother, or son-in-law, with the knowledge and tacit or verbal approval of the owner, but no documents. The former tenant may still sign, or the actual tenant may sign on his behalf, the harvest reckoning.
14. To discharge a tenant or his relatives who are employed by the owner.
15. To refuse permission to plant, to use estate irrigation or pumps, or enforce the 20 percent share of the net returns to a lessee and/or his relatives who want to use idle land in the dry season for an auxiliary cash crop.
16. To cut off positive broker interventions, e.g., securing hospital admissions, jobs, licenses, etc., or, negatively, to arrange in his capacity as a politician or through allies for the harrassment of the tenant over licenses, fees, etc., which are not normally the subject of law enforcement.
17. To intimidate physically or through the use of arms, by *katiwalá*; to harrass, burn haystacks, run off or release or impound livestock, chop down trees, destroy fences, lavatories, and animal pens, run a tractor through crops, put a road through fields, and so on.
18. To take out fake mortgages so that the tenant has no clear owner to deal with, and lengthy cases can be set up.
19. To insert houses one by one onto the tenant's holdings, so that though subdivision is banned in law, the land ceases to be usable as farmland.

The impact of these harrassments is to re-

mind the independent-spirited would-be lessee of real and immediate losses he will suffer compared to the submissive tenant; he will lose known customary rights and privileges in return for possible gains at law.

But owners have to date used the law itself as a weapon. They are men of education, read English in which the law is written, can hire expensive lawyers, and are more familiar with court procedure and its manipulation. By laying a long series of even frivolous cases and appeals and gaining postponements every time a case is called, some owners have managed to haul lessees into court up to six times a year for six years. At every appearance the tenant loses time from farm or job, must pay a lawyer, only to have the case postponed. If he fails to appear, he loses a civil case by abandonment; in a criminal case, he becomes a fugitive. Under the new law, cases must be settled within 60 days, and a Land Reform lawyer acts free for the tenants, but from past experience tenants fear the capacity of the owner to use the law against them. Meanwhile the understaffed courts have a backlog of cases, and some Department of Agrarian Reform municipal offices have not yet been assigned full-time legal personnel.

The purpose of most of this intimidation is to persuade the tenant to go to the owner and personally beg (*humingf*) a negotiated lease rent, rather than the legally calculated one. The landowner is then in the powerful favorable bargaining position of one who is granting a favor, and can exact a verbal agreement or signature to a higher rent.<sup>4</sup> The form of some preprepared contracts is a per-hectare or per-*kabán* calculation (the latter is explained below<sup>5</sup>). Since this is nonlegal, the owner may be able to raise rents further in court when harvests rise.

Owners may use devices other than intimidation to achieve this end, e.g., to call tenants one by one; the first one is given remission of previous loans, or a new loan interest-free, or some other inducement, to sign; later tenants tend to follow the lead. In other cases tenants who lost their 1971-72 crop to tungro and are now short of food are given rice loans in exchange for signing to a high rent. The efficacy of such devices

is attested in large part by the number of "compromise lessees," i.e., those who have no written contract, and/or a contract whose rental is not set in accordance with the legal calculation. The higher rent and insecurity of an improper contract are the "price" for continuing access to credit, and "good relations" with the landlord in the sense that he does not invoke any sanctions. In short, the tenant has to choose between two strategies: (a) low legal rent, breach of relations with the landlord, and refusal of, or high-interest, landlord credit, or (b) high non-legal rent, continuing relations with the landlord, and continuing "normal" landlord credit.

#### *Problems in Replacing Landlord Credit*

Whether or not tenants will risk following strategy (a) above depends in large part on how much trust they place in the national government's will and capacity to carry out its promises to replace landlord credit through new and untried mechanisms. The municipal teams of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) have set up barrio Farmers' Associations, which coalesce into district seminar groupings of four or five barrios, and into a municipal association. At the barrio and municipal levels farmer officials have been elected, usually from among more independent-minded farmers who think in terms of rights and duties, not privileges. Many of them have organizational experience in religious sects, trade unions, village politics, and rural rebel movements. These men have been assured by the municipal-level officials of the DAR that the government has the money, and so long as the farmers set up the proper organizations and get the paper work done, it will be forthcoming on time.

Government officials and farmer officeholders meet frequently to iron out problems and keep up morale, and both have worked hard and staked their own reputations on the thankless task of convincing more reluctant farmers of the government's credibility, to persuade them to take the risk, brave the landlords, and *biomatás*, or come under the law. When the crop year begins in earnest in May-July, the system will be put to the test. If production credit fails to come

through on time, a feeling of betrayal may cause both field officials and farmers to turn against the government. Paradoxically, the poorer the credibility of the government's promises, and the less effective it is in persuading farmers to take the opportunities offered by the law, the less violent will be the reaction, for fewer farmers will have cut themselves off from traditional credit.

Farmers say that despite high interest, the advantages of landlord credit are its reliability, simplicity, and speed. You go to your landlord, tell him how much you need, he decides on the spot and hands over the money. At harvest time he or his representative collects the debt plus interest in palay at the threshing floor. By contrast, many have had bad experiences with previous government credit. Farmers needed many documents, identification photographs, and recommendations, because government credit has always offered an opportunity for frauds. The clerks were rude, treated farmers contemptuously, and kept them waiting. There were membership and document fees, some of them bribes extorted to speed up an application. Some farmers had to pay agents with contacts "inside" to have papers attended to. The whole process was time-consuming, forcing farmers to be absent from paid jobs or urgent farm work. The money often did not come through at all, because the organization had collapsed, funds had been misappropriated, or funds approved by Congress had not been released. When they did come, it was often too late — farmers speak of not receiving credit for planting expenses until harvest time. They know of farmers who opted for leasehold under R.A. 1199 or R.A. 3844 and were forced back to share tenancy or had to abandon farming because government credit was not available or slow, and the landlord would not reextend credit to someone who had defied him.

Moreover government credit, some fear, will be refused to those who have bad ACA records (about two-thirds of Facoma ACA credit in San Miguel, Bulacan in the last four years remains unpaid), and to those who in a future year will have been unable to repay because of a crop failure. Government credit is not available at all for subsistence, or for life crisis and emergency

expenses such as for a funeral or medical bills.

Thus, *though landlord credit may cost more, it is more dependable and comes on time; the organizational framework is there and tried.* The "costs" are higher rents, higher interests and continuing dependence.

#### *Weaknesses in Farmers' Associations*

Against the background of previous failures of government cooperative credit, the DAR and farmers' officials have a hard time persuading tenants that this time it will be different. The new organizations have been unenthusiastically received by many tenants, some for reasons having little to do with land reform. They were set up in every barrio during November–December 1971, and elections held for their officials. But the municipal, provincial, and senatorial elections were held in November; campaigning was already under way for the January 1972 barrio elections. Village kindreds and shifting feud lines are the usual basis for the opposing alliances that are expressed along Liberal Party/Nacionalista Party (LP/NP) lines. These carried over into the associations and have weakened cooperation among officials of opposite parties, or made it hard for an association official of one party to approach, or be approached by, farmers of the other camp. Some tenants, especially those who opted or will opt for compromise leases see the Farmers' Association officials who exhort them to seek legal rental and ACA credit, and to attend barrio meetings, district seminars, and town meetings, as troublemakers who want to make life hard for everyone. The lessee-officials, on the other hand, see the reluctant tenants as men who are afraid of landlord retaliation, have made special arrangements with the landlord, or point to their special problems with considerable penetration.

#### *Summary*

Those farmers who opt for legally calculated leasehold tend to have the following characteristics: (1) they live in ecological zones not subject to recurrent disaster, where the possibility of increasing yields seems higher, and they are more involved in a money economy; (2) they

have less need for credit because their farms are above marginal size, they have good yields, or have off-farm income; (3) they are more independent than others, with organizational experience and a concern for rights, not permissions; (4) they have less to lose in the way of customary permissions (for example, oversized homelots, special credit terms, or jobs received from the owner); (5) they are optimistic, believing yields will rise and that government credit will be provided; (6) they are not political enemies of the barrio Farmers' Association leaders; and (7) their landlords do not impose sanctions because they have scattered parcels, own second-class land, have too many tenants to bother with personal ties, or live too far away and hence administer through more legalistic, less personalistic managers.

Tenants who when compelled to go on lease agree to compromise leases may be described as follows: (1) they have highly personalistic landlords who would cut off privileges and impose sanctions if defied; (2) they live in recurrent crop-failure areas, have submarginal or low-yielding farms, or no sideline, and are subsistence-oriented; (3) they are unused to horizontal associations, think in terms of privileges which they must beg (*humings*), rather than rights; (4) they may be cut off from the Farmers' Association over old village scores expressed along LP/NP lines and hence are also cut off from extension services; and (5) they are more pessimistic, do not believe yields will rise, that the DAR can protect them from sanctions, or that government credit can be depended on.

#### *Composite Illustrative Cases*

To illustrate more vividly the kinds of problems that face the little farmer, it may help to speak in terms of concrete cases. For this reason I have constructed two composite presentations, one of which is centered on problems of debt and debt repayment. The other is concerned with the pivotal role of the homelot (*bakuran*) in the landlord-tenant relationship.

#### *Debt and debt repayment*

I farm two and one-half kabán of land, which my

landowner says is nearly three and one-half hectares. It is all irrigated except for a little near the river that is too high. I took it over from my father five years ago, and with it came a debt of 200 cavans of palay that had been borrowed from the owner in bad years for subsistence, and for my father's medical costs and funeral. My crop share is 70 percent of the net crop after deduction of harvest and threshing costs. I pay all fertilizer, seed, insecticide, planting costs, and so on from my share. Until now the estate gives me credit for farming expenses at 8 percent interest and for my subsistence ration in the growing season at 50 percent, both payable at harvest. On personal cash debts they charge 10 percent per month. On this estate my balance of outstanding palay debt after harvest has no further interest. My harvests have averaged about 200 cavans a year for the whole farm since fertilizer came here in 1967 and the new seeds about 1969. I use quite a lot of chemicals. If you deduct a fifth for harvesting and threshing, and then the other expenses, my reckoning with the overseer looks like this [see accompanying chart].

I put aside the seed. About two cavans we give to landless neighbor women who helped prepare food for the work gangs, and eight to my mother and to my brother who was displaced when the tenancy was given to me. That leaves us 34 cavans more or less, in a normal year. But with six children, the eight of us eat over three cavans a month, so you can see there is nothing left to sell to buy viand, for daily expenses, or to send the children to school, so sometimes I have to borrow to get through the year. We do make some cash off my wife's pig and the chickens, and we get some bananas, fruit, and *sitaw* from the yard, plus fish, frogs, and snails from the fields. The pig is most important as we raise two a year, which bring in about P400.00 a year clear, since we feed them only on the free huskings from the family rice, and on scraps. They pay the matriculation fees for two of the children.

You can see why I have to look for a job whenever and wherever I can. I go away in the dry season to work as a carpenter, and our two oldest children stay away from school in the planting season to work for P3.20 a day. In a poor year they just have to stay away from school and take whatever work is available, little as it is, as we can't meet the fees. They must get an education as there is nothing for them here in the country. There is only one farm, and how can all six of them live off it when they grow up?

But this year my palay was hit by tungro and the harvest fell to 15 cavans, total. The harvesters wouldn't cut it for less than 1/3 share, but I agreed rather than leave it to the rats. The landowner took all 10 cavans remaining for agricultural expenses, and it still was not enough, so I owe him an extra 16 cavans. I had only 40 cavans' balance to pay, and had expected to get out of debt this year. But now I owe 56 cavans.

When I first heard of the land reform I wanted to go on leasehold. But now I do not. I cannot find work because no one can afford to build because of the tungro. I need to borrow now in March till the crop year starts, just to live. We are living off what my wife and children gleaned on our farm, but it won't last the month.

Agricultural credit		Palay (cavans)	
	(pesos)	(cavans)	
Planting costs	P200.00		Full harvest
Fertilizer	280.00		200.00
Pesticide	60.00		Less: Payments for harvesting and threshing services (20% of full harvest)
Irrigation costs	<u>180.00</u>		<u>40.00</u>
Total borrowed	P720.00		
			Remainder A
Add: Interest (8%)	<u>57.60</u>		160.00
Total due	<u>P777.60</u>		Less: Seed for next crop
			<u>2.50</u>
			Remainder B
			157.50
			Less: Landlord's share (30% of Remainder B)
			<u>47.25</u>
			47.25
			Remainder C
			110.25
			Less: Payment of agri- cultural credit
			26.00
			26.00
			Payment of previous debt
			<u>40.00</u>
			<u>66.00</u>
			66.00
			Remainder D
			44.25
			Add: Seed for next crop
			<u>2.50</u>
			For me
			<u>46.75</u>
			For landlord <u>113.25</u>
Total due in terms of cavans at P30.00 per cavan: 25.92		26.00	
Add: Previous debt		<u>40.00</u>	
Final total due		<u>66.00</u>	

The landowner says no one who goes on leasehold will get estate credit at the old rates. He will treat loans to leaseholders as if they were loans *sa labás* (from a moneylender), and both production and subsistence credit will be at three cavans per P100.00, payable at harvest. We will have to sign for the principal plus interest of the debt as *hirám* (debt without interest), as if it were the amount borrowed. This is so we can't prove the interest rate. That interest is about 90 percent at the price of palay now, so it's near the lid; we call it *takip*.

The trouble with the banks and Facoma and the ACA is they won't give you anything to live on — only for farming expenses. That would be all right in a normal year. But this year how will we eat if they won't help and the owner is angry at us for going to the Land Reform? If I did go to the Land Reform, and if I were successful in getting ACA credit, I would still have to borrow to eat till the harvest. That is five months, or 15 cavans, and we would have to return at least 22%, or at *takip sa labás* maybe 30 cavans. Also, the landowner will charge 50 percent per year from now on to leaseholders for their balances. That means my

56 cavans' balance would be 84. So at harvest I would owe at least 106 cavans, and if I did not pay, it would increase at 50 percent per year. Now you know what would happen. I would have to pay off the high-interest loans first. That means I would have nothing to pay back ACA, and at the next crop they would refuse to lend to me. So I might get a low rental and be stuck with high interest.

There is a chance that the Land Reform Farmers' Association will be able to get us credit at least for fertilizer and insecticide. I am lucky there because I am of the same party as the barrio president of the Association. All the other party stay away from the meetings since their candidate lost the presidential election last November when the Association was formed. But he beat our president for the barrio captain vacancy in January.

A few years ago I did try to borrow P300.00 from the Facoma. That was when I first started to farm on my own, and we were trying everything to get out of debt to the estate. When I went there it was April, and I wanted credit to plant the first crop in May, because

that year we had irrigation scheduled for two crops. I had just sowed the seedbed and started plowing. I thought a month would be enough to get the money for planting and other expenses. But I was treated like an underaged girl trying to get married. I had to get photographs and ID cards, and then I had to go to the Municipio and get a birth certificate. The clerks in the office used to keep me waiting around all day for days, and when they did see me, they told me I needed a personal verification of my identity form from my barrio captain and a municipal policeman, because there were a lot of fake applicants who were not farmers. I did all that, but it forced me to become obliged to the captain and policeman, because I had to ask their help. So I had to go to town six times, all day, which was ₱0.40 for travel and ₱2.00 for lunch each time. I had to entertain the captain and the policeman, and the policeman called over several of his friends so that cost me ₱10.00 for drinks. All this when I should have been attending to my farm. But do you know, after all this, they said wait, because funds had not been released from on top, or something. My cousin had tried the same thing the year before, and the credit did not become available for planting till after harvest, and then they refused him because they said he no longer needed it, which was true, as he had been forced to borrow *sa labís* to get the crop planted. I talked it over with several friends who are experienced in dealing with officials.

I could see that the officials were trying to make me offer a bribe, but I needed the money — the seedlings were already 20 days old, and would have to be planted out within 10 days. So I went to a man who was said to have contacts inside, so he would get the loan processed quickly, and I could finish harrowing. In about four days he told me the loan was arranged, and to go and collect the money. I gave him five pesos for his help.

I signed the papers for ₱300.00. There were many documents. But they only handed over ₱240.00, and said the rest was membership fees and costs of documents and so on, plus interest, because I could not pay these costs on the spot. From that ₱240.00 I paid five to the agent, ₱10.00 for drinks, and ₱10.00 or ₱12.00 for travel and lunch in town, so you could say I got about ₱215.00 net. But I had to pay 12 percent interest on the full ₱300.00 which was ₱336.00 in all, repayment for a loan of only ₱215.00 that I could use, so ₱121.00 was the difference. That was more than the *talindawá*, or 50 percent interest, that I would have had to pay a moneylender, and I could have gotten the amount I needed without wasting time!

Maybe times have changed now. That Facoma failed, and a new one was built up again only two or three years ago. But they say the ACA and the Facoma are trying to lend to so many farmers they don't have a big enough fund, and they have so many people applying I don't think they can process all the applications in time. Anyway I do not trust them anymore, and I do not want to be humiliated again by the officials. They treated me like a naughty child last time, or like a beggar.

It is different with the landowner. You go to him and say you want ₱300.00 for farming expenses, and he says yes and gives it to you immediately. There's the advantage, you see: he knows you, so you don't need all those documents, or to wait a long time for some official who might not approve and release the funds in time, or might even refuse you. There is no trouble about repayment, because he knows when you will harvest, so he or his agent is there at the threshing to take back the credit along with the share of the land. If you cannot pay, he never takes your livestock, and provided he doesn't suspect you of cheating will lend to you the next year. The only trouble is the higher interest.

I want to go on leasehold, but I will be honest: I do not want to pay more for leasehold than I have to, because the lease rent set now will continue for a long time; even when harvests fall we will have to pay it. My landowner has let us know that if we go to him personally and ask for lease, he will give it to us at 14 cavans per hectare. That means it would be 49 cavans for me because he says I have 3½ hectares. But if the Land Reform calculated it, then my harvests in 1969 and 1970 were 190 and 210 cavans, respectively, which is why I say it averages 200. In 1971 typhoon Yoling reduced it to 120, and in 1972 it was 15 cavans because of tungro. The least favorable calculation for me would be if they dropped 1971 as abnormal, and calculated my *basihan* or base year's harvest, as 200, which is 157½ after the seed, harvest, and threshing deductions, and 25 percent of that is less than 39½ cavans. But with a little luck they will argue that the 210 was an abnormal year, and will then include 1968 when I harvested 160, so the rent will drop to below 32 cavans for my farm.

So you can see why I want to *bumatás* (come under the law) and have the Land Reform office calculate my rent and negotiate with the owner. I do not want to go to my owner on my own, because he is too clever for me. He always makes me feel that I am being unreasonable since I owe him gratitude for loans in the past. He can read English and knows the law, and I have to go on what people say.

But if I go to the Land Reform to get the legal rent set, he will be angry at me for taking him to law. I won't be able to get any credit to live on. The banks and the Facoma and ACA are not giving any credit for food. He will make me pay three cavans' interest on ₱100.00 for all loans, and 50 percent on balances. If I go to him and agree to the contract on a per-hectare calculation, I will have to pay higher rent all my life, but can at least get food to live on now, and the old interest rates will continue.

I can't even apply for the government credit, to see if it is genuinely available, till I already have a lease contract. If I could get credit for food now I would take the risk and go to the Land Reform. I am trying to find a way, but for the time being I am going to wait and see, because at the moment, whichever road I take I will lose. Several of my neighbors have already agreed to the high per-hectare rental, so they could get a contract and apply for ACA credit. Maybe I will have to do that too.

*The homelot as weapon*

Barrio Kababaan is a hypothetical village in the plain of Central Luzon, the composite of several villages known to the writer. The names of the characters, like that of the village, are fictional. But the cases are based on actual occurrences.

Kababaan is flat to the eye, but the land near the river bank is higher, and is a sandy loam. The road and irrigation ditch run parallel to the river course. The land of Farms I to III on the map (Figure 1) is owned by Don Ninoy, that of Farms IV to VI Doña Siyón. The tenanted Farms run from the river at right angles to river, road,

and irrigation ditch, an arrangement that avoids disputes over access and water. Each farm has about 2½ to 3½ hectares of total area, and includes both riceland and the higher land between river and road. All the houses and animal pens are in this latter strip, as are the bamboo clumps, wood and fruit trees, and the vegetable plots. Tenants' houses are about a third of the total number of structures, and are usually somewhat larger than the others and of more durable materials. The houses of the landless are usually within the houselot strip of the farm of a close relative, and are often only of bamboo and thatch. These houses of the landless may be set back from the line of the houses of tenants, as




Fig. 1 - Schematic map of Barrio Kababaan, a hypothetical village in Central Luzon



it is believed inauspicious to build a house close to and to the east of the house of a parent.

*Farm I.* My farm is on the estate of Don Ninoy. I made great efforts to get out of debt to him because I believed then that keeping us in debt was the secret of his power over us — we were like slaves. I was fortunate, since my wife was a good manager and lucky with the pigs, and also sold food door-to-door, and two of my sons put in all their earnings for a couple of years till they married, while we deprived ourselves of everything. When I got out of debt I went to the court and in 1964 filed for leasehold under the last Land Reform Act. Don Ninoy was angry and called me an ingrate, but maybe it was because he could not stand being defied by a little person, maybe it was to frighten me back into tenancy and frighten the others from filing.

What he did was this: he said I was only entitled to 1000 square meters of homelot, and he set the extent of that around my house. There was just room for the house, the pig and chicken pens, and the *kalabaw* shelter and its dung heap and haystack, plus a few bananas. All the bamboo along the river bank that my father and I had planted, and the *akasia* and *kamatsit* trees that we planted and harvested for firewood by lopping them every second dry season were outside the 1000 square meters, as were two big mango trees, a lot of bananas and *atis*, *sampalok*, *guayabano*, and other trees the fruit of which we had eaten to go with our rice, and so was the bit of sandy loam soil where I used to plant some watermelons, maize, and tomatoes for sale in the dry season.

Then I cut two sticks of bamboo from one of my clumps, on land within my farm but outside the 1000 square meters. Don Ninoy's *katiwaki* immediately reported this to him and the police came out and took photographs for evidence. I was charged with both civil and criminal cases of trespass and theft, which were grounds for eviction. Then the *katiwaki* came back and cut down all the bamboos on my farm and sold them, and cut down two old *akasias* to sell the trunks to agents from a woodcraft factory, and I could do nothing. In the dry season he charged me with civil and criminal cases when I planted vegetables in the usual area. So I have not been able to do anything on this farm outside the riceland and this tiny homelot ever since; the land has been neglected, and I have to buy wood and bamboo.

How can we farmers progress if we cannot use the land? The only other tenant who filed for leasehold back then decided the best thing he could do was to convert the garden land he was forbidden to work into riceland, and he worked all the dry season to level and dike it and extend the irrigation ditches. But Don Ninoy charged him with civil and criminal cases too, as that land, he said, was not included in the rice leasehold or the homelot, and adding its harvest to the rice harvest was a theft. It stands unused now and is overgrown.

Don Ninoy is very clever. His brother is a lawyer. I have had to lodge a bond with the court, and pay in-

terest on the principal. Also each time the municipal court is in session, my cases are listed and called, and I have to be present and pay a lawyer. But each session I attend, Don Ninoy has his lawyer call a postponement, so I have been in court about six times a year for the last seven years, which is expensive. If I don't attend, since I am the accused, I will lose the bond, lose the case by abandonment and be a fugitive. If I do attend, he asks for a postponement. They say he would not be able to do that under the new law, but I am under the old law, and he just does this to frighten me and the others.

The Land Reform Chief in the town is Don Ninoy's sister's son. He says he puts his job first, not his family, and it is true he is very energetic and tenants on other land say he helps them. But tenants here are frightened to go to him because he is Don Ninoy's nephew and might not want to help us fight his uncle.

My sons married, but neither can build a house on my farm, not even a *kubó* (house of light materials), because Don Ninoy is angry at me. There is no space in the little 1000-square-meter homelot, so though they work as plowmen and harvesters in season, they have had to find a place to live on another owner's land. They pay one cavan of palay a year for houselots which are on the farms of their fathers-in-law.

*Farms II and III.* Farm II has no houses within its boundaries now. The river runs close to the road, and the bank collapses. Farmer II, Pabling, has his house next door on Farm III.

Mang Pabling is the tenant on Farm II, has his house within Farm III, but still draws his bamboo and wood from his own farm.

I am Pabling. I moved my house here about eight years ago, with the consent of Don Ninoy and of Jose, whose farm it is. Since then I have filled in the lower walls of the house with concrete blocks. My eldest son and one daughter who married have *kubó* beside mine, and each pays Don Ninoy a cavan per year as rent. It is unlucky for a child to have his house to the east of his parent's, so they built a little behind my house.

I am not willing to go to the Land Reform to have my rent calculated in accordance with the law, because Don Ninoy would be angry. He might tell me to move my house from here, and that of my children, and build somewhere else. I can't go back to my own farm, as the river bank caves in. If I build away from the river bank, my house and animal pens will be flooded in the wet season. He could leave me here, but limit me to 1000 square meters, under the law, like Mang Asto (Farm I). In that case I could not use the wood, bamboo, and fruit from within my own farm, and my two children would not have room for houses in my 1000 square meters. It is not proper for a married child to live in the house of his parents, and anyway there is not enough room for both of them and their children.

I will lose about six cavans a year if I agree to the per-hectare rent that Don Ninoy wants, because it is

higher than the Land Reform rent based on past harvests. But I will have to agree to the high rent or Don Ninoy will be angry.

Mang Jose is the tenant on Farm III, and has to accommodate his neighbor, Mang Pabling, and then Pabling's two children's houses, within his houselot.

I am Pabling's cousin, Jose, and his farm is beside mine, so when he had to move, I didn't mind his building here. But I was less happy about his two children. The more houses there are, the less room I have to plant vegetables, and their chickens damage my plants.

I have always had a good relationship with Don Ninoy. So long as you go to him and ask permission first, he allows you to do what you want. It is only the troublemakers like Mang Asto who want the Land Reform. Where would we be without Don Ninoy to help us? Don Ninoy is a very important man and knows about these things. Mang Asto has no respect, and that is why he has trouble. My family has always respected Don Ninoy. My father was a *katiwala* for his father, and my brother is a *katiwala* for him now. I look after his pump and repair machinery for him, and during harvest I help check the threshing. My son has his house beside mine on the west side. As a consideration Don Ninoy does not charge him houselot rent.

It would be disrespectful of me to go to law to have my rent calculated, without going to see Don Ninoy first to come to an agreement with him. It is his land and we are just tenants. We must agree to the rent he sets. Naturally if a tenant takes him to law he will do the same. If I went to law he could limit me to 1000 square meters, and I would lose my vegetable land; my son who has the house beside mine might have to move, and where would he go? But I have a good relationship with Don Ninoy, and I expect he will set my rent lower than the others. They would not know, as no one is sure about the area of his own farm, except in *cavans*. I am Don Ninoy's man, so he will take care of me.

*Farms IV, V, and VI.* Farms IV to VI are owned by Don Ninoy's cousin, Doña Siyón. She is old, unmarried, and since the *Huk* uprisings in the late 40s has lived in Manila, delegating all management to a distant relative, Pepe, her *encargado*, or managing overseer. Enting is the actual tenant of Farm IV, while his brother Itong, the tenant-at-law, is a bus driver.

I am Itong. When my father died I farmed for a couple of years, but when I got the chance I took a job as a bus driver. We are paid 10 percent of the fares collected, so I have good earnings. I let my younger brother Enting take over the farm, but I stayed on in the old house to take care of our mother. Enting built himself a new house when he got married.

Enting wanted to agree to the rent the *encargado* suggested to. He hasn't been out of the village enough and talks too much to his neighbor, the *katiwala* Jose on Don Ninoy's estate, so that he is frightened to seek his rights. I go to Manila twice of three times a day on the bus, and I meet different sorts of people. I read the papers, too, and am in the union of the bus terminal. So I know more about the march of the times. The old days are gone when you had to beg everything from the owner. The government knows there will be civil war if things don't get better for the small people.

I told Enting to join the Samahan of Land Reform Farmers, and he did. Now he understands his rights. The law is good, although it is strict, and there are many holes in it because the congressmen are *oligarchs*.

But the *encargado* Pepe understands this. He is not like Don Ninoy. Don Ninoy is rich, and it is the rich like him who make the law and are the first to break it. Pepe follows the law closely, and makes the tenants follow it where it is to the advantage of the estate. But he is not unreasonable. He runs the farm like a businessman, and anyway he has his own business with tractors and threshing machines. He does not mind the tenants going to the Land Reform to get the rent calculated. He says once it is fixed rent there will be less secret threshing and kickback between the tenants and *katiwala* under Pepe to cheat the estate of its share. Naturally he refuses to permit any low harvest to be included in the calculation, and claims almost every year is abnormally low, so as to push the rent higher. But once a rent agreement has been reached, that is the end of it. He does not use the *homelots* for revenge.

On the other hand, he is strict about the estate having a 20 percent share of the net crop from anything but *palay*. That is the law, and he won't forget any income that he can get for the estate. No one gets any special privileges.

I am no longer a farmer, so I suppose I am just a squatter here now. But I pay rent of a *cavan* a year, and demand a receipt. I have saved some money, and I hope to build a piggery here. That is different from just having a house here, and I don't know if Pepe will agree without a higher rent from me or my brother. The new law is only about the farmer's rights. What about us?

Our two sisters have *kubò* here. They are just squatters too, paying a *cavan* a year each. Both their husbands are farm laborers, but this law has nothing to say about where they can live. We are close to the river here, and can hire a pump in the dry season to irrigate vegetables. Both my brothers-in-law want to use some of this farm to plant vegetables in the dry season — about one-half hectare each is all they can manage to work, as vegetables need a lot of attention. But what has the law to say about that? Under the old system the estate wasn't interested in vegetables, only in *palay*, mangoes, and bamboo. But that was before transport to Manila improved and before the weir was put in the river and pumps appeared. Now, if Enting planted vegetables, the estate is entitled to 20 percent of the net. But what if our brothers-in-law plant?

You see, we have to think of these things because they are our livelihood. Pepe will squeeze Enting for a

couple of cavans' higher farm rent because he knows we want to ask permission for our brothers-in-law to plant vegetables when they have no right. We will have to agree, and then they will have to negotiate some share to the estate from the net of the vegetables. So the owners squeeze the farmers so that the farmers can help the landless to live, and then they squeeze the landless.

### Conclusion

Given the high rents and continuing dependence which compromise tenants have accepted as the price of continuing credit, they may not have an incentive to strive for higher output, will remain outside the associations and cooperatives, and will remain subservient — in other words, several at least of the policies declared by R.A. 6389 will not be achieved. The landless will remain permissive squatters, inhibited from developing their insecure homelots for livestock and other projects, their lack of defined rights a weapon against farmer-relatives. The genuine lessees will have cut themselves off from landlord credit, and if government credit does not come through on time they may feel betrayed, and through their new organizations express sharp discontent in the coming wet season.

### Notes

Mr. Fegan is a candidate for the Ph. D. in anthropology at Yale University, currently doing an ethnographic study of a Tagalog rice-growing village in Central Luzon (Hasaan, San Miguel, Bulacan). The research on which this paper is based is supported by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program and by Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant #GS28643 of the National Science Foundation.

1. Note that owner-cultivators may also be small landlords with tenants of their own; they can borrow from banks against titles.

2. It is important to distinguish between patron-dependent and broker-supporter ties. A patron has a

monopoly within a certain area over scarce resources that he can give or withhold at will to reward or punish dependents. Dependents must seek his favor to get access to his scarce resources or at least not provoke his disfavor, for withdrawal of resources and imposition of other sanctions can drive them from the area.

A broker's resources are not his own. He is an intermediary who stands at the juncture of two partial systems and exchanges the support (typically votes) of those in the smaller for the resources (typically political influence) of those in the larger system. But since both resource-holders and supporters can switch to another broker, both have sanctions they can impose on him.

The classic landlord-tenant relation in the Philippines is the patron-dependent one, except that those landlords who are themselves politicians may exercise some broker functions. Landlords who live too far away, are too busy in other fields, are old, female, or ill, are personally disinclined or simply have too many tenants, may abandon the patron role, and delegate managerial functions to an *encargado*. The latter is neither a patron (for he has no monopoly over the resources and tenants can appeal over his head) nor a broker (unless he engages in politics), and hence often emphasizes rights and duties, rather than privileges and favors, in the way he runs an estate.

Although the reform hedges about with restrictions an owner's monopoly rights to dispose of his land, and threatens to replace his relative monopoly over accessible credit, it leaves enough sanctions in both areas for landlords to keep tenants partial dependents, for the patron-landlord reacts to a tenant's seeking to go outside the relationship (to demand as rights what have till now been favors) as to a personal affront.

3. Those landlords who still draw 40 percent or more from share tenants are most resistant to legally calculated rent and seek negotiated rents because (a) they stand to lose most financially, (b) they have usually successfully maintained patron-dependent relationships with the tenant, and (c) they have successfully stood off past legal reforms.

4. Such negotiated rents are often about 50 percent higher than the legal calculation.

5. The *kabán* is used in rice areas as an inexact but traditional measure of land — that amount of land that is sown by one *kabán* of seed. Ideally, one *kabán* equals 1.25 hectares; however, where it is used to calculate work payments farmers regularly take one *kabán* to mean about 2.0 hectares. It is to their advantage to do so.

**WEIGHT AND MEASURE EQUIVALENTS  
OF COMMON PHILIPPINE CROPS**

1 cavan palay	= 25 gantas
	= 44 kilograms
	= 2.128 bushels
	Cleans 65 per cent; produces 28 kg cleaned rice
1 cavan cleaned rice	= 57.5 kilograms
	= 2.05 cavans palay
1 picul (Chinese) cleaned rice	= 60.25 kilograms
1 cavan rice bran	= 25 kilograms
1 cavan corn on cob	= 30 kilograms
	= 200 ears corn on cob Shells
	80 per cent
1 cavan shelled corn	= 58.5 kilograms
	= 2.47 cavans corn on cob
1 cavan mungo	= 58.5 kilograms
1 liter palay	= 0.57 kilogram
1 liter cleaned rice	= 0.77 kilogram
1 liter shelled corn	= 0.78 kilogram
1 liter shelled peanut	= 0.34 kilogram
1 liter coconut oil	= 0.93 kilogram
1 ganta palay	= 1.72 kilograms
1 ganta cleaned rice	= 2.30 kilograms
1 ganta shelled peanut	= 1.10 kilograms
1 ganta mungo	= 2.23 kilograms
100 corn ears	= 12 kg shelled corn
1 kerosene can molasses	= 25 kilograms
1 bale abaca	= 2 piculs
	= 126.5 kilograms
1 quintal tobacco	= 46 kilograms
1 picul sugar	= 63.25 kilograms

**NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY**

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Filipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "mangá"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (^). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Filipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## TWO VIEWS OF THE KASAMÁ-LESSEE SHIFT IN BULACAN: AN EXCHANGE

AKIRA TAKAHASHI AND BRIAN FEGAN

Takahashi first studied Barrio Katulinan, Baliuag, Bulacan, in 1963-64. Returning six years later, he found the village greatly changed. Most important, farmers who as share tenants had been a "rural proletariat," virtually indistinguishable from landless workers, had as lessees become "peasants," more completely given to the working of their farms. Viewing the same phenomena, Fegan emerges with divergent perceptions and conclusions. He feels the proletariat/peasant dichotomy is inappropriate, and sees the taking of seasonal off-farm employment not as an "either-or" rejection of the farmer's role, but as an economically sound "both-and" strategy to maximize income. He expects most lessees to continue accepting opportunities for gainful employment both on the farm and off.

### The Peasantization of Kasamá Tenants

AKIRA TAKAHASHI

December 1, 1971

For a Japanese researcher in 1963-64, one of the most impressive features of rice agriculture in Central Luzon was the difference in behavior between that region's share tenants, or *kasamá*, and Japanese small farmers. Rural communities in Japan generally consist of farmholders, either owners or tenants, who tend to be emotionally attached to their land and very much concerned with it. Japanese farmers try their best to maximize the utilization of their own resources and to minimize all farming expenses except those which will increase gross output. In other words, they are both thrifty and austere in the management of their farms, depending heavily on the use of family labor.

The Central Luzon *kasamá*, on the other hand, showed little concern about the total output or net return on their farms. Only nominal care was given to their crops during the

growing season. I often observed crop damage due to waterlogging, for example, that could have been avoided had the cultivator simply attended to the water level of his field. There was heavy dependence on hired workers, even though there was an ample labor force of family members who were not employed outside at that particular time. Furthermore, a *kasamá* could be seen going to town at a time when his crop was being harvested, just to show his confidence in the hired workers. Yet it was obvious to me that these hired workers, left unsupervised in their work, wasted much of the rice yield. At the threshing site as well, no precaution was taken to reduce loss. When the carelessness of a villager caused damage to the crop of his neighbor, the latter did not blame the guilty party; he preferred to maintain good relations with him. Even when the cultivators themselves were

suffering from low yields on their farms, they allowed their neighbors, who had not participated in any part of the production, to benefit from the land through traditional modes of communal sharing.

These facts led to my close participant observation of the interrelations between economic structure and social relations in a kasamá-dominated village in 1963-64. Some of the results of that research were reported in a monograph entitled *Land and Peasants in Central Luzon* (1969). In April 1971, six years after that first research, I was given a chance to visit the same area for a short period, and was strongly impressed by the substantial changes that had occurred there in agriculture and in the lives of the villagers. I would like to present some of my findings in this short paper, as the basis for a discussion of recent agricultural developments in Central Luzon.

#### *Katulinan, 1963-64*

At the time of my fieldwork, Katulinan, a barrio of the Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan, was a rice-growing village of 44 households (36 farming and 8 nonfarming) with 136 hectares of paddy field. Since practically all the cultivators were kasamá tenants, one-half of their yield was given as rental to a *propietaryo*, or landlord; and usually a great amount, occasionally all, of the other half was taken away by the *propietaryo* as payment for debt. Consequently, the majority of the kasamá had to purchase rice for their home consumption at the town market or at the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) retailer even immediately after harvest. Since they rarely marketed their produce themselves, the selling price of rice was not their concern. Furthermore, they usually depended on earnings from off-farm income, such as agricultural and nonagricultural wage work, small businesses, or other sorts of sidelines. Hence they paid little attention to the management of their farms, and had only limited incentive to raise the productivity of their lands.

I seldom saw the family members of the kasamá working on their farms, except when they were hired as transplanters or reapers. The housewives were especially scarce, spending most

of their time in sidelines like hat-weaving, never helping their husbands in the field. Only a few of them earned wages as hired laborers during the transplanting and harvesting season.

All cultivators were entirely dependent on hired labor for such essential processes of farming as pulling and bundling of seedlings, transplanting, reaping, hauling bundles of palay, and threshing. It was a very conspicuous feature of agricultural labor in this area that the division of work between family and hired labor was truly distinct, and exceptions were rarely found. Cultivators exchanged labor only in plowing and harrowing, the expenses for which were supposed to be borne in full by tenants.

As a result, the paying of wages in kind to fellow villagers cost the kasamá considerable amounts of palay out of their yield. This meant, of course, a serious reduction in their net return. However, this way of behaving was rational from the kasamá's viewpoint, for that portion of the output set aside for laborers in cash or in kind, as well as the not very small amounts of palay taken away by neighbors under a variety of traditional sharing arrangements, all remained within the village and contributed substantially to the livelihood of its residents. The tenant, in other words, played two roles, farmer and laborer. As *farmer* he hired more laborers (many of them also tenants) than might have seemed necessary; this he did because as *laborer* he expected to be called in turn to work on other farmer-laborer's farms. In all cases the loss would be the landlord's, not the tenant's.

It is doubtful that the kasamá of 1963-64 really deserve to be regarded as farmers. For although they usually owned working animals and farming implements, they rarely engaged in work on their farms and were very dependent on off-farm income. In fact, they exhibited very little responsibility and took very little risk in farm management. While it is true that some of them were discharged by the *propietaryo* for work on the farm that was extremely inferior by normal standards, they were never considered responsible for crop failures, however bad they might be, provided they gave the minimal expected attention to their fields. Crop failures were blamed on nature.

So long as they remained tenants, the kasamá could expect to borrow living expenses from their proprietaryo. Under such circumstances, the kasamá rarely showed a positive attitude toward farming; instead, they were more concerned about off-farm work. To them, farmland was not so much a means of creating a profit from agricultural production as the means of having a dependable patron in the person of the proprietaryo.

The kasamá, then was more an agricultural worker than a farmer. Although he was called a share tenant, the kasamá was, in essence, a proletarian. In fact, there was no clear economic and social stratification between the kasamá and the wage laborer, even though the latter was employed by the former. Kasamá and wage laborers moved from one status to the other with frequency and ease.

#### *Katulinan Revisited, 1971*

I visited the area again in April 1971, and recognized some substantial changes both in agricultural practices and in the villagers' way of life. Katulinan economy and society had been activated by various cumulative forces in the intervening years.

We may count the following as the most significant changes and activities in the area: (1) a shift in tenancy from kasamá to leaseholder, which started around 1968, even before the area was proclaimed a land-reform district in 1969; (2) the introduction, in 1966 and after, of new varieties of palay such as IR-8, IR-20, and IR-22; (3) the intensive extension work by the Chinese Rice Technical Mission from 1966 to 1967 (19 Chinese experts stationed in the municipality, cooperating with 41 Filipino extension workers); (4) the improvement of the local irrigation facilities by the National Irrigation Administration and the Asian Development Bank between 1967 and 1970; (5) the activation of the Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association (Facoma) under the land-reform program.

These elements had a strong impact on the agricultural production of the area. Today, in Katulinan, four-fifths of cultivators are under

*buwisan* (leasehold) contracts, paying some 20 cavans, in some cases 15 cavans, of annual rental per hectare. The standard yield of an average paddy field (approximately 2.5 has.) is nearly 180 cavans of palay per year. This is two and a half times more than the yield of 1964. Utilizing new seed varieties, straight-row planting, weeding, application of fertilizer and insecticide, construction of improved irrigation ditches (*salahan*), intensive utilization of house lots (*bakuran*) — these are very popular practices nowadays. The use of such machinery as tractors and threshers (*tilyadora*) has become more common, and small equipment like rotary weeders and sprayers are owned by many of the cultivators. Improved irrigational facilities have resulted in an increase of the double-crop land from 60 percent to 85 percent of the total paddy field. During the harvest season, all the cultivators sell a part of their produce, and they consume a part of what they have raised. I found out that some heads of farming households had quit their side jobs of *karitela*-driving, barbering, harvesting, and so on, and were devoting themselves to farming operations more intensively. Claiming that the compensation was not satisfactory, women were no longer engaged in hat-weaving.

Betterment in the level of living is remarkable. This may be observed for example, in the construction of new houses, the renovation of housing with durable materials, the electrification of 15 households out of 59, better clothing on the people, and an increase not only in the number of college students, but also of radios, sewing machines, and fighting-cocks. The town proper has become more accessible from the barrios because of the motorization of the pedicab and the replacement of the *karitela* — once a common means of transportation and an important source of cash income — by the motorbike. Common use of motorized-pedicabs in commuting to town, barrio children frequently spending centavos for candy at the *sari-sari* store, men and women speculating in the daily numbers pool (*huweteng*), the presence of bars and kiosks along the barrio road — these activities also indicate an increase in the supply of money circulating in this rural area.

Another important change brought on by the conversion to leasehold status is the shift of sources of credit from the proprietary to diversified credit institutions such as rural banks and the Facoma.

Above all, the most noteworthy changes are recognized in the attitude of farmers toward their farms. Cultivators, who used to pay little attention to their crops, now show more and more concern for their farms. They visit their fields almost every day, watching the condition of the palay and regulating the farm water level. They try to minimize loss in the farming process, for example, by using a mat or vinyl sheet over the rice stack (*mandala*) and threshing site. They now decline to use hired labor, but have instead intensified the use of family labor. Weeding and fertilizing are commonly done by family members and, in some cases, even transplanting and harvesting are carried out mainly by them. Hired wage workers are no longer left alone, but are personally supervised by the cultivators, who want to make sure that a satisfactory job is done. Labor relations between cultivators and workers are becoming more contractual.

Communal customs such as *pilot* (gleaning) and *pumpóng* (harvest sharing), through which a portion of the output was distributed among neighbors, are now on the wane. This is partly due to the cultivator's unwillingness to share his produce with those who were not involved in any part of the production process, but mainly due to this, that because of the new seed varieties and improved farming practices, there is very little palay left in the reaped field for gleaners.

In short, the cultivators are gaining more initiative as farm operators, and becoming more confident in farm management, knowing that intensified labor and care will be rewarded at the time of harvest. They are gaining more independence from both the proprietary and the village community, and they are becoming more attached to their land.

The farmers have also become more thrifty in farm management. They try to minimize their farming expenses and to maximize their net return, so that roles of farm laborers are changing. Family labor is increasing its signif-

icance as the principal and essential element in agricultural production. This was what I expected in my previous research, when I wrote (1970:142) that

heavy dependence on hired labor has been brought about by the *kasamá* system. If the *kasamá* is replaced by the fixed rent system, tenants will make efforts to reduce farming expenses and their dependence on family labor will be increased. Thus, it is possible to anticipate that progress in implementation of the Land Reform Code . . . will enhance the self-sufficiency of farm labor . . . .

*We may tentatively call this process of changing behavior patterns "peasantization."* The word peasantization is often used to refer to the process by which a tribal society evolves to a more open, heterogenized, and monetarized society through acculturation. I shall now use this term to mean the whole process by which the *kasamá*, who used to have the characteristics of a rural proletariat, takes on the basic features of the peasantry, or petty producer. The *kasamá* is becoming a small producer for his own consumption on his family farm, where production is undertaken primarily by the labor of the members of the family household as a unit of operation, and is becoming, to quote Raymond Firth, "a man who is in effective control of a piece of land to which he has long been attached by ties of tradition and sentiment."

### *Some Reflections*

I have no intention of saying that this kind of change in agriculture and in rural life is a general trend in Central Luzon. I am not even in a position to remark on the regional extent of such a trend, since my fieldwork at this time just has started. It is to say, however, that these changes are rather limited in the specific area of Central Luzon where the land-reform program has been drastically and cumulatively implemented along with other institutional reforms. I believe that neither administrative measures by themselves nor technical elements alone are sufficient to give great momentum to agricultural change. I would rather emphasize the multiplication of critical factors in combination.



It is not yet certain that such a trend has taken root. At this stage, marketing and credit are two factors urgently needed to push this development further. Since cultivators have been involved in the entwining cobweb of rice marketing, it is very likely that the increased land yield due to land reform will be absorbed by intermediaries, unless appropriate measures are taken to counteract the practice. Hitherto, the price of rice has been in favor of producers, including small peasants, but it is not certain that such a condition will continue. On the other hand, although paternalistic loans were and are an integral part of the share-tenancy system, where this system disappears the proprietary is no longer expected to be a major source of credit. *It is imperative that cooperative financing institutions be strengthened to enable them to fill the need once answered by the landlord.*

Another point requiring careful analysis is the reaction of the landed class to the present agrarian transition. As I stated in my monograph, the majority of proprietary in Katulinan had small-to-medium-sized holdings which were for them more a means for upward social mobility than a source of any sizable income. However, these landowners are now becoming aware that, at the very time when productivity is on the increase, they are likely to be excluded from a proportionate share in its benefits. In their desire to

recover the sizable investments they have made, landowners may react strongly against implementation of leasehold arrangements. However, this response of the landed class against land reform can be contained by the legislative framework and the posture of the judiciary, and, more basically, by peasant organizations and movements.

The increasing distinction between farmholders and nonholders is another significant aspect of present-day village society. As mentioned earlier, there was hitherto no clear social and economic stratification between cultivators and noncultivators. The changes in the agricultural structure and the trend of peasantization, however, seem to have resulted in the disintegration of the earlier type of village community. This will give strong impetus to peasant organizations, which are the basic prerequisite for achieving polarization of cultivators into two groups: those who are advancing toward becoming independent farmers with positive responses to institutional stimuli, and those who remain timid. At any rate, the disorganization of the village community will be accelerated under the present circumstances.

Through my current fieldwork (1971-72), I hope to understand the present status of the trends in agriculture and rural society, and the real bases for recent changes.

#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Filipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the *abakada* represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "manga"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (ˆ). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Filipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## Jobs and Farms: The Lessee's Alternatives and Peasantization

BRIAN FEGAN

March 15, 1972

In this brief paper I would like to continue a dialogue with Professor Akira Takahashi which began when he visited Yale while I was studying there. This discussion has taken me to his field village in Baliuag, Bulacan, and him to mine in nearby San Miguel, and has involved a free and cordial exchange of data and interpretation interrupted only by his return to Tokyo in February 1972. Here I comment on his excellent monograph (1969) and a more recent paper he wrote shortly after returning in 1971 to the scene of that study.

### *Takahashi's View*

Professor Takahashi argues (1969) that under the conditions of share tenancy and credit prevailing in one Central Luzon village in 1964, tenants had no incentive to increase gross harvest, or to reduce labor costs and losses in production, because any increment in net farm output would be seized by the landowner. But tenants did strive to maximize *household* income by allocating their own and family labor to paid work on *other* farms, and to non-farm wage labor or self-employment. Tenants stood to gain in their farm-laborer role as families, fellow-villagers, and a class, by inflating labor costs and losses in production to gleaners. Their only advantage over landless laborers was access to credit from the landowners; hence they did the minimum farm work necessary to retain the tenancy right. They were substantially proletarianized (1969: 127).

The then tenancy system was sufficient to cause poor farm management and low yields. A change that would give the tenant an interest

in the harvest would be necessary and perhaps sufficient to cause the farmers to work their land more carefully, withdraw from outside work, substitute free family labor to cut costs, and to try for higher yields (1969: 142).

When Professor Takahashi returned to Baliuag in 1971, he soon noted (and recorded in an August 1971 paper republished here [1972a]) considerable improvement in farm management, more use of family labor, and some abandonment of off-farm work as well as a higher level of living. About four-fifths of farmers had shifted from share to lease tenancy. But although he still considered this change necessary, he drew attention to other factors (new seeds, agricultural extension, credit, improved irrigation), implying that the shift to leasehold was not in itself sufficient unless those other cumulative factors reached a critical mass. Nevertheless, in line with his 1964 predictions, a substantially proletarianized peasantry had been shifted toward becoming a true peasantry, and leasehold was a necessary cause for this.

### *Do Share Tenants and Lessees Behave Differently?*

Takahashi's description and analysis of the effects of share tenancy in Katulinan in 1964 is persuasive but not conclusive, because he was unable then to carry out a controlled comparison of the behavior of farmers under different classes of tenure. If he had been able to show that lessees and owner-operators behaved differently from share-tenants in the allocation of family labor between farm and other jobs, and in the use of non-family labor, we could have been

more sure that he was describing tenant behavior and not just farmer behavior.

In 1964, 36 Katulinan farms were operated by resident tenants, 29 by tenants resident in Baliuag town and nearby, and two by lessees living away (1969:41-47).<sup>1</sup> It seems probable that the non-resident lessees were as bad farmers as the non-resident tenants because of the disincentives of travel (*ibid.*:47). But in 1971, if four-fifths of farmers had become lessees, the remaining one-fifth were presumably still share tenants, and having been exposed to the same other cumulative critical factors, provide a control group. The important question is not whether the changes noted by Takahashi took place, but whether they have taken place unequally on tenants' and lessee-operated farms.<sup>2</sup>

*Off-farm Occupations and Intensive Farming:  
Conflict or Complementarity?*

Takahashi's recent paper considers it empirically true, economically rational for the farmer, in the interests of higher production, and socially desirable that lessees and perhaps their families are abandoning paid off-farm work to concentrate on the land. He predicts this trend will become more widespread as more tenants become leaseholders and lose proletarianized characteristics to form a purer peasant class, capable of forming stronger interest-group organizations. I will argue that any trend in Katulinan may be very localized, is not economically rational for all lessees, as it fails to take account of other options, and is not necessarily the most productive behavior.

First, I think it necessary to remember that abstract verbal definitions of proletarian and peasant have been developed for other situations and problems, and we should not expect Tagalog countrymen to conform to them. The Central Luzon rural economy is part of a basically agricultural economy, dominated by the industrialized capitalist countries. The large production-line factory with its impersonal norms, and regularly employed, time-disciplined labor — the true proletariat — is virtually absent in the towns, still uncommon in Manila, and must be sought in

Japan and the United States. The economy of the rural Philippine town has two sectors. One is quasi-bureaucratized, employing professionals and white-collar workers in administration, health, financial, educational, and police and guard services; all (except the last) are practically closed to the farmer, but time-disciplined salaried or time-rate employees are seldom to be found out of this sector. The other sector, open to skilled and semi-skilled artisans and unskilled workers (hence the farmers) occurs in transport, building, processing and storing of crops, conversion and repair of vehicles and equipment, light and handicraft manufacturing, food and personal services, and the buy-and-sell operations of the marketplace and its extensions. This sector, except for purely personal or family operations, is characterized by dyadic relationships between small capitalists who supply equipment, materials, prime positions, or credit to workers who use it on some version of a user, sharing piece-work putting out, contract, agency, or simple debt system. Rather than proletarians, these operatives are dependent petty entrepreneurs. They are not subject to attendance discipline beyond their short-run need for cash, and long-run need to keep on good-enough terms with the capitalist to keep a place open. This system rests on capital shortage and labor surplus, accounts for the weakness of unions, and is the equivalent in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy of the tenancy system in the primary.

Faced by this sort of employment, the farmer does not have to allocate his labor to either full-time job or full-time farming, but can strive for the optimum mix of both — balancing his need for cash against the need for attention to his farm.

Off-farm work can complement farming in three ways. First, the farmer has a cash flow for subsistence, education of his children, and social expenditures, and is less likely to go into debt. At the prevailing 50 percent or more interest for non-agricultural loans from money-lenders (*sa labás*), and 50 percent subsistence *rasyón* during farming season only from landowners to tenants, the farmer with a "side-line" (*saya-tayn*) income

does not have to repay capital and interest at harvest, which on Takahashi's argument should mean he has more concern about the crop. Second, good rice-farming now and in the future will need increasing cash inputs for mechanical cultivation to shorten the time the land is idle, for certified seeds, chemical fertilizer, insecticides and weedicides, and supplementary irrigation. No matter how much time a farmer has, however, he cannot substitute it for cash to meet these needs except in the case of weeding. On the other hand, except for the daily cutting of grass for carabao (*kalabaw*) fodder during the palay season, and brief attention to water levels, the tasks required for good protection and maintenance of growing rice are not constantly demanding, and can be accommodated to a job under prevailing conditions. Third, an off-farm job allows the farmer to spread his risks and is a cushion against crop failure. Hence it need not be economically rational for the farmer (and much less his household) to withdraw from off-farm work. Some who do withdraw in response to higher income from the farm do so, not to work harder on the farm, but out of a preference for leisure.

Another "non-peasantized" response that can be expected from some leaseholders lucky enough to have a steady or well-paid job is the hiring of a helper, or *katulong*, to carry out all phases of farm work up to planting. The *katulong* is paid 20 to 25 cavans for a two-cavan farm<sup>3</sup> if he supplies the *kalabaw*, and 10 cavans if the nominal farmer does.<sup>4</sup> This practice of subtenancy already occurs under share tenancy, and is likely to continue among lessees, contrary law notwithstanding. The landowner will be unlikely to complain so long as his lease rental (*buwis*) is paid.

#### *Share Tenancy and Leasehold: Hired versus Household Labor*



Takahashi argued that Katulunan tenants in 1964 depended on wage-labor not because of brief local peaks of demand in the work season, but because of the tenancy system. They used wage-labor for those tasks whose costs they shared with the owner, and labor-exchange or

family labor for those borne entirely by the tenant. This was because they had little expectation of sharing in the harvest as tenants, but as farm laborers on each other's farms it was in their interests to increase labor costs at the expense of landowners (see Takahashi 1969: 141-42). But if lack of interest in the net crop was the reason for inflating wage costs, why tenants should treat shared and unshared costs differently remains obscure, as does the reason why landowners and the law make some tasks shared costs and others solely the tenant's responsibility (e.g., R.A. 1199, Secs. 32, 35, 38),


My own fieldwork indicates that whatever the tenure system, certain jobs that must be done for the whole farm in one or two days are done by large groups of workers, while others that can be done a field at a time are done by the farmer (or a worker hired to replace him). There is also a cultural preference for the social advantages of group work, which has some economic rationale; laborious dull tasks alone in the mud and rain tempt the worker to take long breaks and daunt his spirits, whereas 10 cooperating workers, because of zest and emulation, can do more in one day than one man in 10 days. The usual labor and compensation arrangements are shown in Table 1.

Some of the implications one can draw from the table are as follows. *First*, tasks 3 and 5 will be progressively replaced by mechanical rotary cultivation, particularly between the first and second crops. This will weaken the importance of the *kalabaw*, but call for more cash or credit. *Second*, lessees with a well-paying or time-disciplined job may take a *katulong* for tasks 1 through 9, as do several Hasaan tenants now. They may also give up their *kalabaw* because of the daily attention it needs, or, if they keep it, will have someone raise it (*ipinag-aalaga ng kalabaw*) for one cavan of palay a month. Those without a *kalabaw* will be more inclined to seek off-farm work and hire a *katulong*. Lessees with such jobs will select *atorga*<sup>5</sup> for the dry-season (*panag-araw*) harvest, tasks 16a to 16e. They will be the most inclined to take a sub-tenant.

*Third*, lessees without jobs will select *laglagan*<sup>6</sup> for the *panag-araw* harvest, i.e., task



**Seedbed Preparation** 1. Task 1b in Table 1. Farm helpers smooth and level seedbeds in a seedplot (*punlaan*). The seeds are soaked, then broadcast (*sabog*) onto this fine mud to grow until 25 to 30 days old if new varieties like IR 8 or IR 20, but up to 65 days old if traditional varieties like *wagwág* or *makan putí*. *San Miguel, Bulacan, October 1971.* 2. Task 2 in Table 1. Farmer broadcasts incubated seed onto seedplot for second crop, before harvest of first crop. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1971.* 3. Task 1a in Table 1. *Dapog* seedlings sown on concrete without soil. The thick mats of seedlings are rolled up when 11 to 13 days old, saving pulling costs and making them easier to carry. *Dapog* seedlings must be planted in straight rows (at double the usual cost), so that the rotary-toothed weeder visible here can be pushed between. They are easily drowned where drainage is poor. *San Miguel, Bulacan, August 1971.*



5



6





**Land Preparation** 4. Task 3 in Table 1. Farmer plowing alone by *kalabaw*. In lowland riceland preparation, the *pilapil*, or dikes, are first repaired so rain or irrigation water can be held to soak the soil. The object of plowing and successive harrowings is to kill weeds and turn the soil into a fine mud for transplanting. *San Miguel, Bulacan, July 1971.*


5. Task 4 in Table 1. Mechanical cultivation by a tractor whose toothed *Araneta* wheels bury grass and weeds and muddy the soil. This technique (or the *rotobeytor*, rotary plow) costs P100.00 to P120.00 cash per hectare. It replaces plowing plus the first two harrowings, but final harrowing, or *linang*, by *kalabaw* is still needed. *San Miguel, Bulacan, June 1972.*

6. Task 7 in Table 1. Final harrowing (*linang*) by a large group of men working on a *kasuyò* (labor-exchange) basis to level the field and make a fine mud suitable for planting next day. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1972.*

**Pulling and Distributing Seedlings** 7. Task 8 in Table 1. Pulling seedlings, *bumunot ng punlá*, while final harrowing is being done at the same time for transplanting next day. The hired laborers are paid P0.80 to P1.00 per 100 *punggós*, or fist-sized bundle, and usually share in some of the special food served to the *linang* gang. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1972.*

8. Task 9 in Table 1. A farmer and his unmarried son haul seedling bundles on *kareta* (sled) to the prepared field and scatter them for the transplanters. *San Miguel, Bulacan, July 1971.*





11

**Transplanting** 9. Task 10a in Table 1. *Ordinary*, or *waráy*, transplanting in unison by a large group hired on daily-pay basis, called *arawan* (₱3.00 plus morning and afternoon snacks, or *merienda*). The girls sing, accompanied by a guitar, while boys grunt the rhythm (*bumabaho*). The three at the back open the seedling bundles and pass them to planters. Most planters are young girls and boys who enjoy unison planting, but it is unusual and discouraged by farmers, for care and proper spacing are sacrificed for rhythm. *San Miguel, Bulacan, July 1971.* 10. Task 10b in Table 1. A share-tenant's teenage children practice straight-row planting using a method of their father's invention. They will later weed, a practice which increases harvest. A farmer saves on labor costs by having his family do the work (*payók*). Straight-row planting by hired labor costs over double the ordinary costs (₱100.00 versus ₱45.00 per hectare) plus extra for weeding twice (₱3.50 to ₱4.00 per day for three mandays per hectare). Many landowners, however, refuse to share the extra costs of straight-row planting and weeding, required at a season when a tenant is short of cash. *San Miguel, Bulacan, July 1971.* 11. Task 13 in Table 1. Farmer spraying the growing palay against insects. He has already broadcast chemical fertilizer once and will do so again just before the palay flowers (when it is *bilóg*, 'round,' or *naglililihi*, 'conceiving'), for his soil is poor and the variety he planted, IR8, needs fertilizer. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1972.*







**Harvesting** 12. Task 15a in Table 1. Landless laborer reaps the early wet-season crop with *lilik*, or sickle. His harvest gang, or *pankát*, will share equally in the *hunós* of one-fifth or one-sixth of the palay they reap, bundle, haul, thresh, and winnow. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1972.*



**Hauling** 13. Task 15c in Table 1. Hauling sheaves of reaped palay to the threshing floor. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1972.*


**Threshing and Winnowing**

14. Task 15d in Table 1. Threshing the wet-season harvest by hand (*hampás*). One member of the harvest team opens sheaves and passes small bundles to a companion who grasps them with threshing tongs (*piyuká*) and beats the stalks against a wooden "horse" (*hampasan*). The threshing site is in the houselot (*bakuran*) of the share tenant. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1971.*

15. Task 15e in Table 1. Winnowing the wet-season harvest by *bilower*, a gasoline-driven fan. The bilower operator is contracted by the harvest teams for 2 percent of the cleaned palay. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1971.*

16. Harvest team bags palay, four kerosene tins (*baldé*) to one sack (*kabán*). Every fifth sack – less one-fiftieth sack or one-half *salóp* given to the bilower operator – is the hunos share of the harvesters. The overseer (*katiwalá*), seated on the right, and the share-tenant's mother on the left watch the bagging and division. *San Miguel, Bulacan, September 1971.*





15



16

17



**Transporting and Dry-Season Threshing** 17. Task 16d in Table 1. Helped by friends (*bataris* arrangement), a farmer carts palay home by *karetón* from his farm two kilometers away. After threshing, the straw will be stacked for fodder to be used next wet season when the kalabáw cannot graze (as land is planted) but must be handfed with hay or fresh grass cut twice daily on the dikes. *San Miguel, Bulacan, February 1972.*

18. Task 17 in Table 1. The landowner's *tilyadora* machine-threshing the dry-season harvest depleted by tungro disease. Farmer pays the machine contractor 5 percent of threshed palay, and the contractor shares this with his crew. Each stack (*mandalá*) of sheaves contains one variety of palay of one farmer. In this case, two farmers share a site. *San Miguel, Bulacan, March 1972.*

18



Table 1

*Rice-farming work schedule, labor force, and compensation arrangements, by task and operation (Hasaan, San Miguel, Bulacan, 1971-72)*

Task	Operation	Work schedule		Labor force	Compensation arrangement
		Whole farm quickly	Field by field gradually		
1	Seedbed preparation				
	a. <i>Dapog</i> <sup>1</sup> b. Ordinary	— ●	● —	Farmer Farmer	— —
2	Sowing	[applies only to seedbed]		Farmer	—
3	Plowing	—	● <sup>K</sup>	Farmer	Occasionally by exchange labor
4	Mechanical rotary cultivation (incorporates Tasks 5 and 6)	●	—	Contractor	By hectare
5	1st harrowing ( <i>basóg</i> )	—	● <sup>K</sup>	Farmer	—
6	2nd harrowing ( <i>haling</i> )	—	● <sup>K</sup>	Farmer	—
7	3rd harrowing ( <i>linang</i> ) (incorporates leveling and puddling)	● <sup>K</sup>	—	Large group of farmers	Labor exchange ( <i>kanyò</i> )
8	Pulling and bundling seedlings	●	—	± 5 men (omit for <i>dapog</i> )	Daily wage or piecework by <i>cavan</i> <sup>2</sup> or bundles
9	Hauling and scattering seedling bundles	● <sup>K</sup>	—	Farmer	—
10	Planting				
	a. Ordinary b. Straight row	● Can be gradual if <i>dapog</i> (la)	— —	+ 15 women, girls, youths Same	Daily, by <i>cavan</i> Same, but costs double.
11	Weeding				
	a. Pulling, cutting	—	●	Farmer	—
	b. Rotary weeder (for straight row) c. Weedicide	— —	● ●	Farmer Farmer	— —
12	Broadcasting fertilizer	—	●	Farmer	—
13	Insecticide spray/broadcast	—	●	Farmer	—
14	Irrigation, drainage	—	●	Farmer	—

Table 1 (continued)

Task	Operation	Work schedule		Labor force	Compensation arrangement
		Whole farm quickly	Field by field gradually		
15	<i>Dayatan</i> (wet-season) harvest				
	a. Reaping	●	—	+ 10 men (rarely, girls and widows)	
	b. Bundling	●	—	Same	<i>Hunos</i> (20 percent of crop) <sup>2</sup>
	c. Hauling	●	—	Same	
	d. Threshing	●	—	Same	
	e. Cleaning	●	—	Contractor with blower	
16	<i>Panag-araw</i> (dry-season) harvest				
	a. Reaping	●	—	+ 10 men	If <i>laglagan</i> , by <i>cavan</i> ; but (a) to (e) can be done by harvest-gang <i>atorga</i> (20 percent of yield and they pay <i>tilyadora</i> ); <sup>3</sup> (e) may be by <i>bataris</i> , i.e. free help, with some food or drink.
	b. Bundling	—	●	Farmer, if <i>laglagan</i> ; harvesters, if <i>atorga</i>	
	c. Carrying to small stacks	—	●		
	d. Hauling	—	● <sup>k</sup>		
	e. Making large stacks	●	—	+ 10 men	
17	<i>Tilyadora</i> (mechanical threshing and cleaning)	●	—	Contractor with +12 men	5 percent of yield (if <i>atorga</i> , taken from harvesters' share)

<sup>1</sup>Dapog seedlings are sown thickly on banana leaf, plastic, or concrete and transplanted at 10–12 days. Ordinary seedlings are sown more thinly on soil in larger beds, and pulled at 25 or more days. Since weed competition is more serious for the small dapog seedlings, straight-row planting and the weeder are virtually obligatory.

<sup>2</sup>As used here, *cavan* (*kabán*) is a measure of land. See text note 3.

<sup>3</sup>For *atorga* and *hunos*, see text note 5. For *laglagan*, see text note 6.

<sup>k</sup>*Kalabaw*, or carabao, is used.

16a only, and do tasks 16b, c, and d themselves. They will not have a *katulong* or take a sub-tenant.

Fourth, it is only those farmers who have several unmarried teenage-or-older children who in turn are not in time-disciplined or well-paid jobs, that can use household labor in tasks 8 and 10. Some farmers so placed will be more prone to use 1a, *dapog* seedlings, and hence 10b, straight-row planting, and rotary weeding, 11b.

Farmers with such households can, by staggered *dapog* sowings, stagger the maturing dates of the rice, which may make the complex under task 15 (wet-season harvest and hand threshing) amenable to household labor, and also 16a through 16d. This could also allow them to do the *linang* (final harrowing), task 7, field by field and break involvement in labor exchange. But note that though this behavior corresponds to Takahashi's peasant model, I would argue it is only appro-

prate to farmers in a peculiar and temporary household situation. But it is well to stress here the importance of distinguishing "household" from "family" labor. A farmer's children, except for the youngest male, normatively set up separate households on marriage and are paid for farm work done as part of hired gangs because they are unwilling to work unpaid on a parental farm in view of responsibility to their families of procreation. In a village where many are kin, but non-household labor is paid, the term "family" labor may make for confusion.

*Fifth*, tasks 11 through 14 have always been the farmer's responsibility and are an area where improvement will bring greatest returns. Farmers with time-disciplined or profitable jobs will be unable personally to do those tasks adequately, and unless a new system of paying a katulong extra for them emerges, their yields will suffer. Farmers with non-time-disciplined jobs will have readier access to the necessary cash inputs, and many will find the necessary time. But note that they may use chemical weedicides rather than the more laborious rotary weeder, hence find no advantage in straight row and will reject dapog. Those with no jobs will be more dependent on subsistence and agricultural credit, and more inclined to dapog, straight row, and the weeder.

*Sixth*, on the whole, until suitable dry-season crops and markets for them appear, the farmers in unirrigated barrios or with one-crop land will be the least inclined to withdraw from jobs, and such barrios, unless close to cheap transport to jobs, will continue to push out the landless who will be unable to find year-round work there, while they will draw on labor from the more populous irrigated barrios in their peak seasons. Most of the improvements there will wait on capital — bulldozer terracing, well-sinking, and the cash inputs for fertilizer and pesticides. The labor-intensive straight-row complex will appear last there because of non-rectilinear fields.

#### *Tungro and Household Labor*

Both palay crops in Central Luzon in 1971

were damaged by the outbreak of tungro virus, borne by the green leafhopper. Damage varied regionally and between and within individual farms according to whether or not resistant varieties had been planted, and the type and intensity of leafhopper control. Most badly hit was palay that was still young when the hopper outbreak peaked (from about August to October in San Miguel). In general, many farmers abandoned normal crop care when they saw the degree of damage on non-resistant varieties, and sought employment more vigorously or immersed themselves in the November and January election campaigns. However, it is important that normally stable harvest shares and work arrangements were upset. Harvesters refused to work on badly damaged crops for the normal one-fifth or one-sixth wet-season *hunos*, or dry-season *atorga*, and demanded one-quarter, one-third or even one-half of the yield or daily palay pay depending on the extent of damage. In response many farmers who would not normally do so harvested with own and household labor, and excluded *namumulot* gleaners, as the harvest itself was virtually a gleaning operation. On my visit with Professor Takahashi to Katulinan in the November harvest, it was obvious to the eye that the damage there was considerable, and every person we spoke to complained of and asked about tungro.<sup>7</sup> I would caution then that the abnormality of the 1971 harvest be taken into account. I have had to treat my own field data with some suspicion on this account.

#### *Is Katulinan a Special Case?*

Katulinan in 1964 presented some demographic peculiarities that may have made it a special rather than a general case. There were 67 (1969:44) or 70 (1969:66) farms, but only 44 households living in the village. Of these 44, 36 had more or less stable tenure of land, while two farmed small portions of others' land seasonally (1969:42). Of the remaining six households, three appeared to contain no males of working age (1969, Appendix: 150-52), leaving only three landless households with available male labor. Under these conditions of ap-

parent local shortage of landless labor, it may not be surprising that farmers and their household members in a situation of general job shortage worked on each other's land, and still needed non-village labor in the peak labor season.

This is not to deny that tenants as farm laborers in Katulinan of 1964 inflated wage costs as a sort of conspiracy at the expense of landowners. But there were and are now in other places alternative devices for this, such as the "kickback" (*kikbak*) system, where tenant and overseer (*katiwalá*) collude to understate the harvest to the owner in such a way that the tenant is guaranteed some retained rice not seizable for debt. In some villages where available landless labor is abundant, tenants and lessees rarely engaged or engage in harvesting, and use this device. Tenants regard as *mabañt*, or "kind," an owner or *katiwalá* who is accommodating enough to refrain from inspecting the harvest so closely as to deny the tenant some rice, whatever the sharing agreement and balance of debt. These are mutual accommodations involving reasonable behavior. Although strict landowners are insulated against the sanctions of exclusion (by social distance) and of covert violence (by residences outside of the village), the *katiwalá* is not, and his compliance is rewarded in palay and social inclusion. Those tenants (or lessees) with fewest debts, have least need to resort to kickback. What I am suggesting here is that inflating wages in Katulinan and *kikbak* elsewhere are functional equivalents, and the Katulinan device may be the less common because of special demographic circumstances there.

Katulinan 1971 presents another unusual feature to a visitor from another part of Central Luzon. It has the raw pioneer appearance more typical of the rolling upland villages terraced to rice only since the 1940s, rather than of an irrigated village. The houses are small in number and scattered, their home lots comparatively bare, with few useful trees, and these of little specific variety. Decorative plants are uncommon, and sand has not been laid around the houses to control wet-season mud. Professor

Takahashi has drawn attention to the slow return of the villagers to the barrio up to 1964 because of physical insecurity (1969:18, 27); but the importance of living close to non-farm income in town must have reinforced the other conveniences of town life. If Professor Takahashi's model of peasantization under leasehold works, the town-dwelling lessees should be expected to now abandon the town jobs, and live on the farm to be able to work it intensively. I suggest that it will be only those who have not prospered in town that will move back; others may hire *katulong* or become intermediate landlords.

### Summary

One of the most important contributions of Takahashi's 1969 monograph was its reminder that farmers, not farms, make choices about farm management. Thus tenant behavior which looked irrational because it failed to maximize net farm income was rational because it helped maximize tenants' household income, which came from several sources.

In his 1971 paper (Takahashi 1972a) this viewpoint is in danger of being obscured because an inappropriate proletarian/peasant dichotomy has been drawn. Takahashi argues that tenants were "proletarianized" because of the *kasamá* system, but will be "peasantized" because of the leasehold system. Because lessees will retain more from the harvest, they will intensify farming and cut costs; hence they will withdraw household labor from off-farm employment and substitute household labor for hired labor on the farm.

I argue that the off-farm work available in the rural Philippines is not the time-disciplined factory wage labor of the true proletarian, but more often that of the self-employed or dependent petty entrepreneur, and hence needs only enough time devoted to it to keep a niche open. Thus there is not a conflict over the allocation of time such that an either/or choice must be made; rather a both/and optimum mix of sideline work and farm work is open to the lessee as it was to the tenant. Off-farm work can complement good farming by providing a cash



flow between harvests that may help the farmer avoid debt and provide for modern cash inputs, while also allowing him to spread his risks as a cushion against crop failure. Hence the "peasantized" response is not rational for all lessees.

I argue that only those lessees who (a) have no profitable off-farm work and (b) whose households temporarily include several "teen-aged," unmarried children, will adopt Takahashi's "peasantized" strategy. Lessees with profitable or time-disciplined jobs and with less household labor available will pay for more farm operations, use katulong, or even take sub-tenants.

In short, the land reform will not make peasants of all Central Luzon tenants. They, like the landless who exploit diversified and essentially incentive-paid personal niches, will remain difficult to organize into classic class-interest associations.

#### Notes

Dr. Takahashi is a geographer and an associate professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, who has done research in the barrio of Katulinan, Bulacan (1963-64 and 1971-72). His contribution here is the revised version of a paper he read at a seminar at the International Rice Research Institute, Los Baños, August 19, 1971. Mr. Fegan, a candidate for the Ph.D. in anthropology at Yale University, and still in the field at this writing, agreed to PSR's request (earlier endorsed by Takahashi) that he write a comment on the Takahashi paper. This seemed especially appropriate since Fegan was studying a nearby village (Hasaan, San Miguel, Bulacan) and had visited with Takahashi in Katulinan. The writers acknowledge support received for their research: Takahashi, from the Southeast Asia Research Fellowship Program of the Ford Foundation; Fegan, from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program and the National Science Foundation (Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant #GS28643).

1. Note however that 12 farmers were expected to be lessees by the end of 1964 (1969:70).

2. They may not have if tenants have shifted from 45/55 to 30/70 shares. Leasehold rent, *buwis*, is set at 25 percent of the average crop in the last three normal years, less harvest and seed costs. This is not a great advance over 30 percent shares, unless yields continue to rise. When yields fall, as they did in 1971-72, it is a disadvantage, since the *buwis* is not adjustable down, and an unpaid balance becomes a debt against the next harvest.

3. The *kabán* is used in rice areas as an inexact but traditional measure of land - that amount of land that is sown by one *kabán* of seed. Ideally, one *kabán* equals 1.25 hectares; however, where it is used to calculate work payments farmers regularly take one *kabán* to mean about 2.0 hectares. It is to their advantage to do so.

4. Katulong are required to share the burden of crop failure. Some farmers with a normal 150-cavan yield who harvested only from five to 30 cavans of palay owing to tungro in the 1971-72 crop, paid katulong only from one to five cavans and will not pay the balance at the next crop.

5. *Atorga* is payment to harvesters for all tasks 16a-16e (Table 1) on the panag-araw crop and, like *humos*, is 20 percent of the total harvest. However, the 5 percent paid from harvesters' share to the threshing machine (*tilyadora*) crew leaves them a net of 15 percent.

6. *Laglagan* is payment to harvesters for task 16a (Table 1) only, i.e., for reaping palay and laying it in small loose bundles in the field. The farmer does 16b - 16e himself. *Laglagan* pay is 5 cavans per cavan of area if the harvesters are fed by the farmer, 7.5 cavans per cavan if not fed.

7. To a casual observer, an unusually large proportion of harvesters were women and girls rather than young men.

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## DOES GRASS-ROOTS ACTION LEAD TO AGRARIAN REFORM?

JIM RICHARDSON

January 27, 1972

Examining the circumstances that led up to and followed the Nueva Ecija Colorum uprising of 1925, the incident at Tayug, Pangasinan, in 1931, and the Sakdal revolt in Laguna in 1935, the author asks if these open and violent protests were effective in bringing about changes for the better for those involved. He concludes that such grass-roots revolts do indeed lead to government action, but the remedial effectiveness of this action is questionable.

This paper concerns agrarian unrest in the inter-war period (1919-41). It asks to what extent this unrest stimulated the government to enact legislation that would improve the livelihood of those who protested. Such rural discontent, of course, was nothing new. The revolt against Spain, apart from its nationalist and libertarian aspirations, derived much support in the countryside from the resentment felt against the friars in their capacity as landlords. In Cavite, for example, it was estimated that friar holdings constituted 71 per cent of the total farm area (Wurfel 1953:76). The realization that unresponsiveness to calls for reform had played a major part in stimulating the revolt of 1896 served as a warning to Spain's successor, the United States. As the Report of the Philippine Commission for 1900 noted (Philippine Commission 1901:31):

We are convinced that a return of the friars to their parishes will lead to lawless violence and murder, and that the people will charge the course taken to the American government, thus turning against it the resentment felt toward the friars . . .

It was this feeling that prompted the first major agrarian measure of the new administration — following protracted negotiations, the friar lands were purchased by the government. The Friar Lands Act provided that, for the purpose of resale, "bona-fide settlers and occupants"

were to have preferential rights, but in many cases the relatively wealthy cash tenants acquired the land at the expense of the share tenants, whose status remained unchanged. Those cultivating tenants who did attempt to hold ownership often could not afford to keep up paying the installments and sold their purchase rights to a third party, in some cases to the former cash tenant, in others apparently back to the religious order. Two qualified observers noted in 1924 that tenancy had actually risen in the period between 1903 and 1918 by some 3 per cent (Hester, Mabbun, et al. 1924:371). Though such a small increase may not seem alarming at first sight, this occurred at a time when the sale of the friar lands and the availability of large areas of unused cultivable land suggested the possibility of a heavy decrease in tenancy. This one problem, that of the increasing incidence of tenancy, came henceforth to occupy a central position in any discussion of agrarian problems.

Early American legislation, though generally enacted with good intentions, as in the case of the friar lands purchase, did not bring the desired results. The clarification and simplification of procedures for acquiring title to lands, for example, was apparently a common-sense necessity, yet the superior legal and financial resources of the *malatakas* resulted frequently in the dispossession of individuals who had considered themselves owner-occupiers for years, sometimes for

generations. Settlers coming to Nueva Ecija, still sparsely inhabited at the turn of the century, would toil at clearing the land, establish a viable farm or homestead and then be dispossessed by landgrabbers as the harvests came. The result was that the homesteaders were reduced to the status of *kasamá*, or share tenant, the only alternatives being a further search for a new and independent life or suicidal revolt.<sup>1</sup>

The first major disturbance of the inter-war period was partly attributable to such landgrabbing. This was the "Colorum" uprising of March 1925 in certain towns of Nueva Ecija, notably San Jose. The "Colorums" were actually members of an association known as the Kapisanang Makabola Makasinag (KMM, Association of the Worthy Kabola), so titled after its founder and chief, Pedro Kabola. Of Ilocano origin, Kabola had been living in Nueva Ecija since 1918 and had witnessed the legalized theft of many homesteads belonging to his fellow Ilocanos. Channeling this discontent and recruiting other Ilocanos who had come merely as migrant laborers seeking work in the rice fields, Kabola founded his Kapisanan in 1923. Within two years he had a following of some 12,000 (Stubbs 1951:37). Kabola planned to start a general revolution with an attack on one of the barrios of San Jose on March 6, 1925. The ultimate goal was national independence, which would be followed by an egalitarian distribution of the land. Unfortunately for Kabola, an informer betrayed these preparations and on March 3 the Constabulary broke into a meeting of the Kapisanan. In the ensuing melee Kabola and about six of his followers were killed (Manila Times, March 4, 1925).

Only three days previously Governor-General Leonard Wood, aware of the dangerous situation in Nueva Ecija, had summoned the provincial governor, Aurelio Cecilio, to admonish him for apathy in settling land disputes (Manila Times, March 1, 1925). The incident clearly troubled Wood, who immediately wrote letters to the different government department secretaries asking for recommendations as to the remedies the government should take to eradicate friction between landlords and tenants (Manila Times, March 8, 1925). In turn the department secretaries made the same request of their personnel.

One response came from the indefatigable A. W. "Deacon" Prautch, then Chief of the Rural Credit Division of the Bureau of Agriculture, who made the observation that (Prautch 1925):

No man willingly gives up power. It may be bitter for the landowners to recognize the aspirations of the tenants but it is better to do it with good grace than to be compelled to do it later on. Conditions are changing and men must conform with them . . .

It is perhaps the careers of men like Prautch, more than anything else, that best illustrate the progressive aspect of the American occupation, because they stimulate comparison with the prevailing attitudes of the indigenous Filipino elite. In writing an obituary for Prautch, Walter Robb paid testimony to his dedication and unwillingness to compromise in the struggle against the more blatant social inequities. Others, Robb confessed, would compromise (Robb 1939:381):

We all did, as we one and all know we did . . . most of all, of course, the men directly responsible did. Filipinos who for personal gain continued betrayal of their inarticulate brother, because they had an excuse to do so in this man's own shortcomings . . .

Prautch was a Protestant lay-preacher, and many of his letters display an almost evangelical zeal in espousing the interests of the underdog. After holding an investigation of a dispute in Mexico, Pampanga, in 1924, he had been accused of partiality, in particular, of "insinuations against proprietors" and of hob-nobbing with his "friends of the Magsasaka" by one of the landlords involved, Mr. A. J. Panlilio. This accusation had been printed in *La Vanguardia*, and Prautch was in fine form with his counter-blast. The charges he had made, he emphasized, were not "insinuations" but definite charges of wrongdoing, not one of which had been refuted. He expressed confidence that Mr. Panlilio spoke only for himself and "not for decent proprietors," and regretted that someone could show "such a bitter feeling toward all humanity."<sup>2</sup>

The case of A. W. Prautch seems to deserve attention in this respect, as it provides concrete evidence of the allegations made by Robb. David Wurfel's detailed study of agrarian policy in the Philippines reached, somewhat apologetically, a similar conclusion (Wurfel 1953:159):

The administrators could easily be classified as honest and dishonest. Unfortunately one is forced, in further classification, to say that the large majority of Americans were found in the first category, and a large minority, perhaps even a majority, of Filipinos were found in the second category.

Wurfel then adds that even the honest Americans could have placed remedial efficiency higher on their scale of priorities than mere concern for the small cultivator. In the case of the 1925 uprising in Nueva Ecija, however, the more realistic assessment of both Governor-General Wood and "Deacon" Prautch contrasted with the reaction of local officials who denounced outside agitators, the spread of communistic ideas, the courtship of peasant groups by provincial politicians (it was election year), and the narrow personal ambitions of the Kapisanan's leaders. Many of these interpretations, of course, were not wholly inaccurate, but they neglected the basic problem. Such denunciations, either shallow or willfully evasive, also followed the other two most violent outbreaks of rural unrest in this period — the incident in Tayug, Pangasinan, in 1931, and the Sakdal uprising of 1935.

The 1925 uprising jolted officialdom, but without much result in the way of legislation. The largest peasant organizations of the period, after all, were generally peaceful and very much under the wing of the establishment politicians. The first National Congress of these associations, held in 1922, was celebrated virtually in conjunction with the convention of the landlords' Philippine Agricultural Congress and, as Quezon was later to claim in his election propaganda, under his guidance. Jacinto Manahan, then a popular peasant leader but close to Quezon personally and to the Nacionalista Party in general, was elected president. Quezon spoke at the closing session of the Congress and promised the delegates he would not be content until legislation designed to protect the poor from the rich and the greedy had been passed (*Manila Times*, August 28, 1922). Prautch also spoke and engineered a resolution urging a stiffer antiusury law. The demands of the Congress contained many that had been at least partly satisfied by the year 1941, but there were no denunciations of tenancy as such, stress being laid on the im-

portance of "harmony between labor and capital" (*Manila Times*, August 27, 1922). Such law-abiding sentiments were embodied, in fact, in model contracts drawn between the organization that emerged from the Congress (the National Confederation of Tenants and Farm Laborers of the Philippines, NCTFLP) and landlords.

The year 1922, however, also witnessed the significant first appearance of a Labor Party (*Partido Obrero*) under the leadership of Antonino D. Ora, which advocated that big haciendas be purchased and distributed by the government in small lots to poor laborers through the payment of small installments (*Manila Times*, September 7, 1922). Manahan's NCTFLP had only recommended purchase by the government of some remaining "friar lands." Gradually becoming disillusioned with the progress that could be made on behalf of his following while working through the Nacionalista Party, Manahan moved closer to the *Partido Obrero* and probably became a member in about 1925. He then stated that the Labor Party was "designed to command the attention of those holding the reins of the government" and to "call a halt on the business of the political leaders who apparently find pleasure in using the laboring class as an instrument to serve their own interests" (Macarag 1925).

Following a visit to the Soviet Union in 1928, Manahan transformed the NCTFLP into a militant organization that demanded the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government and the abolition of all semi-feudal forms of exploitation and oppression (*Tinig-Manggagawa* 1928). From that time until the outbreak of the war, the Kalipunang Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMP), as the organization was now known, became the most durable and widespread of all Philippine peasant unions. In November 1930 Manahan declared it to be the right arm of the newly established *Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas* (PKP). As such its leaders were persecuted and some imprisoned on sedition charges, but the KPMP was able to survive in a state of semi-legality even after the PKP itself had been forced underground.

Manahan, faced with imprisonment following his 1931 candidacy in North Manila, came to denounce the ultra-leftist stance of the PKP, made his peace with Quezon and again started to work for the Nacionalista Party. This course of action naturally led him to be expelled from both the PKP and the KPMP. The peasant organization was then headed until the outbreak of war in 1941 by Juan Feleo and Mateo del Castillo. The years 1931-32, however, contributed one of the most active periods in the KPMP's history, before the imprisonments and before the schism with Manahan reached the breaking point. Again Central Luzon was the location of events that prodded the authorities into awareness and even, it seemed at first, into action.

The Tayug uprising of January 1931 provides the social scientist with a fascinating example of a rural rebellion that exhibited both "primitive" and "modern" characteristics. Certainly there was an element of mysticism involved, the dissidents carrying *anting-anting* charms to give them immunity, while their leader claimed appointment by, among others, Rizal, Bonifacio, and Mrs. Quezon (Guerrero 1967). The more rational aspect of the incident was revealed in the rebels' actions on reaching Tayug poblacion. There they neutralized the Constabulary barracks on the outskirts of the town, then proceeded directly to the municipal building, where they brought out the documents that recorded their "taxes, slavery, and oppression" and burned them in the plaza. There does seem some evidence that the leader of the group, Pedro Calosa, had contact with members of both the old KMM (Stubbs 1951:62) and the KPMP (Urgena 1960:7-8).

As for the Nueva Ecija "Colorums" of 1925, this protest proved fatal to many of its participants. The town's "recapture" was not much of a problem once Constabulary reinforcements had arrived, but as Governor-General Dwight Davis observed (1932:12-13) in his annual report,

The disturbance which was in itself not so serious a matter does reflect a condition which is fraught with danger. There are numbers of similar groups of vague aims and purposes which are potential sources of similar trouble. Some of the organizations are of pronounced

communistic leanings and under the direction of men who make no secret of their affiliations.

One might suggest, on reading between the lines of the above statement, that the more "communistic" groups (i.e., the KPMP) were regarded by Davis as the major problem. Their aims and purposes were perhaps not so "vague" as those of the other organizations. Continuing, the Governor-General then echoed (1932:72) the feelings of many of his predecessors.

The relations between landlords and tenants, while mainly outside the scope of legislation, are a potential source of great danger to the future. Every effort should be made to build up a sturdy body of independent farmers, owning their own lands, with good titles, free from the burden of debt, their own masters.

Efforts to bring the problem within the scope of legislation nearly materialized with the passage of the Rice Share Tenancy Law (No. 4054) in 1933. Papers from the collection of one of those responsible for drafting this law reveal that the proponents of reform regarded unrest as their best bargaining counter. It was tacitly agreed among progressive government officials that the most productive approach would be the adoption of scare tactics. Reports of a dangerous situation developing in Central Luzon had been issued regularly from March 1932 onwards, and in September of that year the House of Representatives, by Resolution No. 63, ordered the Committee on Labor and Immigration to make an investigation.

The immediate campaign then attracting attention was the KPMP-led protest in the Candaba-San Miguel area. The House Committee made visits to this and other troubled districts for public hearings, and these occasioned mass demonstrations that led to the arrest of KPMP leader Juan Feleo. By late September Governor-General Roosevelt himself was out in the barrios, counseling the tenants (Philippines *Herald*, October 1, 1932) to

guard against being swept on the tide of half-baked theories which are impractical of realization . . . We are doing and will continue to do everything that lies in our power to improve conditions. New good laws will be passed. Old bad laws will be changed . . .

The Committee on Labor and Immigration

rapidly prepared the draft of an Act that hoped to cool the situation down. Originally covering tenancy in general, it was later narrowed to refer only to rice-share tenancy. Among the provisions it stipulated were the following: that contracts should be written in the local dialect, that there should be an equal (50-50) sharing of the crop, an upper limit of 10-per-cent interest on loans, and a guaranteed minimum share of 15 per cent for the tenant, whatever the extent of his indebtedness. Such provisions did represent a significant step forward, but before the passage of the Act an amendment was inserted that completely killed its practical application. This amendment declared that the law would go into effect "only in provinces where the majority of municipal councils shall, by resolution, petition for its application to the Governor-General who shall make the law effective by proclamation" (Hill 1937). As the municipal councils in the provinces concerned were generally landlord-dominated, this provision made Act No. 4054 a dead letter until more serious disturbances prompted the amendment's deletion.

The radical groups of the 1930s were virtually unanimous in the opinion that American imperialism was one of the primary obstacles to an improved standard of living for the working masses, and they were similarly united in condemning what they regarded as the half-hearted and snail-paced campaign for independence being conducted by the Nacionalista leaders. A section of one of these opposition groups, the Sakdalistas, staged an almost coordinated uprising in May 1935. A fervently nationalist organization with a populist appeal, the Sakdal Party had considerable support in the provinces of Laguna, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan. About 63 people were killed as a result of the outbreak, many more than in the 1925 and 1931 incidents mentioned above. Because of this and the more sophisticated organization of the Sakdalistas, the impact was correspondingly greater.

Aimed at preventing a plebiscite which would ratify the Tydings-McDuffie Act (and thus a transitional period to precede independence), the uprising came at the worst possible time from the point of view of Quezon and the Nacionalista

leaders. Since the Jones Law, the debates on Philippine independence had stressed the importance of the Filipinos' exhibiting a capacity for stable government. Such a serious outbreak, with a barely concealed agrarian component, brought this capacity into question. Quezon's reaction was to blame American economic restrictions for the trouble (*New York Times*, July 7, 1935).

Immediately after his inauguration as President of the Commonwealth, though, Quezon commissioned a fact-finding survey of agrarian problems under the direction of Ramon Torres, head of the recently created Department of Labor. This was the most comprehensive survey yet carried out, with agents of the Department making detailed reports on conditions in all the key provinces. A discussion of its findings, probably written by Torres himself, made no attempt to disguise the unsettled state of affairs in the countryside or its implications (Department of Labor 1936-37):

Tenants do not enjoy freedom of speech and assemblage . . . The plight of the working class is indeed miserable . . . The hue and cry of the peasantry is for a radical change in the present scheme of their relations with the all-powerful moneyed and land-owning class. The popular mind polluted with discontent and notions of oppression is the most fertile field for subversive propaganda.

Such strong language was accompanied by a number of radical proposals that indicated Filipino high officials, like their American predecessors, had grown impatient with the foot-dragging attitude toward agrarian reform that continued to characterize members of the legislature. Quezon was never afraid of expanding his powers as President, and used these to act on at least one of the specific recommendations made by the fact-finding survey. This was that the hitherto idle Act No. 4054 should be amended to take effect on January 1, 1937, without any resolutions from the majority of municipal councils in a province requesting its enforcement. On January 20, 1937, Quezon issued proclamation No. 127 (Hill 1937).

WHEREAS extensive agricultural lands in the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlac are dedicated, under the *kasama* system to the rice industry:

and WHEREAS time and again serious agrarian controversies due to conflicting interpretations of legal contracts and other matters affecting the relationship between landlords and tenants in the aforementioned provinces have arisen, thereby menacing public peace and order;

NOW THEREFORE I, MANUEL L. QUEZON, proclaim Act No. 4054, amended by Commonwealth Act 178 to be in full force and effect from and after the date of this proclamation in all the municipalities of the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlac.

Thus those provinces where peasant unions and associations had been most active were specifically selected for preferential treatment in the matter of governmental legislation. The fact-finding survey, be it noted, had made no mention of restricting the application of Act No. 4054 to only those areas.

In the Commonwealth period Quezon launched a full-scale campaign of "social justice" aimed at bettering the lot of the common man and so undercutting the ever-growing support for the radical labor and peasant organizations. Nevertheless the KPMP enjoyed something of a revival following the pardon given to its leaders, and in Pampanga the Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra (AMT, General Workers' Union) of Pedro Abad Santos' Socialist Party attracted province-wide support. Thus by the late 1930s groups dependent on agrarian grievances for their following presented a coherent political opposition in limited but strategic areas.

At the beginning of the decade the problem had been primarily one of peace and order. This threat to the Nacionalista Party's monopoly of political power undoubtedly moved Quezon politically leftward, on some occasions at least. While addressing mass rallies of peasants in Central Luzon's centers of unrest — San Fernando (Pampanga), Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija), or Buenavista (Bulacan) — observers could be forgiven for thinking that the masses had no greater champion than he. In fact his propagandists explicitly made the exact claim and endlessly enumerated his progressive record. Persons active in the pre-war peasant unions have frequently told this writer that Quezon would confidentially imply his sympathies were with their cause, and that he would even join them

when the time was ripe. As the elder Osmeña so aptly observed, however, "Quezon changes his mind every time he sees a crowd." The crowd he saw in the National Assembly and in local caucuses of the Nacionalista Party gave him a slightly different outlook. Some legislation unpopular with the landlords could be pushed through if absolutely necessary, as noted above, but too much would mean a decrease in Quezon's popularity with the political power-brokers. That was too great a sacrifice even for the sake of social justice.

One strategic retreat, for example, was made on the question of purchasing large estates for redistribution. Back in 1935, accepting the nomination of the Nacionalista Party for the Commonwealth Presidency, Quezon had promised (1935) to

attack discontent among our masses at the very source. Mass unhappiness and unrest, leading in some instances to public disorders and even to revolutions have invariably resulted from the ownership of big landed estates... We shall, if elected, proceed with dispatch towards the acquisition and subdivision of every landed estate where tenants and owners have unsettled misunderstandings.

Less than one year later, though, the President regretted in a message to the National Assembly that such a step would not remedy the situation, but merely transfer to the government the difficulties the tenants had with their landowners. He cited the failure of the American friar lands' purchase to back up this opinion (Wurfel 1953:208). Quezon's observations were accurate enough, but that landlord pressure was the real reason for this back-tracking is perhaps indicated by the fact that from 1938 onward, mostly under the auspices of the Rural Progress Administration, steps were finally made to fulfill in part the promise of 1935. The Bahay Pare (Pampanga) and Lian (Batangas) estates were purchased and Buenavista (Bulacan) was leased. The homesites on some other estates were also purchased. Most of the estates affected by these moves had been investigated as troubled areas by the fact-finding survey.

Radicals naturally claimed the credit for any progressive legislation enacted, both at the time and in subsequently reviewing their history. The PKP leader Guillermo Capadocia, for example, recalled (1949:51) in about 1949 that "Because



of the militant and aggressive leadership of the KPMP and the AMT the government was forced to approve the Tenancy Law. The law was so defective it only made the situation worse in the agrarian places."

### Discussion

The evidence in this paper, although necessarily incomplete, suggests that such claims contain more than an element of truth. The ultimate goals of all the associations mentioned above were defeated, at least temporarily, and in that respect they failed. As pressure groups, however, they did enjoy some small victories. The name or ideology of the organizations involved were not important *per se*, but those that attracted most public attention were also the most effective in goading officialdom into concern and ultimately action. On that basis the KPMP, Sakdalistas, and AMT deserve special mention for the inter-war period. That these groups were not content with limited success is evident from the statement of Capadocia quoted above. Agrarian legislation and its attendant publicity (which was considerable) raised expectations in the countryside that often remained unfulfilled. Quezon's desire simultaneously to placate both landlords and tenants ultimately pleased neither, and in 1941 rural class conflict was more acute than ever.

After the war, as is well known, the same grievances (channeled by the old AMT and KPMP leadership) culminated in the Huk rebellion. This event, or rather series of events, provided the stimulus for countless commissions of investigation and inquiry into agrarian problems, notable among which were the 1946 Agrarian Commission and the Mutual Security Agency (Hardie) Report of 1952. Although more recent developments lie beyond the scope of this paper, it does seem that the basic generalizations drawn above for the 1919-41 period continue to hold good for the post-war years. The reports of the various fact-finding agencies again made no attempt to disguise the gravity of the problem, and accordingly made radical proposals. In the case of the Hardie Report, this actually led to an investigation by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities (CUFA). The CUFA, although con-

ceding that the Hardie Report was "less blunt than the Communists" nevertheless found its ideological orientation to be Marxist (House of Representatives 1953:14-15). Again, then, there was opposition in the legislature when rural reform was under consideration. The bills which were passed, in most instances diluted versions of the original draft, were then further weakened through lack of effective implementation. In some cases this can again be attributed to the legislature, which emasculated measures through a wholly inadequate allocation of funds, and in others to the willful opposition of landlord interests at a grassroots level (Douglas 1970:75-79). Few public figures, if any, will now proclaim themselves as being against agrarian reform in principle, but continued dissidence is undoubtedly the price of inaction in practice.

### Notes

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1. Many instances of landgrabbing are recorded in the series of local histories prepared under the direction of the Bureau of Public Schools around 1953, e.g., "History and cultural life of Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija." Some of these histories are available in the Filipiniana Division of the National Library, Manila.

2. A. W. Prautch, letter to the editor of *La Vanguardia* dated March 24, 1924. "The Magsasaka" probably refers to the *Kapatirang Magasaka*, a large, Bulacan-based peasant association that generally supported candidates of the Democratic Party.

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#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Filipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters - a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters - b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the *abakada* represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *mga*, pronounced "manga"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (ˆ). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Filipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## REVIEW ARTICLE

### Land Reform in the Philippines: An Overview

FRANCIS J. MURRAY, JR.

February 18, 1972

Land reform is viewed historically, as well as in relation to several themes recurrent in its development in the Philippines. Limited gains are noted and persistent drawbacks to success pointed out. The author concludes that events may force those changes which government seems unable to accomplish.

The purpose of this paper is to present an ordered summary of what is currently known about several aspects of Philippine land reform. The framework is basically historical, first, because modes of land tenure have changed through time; second, because while developing from within, as it were, land reform has also had its direction altered from time to time by legislative or administrative fiat.

My strategy is simple. Following an introductory section I shall devote some paragraphs to the historical development of land tenure from pre-Spanish times to the end of the nineteenth century. Emphasis will be on those key tenurial institutions which produced the system against which recent land-reform programs have been directed. Next, I shall discuss attempts at land reform in the first half of the twentieth century, with special attention to several themes recurrent in the Philippine land reform. In the paper's fourth and fifth major sections I shall consider the nation's efforts at land reform since 1950, focusing on the underlying themes of social reform and increased productivity. Finally, allowing myself freer rein than elsewhere in the paper, I shall present my personal conclusions about the prospects for land reform in the Philippines.

This essay was originally intended to be a review article. However, the relative newness of effective land reform and the spirited opposition it has provoked have resulted in a literature which at the moment makes im-

possible "an overall evaluation of the contribution of the writings under review to social science or to our understanding of the Philippines."<sup>1</sup> There is, for example, no academic controversy to report, no discussion about which type of land reform would be best for the Philippines. For although we can expect increasing interest in questions of this kind now that there exists a viable land-reform program, the literature till very recently has fallen into just two main categories. The first includes appeals for the support of land reform issued by national leaders; the second comprises historical and descriptive statements.<sup>2</sup> The latter type can be subdivided into popular, journalistic statements, on the one hand, and, on the other, those which appear in scholarly publications.<sup>3</sup> It is with these more carefully researched articles and books that this paper is for the most part concerned.

Basic land reform consists of the redistribution of landrights, but this takes on different forms in different places and at different historical periods. Ruttan (1965) and Raup (1967), for instance, contend that land reform suited to the second half of the twentieth century "must combine redistribution of rights in land and the supporting measures that are necessary to achieve three objectives: social justice, political health, and agricultural output expansion" (Raup 1967: 270). This concept jibes with contemporary Philippine land-reform programs.

Land reform in the Philippines has been influenced in its development by three distinct facts. First, it has been limited for the most part to riceland; second, it has been confined mainly to Central Luzon, the principal rice-growing area; and third, it has been directed mostly toward eliminating tenancy. Because land tenure and tenorial relationships, particularly tenancy, are its major concerns, land reform can be understood only in terms of the development of tenorial practices.

*Land Tenure Before the Twentieth Century*  
*Debt peonage, sharecropping, and caciquism*

There are several early accounts by Spaniards describing aspects of the social system they found in the Philippines. Some of these have been translated in various volumes of Blair and Robertson (1903-09). In his *Hispanization of the Philippines* (1959), Phelan utilized many of these accounts in reconstructing the social system.

Prior to the Spanish conquest, which began in 1565, two patterns that were later to characterize tenancy were already present among food producers in the Philippines: (1) sharecropping, in which a social superior laid prior claim to a portion of the produce; and (2) debt peonage, in which individuals were reduced to dependency because of heavy debt. During the seventeenth century, both the Spanish clergy and civil authorities attacked the second problem, debt peonage, but they generally failed to solve it or enforce legislation against it. Indeed, after four centuries the elimination of these two patterns is still one of the principal problems facing land-reform legislation in the Philippines.

The Spaniards introduced two other patterns: (1) caciquism, and (2) individual ownership of land. Under the preconquest pattern, land was allocated among members of the upper strata of society. The lower, or dependent class, who had no lands, worked on the lands of their superiors, usually receiving one half of their produce of rice and root crops. This arrangement was not only similar to sharecropping but also had much in common with debt peonage because many judicial sen-

tences took the form of fines (Phelan 1959: 20). Those who could not pay the fines or who found themselves in stringent circumstances could secure loans only at usurious rates of interest. These borrowers consequently became deeply indebted to their superiors.

In governing the islands, the Spaniards were careful not to disturb the structure of the villages or the position of the village headman, who became known by the Carib term, "cacique":

By recognizing them, the Spaniards helped the caciques to preserve their power over the people and gave them the opportunity of getting more and more land into their hands, of making more and more people financially dependent upon them (inasmuch as they were the tax collectors), and of reducing freeholders to the status of tenants (Pelzer 1945: 89).

The introduction of individual landownership by the Spaniards virtually reduced freeholders to tenants. For in the seventeenth century, while many caciques acquired the titles to land that their dependents cultivated (Phelan 1959: 117), most freeholders did not bother to secure titles to their lands:

The comparatively few people who acquired legal titles were mostly persons belonging to the cacique group, and these often laid claim to more land than actually they had right to. Thus in many cases peasants who felt secure in the possession of their land and had not known or cared about titles were suddenly confronted with the fact that a wealthy person, with the law behind him, was claiming their land. These peasants were then driven from it or forced to become tenants (Pelzer 1945: 90).

Ironically, when, in 1913, the Americans tried to introduce land registration, they caused or facilitated similar effects.

*The inquilinato system*

Utilizing many sources, including early Spanish accounts, archival material, and secondary sources such as Phelan (1959), Wickberg (1964), and others, McLennan prepared an essay, "Land and tenancy in the Central Luzon plain" (1969), which traces the origin and development of tenancy patterns in this rice-growing area. In his analysis, he pinpoints three institutions responsible for shaping the tenancy system: (1) the *inquilinato* system, (2) the *pacto de retroventa*, and (3) the nineteenth-century haciendas.

Before the nineteenth century, rice culti-

vation was confined to river and coastal areas, where the labor supply was sufficient. Inland from Manila Bay, there were the so-called friar estates of the monastic orders and other private holdings which were used primarily for live-stock ranching.

Late in the eighteenth century, the growing consumer needs of Manila, as well as the demands of the export market, impelled some of the monastic orders, and perhaps some of the private holders as well, to lease parts of these estates for farming. Paying a fixed fee for their leaseholding, many of the lessees, or *inquilinos*, did not farm these lands themselves, but relegated the cultivation to sharecroppers, the *kasamá*. This *inquilinato* system formed the basis of the *kasamá* system operating in the Philippines at present. Today the *inquilino* has more often than not been replaced by a landlord or an overseer, or is himself the cultivator. In some places, however, the system is substantially intact (Murray 1970: 89 and Takahashi 1970: 71).

#### *The pacto de retroventa*

The growth of commercial agriculture also brought about the rise in economic power of the Chinese mestizo.<sup>4</sup> Moving into the gap created by the expulsion of the majority of the Chinese from the Philippines in 1764, Chinese mestizos entered *inquilino* activities in Central Luzon and, according to McLennan, also gained control of the agricultural commerce between Central Luzon and Manila. Using wealth derived from these endeavors, many mestizos began to purchase land from peasants, as did some of the traditional caciques. Although there was some question as to whether much of the land could be legally sold, it was in fact sold to mestizos through a money-lending arrangement called "pacto de retroventa."<sup>5</sup> Under this scheme, the lender protected his loan by taking control of the peasant's land. For the duration of the loan period the peasant remained owner of the land but was at the same time his creditor's *kasamá*. If, at the end of the loan period, he was unable to repay the loan, as was frequently the case, he surrendered the land to his creditor. This practice continues up to the present in Pangasinan (Anderson 1964).

McLennan (1969: 660-61) points out that the pacto de retroventa is socially and economically important for three reasons:

1. The acquisition of land paved the way for the social acceptance of the mestizos by the caciques and finally the supplanting of most of the traditional elite by the former group in those areas most characterized by commercial activities and cash cropping.
2. It vastly extended landlordism in the form of the *kasamá* system. Again, tenancy and commercialization of the economy together intensified and spread out from the Manila Bay core area.
3. Because the acquiring of various small holdings depended on moneylending opportunities, it resulted in a pattern of land ownership best characterized by the term "scattered-holdings."

The term "scattered holdings" is used by McLennan (1969: 661, note 28) to describe "a pattern of landholding characterized by the ownership by one person of scattered parcels of land."

#### *The nineteenth-century haciendas*

Easily contrasted with such scattered holdings were the friar estates and other large estates, or haciendas. As a result of two new forms of land acquisition — (1) the purchase of lands formerly part of the royal domain, and (2) the less common royal grants of lands to individual Spaniards — many more private haciendas appeared during the nineteenth century.

Tenancy of the scattered holdings, which had developed from the pacto de retroventa, tended to be the *kasamá*, or share-tenant system. On the new haciendas, where it was necessary to attract labor, a modified form of the *inquilinato* system prevailed, in which the *inquilino*, or leaseholder, was a cultivator rather than a middleman.

In the early twentieth century, labor became more plentiful in Central Luzon, principally because of the Ilocano migration into Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija. As this happened, the haciendas raised the rents charged to leaseholders and later converted to the *kasamá* system. By 1939, there was large-scale conversion to the *kasamá* system.<sup>6</sup>

McLennan gives much more detail and describes a process much more complex than that which has just been presented, but these highlights will hopefully provide a background for the principal topic of this paper — land reform.

*Recurrent Themes in Philippine Land Reform:  
Their Early Twentieth-Century Origins*

Philippine land reform has recurrently been concerned with the themes of expropriation, purchase, agrarian unrest, resettlement, and social reform. It is around these themes that Philippine land-reform policy has developed. This policy had its origins in the early twentieth century during the American period, and the best source of these beginnings is Karl Pelzer's *Pioneer settlement in the Asiatic tropics* (1945).

Basic land reform consists of redistributing landrights, i.e., purchasing or expropriating, subdividing, and redistributing large private estates. Further, until the middle of the twentieth century, land reform was motivated and supported primarily by considerations of equity (Ruttan 1966)

Noncommunist governments are usually unable to redistribute land on a large scale, not only because of their reluctance to tamper with property rights, and their lack of money to purchase large tracts of land, but also because they are generally prevented from expropriating estates by the powerful landed elite. When agrarian unrest exceeds the point of toleration, however, a government is forced to institute agrarian reform. This often takes the form of resettling tenants on available public lands.

*The expropriation and purchase of large estates*

One of the sources of unrest that brought about the revolt against the Spaniards at the end of the nineteenth century was widespread tenancy on the friar lands. This problem persisted even after the Americans had taken over the Philippines, for the Treaty of Paris (1898), which followed the Spanish-American War, had bound the United States government to protect the friars' property interests. The United States government later decided it was in the public interest to buy these lands in the provinces close to Manila. This was accomplished in late 1905, after long negotiations. The friars kept some of their land but sold 165,000 hectares for almost \$7 million (Pelzer 1945: 90). The land was then resold to small owners.

Government purchase and expropriation of large estates was carried on during the Com-

monwealth period, for the Philippine Constitution, drawn up in 1935, empowered the National Assembly to "authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals" (Art. 13, Sec. 4).

In 1936, Com. Act No. 20 gave the President the power to expropriate or negotiate for the purchase of portions of large landed estates then being used as homesites and to sell them to the occupants. The government was further authorized, in 1938, to lease estates "for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, with option to purchase the same within the same period, and under such terms and conditions as may be advantageous to the public interest" (Com. Act No. 378). These lands were to be leased to the occupants.

These programs, which were administered by the Rural Progress Administration (RPA) were never implemented on a large scale.

*The rights and social conditions of the tenant*

Another recurring theme in Philippine land reform is the tenant's rights and his relations with the landlord. This theme is exemplified in Public Act No. 4054, which the Philippine Legislature passed in 1933. This Act was meant "to promote the well-being of tenants (*aparceiros*) in agricultural lands devoted to the production of rice and to regulate the relations between them and the landlords, . . ." The law, however, was to be applied only in those provinces where the majority of the municipal councils petitioned the Governor General to enforce it. Since the caciques controlled the municipalities, the law was never enforced (Pelzer 1945: 98). Even an amendment to Public Act 4054, passed in 1936 (Com. Act No. 178), failed to help tenants, since it could be made effective only by Presidential proclamation "when public interests so required."

Public Act No. 4054, as amended by Com. Act No. 178, was finally proclaimed by President Quezon in January, 1937, and it was extended to the five provinces of Central Luzon (see Richardson 1972 and Kerkvliet 1971).

The provisions of the Act are hardly revolutionary. There is no mention of land reform at

all, and it provides for a 50-50 share between landlord and tenant of certain costs and of the net harvest. Yet, many landlords reacted unfavorably to the Act, and during 1938 and 1939 many tenants who demanded its observance were threatened with dismissal (Pelzer 1945: 100). This was followed by two acts amending the original Act (in June 1939 and August 1940) which limited the reasons and specified the procedures by which tenants could be expelled from the land. But trouble and disillusionment followed in 1940 when many landlords used the amended Act to dismiss tenants legally. Thus, Public Act No. 4054, even with its numerous amendments, failed to regulate landlord-tenant relations (Pelzer 1945: 101).

Amendments of this Act continued even after World War II. One of the first laws of the new Republic under President Roxas (R.A. No. 34) was an amendment which attempted to define the rights and obligation of landlords and tenants, regulating the sharing arrangements between landlord and tenant, and preventing evictions. But this came at a time when Central Luzon was involved with the Huk revolt, and it was ineffective.

#### *Agrarian unrest and land reform*

Land reform has been resorted to in the Philippines only when social unrest required it. It was consideration of social unrest, in fact, when motivated the introduction (in 1934) of a Constitutional provision allowing for the expropriation of land.

The primary reason for the recommendation was to remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriate the then existing landed estates to be distributed at cost to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would deem such expropriation necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein. Of course, by virtue of the same provision, the government would likewise have power to deal in like manner with other estates that would give rise to agrarian problems (Aruego 1949: 611).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the ensuing period interpreted the power to expropriate as limited to those areas where there was unrest. The decision was that the lawmakers were of the opinion "that the kasamas deserved protection only after conditions had become so bad that the kasamas began to disturb law and

order and came to open clashes with the landlords" (Pelzer 1945: 98). Events following World War II were consistent with this view. When there was extreme agrarian unrest led by the Huks, agrarian reform became a hot political issue. But, as Starner points out (1961: 113), as the Huk threat receded, so did the urgency of agrarian reform among many politicians.

#### *Resettlement on public lands*

A fourth recurrent theme in Philippine land reform, the resettlement of tenants on public lands, also emerged during the American period. If it can be carried out extensively, resettlement offers a solution to many of the problems posed by tenancy.

For resettlement, the government need not spend large amounts of money for the purchase of lands, nor does it have to expropriate lands from those who hold titles to them. When farmers are given pieces of public land, labor surplus and population pressure in the tenancy areas decrease, and the remaining tenants thereby obtain a better bargaining position with their landlords. The problem comes, however, with the actual act of resettlement itself, which requires efficient management and large amounts of money if significant numbers of people are to be resettled.

Under the Treaty of Paris, the American government had acquired large tracts of public lands in the Philippines, and beginning in 1903 these were opened for homesteading. The homestead policy, which gave the individual title to land that he improved, had been successful in the United States during the nineteenth century. However, it was generally a failure in the Philippines for several reasons, not the least of which was the provision of the law requiring a homesteader to clear one-fifth of the land in five years, or else lose his claim to the land (Pelzer 1945: 112). By the late 1930s, however, the government was assisting families to settle on "surveyed and well-defined portions of the public domain" (Dalisy 1959: 80).

Another reason for the failure of the homestead policy was that the Filipino lowland farmer was accustomed to operating within a village community rather than as an individual homesteader. In response to this problem, the government organized colonies to open up new

areas, mostly in Mindanao, between 1913 and 1917. These also failed (Pelzer 1945:132). Other similar attempts were made over the next few years, all with little success.

In 1939 the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) was created to continue the policy of opening up previously unsettled areas. This agency was responsible for the successful Koronadal Valley project in Mindanao.

In 1949 the NLSA was superseded by the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA)<sup>7</sup> which maintained a program of developing new areas through large-scale mechanized farming and then turning the land over to individual families. This program failed with respect to the large-scale farming, but it did in fact open up lands for about 3,000 farming families. The RCPA was replaced by the Land Settlement Development Corporation (Lasede-co), which also failed, mainly because of lack of funds and incompetent management (Dalisay 1959: 80). This was followed by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (Narra), which was established by R.A. 1160 in 1954. At the same time, the Economic Development Corps (Edcor), was established under the Department of Defense. These recent attempts have failed to effect any large-scale resettlement for the following reasons (Sacey 1963: 170):

- (1) The extremely high cost of duplicating in resettlement areas the facilities and services found in places where tenants come from;
- (2) The large proportion of resettlement cost going to subsistence rather than land development;
- (3) The social immobility of the farming population; and
- (4) The tendency for tenancy also to develop in resettlement areas.

With the failure of resettlement, the solution of the major agrarian problems has had to be sought elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Social Reform and Land Reform*

##### *The Hardie Report*

The first major task that faced the new Philippine Republic in 1946 was the resolution of the Hukbalahap, or Huk, revolt. The government attempted to resolve the problem principally through the use of the military, and by 1950 military expenditures had caused an

estimated 34 percent deficit in the national budget.

The Huk problem, together with the prevailing economic crisis, the situation in Korea, and the "knowledge that much of the post-war United States rehabilitation aid to the young Republic had been unwisely spent" (Wurfel 1954: 463), impelled the American president to send to the Philippines the Economic Survey Mission, called the "Bell Mission" after its leader, Daniel Bell.<sup>9</sup> Among the recommendations made by the mission was agrarian reform.

In keeping with the recommendations of the Bell Mission, the Quirino-Foster Agreement was signed in late 1950. By the terms of this pact, the Philippines was to undertake socioeconomic and technical programs, while the American government would furnish economic and technical aid. The Quirino-Foster Agreement, therefore, obligated the Philippines to undertake measures of social reform as a condition for receiving aid. The Philippines, Wurfel observes (1959: 462), "is the only Asian country in which American administrators clearly accepted the desirability of attaching the strings of social reform to United States grants."

It is in this context that Robert S. Hardie, a land-tenure specialist, was brought to the Philippines by the American Mutual Security Agency to investigate and make recommendations with respect to agrarian reforms. Although he had been largely responsible for the success of land reform in Japan, where he was previously assigned, Hardie lacked the proper understanding of the role his Mission should play in a sovereign state like the Philippines (Wurfel 1959).

The principal recommendations of the Hardie Report, entitled *Philippine land tenure reform: Analysis and recommendations* (1952), are as follows:

- a. Abolish insofar as practicable the institution of tenancy.
- b. Establish to the maximum practicable degree, a rural economy based on owner-operated family-sized farm units.
- c. Establish and guarantee fair tenancy practices for that portion of farmers who will continue to work the land as tenants.
- d. Eliminate hindrances of the fruition of objectives set forth in a, b, and c above (Hardie 1952: viii).



There were also specific recommendations as to how these goals were to be met.

The report, however, was not seriously considered because of its wording and lack of respect for proper channels. Starner also points out (1961: 120) "Hardie's tendency to underestimate the political resistance to reform led him not only to project a program of far greater scope than was politically feasible, but also to propose a scheme of financing that was hardly in conformity with existing interpretations of constitutional requirements." For a while the report was a political issue in the Philippines, and at one point there was some concern within the U.S. Mission that the Philippines might withdraw from the aid program.<sup>10</sup>

The storm created by the Hardie Report had blown over, however, by the time Magsaysay assumed office in 1954. By then, the call for land reform had moderated even among the top officials at the U.S. Mission to the extent that "there was no attempt in the aid mission to use Hardie's more extreme proposals as a bargaining position to effect a modified, but still radical, land reform program" (Wurfel 1959: 473).

Of the three principal recommendations made in the Hardie Report — (1) abolition of tenancy, (2) establishment of owner-operated, family-sized farms, and (3) fair tenancy practices for the remaining tenants — only the third has been carried out to any extent in the intervening years. The first two are featured prominently in the wording of recent legislation, but tenancy still remains in a compromise form of "leaseholding," although the establishment of the owner-operated farm is the eventual goal of leaseholding.

#### *Magsaysay's Agricultural Tenancy Act and Land Reform Act*

Although World War II and the Japanese occupation temporarily disrupted the political and economic structures which gave support to tenancy and to the system of which tenancy was a part, there was a return to the *status quo ante* immediately after the war. This return was opposed by the Huks, whose open revolt the government of the young Philippine Republic tried to counteract.

The person whose name is most often associated with the government's effort to subdue the Huks is Ramon Magsaysay. First as Secretary of National Defense under President Quirino and later as President, Magsaysay put down the revolt, and then turned his attention to the social unrest that had supported the Huk movement. He sought the solution to the problem in agrarian reform.

The most comprehensive scholarly work on the political aspects of Magsaysay's agrarian reform program is Frances L. Starner's *Magsaysay and the Philippine peasantry: The agrarian impact on Philippine politics, 1953-1956* (1961).<sup>11</sup>

Starner maintains (1961: 6) that Magsaysay's program did not differ from earlier attempts at land reform except in that he emphasized the common people, the farmers, as a major source of political power.

Magsaysay brought his campaign to the barrios, where no presidential campaign had ever gone, and he generated such tremendous support among the people in the rural areas that he was easily elected over the incumbent Quirino. But, as Starner points out (1961: 69): it does appear that the enthusiasm which Magsaysay engendered in the rural areas in the 1953 campaign resulted more from the attention which he focused on those hitherto neglected areas than it did from any specific measures he proposed to relieve the agrarian situation.

Once he assumed office, Magsaysay was determined to carry out a program of rural reform as he had promised in his campaign. However, he was hampered from doing so by a lack of "the kind of political backing essential to successful implementation of a reasonable agrarian policy" (Starner 1961: 125). Furthermore, the urgency of the problem decreased as the unrest declined. It would seem that by quelling the Huk rebellion as Secretary of National Defense, Magsaysay hampered his chances of mounting a program of agrarian reform as President.

Magsaysay, however, set up his own committee on land tenure which released its major recommendations in May 1954. These were (1) increase in taxes on large landholdings, (2) consolidation and broadening of laws gov-

erning the tenancy relationship, (3) creation of a court of agrarian relations, and (4) provision of a basis for extensive redistribution of lands by the administration (Starnier 1961: 135-36). What the committee was calling for was basic land reform and guaranteed fair tenancy practices, which were also among the major recommendations of the Hardie Report.

Congress then went to work on an agrarian reform bill that emerged as R.A. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act. This Act, Starnier succinctly remarks (1961: 140), "was clearly disappointing." Although there was no change in the basic tenancy contract, the bill had some significant aspects; namely: (1) the clarification and modification of existing tenancy laws; (2) the detailed spelling out of the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant; (3) the reduction of legal rates of interest and the increase of the tenant's exemptions from creditor's liens; and (4) provisions for the law's effective administration and enforcement (Starnier 1961: 140-41).

Early in 1955 Magsaysay asked Congress for legislation to set up a court of agrarian relations and to redistribute large estates. Accordingly, the Court of Agrarian Relations was established by R.A. 1267 in order to help implement the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act.

Congress then reluctantly turned its attention to the redistribution of land - or basic land reform. Congress had the power under the Constitution to authorize the expropriation of lands, but this had never been made explicit, and, in any case, funds and administrative agencies would be needed for implementation. Furthermore, as has been stated earlier, Supreme Court decisions had interpreted the power to expropriate as limited to those areas where there was unrest.

The proposed land-reform bill became quite controversial, some of the major points of difference being these: (1) which lands would be expropriated, (2) the size and other restrictions of the lands, (3) the mode of payment for these lands, (4) the provision of funds for payment, and (5) the size of the farm units to be redistributed. However, it is likely that much of the controversy generated by the bill came

more from the philosophy it embodied than from its specific provisions (Starnier 1961: 160).

After much discussion and debate, in which there was organized opposition on the part of the landlords, but in which "the peasantry were most conspicuous for their absence" (Starnier 1961: 175), Congress finally enacted R.A. 1400, the Land Reform Act, in September 1955. It passed because many members of Congress did not wish openly to oppose Magsaysay, who enjoyed popular support, but it passed in a form that was "so watered down as to be little improvement over existing legislation" (Wurfel 1959: 473).

This Act set up the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) directly under the President. The LTA was to submit studies and plans for the redistribution of lands to the President; they could also negotiate the purchase or the expropriation of lands over 300 hectares in size or where there was "justified agrarian unrest." In the case of negotiated sale, the price was to be worked out by the LTA and the owner, and payment was to be made in cash. The land was then to be sold to the tenant at cost plus 6 percent interest for 25 years.

Unfortunately, under the influence of the landlords, high officials of the Magsaysay administration itself were determined to block the implementation of the measure (Starnier 1961: 187).

Furthermore, the Act itself had several defects which made its implementation difficult: (1) no incentives for the landlord to sell, (2) no fixed pricing of the land, (3) a very high maximum retention allowance of 300 hectares, (4) the acquisition of tenanted land had to be petitioned by a majority of its tenants, (5) no adequate government financing for purchase, and (6) no financial assistance for the repurchase of the land by the tenants (Ledezma 1968: 19).<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the first major land-reform program to be enacted in Philippine history was allowed to wither and die. Magsaysay was able to get a bill through Congress - although it had been much changed and amended - but he was unable to implement it.

*Land Reform for Increased Productivity**Productivity as a goal of land reform*

Ruttan points out (1966: 53) that "In general, political and equity objectives occupied a central role in the land reform movements of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. In recent years, this 'classical' objective has been increasingly complemented by a productivity objective." He says this is true of Southeast Asia including the Philippines, and he attributes the shift to new regimes trying to satisfy the equalitarian drive of the peasants and the demand of an increasingly articulate urban population for stable rice prices, both in the face of increased population pressure on available food supplies. The drive for more widespread landownership had been reinforced by the unproven assumption that owner-operators of small farms would tend to raise larger food crops than tenants would — expectations generated by the modern theory of the business firm had been gratuitously extended to the subsistence farmer (*ibid.*: 59–60).

Sacay very clearly states (1963: 171) that in the Philippines the principal reason for abolishing share tenancy is the fact that it does not provide the necessary incentives for increased production. Palacios adds (1966: 18) that the land-reform program based on the 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code aims to motivate tenants to increase their agricultural produce to meet the needs of a growing population.

In the Philippines, where rice still has to be periodically imported and where the annual population growth rate is over 3 percent, increased productivity in food becomes a national goal of top priority. If, as many believe, owner-operated farms will increase productivity, then it is to be desired. However, the problem that has always plagued Philippine land reform remains: how to transfer the land to owner-operators.

*Macapagal's Agricultural Land Reform Code*

The Agricultural Land Reform Code, which was enacted during President Macapagal's administration, "bears the unmistakable imprint of a group of young economists and intellec-

tuals who were primarily concerned with the failure of existing agricultural development programs to generate sufficiently rapid gains in agricultural productivity to match the rapid population growth . . ." (Ruttan 1966: 61).

This failure of previous programs is reflected in what Golay calls (1961: 26) "agricultural poverty," apparent in the sad fact that while approximately 70 percent of the Philippine population depends on agriculture for a living, less than 40 percent of the national income originates in agriculture. Because of the high rate of tenancy, the average of which increased from 37.4 percent of all farmers in 1948 to some 50 percent in 1960 (Wernstedt and Spencer 1967: 191), at least 20 percent of the already low income was going to landlords who did not work their farms. Thus the small farmer was in relative distress with an average income of "perhaps no more than one-fourth of the average income outside agriculture" (Golay 1961: 266). In addition to this, there were more new families each year who were unable to find a farm for themselves and were dependent for seasonal work on those with farms.

Section 2 of the 1963 Code, which was an attempt to cope with this situation, states the following goals:

- (1) To establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;
- (2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmer free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices;
- (3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity and higher farm incomes;
- (4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural wage earners;
- (5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land distribution; and
- (6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

In calling for owner-cultivatorship and the family-sized farm, the first aim echoes the Hardie Report, but has deeper roots in the teachings of Thomas Jefferson and Pope Leo

XIII. The ideal of diverting landlord capital to industrial development is one that has yet to be achieved in Philippine land reform, and this failure is one of the biggest bottlenecks in the whole land-reform movement. Landlords have not been given any strong incentives for willingly cooperating with land reform, but have been forced to do so by law.

The second and fourth goals deal with the theme of equity, or the rights of the tenant; the third and sixth aims show a new emphasis on productivity; and the fifth restates the theme of resettlement.

The main thrust of the Code is movement toward widespread owner-cultivatorship and family-sized farms. This, as Sacay points out (1963), is to be attained in two phases: (1) replacement of share tenancy with a leasehold arrangement, and (2) transfer of landownership to the cultivator. To date the emphasis has been on the first phase, which requires several support systems. The Agricultural Land Reform Code makes provision for the necessary support systems by creating the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), the Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC), and the office of the Agrarian Counsel (OTAC).

The Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) was not entirely new but represented a reorganization of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCF), which had been created in 1952. With the reorganization came an increased budget, which was needed to bring the Administration in line with the requirements and objectives of the Code. ACA's main function was to make loans, especially production loans, to cooperatives and small farmers.

The Agricultural Productivity Commission (APC) also resulted from a reorganization. It combined the Bureau of Agricultural Extension and the Agricultural Tenancy Commission, and included the new Division of Cooperatives. Its purpose was principally that of agricultural extension.

The National Land Reform Council (NLRC) was the administrative and policy-making body charged with carrying out the provisions of the Code. Administration was to be carried out

through Regional Land Reform Committees and local Land Reform Project Teams.

Expanded legal support was provided for the farmers in the creation of new Courts of Agrarian Relations and the Office of the Agrarian Counsel. It was the function of the latter "to represent agricultural lessees, agricultural farm workers and agricultural owner-cultivators referred to in the Code who cannot engage the services of competent private counsel in cases before the Court of Agrarian Relations."

In addition to provisions for conversion to leaseholding and supports for the new leaseholders, the Code, through its creation of a Land Authority and Land Bank, also provides for expropriation and redistribution of land. To date, however, the major accomplishments of the Code have been in the area of conversion from *kasamá* to leaseholder.<sup>13</sup>

#### *The kasamá way of life in recent years*

The principal monograph on the social and economic life of *kasamá* rice farmers in Central Luzon is Akira Takahashi's *Land and peasants in Central Luzon: Socio-economic structure of a Philippine village* (1969). This is the only comprehensive and detailed analysis in print of the socioeconomic structure of a village under the *kasamá* system. It is an excellent source for understanding not only the problems of tenancy but also those of conversion from *kasamá* to leaseholder.

For this paper, however, given its limited scope, the following summary of the *kasamá* way of life will suffice. It is based on my own observations and research in Central Luzon (Murray 1970).

The *kasamá* way of life as it has developed in recent years represents a complex of values and behaviors related to that particular type of sharecropping called the *kasamá* system. In this system, the *kasamá*, or tenants, cultivate small (two to three hectares),<sup>14</sup> individually assigned plots and equally share most of the overhead expenses and all of the net harvest with a landlord who usually lives in an urban center far from the farm. The relationship usually involves the landlord's advancing the *kasamá* cash or kind against his forthcoming harvest or

giving him an outright loan when the harvest is poor. This has resulted in the *kasamá's* perennial indebtedness to the landlord, practically forcing him to surrender most of his share to the landlord at harvest time.

The tenant's dependence has encouraged abuse on the part of some unscrupulous landlords, and it is in recognition of this that the Agricultural Land Reform Code seeks to make "the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices."

On the other hand, in the majority of cases the landlord is not abusive, and the availability of loans from him provides a great sense of security for tenants. A recent study of Nueva Ecija farmers (Pahilanga-de los Reyes-Lynch 1972) notes the recognition of this security by the tenants themselves. Furthermore, the tenants often have in their landlord a powerful patron in the urban-elite sector, and in a society built on patronage, having such a patron is highly valued.

Besides this relationship with the landlord, the *kasamá* also maintain complex horizontal relationships involving the distribution of a portion of production surplus to social equals — kin, neighbors, friends, and *barriomates* (Murray 1970). This is part of what Wolf calls the "ceremonial fund."<sup>15</sup> For the *kasamá*, ceremonial payments fit under the general heading of *pakikisama*, maintaining smooth social relations which are seen as necessary or desirable (Lynch 1970: 10).

Because the *kasamá* surrenders most of his own share of the harvest to the landlord in payment of debt, he is usually unable to make ceremonial payments in goods or money. He must, therefore, make them in the form of his own labor or, as is frequently the case, in providing work opportunities for his fellows so they may be paid out of the fund of costs which he shares equally with his landlord (Murray 1970: 94–96). Takahashi (1966: 146) points out that the latter practice, while reducing the net return, is "rational enough for the villagers."

In many ways, the *kasamá* is like a subsistence farmer. He produces sufficient rice to fulfill the basic needs of his household and to cover

his expenses. In addition, he has sufficient surplus to cover his ceremonial payments and the payments due his landlord. But this is all he has; no matter how much or how little he produces, most, if not all, of the surplus will go to these social payments. The landlord takes a percentage of the surplus in the form of his share or the repayment of debt, and the tenant's ceremonial payments must be large enough so that he will not be considered stingy. The result of this is that the *kasamá* normally breaks even, or just misses breaking even in those cases where he increases his debt. Nothing in the system encourages increasing or maximizing productivity, and what few incentives are presently found outside the system are canceled out by the tenant's desire and need to maintain good social relations with his fellows through sharing. Thus, the *kasamá* system and the *kasamá* way of life are not conducive to the national goal of increased productivity.

#### *From kasamá to lessee*

Central to the implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the conversion of the rice farmer from *kasamá* to lessee. This conversion, which must be made willingly by the farmer himself, involves the farmers entering into a new contract with his landlord whereby he receives a greater share of the harvest. Since it also involves major changes in other aspects of the farmer's way of life, it means abandoning basic values and behavior associated with the *kasamá*-landlord relationship.

In the leasehold relationship, the tenant no longer shares the farm expenses and income with his landlord, but instead shoulders almost all of the farm expenses himself and pays a fixed rate (equal to 25 percent of an average harvest) to the landlord.

Ideally, the landlord is to abandon his paternalistic role and eventually to relinquish the farms to his tenants (who will thus become owner-cultivators), and to divert his capital in agriculture to industrial development.

Leaseholding not only gives the tenant a larger share of the crop, but also allows him to keep all that he produces over and above a normal crop. On the other hand, because he

must assume all the expenses, the tenant stands to lose much more in the event of a bad crop. Still, in either event, the lessee is supposedly motivated to maximize his productive output. He derives additional motivation, again supposedly, from the fact that instead of getting loans and advances easily from a landlord whom he knows personally, he theoretically must seek credit from a less personal institution.<sup>16</sup>

As the relationship with his landlord becomes less personal, the tenant must necessarily give up his primary source of security and his principal patron in the urban-elite sector of society. For the tenant, however, who sees little opportunity for advancement in a world that he considers relatively unchanging, it is very difficult to opt for leaseholding, which selects against the security and patronage offered by the landlord. Maximizing his productive output will also involve the farmer's limiting his ceremonial payments in the form of providing opportunities for work. This means that his reciprocal relations with neighbors will suffer and that he and his family will have to do more of the farm work. These considerations will also make the choice for leaseholding difficult.

The choice for leaseholding will be made easier if support systems are available to provide needed security, and if social and economic incentives exist to encourage involvement in the country's national concerns beyond the barrio.

The support systems provided by the Code have been discussed above. Credit is being made available through the Agricultural Credit Administration and some security can be gained from the Courts of Agrarian Relations and the Office of the Agrarian Counsel, which frequently acts against vindictive and unscrupulous landlords.

There are, however, few economic or social incentives to encourage participation in the nation's life. Social mobility is very difficult, and the linkages between the farmer and the market will have to be improved considerably before the farmer is sufficiently motivated to increase his labor input for increased productivity. Unless his additional labor is somehow

rewarded with valued goods or services, productivity will remain below maximum.

In the past the landlords have played an important role in coordinating the activities of the farmers, and this is another role which must be filled. In this regard, efforts are being made to organize more farmers' cooperatives in addition to those already in existence. The cooperatives are expected to assume a more important role in extending credit; in distributing seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs; and in marketing, an area which has generally been the landlords' preserve until now.

#### *Marcos' Code of Agrarian Reforms*

Although the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted in 1963, its provisions were not put into effect<sup>17</sup> with any intensity until 1970 and, then, mainly in the pilot area of Nueva Ecija (B. de los Reyes 1972). In September 1971, under the administration of President Marcos, the Code was amended (R.A. 6389) and is now known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

The principal innovations and changes in the amended Code include the following: (1) automatic conversion of all agricultural share tenancy to agricultural leasehold; (2) provision for the control and eventual ownership of irrigation systems by the lessees as individuals or groups; (3) emphasis on cooperatives and the machinery for their development; (4) creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform headed by a Secretary; (5) increase in the maximum credit extended by ACA from ₱2000 to ₱5000; and (6) reduction of the maximum retention limit in the case of expropriation of landholdings from 75 to 24 hectares. The new Code is merely continuing the first phase of a land-reform program enacted nearly nine years ago, i.e., the conversion from share tenancy to leasehold.<sup>18</sup> By extending leaseholding and improving its supports, it is moving closer to, but not actually attaining, large-scale conversion of lessees to owner-cultivators. Leaseholding, however, is being extended to the whole of the Philippines, rather than just to "approved" areas or the pilot area. Furthermore, the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform

headed by a cabinet-level Secretary may add prestige to the program and give it impetus.

### *The Effects of Land Reform*

#### *Long-term goals*

It is too early to determine whether Philippine land reform has been effective with respect to its long-term goals. The Code of 1963 had not been implemented with any great effort until quite recently, with most of that effort being directed toward the pilot project in Nueva Ecija (B. de los Reyes 1972). The new Code of 1971 through "automatic" conversion of all share tenants to lessees extends land reform to all the Philippines, but it will be some time before the conversion will take effect generally, if it ever does.

Furthermore, the present activities of the land-reform program are directed toward intermediate goals rather than the long-term ones of owner-cultivatorship on family-sized farms and the diversion of landlord capital into industrial development. Until these goals are reached, the program will not be successful by its own terms.

But even if the land-reform program becomes successful by its own terms, it will be a failure if it does not result in a system more equitable and productive than the one that went before it. It must furthermore be a system that improves, or at least endures, through time.

There are many questions that must be answered with respect to the long-term goals, and perhaps the most important ones have to do with the "family-sized" farm. The Code of 1971 sets this size at "not more than six hectares,"<sup>19</sup> which is quite small by modern farming standards. A farm of this size can be easily managed by a single household utilizing ancient agricultural methods—plowing with draft animals, planting and harvesting by hand. But if the land-reform program is part of an overall scheme to promote a sound social and economic development for the country, then maintaining a counterproductive system that utilizes man and animal energy rather than combustible fuels and modern technology can only work against the program.<sup>20</sup> As the

modernized sector of the economy advances, the farmer will be left further and further behind. Even maximized production on his farm through modern methods can support only a limited amount of new technology before the returns begin to diminish. Cooperatives may give some relief here, but they will not solve the whole problem.

If individual farms are made larger, many farming families will be displaced, and to date there are no programs of sufficient scale to take care of these displaced families. Many families are, in fact, already being displaced by population pressure alone, which also accounts for the small size of most tenant farms (between two and three hectares). The problem of a surplus rural population is probably the principal driving force behind the various factors agitating for land reform, and yet it is a problem with which the present program does not cope. If the land-reform program is to be successful in the long run, it must address itself to this problem, so that the resulting system is fully integrated into the Philippine socioeconomic system.

#### *Intermediate goals*

The conversion of farmers from *kasamá* to lessees seems to be making headway in the Nueva Ecija pilot area through the efforts of the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program (B. de los Reyes 1972), and there is no reason to believe that this will not work elsewhere.

The conversion to leasehold is supposed eventually to lead to owner-cultivatorship. If this aim is to be achieved, however, there must also be conversion from the *kasamá* way of life. The *kasamá* must cease to think and act in terms of a closed, secure system of subsistence production and begin to be a maximizing market producer. This can happen only if the lessee is convinced that he will be rewarded for each additional unit that he produces. If not, he will continue to think and act as a *kasamá*, even though he has signed a leasehold contract. Clinging to the *kasamá* way of life prevents the lessee from becoming a market producer and can also eventually cause social and economic

disruption as the better landlords withdraw from the scene. At the very least, the kasamá mentality puts unnecessary strains on the government's support systems, especially the Agricultural Credit Administration, which cannot allow loans to go unpaid for several years.

The recent study by Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (1972) reports that even among many lessees there is very little objection to the kasamá system under a good landlord. This may well indicate a clinging to the kasamá way of life. If this is true, then attaining the intermediate goal of conversion to leasehold may not be a positive step toward the long-term goals of owner-cultivatorship and increased productivity; it may only be a modification of the kasamá system, with the government taking over some of the landlord's roles, which it may not be able to handle or to afford.

### *The future*

Cook, writing in 1961, discusses the progress of land reform in the first five years after the legislation under Magsaysay. He points out (1961: 177) that there has not been a "thoroughgoing land redistribution program" because of the following reasons:

1. Since the landlord furnishes much of the capital and management as well as the land, the productivity of agriculture could be expected to fall sharply if the land were subdivided and turned over to tenants, unless the government were in a position to furnish capital and management . . .
2. The government operates under a constitution . . . which contains safeguards against confiscation. To take over privately owned estates poses many problems.
3. By and large the Congress is composed of the large landowners who could hardly be expected to vote the necessary legislation.

For the most part the same conditions prevail today. There is in fact no "thoroughgoing land redistribution program" nor is there one in the offing. What changes have been made in legislation have reflected these same conditions. And where there are schemes for redistribution, implementation has been slow.

Where the landlord is being removed from furnishing capital and management, the government is, in fact, stepping in and will probably become more involved than it was ever intended to be. The Code of 1971, however, strives

toward turning these functions over to cooperatives.

The present Constitutional Convention is considering the question of rights to land. Yet, any relaxation of the present safeguards against confiscation will most probably run into strong opposition, so that the chances of major changes are quite small.

The landed interests are still represented in Congress, and Congress is reluctant to force them to sell their lands or to make expropriation a simple matter. At the same time, however, Congress has not been able to provide landlords with sufficient incentives to sell their lands and to divert their capital elsewhere.<sup>21</sup> Thus, there is a stalemate, and Congress avoids the subject of land reform as often and as well as it can.

The land-reform pattern until now, therefore, has been to bring about certain changes in landlord-tenant relationships but not to redistribute land on a large scale. Land has not been expropriated except in token instances; landlords have not been forced to sell their lands through increased taxation or other means; and landlords have not been provided with incentives to sell. Eventually the government will have to take issue with one or the other of these if the goals of owner-cultivatorship and increased productivity are to be met. Otherwise, the aim of land reform — the redistribution of land to the present tenants — will have to be abandoned.

Increased productivity goals, however, will still have to be met. One way of doing this would be to increase taxation on agricultural land and base the taxes on the land's productive capacity. This would force the landowners, most of whom have never attempted to maximize production on their lands, to sell out to those farmers who could run the farms at a profit. It is likely that these would not be former tenants using antiquated farming methods on family-sized farms, but rather "commercial" farmers using modern methods and machines. This would, of course, require Congress to raise the taxes on agricultural land which "is hardly taxed" (Palacios 1966: 23), and this is something they have been reluctant to do for a



long time. Furthermore, such a scheme would displace many more farming families than are now being displaced, and these people would not only have to be provided for but should, in fact, be given the means to a better way of life than the one they presently enjoy.

In the meantime, it seems most probable that the issues will continue to be avoided, while localized "projects" are given attention and publicity, and reform will be kept in the leaseholder stage, which represents at least some reform, until the day when events, rather than legislators or government officials, force a change.

### Notes

Dr. Murray received the Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Pittsburgh in 1970. His dissertation concerned a rice-growing village in Nueva Ecija where he lived 1966-68. The present article was written during a later visit to the Philippines (1971-72) as a visiting research associate of the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila. Dr. Murray is currently on the faculty of the department of anthropology, University of Western Australia, Perth.

1. Book report specifications for the *Philippine Sociological Review* (PSR 19[1-2]: 145).

2. A good example of the first type is the first part of a collection of speeches by Manglapus (1967). There is, of course, some overlap between the two general types. A book (1969) by the new Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, illustrates this crossing-over, as do a book edited by Dorothy Dillon (1968) and a CCF forum in *Solidarity* (1966). Similarly, there are recent articles in *Solidarity* by Estrella (1971) and Medina (1971).

3. Most of the journalistic statements appear in the *Philippines Free Press*.

4. This is discussed at length in Wickberg (1964).

5. This is also discussed in Larkin (1971:792).

6. While tenancy rates "rose from 3% in 1903 to 22% in 1918, 35% in 1952 to 45% to 50% at present" (Koono and Gleock 1970:1), the rates have always been even higher in Central Luzon.

7. For material on resettlement in the postwar period, see Dow (1966), Lichauco (1956), and Scaff (1955).

8. Bringing this up to date, Koono and Gleock (1970:50) state that "Although most of the settlements were established in the 1950s, surprisingly few titles have been awarded to settlers. President Magsaysay claimed the issuance of almost 125,000 patents, but since 1963, according to available records, only 1,243 titles have been awarded. During the same period, a total of 4,127 settlers were allocated lands."

9. Wurfel (1959) provides a good summary and analysis of the Bell Mission and its aftermath.

10. One of the more upsetting passages of the Hardie Report states that "the land tenure system stands as an obstacle thwarting all efforts of the United States to foster the development of a stable and democratic economy. But over and above all of this, continuation of the system fosters the growth of communism and harms the United States position. Unless corrected, it is easy to conceive the situation worsening to a point where the United States would be forced to take direct, expensive, and arbitrary steps to insure against loss of the Philippines to the Communist block in Asia - and would still be faced with finding a solution to the underlying problem" (Hardie 1952:8).

11. In addition to Starner, there are several other sources on the Magsaysay period and the period immediately following. It would appear that while there was some hope that land reform would catch on, literature on the topic flourished. With the failure of land reform, the amount of writing on the subject has fallen off. Some of these sources are Arnaldo (1954), Cook (1961), Golay (1956), Mabun (1955), McMillan (1955), Motheral (1956), Wurfel (1954, 1958), and Samonte (1959). There are also frequently cited reports from the U.S. Mission for this period by Bull (1958), Emerson (1956), and McMillan (1954).

12. Here Ledesma (1968:19, n. 16) is following the Macapagal reform program (n.d.: 7-8) and Nemenzo (1959:8-11).

13. Accomplishments in the area of purchasing estates and redistribution are as follows (Koono and Gleock 1970:50): "Since 1963, a total of 4,236 hectares have been purchased by the Land Authority, which benefitted 2,862 tenants. A total of 6,589 deeds of sale have been made since 1963 to farmers occupying land within the landed estates." These landed estates apparently are "47 landed estates which compose an area of approximately 66,500 hectares," and these "although a few go as far back as 1918 were mostly purchased between 1950 and 1962. A total of 29,352 farmers are reported to occupy these lands. An undisclosed number, however, have been allocated home sites only" (Koono and Gleock 1970:48-49). The same authors (p. 50) also report that "From 1966, when the Land Bank became operational, it has purchased only 1,551 hectares . . . 327 tenants (of whom 70 occupy home sites only) occupied the properties at the time of purchase and apparently no subdivision or resettlement actually took place." This is very little when one considers that the 1960 Census reported there were 864,538 tenant farms of all types on 2,000,201.1 hectares.

14. This is based on the writer's own data and observations in the limited area of southern Nueva Ecija. In the Philippines as a whole the 1960 Census shows that there were more farms between one and two hectares in size.

15. Wolf argues that each social relation into which cultivators enter "is surrounded with symbolic constructions which serve to explain, to justify, and to regulate it." He further states that such ceremonial

"must be paid for in labor, in goods, or in money. If men are to participate in social relations, therefore, they must also work to establish a fund against which these expenditures may be charged." See Takahashi and Fegan 1972 for a discussion of the role of off-farm jobs among share tenants.

16. In fact, however, Pahlilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (1972) report that 61 percent of landlords with lessees have been approached for loans, and eight out ten have granted them. See also Fegan 1972.

17. Under the 1963 Code, land reform had to be "proclaimed" in a particular municipality before the provisions of the law went into effect. As of 1970, it had been proclaimed in 154 municipalities (Koono and Gleeck 1970:52), of which 31 were in the pilot project area. Under the new 1971 Code there is no proclamation; land reform has been extended to the whole nation.

18. Even here the progress has been slow. "When President Marcos became President in 1966, he announced that he would convert 350,750 tenants into lessees by the end of 1969. As of September 30, 1968, 13,377 farmers had obtained leasehold contracts, and on December 31, 1969, 28,616 farmers had such contracts" (Koono and Gleeck 1970:47).

19. Section 51, number 6, for example, empowers the Department of Agrarian Reform to "give economic family-size farms of not more than six hectares to landless citizens . . ."

20. Wolf (1966:19) distinguishes between two kinds of ecotypes, or systems of energy transfer: "one marked by the employment of human and animal labor, and the other characterized by increasing reliance on the energy supplied by combustible fuels and the skills supplied by science." He calls the first "paleotechnic," the second "neotechnic."

21. Under the 1963 Code "landowners were to be compensated by 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in 6 percent tax free, redeemable Land Bank bonds, unless the landowner opted for payment in Land Bank shares up to a total of 30 percent. Landowners were vehemently opposed to taking compensation in bonds. They preferred cash, but acknowledged that the government was without funds and that such payments would be inflationary" (Koono and Gleeck 1970:56). The new 1971 Code does not improve on this very much except that it increases the cash payment to 20 percent.

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#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Pilipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters - a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters - b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *mga*, pronounced "mangá"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (^). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Pilipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

Reflections on the IPC/BAEcon Study

DAVID CHRISTENSON

January 18, 1972

When I ask myself under what conditions a share tenant will want to become a lessee, and a lessee want to own his own farm, I find it best to pre-mise my thinking with these three assumptions.

1. Farmers and landlords will seek to maximize their net well-being, each in accordance with his own value system.
2. Both farmers and landlords can and will assess the changes taking place around them as ultimately favorable or unfavorable to their net well-being.
3. The value systems of both farmers and landlords are flexible and subject to influence.

Given these assumptions, it follows that where farmers have shifted to leasehold they did so because they thought they would thereby be better off. What do the data say?

*Most small farmers will stay small farmers.* I think we can say that for most small farmers opportunities to improve well-being, or level of living, will be sought mainly through farming. Some, it is true, would like to have off-farm jobs as well, while others say they would like to leave the farm entirely. But the majority see their livelihood as dependent on the soil.

The "good life," thus, is to be sought in the context of farming. Through farming the average

small farmer hopes to acquire sufficient food and money for subsistence; to be sure of this, he must pay off old debts and not incur new ones; and an ideal vehicle for this freedom from debt is to own his own farm.

*Switch to tenurial status depends on perceived relative benefits.* Being a share tenant or being a lessee are alternative ways of solving the same problem of acquiring those amounts of food and money required for subsistence. If sharecropping arrangements are such that subsistence is assured, then it is seen as a good system. For the major complaint about share tenancy is, not the dependency it implies, but that often the share is insufficient to meet family subsistence needs.

Leasehold is not seen by share tenants as a good thing in itself. It is good when the returns to the farmer are greater than the sum total received under the share system. Under share tenancy normally, the owner-tenant relationship provides security in times of trouble. If additional returns under leasehold obviate the need for such a special relationship and/or substitute security systems are available, then leasehold is good.

Share tenants normally have someone to fall back on (the landlord), and owner-operators something to fall back on (the land) in cases of

emergency. The leaseholder is far more vulnerable. Until he can develop some kind of cushion, he probably has no one and nothing to fall back on.

Perhaps a slightly different approach will be more useful. What are the key variables in the three forms of tenure. I think the IPC/BAEcon research suggests four: (a) security – the availability of support for withstanding crises or disaster, (b) income – net return to operator from his enterprise, (c) autonomy – choosing one's own destiny and making operational decisions, and (d) financing – assurance of funds to run the enterprise.

A matrix can be developed as follows. The values (High, Medium, Low) represent the expectations the small farmer would be likely to have for each of the four variables.

Variable	Tenure		
	Share	Lease	Owner
Security	Medium	Low	High
Income	Low	Medium	High
Autonomy	Low	Medium	High
Reasonable financing	Medium	Low	High

Other variables certainly will influence the individual decision but I believe that these four are generally the most important. The typical problem of the share tenant contemplating conversion to leasehold is whether the added income and autonomy he expects will more than offset the losses he will incur of the assured security and financing available to him under share tenancy. If the landlord does not now regularly and dependably give the share tenant security and/or reasonable financing, or if it is believed that the landlord would continue to supply these in spite of the transition, then a move to leasehold would be seen as a forward step in maximizing net well-being. Similarly, if the probability of obtaining financing and/or emergency support under leasehold were increased, then leasehold status would become more attractive.

The movement of a share tenant to leasehold

occurs because the share tenant believes that life will in fact be better for him under leasehold. Continuation of the leasehold depends on maintenance of this belief. For many, however, if the newly-gained advantages of increased autonomy and income are not used as opportunities for increasing productivity, the leasehold may not prove viable. Unless the lessee can develop a cushion to protect himself from crisis situations (such as property or crop destruction, family illness or death) he is likely to suffer a setback in his net well-being under leasehold, and be tempted back to the security of share tenancy.

Owner-operatorship appears in the study to be the ideal tenure situation in the view of the farmers. The data indicate, however, that share tenants place higher value on educating their children than they do on owning a farm. Although this may seem a form of escapism, it

may in fact be intelligent realism. The betterment of subsistence families through the vehicle of educating one's children is far more common than is the same upward movement through the share tenant's eventually buying the farm he works. The gap between share tenancy and owner-operatorship is too great for many farmers to consider its spanning a realistic possibility. Lessees, on the other hand, have taken the first step in taking control of the farm, and for them the possibility of actually becoming an owner-operator is realistic.

*The need is for more money to finance land purchases.* The major stumbling block to the transformation of tenants into owner-operators is obviously the lack of funds on the part of the tenant for purchasing the property, and the lack of funds on the part of the government to purchase land and finance such transitions. It does not appear that there are any social or psycholo-

gical blocks preventing the tenant's movement toward owner-operatorship, but only economic blocks.

We do not know how much land would be willingly offered by landowners for sale to the government if funds were available for financing such sales. Voluntary offers to sell have been made in the absence of sufficient funds, indicating that such opportunities would be considerable. In the short run, then, the major stumbling block to transition to owner-operatorship is that of insufficient funds, which indicates a low priority on the part of politicians/the people for this kind of resource allocation.

*But public funds are slow because increased productivity unproven.* Unfortunately, at present the only valid arguments for increased allocation to this type of activity are those of social justice and social development. There is no proof that increased productivity is a direct result of tenure transition in the Philippines. It is assumed, however, that there are greater incentives for lessees and owner-operators to increase their production than there are for share tenants. If systems can be developed to enable these farmers to respond to the incentives, then economic arguments can be developed to supplement those of social justice.

Unfortunately, the government's small-farmer

support systems have not been effective in increasing the productivity of small farmers on a broad scale. If such systems can be developed, the argument of land reform would be greatly strengthened and presumably would receive higher support priority. To illustrate, under share arrangements, the landlord supposedly provides the financing required by the farm enterprise. Under leasehold, the government accepts (or is expected to accept) this role. Unfortunately increased productivity has not resulted from such a transition, and the government financing mechanisms have proven to be ineffective and very costly. Private costs have become public costs with no great increase in productivity. It is not surprising that greater public concern and subsequent resource allocation has not resulted.

The solution to all of this is to find ways to make the leaseholder and owner-operator more productive. Though difficult to accomplish, this goal is not "pie-in-the-sky" or wishful thinking. Other countries have been successful; we can be successful too.

#### *Note*

By the IPC/BAEcon study is meant an earlier version of the findings reported in the article by R. P. de los Reyes and Frank Lynch, found elsewhere in this volume. Mr. Christenson (of USAID) is a land reform adviser to the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program.

## **Irrigation And Organization: Research In Progress**

E. WALTER COWARD, JR.

May 15, 1972

A major provision of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 6389) is that the ownership of irrigation systems is to be transferred to the lessee farmers. As envisioned in the law, permanent irrigation systems may have been constructed by any of three parties: the lessee farmers themselves, the lessor, or the govern-

ment. If the irrigation was constructed by the lessees themselves, ownership will reside with them; further, the law provides that if the rental relationship is terminated the lessor must pay the lessee for this irrigation improvement. If the irrigation system was constructed by the lessor, the law provides for the transfer of

ownership of the irrigation system by having the Land Bank acquire the irrigation system and vest it in the lessees.<sup>1</sup> Finally, if the irrigation system was constructed by the government, it is to be given to the lessees with the provision that a portion of the irrigation fees collected by them will be used to repay the construction costs.

*Main Point: Organization Most Important*

In all cases ownership of the irrigation system carries with it responsibility to operate and maintain the system. Clearly, whether or not this ownership will be an asset or a liability to the farmers is dependent upon the ability of the farmers to organize themselves successfully for operation and maintenance activities. In all of this the implicit assumption is that the problems which farmers presently have with the delivery of irrigation water are related to their nonownership of the irrigation systems which serve them. However, observation suggests that such transfers of ownership and attached responsibility may ameliorate the problem that government agencies have in delivering irrigation water, but will not assure the farmers' receiving adequate water at appropriate times.

The thesis I should like to pursue in this discussion is as follows. There is an urgent need to include genuine irrigation reform in the agrarian reform program. *The basic irrigation reform required is better organization for improved water management.* Since the transfer of the ownership of irrigation systems to the lessee-farmers may or may not contribute to this basic reform in water-management procedures, the question of ownership should be considered somewhat independently of improved organization.

*The Interplay of Organization and Ownership*

At a general level one can consider the basic elements of an irrigation system to be these: (1) the physical component, (2) the information, or knowledge, component, (3) the incentive component, and (4) the organization component. Each of these components is directly related to the water-management behavior of water users in the system. Organization is that component which combines the other components

through the elaboration of rules and procedures and the creation of roles to carry out these rules and procedures.

The need for organizational reform in Philippine irrigation systems has been noted by Barker and Reyes (1971) and Levine (1971). Levine, an agricultural engineer familiar with the Philippine situation, states (1971:392) that "a large potential for expanded production exists in many less developed countries without major investments in large-scale projects but with a major effort required for the development and implementation of improved water management practices."

The irrigation reform needed consists of those changes required to overcome what Takahashi has described (1970:120) as the "anarchy [which] prevails over the use of irrigation water" at the village level. There is need for organizational changes that will provide rules and roles that (1) are more congruent with the physical facilities of the irrigation system, (2) will identify and diffuse new information and knowledge, and (3) will provide positive incentives to the water users by rewarding preferred water-management practices.

As mentioned, the present Code of Agrarian Reforms emphasizes the need to transfer the ownership of irrigation systems to the farmers themselves. While such a transfer of ownership can have an obvious impact on the organizational component, a basic question remains. Will such a transfer of ownership result in better water-management practices?

Frequently when changes in irrigation organization are considered there is the image of the farmer-owned and -operated, so-called communal, irrigation system. The image takes on some of the characteristics of the *zangera* systems described by Lewis (see "The Sampler" section in this issue of PSR) in which the water users themselves, either directly or indirectly through a locally-created water authority, build, repair, expand, and maintain the physical structures of the system and design a system of rules, procedures, and sanctions for the allocation and distribution of water.

However, the ideal model, somewhat like the ideal of life in a small town, has some features



which may limit its broader utility for irrigation reform. At least two points need to be emphasized with regard to such *zangjera*-like organizations. First, they typically deal with relatively small command areas: Lewis reports (1971:129) that the *zangjeras* in Ilocos Norte irrigate from "less than six hectares to more than one hundred hectares." Enough is known about the effect of size on organizational form to suggest that *zangjera*-like organizations probably have associated size limitations. Second, most communal systems are the result of local initiative: the system was constructed by the present water users, their kin, or the kin of their *barrio*-mates. An additional point, though one that may not be so general as the previous two, is that communal irrigation organizations may prove an enduring form of irrigation organization only when such organizations assume "an importance and function considerably beyond the manifest purpose of providing irrigation water" (Lewis 1971:138), for example, by serving as social units for political mobilization.

One of the fundamental characteristics that differentiate irrigation systems is size, with its usual correlate, technological complexity. Irrigation systems that are large and technologically complex require a level of professional expertise for certain operation and maintenance functions that cannot reasonably be expected to come directly from the water users. Consequently, it may be useful to differentiate the type of reform that is preferred for various classes of irrigation systems, based upon their size. Beginning with the crude classification of small and large systems I suggest that a viable irrigation policy would be one creating farmer-owned organizations in small systems and joint organizations in large irrigation systems. Small systems would be defined as those systems serving not more than 2000 hectares of irrigated land.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of the farmer-owned organization for small systems is a well-known one. These organizations could follow as their models the *zangjeras* described by Lewis or the irrigation cooperatives found in Rizal province, and briefly described below.<sup>3</sup>

The joint-organization form suggested for the

large irrigation system assumes that ownership, overall supervision, and large-scale maintenance will remain the responsibility of government, but with a significant increase in the rights and responsibilities of the water users. This increase will be achieved through forms of irrigator organization that will create more responsible and responsive interaction between the water users and the water authorities. A joint organization will have as a major aim improvement of the interaction between the serving bureaucracy and the end users. In a sense, improvement in this interaction is more basic than change in ownership, because organization change that improves interaction without change in ownership can be expected to have a positive impact on water management, whereas the opposite is not likely.

#### *Farmer-owned Systems in Rizal Province*

In my own research on irrigation organization I have begun to collect data on the existing irrigation cooperatives in Rizal Province. These irrigation cooperatives have existed as communal irrigation systems for long periods of time, some reportedly since the Spanish period. Many have been formally organized as cooperatives only since 1967 or 1968. They were organized at this time because the provincial government of Rizal was then implementing a program of agricultural development which included financial assistance for the repair and improvement of communal systems. Such assistance was provided in the form of a long-term loan and as a prerequisite to receiving such a loan the farmers operating the system were required to organize and formally register as a cooperative society.

At the time of this writing I have data from three such irrigation cooperatives. The data suggest the following features of these systems: (1) ownership of the system resides with the irrigation cooperative; (2) they serve relatively small command areas — about 200 hectares in the wet season, usually a smaller area in the dry season; (3) they involve more or less 100 farmers who are residents of several different *barrios*; (4) they design their own rules and procedures, and hire their own staff to implement and enforce these rules; (5) they have high rates of payment of irrigation fees; rates of 80 to 100 percent are

reported; (6) they are completely responsible for the maintenance and repair of the system, generally effected by hiring casual laborers to do the work rather than by the *bayanihan* system; (7) their decision-makers seem interested in considering modifications in the present plans of water distribution.

In general the impression that one has of these three systems is that they are effectively serving their members, and that these members actively support their system and participate in decisions relative to its operation. The data indicate that small irrigation systems can be organized following the farmer-owned system.

#### *A Truncated Joint Organization in Cavite*

By way of contrast let me present some data being collected on a Cavite-Province irrigation system operated by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). This system has a command area of just over 600 hectares. Land in the system is farmed by approximately 380 individual water users who reside in 10 different barrios. While this system is modest in size compared to other NIA systems, it is somewhat more complex in scale than the communal systems observed in Rizal.

The day-to-day operations of this system are handled by seven ditchtenders (*siladór*) under the supervision of an acting water-master, all employed by the NIA. All of these men are local residents of five nearby barrios, four of which are included in the irrigation system.

As reported by Wickham (1970), in an NIA-operated system it is the ditchtender who is the visible representative of the water authority. It is he who deals with the farmer on a daily basis. Ditchtenders are assigned to work in a "section" of the irrigation system and officially are expected to serve about 150 hectares of land. In actuality, the ditchtenders in this NIA system serve from 69 to 121 hectares (in the wet season) and this involves working with from 35 to 76 individual water users.

The two most important activities of the ditchtender are the distribution of water in the main and lateral canals (operation) and the repair and cleaning of the main and lateral canals

(maintenance). In addition to these activities, many of the ditchtenders are involved in campaigning for fee collection, though most of them do not actually collect the fees.

It is also important to note what the ditchtenders do *not* do. They do not deliver water from the main or lateral canals to the individual farm ditches and farm plots, nor do they do any repair or cleaning of these farm ditches. Both of these responsibilities belong to the individual water users.

There has evolved around this set of water-user responsibilities an interesting role referred to as the *tagakaón* (literally, "one whose task it is to fetch"). The *tagakaón* is hired by a subset of the water users in a given section (usually 16-20 farmers) to assist them in obtaining water from the main or lateral canal. That is, after the ditchtender has delivered water into the main or lateral canal, there remains the task of diverting that water from the canal to farm ditches for delivery to the individual farm plots. This is a job that can be inconvenient and time-consuming. It can be inconvenient because water may be delivered by the ditchtender at night or at a time when the water user is elsewhere. This is especially true since many farmers have land in more than one part of a section or even in more than one section. The job can be time-consuming because while water is being delivered to a group of farmers each will feel the need to be there to make certain that a fair distribution of the water is achieved.

Hiring a *tagakaón* can be a solution to both these problems. The first is obvious, since it is the *tagakaón*, not the farmer, who will be up all night, if necessary. When a *tagakaón* is hired, the farmer is also able to save time because it is not necessary for him to be on the spot when the water is delivered. Since the *tagakaón* works for a group of men, it is his responsibility to distribute the water equitably among his "employers." If he consistently fails to do so he will be replaced.

There is another important function which I believe the *tagakaón* performs, but the present data are inadequate to support or reject this hypothesis. Farmers are seldom satisfied with

the adequacy of the water service they may be getting at any given time. There are always many requests and complaints to be made to the ditchtenders. The tagakaón may often be used as go-betweens through whom water users voice complaints to the ditchtenders while maintaining acceptable social relations among the parties involved.<sup>4</sup>

One of the significant aspects of the tagakaón phenomenon is that while the NIA finds it difficult to collect irrigation fees from the farmers and landowners, farmers are willing to pay for the services of the tagakaón.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, a startling point about the tagakaón is that the NIA, through the *de facto* policy of the acting watermaster, is rigorously resisting the use of the tagakaón by water users. Ditchtenders have been told not to allow water users to hire a tagakaón. The stated reason for this policy is that the work of the tagakaón interferes and conflicts with that of the ditchtender. In fact, it does overlap with regard to the tagakaón's usual practice of walking along the main or lateral canal to see that no unauthorized water user is diverting water from the canal. However, since the tagakaón does not clean the main or lateral canals and the ditchtender does not deliver water to the individual farm ditches there appear to be significant areas of independent responsibility.

A more subtle problem with the tagakaón system is that it suggests that the respective ditchtender is ineffective in his work. In part, this perceptible has an historical basis which I should mention briefly. Prior to 1965 this irrigation system was operated by the Bureau of Lands. At that time fewer ditchtenders were employed, and consequently each served a larger area and number of farmers. At that time both tagakaón and *kabisilya* (briefly described as group leaders appointed by the ditchtender) flourished and acted as useful aides to the ditchtenders. In 1965, when the system came under the supervision of the NIA, the number of ditchtenders was increased (perhaps doubled) as a way of providing more adequate service to the water users. In light of this provision, some NIA authorities seem reluctant to believe that any role remains for the tagakaón.

The tagakaón role suggests a primitive step in the direction of a joint organization in that it is intended to improve the necessary interaction between water users and water authorities. Unfortunately, in this case the NIA authorities have decided to discourage rather than encourage this development.

#### *Summary and Discussion*

In summary, in view of my own past and present work<sup>6</sup> and the work of others, I believe that a basic generalization can be made about irrigation reform: *Improved organization is more significant for irrigation reform than is transfer of ownership.*

What may be needed is a more differentiated irrigation-reform policy that aims to create farmer-owned organizations in small irrigation systems and joint organizations in large systems. The preliminary data presented for the Rizal irrigation cooperatives, in addition to the evidence on the zangjera systems, suggest that farmer-owned organizations can be viable. The data for an NIA system in Cavite suggest that an incipient form of joint organization has evolved but that it has been attenuated rather than encouraged by the present policy of the water authorities. Nevertheless, the example is suggestive of organizational forms that can be developed to provide more meaningful interaction between water users and water authorities in a large irrigation system.

The type of irrigation reform suggested implies, of course, a need for extended training of both government water authorities and the water users. Water authorities, ditchtenders, watermasters, and others, need training in both the technology of water management and in the social know-how of assisting attempts by water users to develop rules and roles to improve water management.

Finally, it should not be presumed that our knowledge of alternative forms of irrigation organization are sufficient to allow us to move rapidly with such irrigation reform. Much remains to be learned about such organization, and resources should be allocated to obtaining such knowledge as a critical element of the overall agrarian-reform effort of the Philippines.

## Notes

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1. There is no mention of the need for lessees to repay the Land Bank for this purchase, although the provisions with regard to irrigation systems constructed by the government specifically state that the repayment of costs is to be made.

2. This is a tentative suggestion for a cut-off point. It is selected on the basis of the experience in Taiwan, where irrigation systems are divided into working stations each of which is responsible for the operation and maintenance of facilities and the collection of fees in an area of about 2000 hectares.

3. Dr. Pat Ongkingco of the Department of Agricultural Engineering, University of the Philippines College of Agriculture, has collected data on communal irrigation systems in Laguna province and is presently preparing a report of this research.

4. Frank Lynch (1970) has suggested that the use of go-betweens is one mechanism for maintaining smooth interpersonal relations (SIR) in Philippine society. With respect to another irrigation organization Frutchey (1969) reports that in Thailand messengers are used for the same purpose to communicate possibly unpleasant information from the ditchtender to the water user.

5. Actually it is not quite correct to say that the farmer pays for the services since the actual practice of share tenants is to pay the tagakaon from the harvest, prior to the harvest's being divided with the owner. Thus both the farmer and the landowner contribute. Some owners object to the tagakaon since it appears to them that they are making double payment for irrigation services, to the NIA and to the tagakaon. The usual rate of payment that is reported is one cavan of palay for each hectare of land planted.

6. For discussions of my previous work with irrigation organization in Laos see Coward (1971, 1972).

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### Blueprints, Realities, and Success in a Frontier Resettlement Community

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October 4, 1972

Resettlement as a concept is vaguely defined and little understood, for it takes many forms

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and serves varied purposes in different settings. For our purposes resettlement, or land settle-

ment, is taken to mean the "large-scale internal transfer of populations to vacant and frontier lands under the sponsorship and assistance of government or private agencies."<sup>1</sup> Reviewing selected aspects of a single but notable case from the Philippine context, that of the Narra project in Palawan, several questions are asked, namely: How closely do settlers come to following the preplanned schedule and achieving the preset goals of the resettlement program? Government schedules and goals aside, how may a settler's success be defined and attained? What practical conclusions may one infer from the answers to the first two questions?

#### *Narra: The Frontier Setting*

The word "Narra" is a shortened form of the phrase, "National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration." It may stand for that government entity, for the project with which we are here concerned, or for the townsite and municipality that has grown up at the site of that project. Most commonly I shall use the term to refer to the project.

The history of Narra as a resettlement area goes back to the 20s and 30s of this century, when pioneer settlers from nearby Cuyo Island began homesteading on the east-coast flatlands of Palawan, some 70 kilometers south of Puerto Princesa. The future Narra was officially established in 1949 as a government agricultural colony of the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA), but was in 1954 converted into a resettlement project administered by the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (Lasedeco). The Lasedeco gave way to the Narra in 1956, which was replaced 10 years later by the Land Authority (LA). In 1971 the LA was revamped and reorganized to become the National Land Reform Council (NLRC), but the project is still called Narra, as is the townsite and municipality.

The Narra settlement sprawls over 25,300 hectares of gently rolling, richly forested land, an area about 33 kilometers in length (north to south) and 8-15 kilometers in width. It is bounded on the east by the national highway which runs in a general northeast to southwest

direction, paralleling the east coast of the island. Its western boundary is left more or less open to make room for more settlers. The whole settlement is divided into six agricultural sectors, which are in turn subdivided into six-hectare famlots. Each sector can accommodate some 350 to 400 settler families.

As originally planned, the local Agency was to administer the Narra project for 20 years, it being anticipated that after that time the settlers would have become economically self-sufficient and able to take over the administrative functions themselves. Today, 22 years after it was established, Narra appears to be stranded midway in its development, and the Agency foresees the need to stay on for another 20 years. Settler families were still arriving in 1970, and at this writing new areas are being prepared for another 200 to be added to the 2,666 families that have been admitted to Narra since 1954.

#### *The Resettlement Experience: Blueprint*

The process of transferring to a frontier area may be viewed from either of two standpoints: the Agency's or the settler's. Here we consider the Agency's view, by which resettlement is a series of developmental stages that settlers go through in the process of achieving the formal resettlement goals, namely, titled landownership and increased productivity. In pursuit of these objectives, the Agency strives to provide the settler with material assistance and various services according to a preset schedule. This schedule follows the sequence of activities found in the table below, which is really a schematic representation of the ideal resettlement experience.

Hence by this plan the average settler coming to Narra should be an independent owner-operator by the end of his tenth year in the settlement. This is the blueprint, this is the dream.

#### *The Resettlement Experience: Realities*

The de facto history of the average settler

*Summary of the Agency's Plan of Work for Resettlement  
(Narra 1966)*

Phase	Activities	Duration
I	Recruitment and screening: Processing and approval of applications	3 weeks
II	Removal from the old home to the new setting	5 days
III	Cushioning and stabilizing the settlers a. Temporary housing b. Subsistence aid c. Medical services d. Permanent housing	First 6 months to 1 year
IV	Land development a. Allocation of farm and homelots b. Land clearance and cultivation c. Allocation of work animals d. Provision of seeds, fertilizers, and other agricultural extension services	First 5 years
V	Landownership a. Settling of accounts b. Titriling of land	First 10 years

has not followed the above plan very closely. We can document the differences phase by phase.

*Phase I: Recruitment and screening*

Application forms are filled out and submitted to the Central (National) Agency in Quezon City. In theory, the Agency treats applications of settlers singly, and makes separate contracts with each individual applicant; in practice, however, for convenience in processing applications and in the mechanics of removal, settlers are generally recruited in batches of 10 to 100 families. Chances are that applicants from the same community or region will be grouped in a single batch.

All Filipinos are supposed to have equal opportunities for resettlement. However, regional preferences appear to coincide with the origins of the incumbent president. Thus during the Magsaysay administration (1954-1957) the majority of the settlers came from the central

Luzon provinces (Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, Zambales). The Visayans were given top priority during the Garcia administration (1957-1961); just as the Macapagal administration gave preference to settler applicants from Pampanga and Pangasinan. Today the Ilocano and Northern-Luzon applicants are said to be the top-priority settlers. It is the consensus of settlers that, in terms of assistance they received, "The Magsaysay settlers had it best; the Garcia settlers, the worst."

The time it takes to process an application (ideally, three weeks) varies from three weeks to six years. While some applicants wait for years, sending three or more applications before getting the Agency's approval, others proceed to Narra on their own, without bothering to file their application.

*Phase II: The removal*

Transporting the settler's family and their

belongings from the old home to Narra is one of the major services provided by the Agency. Settlers from Luzon leave their homes for Manila by land for the first leg, board an interisland vessel for Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the second leg, and finally proceed to Narra overland. Altogether this trip takes five days, and the Agency provides each batch of settlers with escorts — a doctor, finance officer, and team leader — to ensure comfort and safety of travel. Transportation expenses are charged to the settler's account.

While the above arrangement is both ideal and typical, the strategies for removal vary. Some come to Narra with little or no knowledge of the place, while others make prior visits to the settlement before applying. Still others come alone and later send for their families as soon as land and housing are ready for them. Further, whereas in most cases the Agency must extend loans to settlers for transportation, there are settlers who pay their way in order to minimize or avoid indebtedness to the Agency.

The scheduling of these settler transfers is supposed to be so arranged that they arrive in Narra early enough to clear their lands and plant at the onset of the rainy season. This ideal has been honored more in the breach than the observance: in the years 1967–69, for instance, settler families were transported all year round, with little relation to local planting schedules. As a result, many settlers had to wait for months before they could start land clearance, meanwhile living on subsistence rations charged to their account.

#### *Phase III: Cushioning the new settlers*

Two items which incoming settlers need immediately upon arrival are housing and subsistence, the latter to be continued till after the first harvest.

*Housing assistance.* The local Agency prepares bunkhouses, divided into one-room living quarters, which settlers occupy for from six months to one year. In that period of time they are expected to construct cottages on their homelots, using housing materials provided by the Agency. During this same period, and until they are producing their own food, families are pro-

vided with rations and other basic household items, all on credit.

Not all the settlers need housing assistance. Some stay with kin or friends until they are able to construct their own homes. Other settlers come well ahead of their families, and send for them when they have a house ready. They may spend only a few weeks in the bunkhouse. On the other hand, some families have lived in these cramped quarters for as long as three years. This delay in home construction is sometimes due to the Agency's inability to provide the families with the promised housing materials. But at times, even when the materials are available, settlers will waive their right to such loans on grounds of the increased cost of the materials: lumber and galvanized-iron roofing which cost ₱800 in 1967 cost ₱3000 in 1972.

*Subsistence rations.* Food is given to settlers on credit, to sustain their families while they are clearing the land and planting the first crop. The rationing periods vary, three months for some families, 18 months for others; while some families ask for an extension of this period of assistance, others decline the assistance. Settlers often complain about the lack of variety in the foodstuffs that are given to them and charged to their accounts, selling or trading these items for other foodstuffs. Some administrators, while disapproving of this practice, see a positive side as well. "If they don't have a taste for (Scandinavian) sardines, (Australian) butter, or (CARE) powdered milk, it is just as well. We do."

*Medical assistance.* The Agency maintains a medical staff. The majority of the settlers, coming from nonmalaria regions, have their first bout with malaria in Narra, for Palawan is even today the primary malaria region of the country, reporting fully 25 percent of all the malaria cases in the nation. The disease is endemic to the area, and while knowledge of prevention measures are slowly being accepted, the medical facilities of the Agency are hard pressed to meet settler needs.

#### *Phase IV: Land development*

The settler's life in Narra is ideally devoted to developing the land allocated to him, carving a farm from the forested landscape. Five years

after its allocation, the land should be producing enough for his family's needs plus a small margin beyond immediate needs for paying his accounts with the Agency. In another five years and with full irrigation, the land should produce three rice crops a year. At this time (after full payment of accounts), he should have been awarded title to the land, making him a bonafide landowner. This is the dream.

*Allocation of farms.* Farmlots measuring six hectares on the average, presurveyed and subdivided into rectangular parcels, are allocated to the settlers soon after arrival. The temporal trend of land allocation in the settlement proceeds from the townsite outwards, and from the highway to the hinterlands. Prime lands are those closest to the town and closest to the road. Ideally the system of allocation does not allow the settlers to choose the parcels of their preference; rather, they are awarded parcels according to numbers which they draw from a pool. This random allocation of lands finds its rationale in the Agency's attempt to "randomly integrate" settlers of various ethnic origins. It remains, of course, only the *ideal*, for settlers have worked out various means to get parcels more closely approaching their standards of preference: topography, closeness to the road or to relatives, irrigation potential, thickness of forest growth.

*Land clearance.* The majority of the settlers, with the exception of the indigenous Tagbanua and the pioneer Cuyonon, come from parts of the country where swidden, or *kaingin*, cultivation has long since disappeared from the cultural landscape.<sup>2</sup> It is a safe assumption that new arrivals at Narra, poor and landless though they be, are in fact relatively sophisticated lowland-rice agriculturists, having worked irrigated, perhaps even mechanized, farms employing modern scientific technology.

For men steeped in this tradition, whether settlers or agricultural extension workers, swidden agriculture was an entirely new experience. As a result, they turned to the Tagbanua and the Cuyonon to learn how to gird and cut trees. Some never made the adjustment, however; many settler families turned right around and left the settlement. Serious injuries and deaths resulting from land-clearing accidents, while few

and isolated, were widely known and publicized, and did not help the sagging morale of the migrants.

The Agency soon recognized the necessity of extending loans for land clearance (P60 per hectare), but this was, on the whole, little help. Additional labor was scarce, and average settler families relied on the efforts of the father, the sole adult male. In most cases the loans were used to augment the subsistence fund, and settlers fell further and further behind schedule in land development. Additionally, the very scarcity of funds became another source of discontent.

Because of their lack of knowledge and skill in clearing forested lands, settlers made gross errors, with disastrous effects on the physical environment. The thoroughness (however slow) by which contiguous farms were cleared simultaneously exposed the top soil in vast areas to an acute laterizing process. This was further aggravated by the tendency of the Luzon settlers to plow the cleared areas, something any experienced *kaingin* farmer would not do, for it destroys the thin layer of fertile topsoil. The areas thus cleared were cultivated for two years, but no sooner had they been left fallow than they were invaded by *kugon* grass (*Imperata*), resulting in the formation of virtual *green deserts*, reclaimable only by irrigation.<sup>3</sup>

This almost wanton clearing of the forest cover led to the destruction of valuable watersheds, thus reducing the irrigation potential of Narra to only a few topographically favorable pockets suitable for intensive rice cultivation. Valuable timber, direly needed for housing and construction, was carelessly cut, burned, or left to rot. What could have been an easy and cheap source of construction materials literally went up in smoke. Ironically, Narra today imports lumber from Manila.

In ecological terms the effect of these mistakes is staggering. Flying over the resettlement area, one clearly sees the disastrous proportions of the destruction wrought by these early errors. One of the Agency's agricultural extension workers estimated that no less than 60 percent of all farmlands allocated to settlers is *kugonad* (grass-infested wasteland), which can be re-



claimed only by proper irrigation methods; 20 percent is still forested, and the last 20 percent may be classified as productive. Less than half of this productive land is presently irrigated.

*Allocation of work animals.* The settlers' propensity to lowland rice culture includes a high premium on work animals. Acquiring them is, at best, a tedious and complicated process that baffles even the most enlightened of the settlers. Given the great need for draft animals, the meager financial resources of the settlers, and the complicated allocation procedures, the furnishing of carabaos is one of the most important services the Agency extends to settlers. During the 18 years that Narra has been in operation, about 1800 heads of carabao have been given out (on credit) to settlers.

What the records do not show is the fact that more than a few of these animals, which are legally owned by the Agency, have changed hands — the original allocatees having used them as pledges for loans and subsequently lost them by default. The Agency's policy is to give priority in allocation of carabaos to settlers whose farms have been cleared and are ready for plowing. However, this is not always the practice. We know of settlers who acquired work animals even before they cleared their lands, and now rent out the animals at ₱8.00 per animal per working day. Again, while close to 1000 settlers have been waiting for their work animals for many years, some settlers are known to have as many as six head of carabao, which they obtained through allocations and direct purchase from private dealers. Others, meanwhile, have lost their animals through pests or theft.

*Abandonment of farms and land consolidation.* Each settler is bound by contract personally to occupy and cultivate the land assigned to him, and not to engage in occupations other than farming, if by so doing he would neglect the development and cultivation of his land. The contract further states that his rights to the land are nontransferable except by inheritance. Absence from his farm for more than six months without the Agency's permission is reason enough to discharge him from the settlement, in which case his outstanding accounts become due and demandable.

In August 1967, 815 settlers out of 2,666 (about 30 percent) were reported to have "abandoned" their farms, "abandonment" meaning "non-cultivation of farms for the last two cropping seasons" except those farms (although idle) verified to be actually occupied by the allocatees themselves. An investigating committee found that 500 of the reported cases were actually living in the settlement but were temporarily engaged in occupations other than cultivation of their farm. The remaining 315 cases were reported to have gone back to their old homes or were nowhere to be contacted, thereby releasing their farms to new applicants. On inspection, the lands in question were found to be occupied by farmers who had squatted on them for the last few years without the Agency's knowledge. Some claimed to have bought the original holders' rights to the land. Others claimed the right of occupancy and use on grounds of rent paid or a borrowing or share-cropping arrangement with the original holders.

To the 500 settlers who were still in Narra the Agency issued a strong admonition to return to cultivating the land or lose their rights. The investigating officer admitted, as an aside, that the government could not really take as strong a hand as it normally would, considering that the Agency had to some extent not fulfilled its part of the contract. The same officials estimated that 80 percent of the total land allocated was either abandoned, idle, or uncleared of forest growth and only 20 may be considered as currently productive, of which less than half (8 percent) is irrigated.

What are the alternatives open to settlers who leave their farms but do not leave the settlement? They may take on agricultural opportunities by borrowing lands from other settlers or homesteaders, they may join the town-based non-agricultural labor force, or they may become share tenants on already productive agricultural lands. Taking temporary leave from their own farmland is often a profitable tactic: it allows the settler to earn a sure living without going further into debt, and enables him to put something aside for developing his own still unproductive lands at a later date. A brief survey of 27 homesteads in the nearby barrio of Panacan

showed how popular this tactic was: an average of three settler families per homestead was found to be cultivating borrowed or rented parcels or working as sharecroppers.

An equally interesting development in Narra is the attempt by some settlers to expand or consolidate their landholdings, despite the Agency's making no provision for such action. The Narra charter defines the standard allotment as a six-hectare, family-sized farm. Settlers who have developed this original holding to a point where they have an irrigation system, especially if they have access to farm machinery, find these farms uneconomically small. To expand their holdings, settlers have developed a number of effective strategies. Before speaking of the more common ones, let me mention two extraordinarily successful cases.

The first case is that of a settler who "purchased" the landrights to two parcels adjacent to his own, thus giving himself a total of 18 hectares of prime riceland, fully irrigated and mechanized. He then got together with 23 other settlers in his area whom he helped — by providing loans and extension services — in the planning and laying out of rice paddies. These parcels, previously planted to upland rice or to rain-fed lowland rice, were gradually converted into irrigated rice paddies fed from his own reservoir. He assumed the management of these 23 parcels, which he organized into a corporate farm, the other members gradually paying him for the physical improvements he had financed. While admitting the economic success of the venture, the local Agency did not look too kindly or sympathetically on his activities, claiming that he was becoming a petty landlord.

The second case is that of a settler who financed and managed the cultivation of 16 hectares of irrigated rice land, worked by four share tenants (settlers who had temporarily left their farms), while his own farmlot, located some 15 kilometers from the road and 25 kilometers from the townsite, remained uncleared.

But these are extraordinary cases. The more common means of setting up a more economical farm unit are the following.

1. Several members of a family apply for the

usual six-hectare parcels, but they arrange to have adjacent farms allocated to them. For instance, three settler applicants who are brothers, have 18 hectares of land together, which is being cultivated by one of them. This method is considered legal, but one needs brothers and foresight.

2. Borrowing lands that are not cultivated by the original holder allows the more enterprising settlers more space, if only on a short-term basis. Borrowing of lands is sanctioned by the Agency, which encourages and even arranges for it, especially for the newly arrived settlers. Borrowing, as the term suggests, stipulates no rent or share of the crop. The original holder, especially if he is not cultivating the land himself, is only too glad to have someone work his land, lest the land inspectors declare it abandoned.
3. On occasion settlers in financial distress will illegally surrender their land rights to another person. This extra-legal arrangement varies from case to case, as the settler may surrender only the management rights or may agree to leave the farm altogether. Under such arrangements, one may gain control or possession over as many land parcels as one wishes. The original holder will stand by his creditor, even with the knowledge that the law is against these arrangements. The Agency clearly prohibits such turnovers, but on the whole remains ineffective in enforcing its policies.
4. Outright purchase of *private* lands or application for homestead rights over public lands are the methods highly preferred by those who have the capital and desire to acquire larger land parcels.

#### *Phase V: Landownership*

Repayment of loans constitutes the final stage in the settler's development in the new settlement. Except for farm and residential land allocations, all other material goods and services extended to the settler by the Agency are considered farm loans. These loans are without interest and constitute a lien upon the land; amor-

tized over a period of 10 years after the date of arrival, they are subject to the settler's right to pay in full at any time prior to the maturity of the loan (R.A. 3844, Sections 68, 69 and 70).

As mentioned earlier, settlers differ in the amount and extent of assistance and services they have accepted or sought from the Agency. Those who came before 1968 have accounts averaging ₱2,800 per family, while those who came in the inflation years have accounts averaging ₱8,000 per family. There are some settlers who never incurred any debts with the Agency, but a greater number (pioneers and local settlers) who were not entitled to loans.

In a survey of 500 settlers who had accounts ranging from ₱300 to ₱12,000, we discovered that 16 had started to pay back (four of them had paid more than half their debts), but none had made plans for regular repayment or had any idea when they might return the last peso they owed. In fact, *no one expressed the felt need to acquire title to his land.*

Many did express dissatisfaction with the record-keeping and accounting system of the Agency, citing numerous cases of allegedly unscrupulous officials who padded the settlers' accounts. Only four out of the 500 respondents claimed they themselves kept a complete accounting of the services and goods they had received or payments they had made, supported by receipts. Many were hopeful that someday, by some legislation, their accounts would be cancelled; some said they would (understandably) enjoy seeing the Agency records lost or burned.

#### Summary

It is no surprise to find differences between the resettlement experience as planned and as lived. Cultural pressures and unforeseen practical difficulties are bound to have their warping effects on any program, no matter how well devised. But the preliminary findings reported here might profitably be examined with a view to modifying elements of the resettlement blueprint.

One such element is the assumption that the independent six-hectare, family-sized farm is economically desirable. Evidence from elsewhere

in the Philippines casts doubt on this proposition, and the extremely successful case of the "illegal" corporate farm cited above gives us an attractive alternative.

A second element is the assumption that settlers share the Agency's conception of what makes a settler basically successful, namely, titled landownership. The evidence is that few settlers feel this way, all but these few being quite content to live on in debt to the Agency, working government-owned land. The difference in viewpoint is the distinction between "*land for the landless*," which all settlers consciously desire, and "*landownership for the landless*," which apparently interests only a small minority of them. The facts are that in 23 years not one residential lot at Narra has ever been titled, while of the allocated farm lots fewer than five percent have been formally transferred to settler-owners.

#### Success in Narra

This leads us to the consideration of another question: If settlers seem not to measure success in terms of titled landownership, how do they conceive of it? What are the alternative definitions of a successful settler?

#### Conceptions of success

A survey of those living at Narra — settlers, Agency administrators, and others — leads to the following generalizations.

1. As one might have predicted, there is a consensus among Narra residents that some settlers are more successful than others.
2. The distinction between those who have succeeded and those who have not is expressed in terms of development indicators which may be categorized as follows.
  - a. Extent of land development;
  - b. General style of living;
  - c. Ownership of agricultural production equipment;
  - d. Ability to send children to college (and prospectively, to have the children's earnings augment the family income);
  - e. Active participation in community affairs.
3. Success and failure are seen as two ends of

a continuum, at some point along which people may be placed. It is always a case of *more-or-less* rather than *either-or* or *all-or-nothing*. It does not allow us to say of any settler we meet, "He is a success," or conversely, "He is a failure"; rather it allows us to say in what general direction he is going. He may falter as he meets setbacks, he may choose to get sidetracked, or he may accelerate in that direction.

4. The distinction between success and non-success is real in the sense that people are able to place and rank individual settlers in terms of indicators which are meaningful to them. The respondents (40 raters) agree in general on who the most successful settlers are (picking 30 out of a possible 200 nominees), but the same is not true for the least successful (only eight were mentioned out of a possible 200). The raters are either reluctant or unable to give names for the latter category, explaining that most of the Narra settlers fall into this class anyway. With caution, this may be read to mean that the general distribution of the people in the stratification system is *pyramidal*, with a handful of success cases at the apex and the great mass of the less successful ones filling out the broad base.

5. Conceptions of success vary by respondent category.

- a. Agency administrators tend to view settlers' success in terms of the formal goals of resettlement;
- b. Teachers and merchants stress indicators of successful social adaptation and active community participation;
- c. Settlers view success in terms of personal, small-scale, positive departures from their former lives in the places they came from, placing strong emphasis on economic security (within or outside of the settlement norms for this).

#### *The strategy for success*

In a situation where most settlers are dependent upon the Agency for the scarce goods and services they need to get started in the frontier setting; and where the Agency (with the best of intentions) cannot sufficiently and efficiently

provide all of these settlers and their families with the needed assistance; it will follow that the success of a settler will rest mainly on two qualities; namely:

1. *Social talent*, or skill in establishing social alignments with or bridges to the sources of the needed goods and services; and
2. *Business sense*, or acumen in making efficient and productive use of goods and services have been procured, thus maximizing income and profit.

In other words, *differential skills in procuring the needed goods and services and differential efficiency in investing them lead to differential placement in the success ladder*. We shall examine in turn the elements of this formula.

I. *Employment of resources initially controlled*. Earlier, it was shown the settlers differ in the amount of resources they initially control: while some need every bit of assistance they can get from the Agency, others waive their rights to this aid to avoid or minimize their indebtedness. Our survey (N = 300) shows that, aside from their personal belongings and basic household items, settlers come to Narra with cash savings ranging from P250 to P10,000, the average being about P1,500 for successful settlers and P500 for the unsuccessful. Very few bring any farm machinery, like a tractor, a rice mill, or an irrigation pump.

More important than the value of the settler's starting resources, however, is the strategy employed in their use. Thus one settler spent P800 for clearing his allotted land of forest growth, while another spent P350 for soil preparation and fencing of a parcel of land he *rented*, temporarily leaving his allotted farm uncleared. The first man lost his P800 when he had to abandon his farm after two years; the latter's vegetable plots on rented land netted him P2000 in two seasons.

II. *Access to and control over additional resources*. Ideally, needed goods and services would be available to all, and all settlers would know where and how to get them. This was not quite the case in Narra. We found some settlers, generally the more successful ones, who knew of a wider range of sources than most did. Furthermore, not all settlers had equal access to

possible sources of assistance. Narra residents such as merchants, doctors, Agency employees, and even settlers themselves had a negative impression of most settlers and would often withhold services from them. Extraordinary credit and loans were virtually inaccessible to settlers other than those successful ones for whom an employee would vouch.

But it is not merely a question of being alert to sources of assistance and being a good credit risk. To get ahead one must know how to "make friends and influence people." At the start of their stay in Narra, most settlers rely exclusively on the Agency for major assistance, which is arranged for them by an agricultural extension worker. But as time passes the future success cases come to know alternative resources, working their way through complex problems by adeptly playing the Agency and other sources, now in concert, now against one another, for various kinds of help.

The social alignments of successful settlers tend to provide firm and efficient bridges to the things they need. Unlike most settlers, the successful ones socialize freely with the Agency employees and the teachers, their ties having definite social-class overtones. Often such settlers have children who after college join the bureaucratic ranks. Indeed, their bridges extend beyond the confines of Narra to the topmost national-level officials in Manila. Alignments such as these give them additional leverage.

III. *Awareness of business and market opportunities.* Another requisite of success, an obviously crucial one, is acumen in converting procured goods and services into efficient investments, thereby increasing and maximizing income and profit. This business-oriented outlook is one of the distinguishing marks of the successful settler. He views farming as an enterprise, as well as a way of life. Much more than his unsuccessful co-settler, he realistically appraises the possibility of failure and success, and has alternative plans in readiness. He takes systematic if unsophisticated stock of his agricultural business ventures, keeping a record of gains and losses.

Such successful settlers are not farmers but farm managers. They recognize that to succeed they must mobilize human and nonhuman re-

sources and coordinate them by efficient and persistently productive effort. They attempt to minimize risks by diversifying their economic activities, channeling increments from the farm to a small retail store, for instance, or to a pedicab business. An outstanding success story is that of a settler who initially failed as a farmer and temporarily became a butcher. His meat market soon became a general store, and today his total assets amount to ₱75,000. His annual income leaped from barely ₱1,000 from the market to about ₱18,000 from a variety of sources, including the smuggling of cigarettes from Borneo. Today, he is also a successful farmer with a fully irrigated and mechanized rice farm.

In brief, successful settlers in the Narra settlement are farmers only in name. They are more aptly called businessmen *entrepreneurs*. Social talent and business sense are the major elements of their code.

#### *The success cases: products and agents of change*

To understand the processes of change and continuity concurrent with the process of re-settlement, we take a closer look at 15 successful settlers for clues and insights. Who are these successful settlers? What makes them perform differently from the many settlers who are not successful?

Successful settlers stand apart from others in terms of formal education, exposure to media, travel, managerial skills, and employment experience. As a group, their average formal education is three years of college. Two have attended graduate school, and another currently attends law school. Average settlers, by contrast, have had only four years of schooling. All successful settlers claim they have spent some time in the city, either for studies or for employment, holding jobs which call for managerial skills. Five of them take pride in having been trained by American employers, and four others, in having been assigned overseas (Guam and Okinawa).

The key to their success, they claim, is managerial know-how rather than technical skills. To succeed in farming one need not be an agriculturist, they say. They are confident in their ability to harness the necessary technical

skills, human resources, and machinery as they need them. They are also quite aware that modern managerial skills must be adapted to a frontier agricultural area like Narra, where many of the settlers still operate according to the traditional rules and norms familiar to them. Using with equal facility and deftness both the bureaucratic procedures of the Agency, they are able to establish for themselves a wide base for manipulation and maneuver.

The distinguishing personal traits and skills of the successful settlers were acquired prior to arrival in Narra. As success cases they are not

Narra-bred; and it is a good guess that they would succeed in other places, perhaps any other place, as they did in this new setting.

It is equally significant to understand the implications for change in the successful settlers activities. The pursuit of particular goals by successful settlers, or by any settler for that matter, successful or not, has certain consequences for the community. As settlers interact, evaluate the actions of others, and choose from a range of alternatives, these very same per-

(Continued on p. 272)

### Suggestions for Student Visits to Rice Farmers, Landlords, and Technicians

FRANK LYNCH AND ROMANA PAHILANGA-DE LOS REYES

August 31, 1972

If students enrolled in the land-reform course (or any similar course in college or high school) can possibly make one or more trips to a rice-farming area, they should be encouraged and assisted to do so. From field trips such as these the student may possibly learn more about the agrarian structure and land reform, and learn it more lastingly, than he would from several classroom sessions and their related readings.

Note that we say field trips of this kind may be genuine learning experiences. Much depends on the student's desire to learn, of course. Beyond this, we feel that the likelihood of these outings' being worthwhile events will be increased if the following recommendations are accepted.

*First*, the teacher/guide should *prepare both the students and their hosts-to-be for the forthcoming field trip*. Concretely this means deciding ahead of time what the specific purposes of the trip will be — what will be observed, who will be interviewed by whom about what, and on what time schedule. More particularly, the teacher/guide must (a) be sure that the municipality or municipalities to be visited are appropriate for the purposes of the trip, and that in these places there are genuinely willing informants for visiting students; (b) personally notify the intended informants of the purposes and

other details of the field trip well in advance of the event (without however giving information that would lead them to prepare the "right" answers ahead of time); (c) teach the students how to observe and how to ask questions about what has been observed; how to interview for opinions and attitudes without suggesting the answers; (d) decide, with the students, what information *each* student (or pair, or trio, of students) will be responsible for, and what things *all* should learn (e.g., the stages and tasks in rice production, when and why credit is usually needed in the rice-production cycle, the pros and cons of "miracle rice").

*Second*, students should *review what they have learned*. This may be done through individual and/or group reports (oral or written), given during a subsequent session of the land-reform (or other) course or at a special session held outside the ordinary classroom hours. Observation should be related to available literature on the subject.

In the entire exercise one of the main goals will be to help students grow in the ability to distinguish between what they have heard and read and what they have personally observed; between what books and newspapers and magazines say about farmers and what the farmers themselves say. The two are not always the same.

## THE SAMPLER

### Editor's Note

FRANK LYNCH


December 20, 1972

Lewis' study is concerned with similarities and differences between two Ilocano barrios, one in the homeland near Laoag, Ilocos Norte, the other a migrant community in the vicinity of Cauayan, Isabela. Here we reproduce in full by photo-offset two chapters which are especially enlightening for those interested in land reform. In Chapter 11 ("Landlord and Tenant," pp. 119-27) Lewis portrays the traditional socially-vertical landlord-tenant relationship; he also describes something rarely encountered in the literature: a relationship in which landlord and tenant are social equals. In Chapter 12 ("Irrigation Societies: Zangjeras," pp. 128-46) we are introduced to the famous Ilocano irrigation societies which were described by E. B. Christie in 1914 and have been generally neglected by students writing since that time.

PSR and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Sociological Society express their gratitude to the University Press of Hawaii for allowing us thus to put this selection into the hands of those readers, the cooperation and assistance of whose countrymen made this excellent publication possible. The book was earlier reviewed in PSR 19 (1-2): 134.

"Landlord and Tenant" and "Irrigation Societies: Zangieras"  
from Ilocano Rice Farmers: A Comparative Study of  
Two Philippine Barrios

HENRY T. LEWIS





## 11 LANDLORD AND TENANT

### THE ASYMMETRIC DYADIC RELATIONSHIP

There are four ways of deriving income from land: as landlord, owner-operator, tenant, or laborer. All four commonly involve different kinds and sets of interpersonal relationships and social ties. The most commonly seen relationships are those which take place in the context of field work: the shared exchange and the contracting of labor, *ammuyo* and *pakiawen*, discussed in the previous chapter. *Ammuyo* and *pakiawen* relate directly to the needs of agricultural work, they are not functions of landownership.

The landlord-tenant relationship is both situationally and structurally different from the exchange of labor. It can be viewed in terms of the second type of dyadic contract proposed by Foster in which "patron-client contracts tie people of significantly different socio-economic status . . . who exchange different kinds of goods and services. Patron-client contracts are phrased vertically, and they can be thought of as asymmetrical since each partner is quite different from the other in position and obligations" (1963:1281).

The asymmetrical dyadic contract is applicable to the landlord-tenant relationship in Ilocos Norte and Isabela in some instances but not in others. The most characteristic form of the landlord-tenant relationship involves people of obviously different socio-economic statuses, usually an upper-class townsman and a rural, lower-class farmer. If the landlord and tenant are not of different status positions, they cannot enter into an asymmetric dyadic contract. There are numerous tenants in Buyon and Mambabanga who work for upper-class landlords; there are also many who work for local, barrio-resident landlords with whom there are little or no social differences. A knowledge of the different forms of landlordism and tenancy is necessary to understand the wider social and economic situation.

The four means for deriving income from land are not simply four separate status groupings: they constitute but four of the fifteen possible ways by which individuals may relate to and derive

income from land. The fifteen ways of classifying people according to land-use relationships are:

- |   |                                   |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. landlord                               | 9. owner-operator                 |
| 2. landlord:owner-operator                | 10. owner-operator:tenant         |
| 3. landlord:tenant                        | 11. owner-operator:laborer        |
| 4. landlord:laborer                       | 12. owner-operator:tenant:laborer |
| 5. landlord:owner-operator:tenant         | 13. tenant                        |
| 6. landlord:owner-operator:laborer        | 14. tenant:laborer                |
| 7. landlord:owner-operator:tenant:laborer | 15. laborer                       |
| 8. landlord:tenant:laborer                |                                   |

Yet, although individuals in both Buyon and Mambabanga can be so classified, the above classification is not one employed by the people in Buyon and Mambabanga. The fifteen possible permutations do not constitute a folk system of classification. To be a landlord or a working landowner (i.e., owner-operator) is important in terms of the overall status ranking system, but the different positions and the combination of these positions are far from being the only variables involved in status ranking. The point being made is that the landlord-tenant relationship does not necessarily involve people who are of unequal socioeconomic status. Equality or inequality is not based simply or exclusively upon the land-use relationship. The nature of any landlord-tenant tie depends upon the socioeconomic status of any two individuals who enter into a particular contract. One factor involved, of course, is the individual's respective position in that contract as either landlord or tenant. His position can and does influence his place in the status ranking system, but it alone does not determine his rank. The various facets of tenancy develop in the following ways.

A family may own land so far from its own barrio that it must lease that land to an individual living in a barrio nearer the fields. Then, because they no longer derive the full produce from the land, the family must often work as tenants on lands nearer at hand. Persons too old to work or widows without able sons may derive their subsistence income as landlords. The leasing of land in these cases is not based upon the owner having too much or even enough land, nor does it normally improve his social standing. In Mambabanga there are a few families that own more land than they can farm and the "surplus" is leased out to tenants. Still other families have jobs in town, are school teachers in the barrio, or are overseers and assistants to the large absentee landlords, and have neither time nor need to work all the lands they may own. Such people are usually of relatively higher status but rank does not accrue to them simply because they are landlords. Yet, what-

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ever the "real" social position of landlord and tenant may be, the landlord-tenant contract is not an equal or essentially reciprocal relationship. Although the social positions of the two individuals may not be different, the obligations involved in the contract do differ, and the way is open for the development or use of status distinctions. The relationship is unequal if for no other reason than that it involves control of land use and this control ultimately resides with the landlord, whatever his relative status or class position. Thus, although being a landlord does not automatically establish or reflect status differences, it is basic for obtaining and maintaining social position. Landlord-tenant contracts between persons of unequal class or status position differ significantly from those between social equals.

## THE EXCHANGE OF "EXTRA" GOODS AND SERVICES

There is always one kind of exchange, and there can be two, involved in the landlord-tenant contract. The first exchange is basic to tenancy and is essentially economic: the tenant pays a percentage of the crop for the right to farm a piece of land. In Mambabanga this exchange involves the division of the rice crop on a 70-30 basis, the tenant receiving the larger share. In Buyon the crop is divided on a 50-50 basis. These arrangements, which are discussed below, apply to the landlord-tenant contract regardless of social differences involved; they concern the minimal, irreducible economic consideration—the division of the crop. The second kind of exchange, which is not always performed, concerns the flow of "extra" goods and services between landlord and tenant. This involves doing favors, some solicited, some unsolicited, but all expected in terms of that particular relationship. This kind of exchange is commonly carried out where a significant status or a real class difference exists, and in this context landlord and tenant are also patron and client. It characteristically involves expected patterns of behavior which reflect and, at the same time, reinforce the status or class difference. For instance, the tenant may take his landlord firewood or a vegetable from his garden when he visits town. He will perhaps help his landlord build a fence or he may come occasionally to clean up around the landlord's home. The tenant's wife may assist the landlord's family during a party or wedding. Of special political importance is the fact that the tenant will often defer to the landlord's choice and recommendation of a candidate for elective office. In return the

landlord may assist his tenant in settling a tax problem or in obtaining legal advice. He might assist a near relative of the tenant to obtain a job or an appointment with a municipal official. He may provide medicine during an illness in the tenant's family or even advance him money until after the harvest. He will often act as sponsor at the marriage of a tenant's child.

The goods and services in this type of exchange are unequal and of a quite different kind. It is the most common asymmetrical dyadic relationship found between lower-class, landless tenants and upper-class landlords. The services provided by the tenant are of a type which the landlord, a member of the upper class, would not, and in some cases cannot, do for himself. Conversely, the landlord provides services for his tenant which normally are beyond the reach of lower-class persons. Such vertical exchanges are basic to the maintenance and reinforcement of status and class differences. They are also of primary importance to the operation and composition of politically important alliance systems. In addition to providing the upper-class landlord with goods and services, the relationship necessarily involves interpersonal behavior appropriate to the social distance involved: terms of address employed, speech intonations, physical attitude, a degree of humility, and a submissive, reserved familiarity—all the social ingredients necessary in relating to a member of the elite, a *baknang*. Though the landlord-tenant contract is not the only way in which people gain and maintain social position, it constitutes the single most important relationship influencing and reflecting status and class position.

The immediate and direct economic value of this exchange is normally greater for the tenant than for the landlord, in both relative and absolute terms. For instance, the landlord can hire others to provide the same services given by the tenant, whereas the tenant is seldom in a position to obtain for himself that which the landlord can provide. The landlord has contacts (symmetrical dyadic contracts) with others of the elite and can unlock doors in the social-political setting of the town, especially in the municipal government, where the tenant must occasionally involve himself and where he lacks effective social ties. In addition, the tenant gains the local, barrio prestige of being linked to an important person. Thus, where class and status positions are different, the landlord-tenant contract can provide extra socioeconomic benefits to both patron and client.

Whether or not these additional exchanges are part of the land-

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lord-tenant contract involves more than just the question of whether or not the landlord is a social equal or someone of the upper class. Of primary importance is the relative need of the individual tenant for the kinds and degrees of socioeconomic security which a *baknang* can provide. In Buyon, the landlord-tenant tie can be an important source, both real and potential, of social and economic security. It often is of more "profit" to the tenant than to the landlord, despite the real disparity in power and position of landlord and tenant.<sup>1</sup> In Mambabanga both real and relative needs are not so great and, consequently, tenants are less willing to enter into the exchange of "extra" goods and services, and, as shall be seen, this feature of the landlord-tenant relationship is less commonly found in Isabela. Under "normal" circumstances the relationship is nurtured by the recognition of social obligations by both landlord and tenant, the recognition that both parties are involved in a "debt of honor," or *utang a naimbag iti nakem*. The social effectiveness of the moral obligation involved is validated and maintained with the continued exchange of goods and services.

THE MORAL IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE  
PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Ideally, the emphasis of the landlord-tenant relationship is upon a *social* obligation. When the goods and services used assume a real, material importance out of proportion to their symbolic importance, the tie becomes morally impoverished. This condition is especially pronounced in Ilocos Norte where such services from the tenant are expected more and more as part of the basic, economic relationship between landlord and tenant. Ideally, the goods and services are seen as gifts which "simply" accompany an economic relationship; they are prestations which are, as Marcel Mauss notes, "in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested" (Mauss 1954:1). Very often, however, this exchange is only a means by which the landlord derives more from the leasing of his minuscule fields than the formal 50-50 division of the rice crop. Where land is scarce, the goods and services involved can be used, both by landlord and tenant, in bargaining for the tenancy contract itself. In the municipality of Bacarra, it is less a moral obligation that links the tenant to the landlord than it is the bare economic necessities of life on the Ilocos coast.

In Mambabanga, where the tenant works six or seven times as much land, the arrangements again differ from what would be expected under "usual" or ideal circumstances. Although one sees deference and appropriate behavior being accorded upper-class landlords, much less commonly does one observe tenants actually performing the extra services for landlords. In Isabela it is the upper-class landlords who complain that tenants are "not like they are in other places." Some tenants provide landlords extra services, but most consider this an unnecessary economic burden. If landlords become too demanding, (by standards the tenants consider appropriate in Isabela), there are always other landlords to work for or, as a last resort, new lands to be pioneered in the Sierra Madres. The tenant in Mambabanga is willing to pay due respect and act properly toward persons of social and political importance. He will, if possible and practical, defer to the advice of a landlord on voting. But, beyond the show of deference and proper behavior, the tenant is normally unwilling to contribute material goods and services. In addition to the fact that the average tenant in Mambabanga has greater socioeconomic security, most of the tenant-farmed lands are owned by absentee landlords and the contracts with their overseers are essentially commercial in character. Many landlords do not even live in Isabela, and the moral, obligatory character of the landlord-tenant tie, i.e., the patron-client relationship, is simply precluded under these conditions. The relative abundance of land with alternate opportunities for tenancy prevents the landlord from getting extra economic and social advantages from this relationship. At the same time, those upper-class landlords who do reside in Isabela, many of whom live in the countryside, cannot demand the goods and services which landlords require of their tenants in Ilocos Norte. Depending upon individual circumstances and inclination (especially toward politics), they will establish wider or narrower sets of obligations with their tenants.

The formal relationship involving the actual division of the crop illustrates the relative difference in socioeconomic security between Ilocos Norte and Isabela. Tenancy laws in the Philippines require that the rice crop be divided on the basis of 70 percent for the tenant and 30 percent for the landlord. In Mambabanga the 70-30 division is practiced in almost every instance.<sup>2</sup> In Buyon, on the other hand, the rice crop is allocated on the basis of a 50-50 division without exception. There is no attempt to conceal the "illegal" 50-50 sharing arrangement. Quite the contrary, it is

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readily admitted and openly practiced by everyone. Enforcement of the tenancy law is not possible or even considered. The problem of being a tenant in Buyon is further intensified by the fact that landlords of the same or nearly the same social status as the tenant, as well as upper-class landlords, require the extra services. In these cases, the extra services are but a part of the contract bargain with little or no deference shown the *barrio* landlord. There are still other mitigating factors relating to the kind and number of services involved. The *barrio* landlord must often acknowledge other obligations and often tenants are the landlord's own neighbors or relatives. In these instances the extra services may be considerably reduced or eliminated. When, however, the tenant is of a different *barrio*, or is more distantly removed, socially and geographically, in his own *barrio*, some extra services are expected. In general, the lower-class landlord, unless a close relative, is much less desirable than the upper-class landlord who lives in town, because the landlord without wealth normally requires some services but can provide nothing in return. In Buyon the question was asked, "What good is a poor landlord? What can he do for you?"

The landlord-tenant relationship in Buyon is complicated still further. In Mambabanga the full-time tenant works for two, or occasionally three, landlords, but he seldom performs extra services for them. In Buyon the full-time tenant works for ten or even more different landlords, most of whom require extra services. In addition, the upper-class townsmen are involved in different political alliances with different partisan loyalties, and they may make conflicting demands for the political support of the tenant. Such problems are not easily resolved, and, in consequence, it is not uncommon for tenant lands to be "reshuffled" following an election. The failure to acquire another plot of land in the "redistribution," or simply the fear of such a situation, is one of the many pressures on the landless tenant to emigrate.

Recent history in Ilocos Norte has provided still another complication of the tenancy situation. As mentioned in chapter 3, many of the large landholdings of the upper class were mortgaged piecemeal, often to *barrio* people who were receiving funds from relatives newly employed in Hawaii, California, and elsewhere. When the upper-class owners were unable to pay off such mortgages, the lands were often taken over by the tenant moneylender, not uncommonly the same tenant working the land. In other instances the mortgagee was not a tenant, or at least not the tenant

farming the particular field concerned, and, no longer "protected" by the patron-client relationship to the former landlord, lost the lands which had been traditionally his to work. Usually the new, lower-class landlord either wanted to work the lands himself or else he permitted a relative or close friend to work them. All of this tended to increase the insecurity of landless tenants and to stimulate further emigration.

Landlord-tenant relationships are essentially the same in Buyon and Mambabanga. In both barrios, they are directly related to both the wider and the specific social differences which exist between people of different classes. Both barrios have contracts where persons are of the same general status position and both have contracts which exist between people of different status and class positions. In each barrio there are examples of the extra exchange, the moral obligation involving the respective exchange of goods and services between patron and client. These relationships are felt rather than defined, and continue over time with no apparent attempt to reach a "balance." Ideally the landlord-tenant relationship involving this extra exchange is one in which both patron and client benefit. It should be an exchange which is essentially based on the prestations of gift and counter-gift giving, and should involve emotionally important obligations. However, as mentioned above, the relationship can be used to serve personal needs and interests both in bargaining initially for the tenancy and subsequently for exploiting an established relationship. The personal or material gain is used and manipulated by both landlord and tenant. Because land is relatively scarce in both areas and because the relationship is, by definition, unequal, the advantage normally rests with the landlord. In Buyon and Mambabanga the relationship is used by both patron and client, depending upon the particular circumstances and upon the wider socioeconomic considerations which tend to favor one or the other. Where it does "work" to the benefit of both parties, it is reinforced and given meaning by the moral principles of Ilocano culture which stress the recognition of a "debt of honor" and the avoidance of personal shame. This, too, is necessarily involved in defining the need for socioeconomic security.

In Mambabanga the interpersonal involvement of landlord and tenant is not of special importance. Much of the land is farmed for absentee landlords, and the social-emotional content of these ties is all but nonexistent. Also, tenants are able to avoid or ignore the material, economic burdens of the asymmetrical dyadic contract.



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
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Because their economic need is not so pressing, they can manipulate these aspects of the relationship.

The tenant in Buyon is caught in a system of conflicting demands and pressures with few corresponding social or economic rewards. Thus, a relationship which should afford social and emotional security as well as economic safeguards instead intensifies social uncertainties and increases the economic burden.

## NOTES

1. I was both amused by, and suspicious of, a comment made by an upper-class landlord in Laoag to the effect that tenants "exploited" landlords in Ilocos Norte. Although "exploitation" by the tenants is perhaps a gross exaggeration of what occurs, there was an implied recognition of the fact that tenants attempt to manipulate (often successfully) the relationship with a landlord. Few anthropologists need to be reminded of their own involvement with, and manipulation by, "simple primitive" or "peasant folk." However, local landlords understand the "rules of the game" better than an uninitiated, socially naive anthropologist does.
2. The 70-30 split occurs where the tenant provides the work animals and tools which most tenants ordinarily possess. When these are provided by the landlord other arrangements in the division of the crop are made which, of course, give more to the landlord. However, in some instances a one-third/two-thirds division is made, giving the landlord a small advantage of three-and-one-third percent, this often being the arrangement between kinsmen and friends.



(After official maps of the Philippine Board of Technical Surveys & Maps)

## 12 IRRIGATION SOCIETIES: ZANGJERAS

### THE HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE IRRIGATION SOCIETIES IN ILOCOS NORTE AND ISABELA

Ilocano irrigation societies were reported as early as 1914 by E. B. Christie who provided the first substantial ethnographic reports on the Ilocos area. The *zangjera*,<sup>1</sup> or cooperative irrigation society, is a special development of Ilocanos in Ilocos Norte. Keesing referred to Ilocano irrigation societies and, on the basis of early Spanish reports, dated their origin at about 1630 (1962:145; 305-307). Although they may date even earlier, perhaps predating Spanish contact,<sup>2</sup> they are quite old and their age suggests an early population density of some significance. What relationships and significance the irrigation societies may have had for population density and why they occurred in Ilocos Norte and not elsewhere are questions which cannot be answered here. Demography, climate, and topography are undoubtedly important factors and to these one might add the Ilocano personality type ("hardworking, thrifty, industrious"), except that there are no irrigation societies in Ilocos Sur or La Union.

The manifest function of irrigation societies is simply to procure a stable, reliable supply of water, which can increase crop production in some cases by more than half. Given this goal, the *zangjeras* employ a wide variety of organizational means and methods. It should be stressed, however, that these variations do not reflect different "types" of irrigation societies; they simply reflect various solutions to different technological problems. For instance, some *zangjeras* are restricted to membership from within a single barrio. Such "restrictions" are incidental, however, and *zangjera* membership is invariably independent of barrio membership. The point is that *zangjeras* are not designed to correspond to the members or geographical boundaries of the barrio; they are designed only for obtaining water for particular field areas.

Most *zangjeras* have members from two, three, and more barrios with some of the largest societies having members from ten or twelve. In some *zangjeras* the members are all landowners; in

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some, landowners and tenants; and, in several, all members are tenants. In a few, formal ownership of the land is vested in the zangjera itself with members owning only use-rights to the land. Some societies are dominated by one or more family groups while others have no suggestion of extended family control. In one instance, in a barrio near the poblacion of Piddig, an irrigation society is an independent group which sells or leases water for a percentage of the crop. The members of this "professional" irrigation group farm no land (at least as members) themselves. In the final analysis, membership is "decided" by the hydraulic engineering employed by Ilocanos to get water, and a wide variety of social ties and relationships becomes involved. As Leach has noted for the village of Pul Eliya in Ceylon, the "inflexibility of topography" and the "crude nursery facts . . . that water evaporates and runs down hill" are inescapable conditions for the social organization of zangjeras (1961:9).

Within the municipality of Bacarra there are twenty-six zangjeras ranging in size from less than six hectares to more than one hundred hectares. In the whole of Ilocos Norte there are reported to be 185 societies in all.<sup>3</sup> Among the individual zangjeras there are various "levels" of intersocietal cooperation. The complex of dams, canals, reservoirs, and drain-off systems has resulted in the need for a wide number of verbal and written agreements between zangjeras in any given area. Different zangjeras may share the use of a main canal or even a single diversion dam. In other instances, where there are several *padul*, or diversion dams, located along a desirable section of a river, a number of zangjeras will have agreed to cooperate on the repair of dams damaged or destroyed during the monsoonal flooding. Different societies may have interconnecting canals by which water from one system can be diverted to another system which has become temporarily inoperative. Drain-off water from one system may be used to supplement the basic water supply of a nearby or adjacent society. Usually one irrigation society will be involved with several other societies in various sets of mutually cooperative relationships. As a consequence, the interdependence of various zangjeras tends to moderate any conflicts which might arise among them.

In the Bacarra area, forty zangjeras (including several from the adjacent municipalities of Vintar, Laoag, and Pasuquian) form the *Federation of Communal Irrigation Systems for Bacarra*, an organization which acts to settle disputes between its members and acts on behalf of the membership on matters of political importance,

especially those relating to government irrigation developments. The federation operates in situations, internal and external, which threaten one, more than one, or all members, but it exerts no direct control over the "internal affairs" of any single zangjera. Individual societies may join or withdraw as they so choose. Leadership in the federation is elective, and the president of the group is an important and influential man in Bacarra politics. He is a member of two zangjeras and president of still another.

The area of land occupied by all zangjeras in Ilocos Norte is estimated to be in excess of 17,000 hectares. Christie's (1914:99) report from over fifty years ago gives 15,000 hectares, which, as far as figures go, is not inconsistent with current estimates. Unfortunately, however, both figures are probably considerably excessive. Estimates in many instances are confused or exaggerated by the fact that most irrigation societies sell water to nonmembers whose lands border the systems, and such lands are often included in government estimates as being within the zangjera. In several instances the area of nonmember lands actually exceeds those formally within the system. Individual zangjeras also tend to exaggerate the size and importance of their organization, especially when government aid may be involved. In any event, the development of cooperative irrigation in Ilocos Norte is impressive, especially by comparison with other parts of the Philippines.

The above description of zangjeras hardly seems to apply to Isabela where there are so few of these organizations. Although immigrants in central Isabela were quick to obtain the water rights to their lands, few groups followed this up by developing cooperative systems. Most of the water used to irrigate the rice-growing fields of Isabela comes from a single source: the 30,000-hectare government-constructed Magat River Irrigation Project located southwest of the town of San Mateo. Beyond the limits of the Magat system there are a few privately developed irrigation systems, usually the work of one of the large haciendas, or, very occasionally, an Ilocano zangjera. The actual number of cooperative systems outside the Magat River project is difficult to ascertain as records on these are much less complete. Some are but paper organizations, a few have ceased to function, others were absorbed by the Magat River project, and a few were appropriated by individuals. In all, there are probably no more than six effective irrigation societies (four were actually examined) in the whole of Isabela. They exist for the same reason that their "parent" organizations in Ilocos Norte exist: to provide irrigation water. They

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also exist because the migrants from Ilocos Norte had a history and tradition of irrigation cooperatives and possessed the knowledge and the incentive to construct them—something which the indigenous Ibanags and other immigrant lowland groups did not. The few zangjeras in Cagayan Valley were all constructed by Ilocano immigrants from Ilocos Norte.

Yet, the same ecological conditions which encourage the operation of zangjeras in Ilocos Norte were absent (and, for the most part, still are absent) in Isabela. Zangjeras in Isabela "suffer" as a consequence of the relative prosperity of the people and agriculture in Cagayan Valley. The few zangjeras there function quite differently than do those in Ilocos Norte because there is less need for irrigation and because the social factors relating to irrigation societies are so different. This is especially evident with regard to the derivative functions of zangjeras in the two provinces.

## IRRIGATION COOPERATIVES IN AND NEAR BUYON

The Laoag District Engineer's Office lists two zangjeras as being located in Buyon: the Zangjera de Camungao and Zangjera San Antonio. Most members of the Zangjera de Camungao live in Buyon, and a large number of those in the Zangjera San Antonio also live there. The land for both cooperatives is located generally within the formal boundaries of Buyon. Eight other zangjeras also have members living within Buyon, the most distant of these zangjeras being about three kilometers away. The bamboo and rock diversion dams for both Camungao and San Antonio are located on the Bacarra-Vintar River just south and west of the town of Vintar (see map 2). The main canal for Camungao is approximately three kilometers long; the main canal for San Antonio is about one kilometer. About one kilometer northwest of the town of Vintar, and for another one-half kilometer downriver, there are four dams representing five irrigation cooperatives: the first and farthest upstream belongs to the Zangjera Narpayat; farther downstream is the dam belonging to San Antonio; the third dam is used by Camungao and the Zangjera Dibua; the fourth and farthest downstream belongs to the Zangjera Curarig. For specific problems associated with the dams, these five zangjeras will act as a single, essentially cooperative, group. For instance, when any single dam of the four is damaged or when excessive silting has occurred at the entrance to a main canal, all five zangjeras will act together as a cooperative body to undertake repairs.

In addition to the arrangement among these five zangjeras, there are several sets of relationships within this group of five, plus special arrangements by one or more with still other zangjeras affected by their operations. For instance, the main canals from all four dams pass through the lands irrigated by Narpayat, San Antonio, and another zangjera, the Zangjera Bangbangkag. Camungao and Dibua share a single main canal which continues past Camungao's lands and through the lands of Zangjera Curarig. The main canal of Curarig passes through Camungao, and some of the overflow from Camungao is emptied into the Curarig system. Where the main canals of the upstream systems pass over (via stone or brick aqueducts) the canals of the more downstream systems, arrangements have been made for diverting an emergency supply of water from the higher into the lower system. In addition to the primary source of irrigation water supplied by the diversion dams, there are secondary water sources—creeks, springs, secondary diversion dams, water drained off from other systems—which are utilized by one or more of the cooperatives. All of these arrangements involve special agreements between two, and often more, of the zangjeras in any given area, and such agreements may involve either oral or written contracts.<sup>4</sup> The diversion, passage, and drainage of water involves a complexity of arrangements much greater than the simple bamboo dams would seem to suggest.

At the time of the field research, the Zangjera San Antonio was faced with problems of major proportions. A flood in late 1960 altered a main channel of the river and destroyed almost all of the member lands, and many of the nonmember lands, irrigated by the system. Some of the land which was not completely removed or buried under rock and gravel was being reconstructed. An attempt was being made to bring new members into the zangjera and some suggestions were even made that San Antonio should join with Camungao. Despite the seriousness of the situation, which involved the loss (since their lands were washed away) of working members, the Zangjera San Antonio remained a small but viable organization.

Camungao lands have suffered almost as badly as a consequence of a more prolonged process. The main channel of the Bacarra-Vintar River abruptly alters its east-west course below the main highway bridge at Bacarra; at that point it turns directly south to hit and turn again against the main lands of the Zangjera de Camungao (see map 5). The riverbank has become undermined at this point with chunks of land regularly dropping into the river.<sup>5</sup>

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Members of the zangjera claim that over three-fourths of the original lands have been washed away. Out of perhaps an original thirty hectares, the member lands of Camungao now number no more than six hectares. More land, thirteen hectares, is irrigated for nonmembers in Buyon than for members.

The organization of San Antonio is structured along more general lines: members own their own lands or are tenants for landowners. Each member contributes work on the repair of the dam and main canals. Individual members have to contribute small amounts of money to buy bamboo and other materials used in dam and canal construction. Nonmembers pay 10 percent of their production as the fee for using water, and, if they so desire, individuals may join as full participating members by contributing one-third the total amount of land to be irrigated (or an agreed upon equivalent) to the zangjera. Given the importance of land in Ilocos Norte, it is obvious that new members are not readily or regularly forthcoming, the 10 percent fee being the more usual agreement.

The Zangjera de Camungao has a unique system of organization which discourages potential members from joining. Instead of a group of individuals, each with his own or his landlord's land, the Camungao cooperative itself owns the land and controls the water rights. Individual members own only the use-rights to that land, rights which are invariably inherited, and, when available, the shares of which can be purchased for 250 pesos, or about one-fourth the local land value. The shares of land are about one *uyon* in size, or, translated into land measure, about one-fifteenth to one-tenth of a hectare (.16 to .25 of an acre). In some instances there are half, and even quarter, shares, these being the result of adjustments made over past years because of the continuous erosion of the land. In addition to individual member shares, there is a communal section of land representing two *uyons* (an area equal to two shares), which is set aside for the use of the zangjera as a whole. This section is cooperatively worked and provides the means for obtaining the necessary supplies used in the maintenance of the irrigation system. An additional half-share is also set aside for the head man, called the *pangulo* or *maestro*, as payment for the extra work he must perform. No one in Buyon knows the original basis for such an organization. The original "constitution" no longer exists but the written agreement, mentioned above, between Camungao and Dibua, dated 1937, states that the Zangjera de Camungao was founded in 1793. The name derives from a

local family, and a few people with the same name still belong to the organization. Whatever the historical origins for this kind of organization (and an extended kin group ownership seems the most reasonable guess), it is now virtually impossible to attract new members since the individual must give up formal ownership to his land. This, together with the continuous wearing away of lands by the river, means that the Zangjera de Camungao is faced with the possibility of losing all of its member lands.

The amount of work which an individual must do to maintain and repair a system in any given year is considerable. Damage to the bamboo and rock diversion dams can occur a number of times each year, especially during the monsoon and typhoon seasons.<sup>6</sup> Heavy silting occurs in the main canals, requiring considerable yearly maintenance throughout the system. As a consequence, each member must contribute from forty to sixty full working days a year. Fines are levied for work absences, and, if an absence continues, the loss of land may result. In Zangjera San Antonio, where members own their own land, repeated failure to attend work sessions can result "only" in the loss of water, but considering the importance of water and the thin margin of subsistence, the individual simply cannot afford to neglect his obligations to the zangjera.

In addition to the subsistence and technological demands of cooperation, there are certain social rewards, valuable in an environment where there are few such benefits. Camungao, like most zangjeras (though not San Antonio), has a meeting place, or *kamarin*, where, once each year following the harvest, a feast is held. Usually a religious personage is invited—it may be a Catholic priest, an official of the Aglipayan Church, or a Protestant missionary. Considerable amounts of food and drink are provided. Various kinds of meat (beef, pork, goat, sometimes dog) are eaten with rice, and large quantities of *basi*, or sugarcane wine, are consumed. Sometimes food offerings are made to the local spirits, though care is usually taken not to offend a priest or minister. Local and provincial politicians are often invited to these events. In the absence of barrio fiestas, these yearly feasts constitute the only community-wide celebrations in the area—the "community" being the zangjera, however, not the barrio. Yet, even work projects are occasions for some degree of sociability; food, such as that provided at the annual feast (items not normally eaten at everyday meals), is provided the working group and here, too, the favorite drink is *basi*. Money derived from the fines assessed



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against absentee members is usually insufficient to cover either the annual feast or the workday expenses since normally very few members are ever absent in a given year. During 1963, a total of fifty pesos (the usual fine being two and one-half pesos for each day's work missed) was collected with no fines outstanding. Funds for covering social expenses largely come from the income derived from selling water to outsiders.

## IRRIGATION COOPERATIVES IN AND NEAR MAMBABANGA

There are two zangjeras in the general area of Mambabanga: the Society Mambabanga and the Union Bacarrena.<sup>7</sup> The fact that people from Mambabanga belong to two zangjeras is certainly atypical for Isabela—especially since there are probably no more than six operative systems in the whole province. The zangjeras have not made Mambabanga more cohesive, however. The Society Mambabanga may be used as an example of what has happened to at least some of the early ideas and plans for developing irrigation which were based on the traditions brought by Ilocano immigrants into Cagayan Valley.

Water rights to the original land grant were acquired by the founders at the time the barrio was settled in 1918. However, no action was taken to develop an irrigation system until more than twenty years after this and only then because of the efforts of a single individual, whom we have called Mr. Cruz. During that twenty-year period Mr. Cruz had become the single largest landowner in Mambabanga, acquiring just over half of the original two-hundred-hectare land-grant purchase. From the very beginning, his holding of over forty-three hectares was the largest in the barrio; in the process of acquiring land from other less fortunate or less successful individuals he created considerable enmity and jealousy. At the same time, whether it was his original design (as some people contend) or not, his lands were strategically located further upstream on Macanao Creek, and consequently, nearest the dam. According to a number of persons in the barrio, he attempted to use this geographic position for his own personal gain. Even more animosity developed against him when, through a legal maneuver, he obtained the formal title to all water rights. A number of families in Mambabanga claimed that he used these rights and his location upstream to create difficult circumstances for the families more removed from the dam by withholding amounts of water at crucial times. By creating a severe hardship,

he attempted to buy up the lands of the more hard-pressed, small farmers. If this was his intention he was unsuccessful, for no new lands were added to his total holdings after the construction of the irrigation system.

Along with the development of his irrigation system, Mr. Cruz brought new tenants in to work his land; all of them settled in the western section of the barrio, or what is now Harana (see map 6). Most of Mr. Cruz's tenants were Ilocanos newly arrived from Pangasinan and considerably poorer than the people of Mambabanga, who considered them rude and aggressive—as the Ibanags had considered the people of Mambabanga a quarter of a century earlier. Partly because of the increasing animosity towards him and partly because of his age, Mr. Cruz sold the land and moved to a town located a considerable distance away.<sup>5</sup>

The sale of land took place in the mid-1950s after Harana had become a separate barrio. The new landowner was a Chinese mestizo who owned a large tract of land in Pangasinan, and many of the more recent tenants were attracted from his holdings there. This individual went out of his way to settle some of the problems created by the former landowner, and water is now distributed equitably to all members of the society. All people within the system, the tenants in Harana as well as a number of families in Mambabanga, are required to contribute work on the dam and on the main canals. The officers of the organization are almost all tenants of the new landowner, the reason being given that their residences are much closer to the dam and they are thus in a position to regularly check and control the flow of water. An annual feast is held each year following the harvest, and the large landholder makes the major contribution of food and drink on these occasions. Dominated as it is by a single, important individual, the Society Mambabanga is much less a communal effort than the other irrigation cooperative, the Union Bacarreña. The members in Mambabanga are happy with the system as it operates despite the fact that it was used quite differently by the former landholder, Mr. Cruz.

The Union Bacarreña covers about half again as much area as the Society Mambabanga, but not all of its over 300 hectares is regularly irrigated. Named after the Bacarra area, from which many of the original members had come, the Union Bacarreña was originally a group of immigrants who, like the settlers of Mambabanga, had applied for and purchased a land grant from the Friar Lands Estates. All of the Bacarreña land lies north of Macanao

Creek (see map 3). These settlers first established three different barrios: Puroc, where today almost a third (twenty-seven) of the members reside; the nearby barrio of Luna (now the poblacion of Luna), which has nineteen members; and the barrio of Concepcion, currently with eleven members. Through intermarriage and inheritance, memberships have spread to other barrios as well. The actual barrio sites having members in the Union Bacarreña are located on less fertile or higher spots of ground within or bordering the system of irrigated fields; Mambabanga, however, is located well outside the system. There are eleven members in Mambabanga. As mentioned in chapter 3, several families moved there from Concepcion following a flood in 1937, and it is these people and their offspring who are the members from Mambabanga.

In terms of formal organization, the Union Bacarreña is like the Zangjera San Antonio in Buyon: members own their own land; the society controls the water rights; individuals must contribute work on communal projects; water is sold to nonmembers; a feast is held each year. Both the Society Mambabanga and the Union Bacarreña take their water from Macanao Creek where Bacarreña has a concrete and log dam which backs the stream up to form a reservoir. Although this dam and the one of Society Mambabanga are subject to some damage by flooding, the threat of high water is never as serious as it is on one of the major rivers. Partly because of this, only one-third to one-half the number of workdays are required by Union Bacarreña members as are required of the zangjera members in Ilocos Norte where, as was mentioned, water is diverted from the Bacarra-Vintar River.

Even though members of the Union Bacarreña are less often called upon to work, they are also less willing to work. Some members regularly fail to appear for labor details, and fines assessed against them are often impossible to collect.<sup>9</sup> Many complain that the system itself is inadequate and that it only provides sufficient water for those fields nearest the water sources. Several individual members farthest removed from the dam, those most commonly affected by water shortages, withdrew entirely from the society. New members were solicited from among the outsiders buying water from the Bacarreña, but most prefer to pay the required 10 percent of their crop rather than contribute work on the system. New memberships were opened simply on the basis of participation, but no new members were forthcoming. The national government has twice provided financial assistance and

without this the Union Bacarrena would probably have had serious, if not insurmountable, maintenance problems. The stated hope is that the system will be eventually incorporated into the planned extension of the Magat River Irrigation Project which ends only a few kilometers away.

It is not greater motivation which makes zangjeras in Ilocos Norte work more "efficiently" than those in Isabela. Zangjeras (like varieties of rice, the cohesiveness of extended families, or the amount of money saved in banks) differ according to the circumstances. Although the physical environment has a direct effect on the operation of the zangjeras in two areas, there are important social factors as well. One of the most important of these is the relative significance, the variable latent function, which the zangjera has in the municipal and provincial political scene.

#### IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Like many other barrios involved in the pioneering development of Isabela, Mambabanga was formed out of common purpose and maintained out of shared needs and fears. A socioeconomic basis for barrio communalism still persists in Mambabanga, through a complex of overlapping and interrelated ego-centered work and landowning groups. Thus, both historical continuity and social interdependency are involved in what constitutes the community of Mambabanga. And, as we shall see in chapter 14, the annual barrio fiestas reflect the importance of the barrio as a socioeconomic unit in most of Isabela; the virtual absence of fiestas reflects the poverty of the barrio as a socioeconomic unit in Ilocos Norte.

In Buyon the historical conditions of barrio communalism are long forgotten. Because shared *ammuyo* work groups are virtually nonexistent and landownership is invariably a real or potential source of conflict, existing social ties are abbreviated and relatively ineffectual. In Ilocos Norte, only the zangjera forms a meaningful socioeconomic community of any size. Partly because the irrigation societies are effective social units and partly because of the nature of political activity in Ilocos Norte, zangjeras have assumed an importance and function considerably beyond the manifest purpose of providing irrigation water. A brief reexamination of the class and landowning situation is necessary to illustrate these relationships.

A traditional occupation for the Philippine elite has been to

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manage farm lands, sometimes directly, sometimes as absentee landlords. For what are essentially geographic and demographic reasons, the Ilocano elite (like the Ilocano non-elite) has been much less endowed with land than the upper class of other cultural groups in the Philippines. Because of this the Ilocano upper class has more often turned to politics. Reference has already been made to Hollnsteiner's (1963) and Lynch's (1959) work on the importance of the "alliance system." Beyond the relatively narrow limits of shared interests and individual loyalties, the most important component in maintaining alliance systems is wealth. This becomes especially important in the complex of alliance systems making up the larger alliance system and the following of a political person. Although wealth is so often the limiting factor in Ilocos Norte politics, it is to politics that so many of the elite want or need to turn. Intensification of political activity has developed in recent years with a growing number of non-elite persons turning to politics, individuals just as politically ambitious and just as wealthy—or poor—as the elite. The economic rewards of political life in the Philippines are always an inducement to seek elective office; and, corresponding to the relative impoverishment of all classes in the Ilocos area, political office has become that much more attractive and competitive.

Politically active persons have to involve themselves personally and directly with an ever growing number of associates who, in turn, have limited influence and political ambitions of their own. Thus, the promise of support in this election may be partly based upon supporting others in future elections. The consequent lack of continuity in office adds still more to political instability. Though often owning little land, the landowning elite attempt to make the widest use of their resources in property to influence a large number of people. Consequently, the landowner breaks his two- or three-hectare holdings into fifty to seventy-five tenth-of-an-acre plots to acquire as many tenants and, hopefully, as much support as possible. Other "political landowners" do likewise, so that a single tenant may be subject to the demands of several landowners, not one of whom has an exclusive "right" to his support. In the face of increasing competition and decreasing reserves of wealth and influence, the politically ambitious individual builds what he can on political promises, commitments, and social obligations—a precarious and often hazardous alliance system. Pressures and the potential for conflict continue to mount, competition increases, personnel shift between alliances, promises are made and

broken, animosity grows, and the final complication of political life in the Ilocos emerges: political warfare and feuding. In fact, political killings and terrorism have themselves become an important means to the realization of political ends—and not simply when all else has failed!

Within the Ilocos area itself there are significant differences in the intensity and instability of political life. This is most pronounced when comparing Ilocos Norte to the southern Ilocos area, particularly Ilocos Sur. During the election year of 1963 (a non-presidential off-year election) more than 100 "political" killings were reported for Ilocos Sur and twenty-five for Ilocos Norte.<sup>10</sup> The reason often given in Ilocos Norte for the difference is that Ilocos Sur has a particularly large number of *Bagos*, or "new Ilocanos," the new or recently Christianized Tinguians from adjacent Abra Province. The assimilation of Abra people may indeed play some part in this inasmuch as some of the most politically explosive areas border Abra, but just how or in what way is impossible to say here. The significant difference is in the presence of irrigation cooperatives in Ilocos Norte and the particular agricultural economy which exists in Ilocos Sur.

To illustrate, tobacco has been grown as a commercial second crop on the Ilocos coast since Spanish times and, in fact, in the late eighteenth century a revolt was narrowly averted in the Laoag area over the imposition of a tobacco monopoly by the Spanish colonial government. The varieties established early in that period, now called "native tobacco," are used for cigar production. A major change in tobacco production occurred shortly after World War II with the introduction of Virginia leaf tobacco which is better suited for cigarette production. In 1952 the national government established import duties and a local price support program to aid the growing industry and to protect the growers against foreign competition. Partly to keep the Chinese business interests from gaining control of the market and partly to gain political patronage, the program—grading, purchasing, payments, jobs, etc.—was administered by local political officeholders. This resulted in an intensification in the political alliance systems. First, it provided a means by which those in power could not only increase their rewards to the political faithful and attract new support, but could punish the opposition in terms of low gradings, delayed payments, etc. Second, it has made the attainment of political office increasingly more popular and correspondingly more competitive. Finally, it has made the individual farmer more

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independent and more difficult to reach by the traditional social and economic means. A study of the effects of Virginia tobacco in Ilocos Sur and La Union noted the following:

The economic prosperity of the farmfolk has somewhat lessened the tenant's subservience to his landlord in the matter of choosing national as well as local officials.

Political leanings of the Barrio folk are more influenced by material aid. . . . [Garcia, 1962:10]

Except in the southernmost section, relatively little Virginia leaf tobacco is grown in Ilocos Norte. This is apparent by the absence of tobacco-drying sheds north of Batac. The most important second crop in central and northern Ilocos Norte is either garlic or onions or, less commonly, the traditional "native tobacco." The sale and marketing of these are more subject to changes in the marketplace and not directly to changes in the local political system. The highly arid and extended dry season of Ilocos Norte which makes the growing of Virginia leaf unfeasible, probably influenced the early development of communal irrigation societies. Also, because of the longer growing period required for bayag varieties of rice, artificially irrigated lands are much less commonly planted to tobacco than are nonirrigated or naturally irrigated lands.

The irrigation societies constitute the second condition distinguishing the relative political stability of Ilocos Norte. The decline in affluence and influence of the upper class, the increasing isolation of the individual, the various interrelationships of these factors and the resulting weakness of the political alliance systems have already been outlined. Only the communal irrigation systems constitute relatively large and, at the same time, stable social groupings with shared community interests. These groupings generally must protect their water rights and obtain materials (especially cement and other building materials) to improve upon and maintain the irrigation works. The zangjeras, in the absence or incapacity of other social forms, particularly the barrios, are an important political resource. The backing of several irrigation systems can widen and extend the scope and effectiveness of a politician's alliance system. Because of the presence of zangjeras, and because of the corresponding absence of the highly political Virginia tobacco "industry," the political situation in Ilocos Norte is somewhat less intense than is the case further south. Competition for the zangjera vote is intense, and political violence is by

no means abrogated; but the influence of the irrigation societies in Ilocos Norte provides at least some block support together with a higher degree of voter predictability. The extremely individualized, intense house-to-house search for votes which is found in the southern Ilocos area is tempered and less frenetic. The difference is only relative, however, not absolute.<sup>11</sup>

#### POLITICS AND THE BARRIO

Political feuding does occur in Isabela, but it is by no means as pronounced or intense as it is in Ilocos Norte. It is normally the landed, elite class in Isabela, as elsewhere, which occupies itself with politics. The builder of a personal political alliance system there is wealthier, and has a relatively large and stable social group, the *barrio*, to which he can appeal. Though tenants in Isabela are relatively independent and can usually find other lands to work, nonetheless, landlords do exert considerable influence over the voting of their tenants. It is, after all, the landlords who ultimately control part or all of the tenants' means of livelihood. Yet, as mentioned earlier, this superordinate-subordinate relationship is not without its rewards for both parties, and the tenant does not feel particularly coerced or forced into voting against his will. In fact, except where the charisma or ethnic position of a candidate intervenes, the *barrio* voter will make his choice according to the immediate and practical considerations relating to his voting—his landlord's wishes, his ties with *barrio* mates, the promises made by a candidate, an obligation to a friend, relative, or *compadre*, the need to sell a vote, and so on. Because *barrios* are effective social units, they can often be influenced to vote for one party or alliance system. The older *barrios*, such as Mambabanga, vote along traditional lines which have been maintained and nurtured by both voter and politician. Although particular *barrios* are often described as "Liberal" or "Nationalist," what is meant, in fact, is that these *barrios* have traditionally supported particular alliance systems in Luna which are associated with one of the national parties.

Mambabanga differs from some *barrios* in that it is split into Liberal and Nationalist factions; yet the split is along traditional, essentially predictable social lines. The original settlers of Mambabanga have traditionally given support to certain alliance systems which are now identified as Liberal. This is also true of Harana, in



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large part a result of Harana's having been a sitio of Mambabanga, so that all of Harana and most of Mambabanga identify with Liberal Party candidates. Of the sixty-one houses in the barrio, thirty-six identify with Liberal Party candidates; nineteen claim to have traditionally supported the Nationalists; and two claim to be "nonaligned." These latter two families are very recent arrivals, one having ties established in the town of Cabatuan and the other not having yet established itself. The nineteen supporters of Nationalist candidates are all members of the families which moved to Mambabanga from Concepcion in 1937. The thirty-six families which support Liberal Party candidates are the descendants of the original settlers in Mambabanga plus several "converts" from the later arrivals. Most of these converts from the Nationalist group are second-generation families or families from Concepcion who intermarried with the original Mambabanga families. Although most of the late arrivals from Concepcion still own land and have important economic and social ties in the old area, they have become increasingly involved and interdependent with the original Mambabanga families. Mambabanga now holds a rather special position in the municipal political scene for it can deliver a pivotal block of votes in an election. The barrio people, as a consequence, have profited from both sides.

Irrigation societies in Isabela, on the other hand, are almost nonfunctional with respect to political life. While politicians seldom miss the opportunity to speak at a gathering of either the Society Mambabanga or the Union Bacarra, it is to the barrios that they direct most of their political efforts. Besides the fact that barrios are socially and economically important, the irrigation societies in Isabela are simply too few and too poorly organized to constitute an important political focus. In Isabela, because of the interdependency of various socioeconomic ties, the barrios are significant politically. In Ilocos Norte, because of real social and economic poverty, the zangjeras partly fill a political vacuum from which they are able to profit. Thus, communal, cooperative efforts to obtain water by the same cultural group have been applied in two environmental settings with strikingly different results. All this points up the fact that the behavior of a given group does not result from social arrangements or cultural tradition or environment alone. The behavior of Ilocanos in both Buyon and Mambabanga is a consequence of the shared social and cultural traditions as those traditions relate to and are interrelated with their respective natural and social environments.

## NOTES

1. The name apparently derives from the Spanish word *zanja*, an irrigation ditch or conduit. At first glance the word *zangjera* (sometimes spelled *sanghera* or *sanbera*) might suggest that it was derived from *sangre*, or blood, but I was informed, on good authority, that this is not so. At the time, the suggestion of a link to the word *sangre* seemed pregnant with meaning for the kinship system!
2. Keesing's evidence, from the Blair and Robertson collection (1903-09: vol. 7, p. 174; vol. 12, p. 210) is based upon references by Spanish priests who were developing irrigation systems at "mission-created settlements." There are no comments, unfortunately, as to whether or not such irrigation projects existed elsewhere but there is no reason why the Spanish should have limited such success to the northern Ilocos area. The use of a Spanish-derived word, *zangjera*, is not necessarily solid evidence for origins since there is an Ilocano equivalent, *pasayak*. Also, none of the technical or operational terms associated with *zangjeras* are of Spanish derivation; all are Ilocano words—*puttot*, a dam for stopping water; *padul*, a diversion dam across a large stream or river; *kali*, a main canal; *aripit*, a small ditch; *sayugan*, a flume; *bingai*, a share or membership; *ganglo*, working sections of land; *kamarin*, a community meeting place; etc. We are not, however, considering etymology here.
3. Some of the more general figures and information on *zangjeras* outside the Buyon area were graciously provided me by the Bureau of Public Works, Office of the District Engineer in Laoag. Francisco T. Tamayo, the senior civil engineer, was especially helpful. However, neither he nor other members of the District Engineer's Office are in any way responsible for the interpretation given the data here.
4. A written contractual arrangement exists between the *Zangjera Camungao* and the *Zangjera Dibua* with regard to sharing the diversion dams and main canal. There are, however, no written agreements between the *Zangjera Camungao* and the other *zangjeras* regarding the various other intersocietal arrangements mentioned. Whether such "contracts" are written or simply verbal should not be taken as an indication of the relative importance of one agreement over another. All such contracts have relative and immediate importance with regard to the particular needs and problems solved in any given agreement, and the existence of a written contract can be related to the specific circumstances and the particular individuals concerned at a given time and place.

The written agreement between *Camungao* and *Dibua* was made in 1937 and is written in Spanish. I was somewhat bothered by the fact that Spanish was used because, as far as I could ascertain, none of the members of either *zangjera* spoke any Spanish. The officers of *Zangjera Camungao* were good enough to loan me the contract which was duly translated and I subsequently provided the members with the English translation. Two of the officers expressed their thanks for copies which

*Irrigation Societies: Zangjeras*



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
they could read and both agreed that it said, in fact, what everyone thought it said. My question as to why it was written in Spanish instead of Ilocano, or even English, was answered by the older members. They informed me that it was drawn up for them by a local lawyer who felt that Spanish was the appropriate "legal language." The written document was, in effect, a symbolic, essentially decorative, gesture involved in a *real* social contract.

5. This was instrumental in bringing about the sharing of the same canal and dam by Camungao and Dibua. The main canal of Dibua was located along the northern border of Camungao but was lost to erosion by the river. In 1937, the two zangjeras agreed to share both dam and main canal plus all construction and maintenance work. Because Dibua is considerably larger, Camungao was "compensated" for having to widen the canal by acquiring three times the labor force it could normally muster for itself.
6. A comment is perhaps necessary about the dams. One of the first statements made by Christie (1914:99) concerns the "crudely constructed dams" which are "either completely destroyed each year or require considerable repairing." These rock and bamboo dams are not, however, as impractical as Christie suggests. Bamboo is relatively cheap, and rock and cooperative labor involve no formal expense; in addition, the dams are comparatively easy to repair. Without government aid and assistance, a concrete dam would be prohibitively expensive to construct, and, except on the smaller streams, impossible to maintain. Such a dam was constructed for the Zangjera Curarig at the lower end of Tamucalao Creek (see map 5) and, during the flooding of 1960, the dam was broken. After the flood Curarig rebuilt their bamboo diversion dam on the river. The traditional bamboo and rock dams, being so easy to repair and replace, are more "reliable." The danger from flooding comes at the middle of the rice-growing season when there can be no delays such as waiting for the dry season or waiting for government assistance. A concrete dam is practical only in a society which can afford the time, money, and delay involved in construction, maintenance, and repair. The people in Ilocos Norte can afford none of these.
7. Only the older men and more recent immigrants to Isabela refer to irrigation cooperatives by the term zangjera; invariably the Ilocano term *pasayak* is used. I never noted the use of Spanish words, except for *sombra*, or sluice, used with reference to a *pasayak*. The honorific term *don* was used in some instances in Ilocos Norte as a term of address to the zangjera officers, but it was never used in Isabela. Ilocano terms were always used.
8. Shortly after my arrival in Mambabanga a legal case which developed from the sale of this land was completed in Luna. Mr. Cruz was taken to court by his brother, a Hawaiian and a resident of the United States, who contended that he had financed Mr. Cruz for the initial purchases and the subsequent additions to that land. Mr. Cruz claimed that this was

not true and, since no formal agreement existed between the brothers, the claimant from the United States lost his case. Although quick to state that this was very un-Filipino-like behavior, the people in Mambabanga were not unduly surprised, for the incident corroborated what they already "knew" about the character of Mr. Cruz. My own opinion is that such behavior between close kinsmen, in this case siblings, is not as uncommon as anthropological literature would suggest.

9. During my field research period, the officers of the Bacarreña met to take formal, legal action against recalcitrant members. The amounts due in outstanding fines were totaled up and a list was made of all persons in arrears. This caused some embarrassment since 90 percent of the members, including most officers, had outstanding debts! The list was shortened to include the "really" outstanding debtors, those owing P1,000 or about \$250, and even this amounted to over 30 percent of the members. A local attorney in Luna who acts as their legal representative informed the officers that their "constitution" had no formal, legal status so there was no legal way to enforce the fines. The attorney was well aware of the social importance of a *zangiera*, and informed them that "to be a cooperative you must cooperate!" The concerned members then asked the municipal mayor to speak to the delinquent members. This action was considered by the older members to be especially bad policy. It would have been understandable in dealing with another organization, they said, but it was inappropriate for outsiders to settle an internal problem. The mayor called a special meeting in Luna where he admonished the delinquents to live up to their responsibilities; characteristically, however, most of the very delinquent members were absent and most of the fines remained unpaid.
10. It is difficult to distinguish between "political" and "nonpolitical" killings. Authorities in Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur are understandably reluctant to add more publicity to that which they already receive. Consequently exact figures are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Though the newspapers perhaps tend to exaggerate the number of shootings, it is also true that not all shootings are reported to the newspapers.
11. In November 1963, just before an election, an ambush occurred outside the poblacion of Bacarra which resulted in the death of four persons, one of whom was the Liberal Party candidate for mayor of that town. The attack was explained as being the result of a long-standing blood feud between the candidate for mayor and the leader of the ambush group. The complex of relationships within each group (the attackers and those attacked), between the two groups, and in the web of sociopolitical systems and subsystems in Bacarra was fantastically involved. It stands as a classic—and very tragic—example of the highly involved and unstable nature of alliance networks in the Ilocos area.





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## ALTERNATIVE OUTLINES FOR A HALF-SEMESTER COURSE IN PHILIPPINE AGRARIAN REFORM

### Introduction

FRANK LYNCH  
August 30, 1972

Since July 1968 every private Philippine high school, college, and university has been required to offer a course on "Taxation and Land Reform." According to the Bureau of Private Schools document which made this innovation compulsory,

The curricular offering on Taxation should include, among others, the need for tax consciousness as a civic responsibility, the structure of our tax system, and the continuing program of tax collection. The offering on Land Reform should include the objectives of the Land Reform Program, the agencies and activities of implementation, and its importance and implications (Circular no. 4, series of 1968, dated April 5, 1968).

In the suggested content for both subjects one notes a heavy emphasis on the normative and structural, on the laws' objectives and the frameworks erected for their realization. One finds no explicit provision for the student's enlightenment on the present state of affairs in matters of taxation and land reform, nor on the ways in which these aspects of government functioning relate to others, or to the individual citizen's rights, aspirations, needs, wants, or way of life.

However, when one ponders the "importance and implications" of the Land Reform Program, he is led inevitably to think about all these non-statutory and extremely vital concerns. To help the teacher, student, and general reader to order his thoughts about these matters, we offer the following three study outlines. Each of them is suitable for use during about one-half of an 18-week semester — the individual session, if conducted in classroom format, to last about 45–50 minutes.

Understandably, every outline bears the imprint of its author or authors. Father Ledesma's outline highlights the social and moral implications of agrarian reform, a not-surprising emphasis for one whose passion is social justice and whose major academic interest is the theology of development and liberation. Though he received the M.A. in political science recently (University of the Philippines, 1968), Jesuit Father Ledesma is a lecturer in the Ateneo de Manila's theology department. An instructor in the same university's department of economics is Miss Valdez (M.A. economics, Ateneo de Manila, 1962). The agrarian-reform course which she suggests is slanted toward the economic, as one might expect it to be. To her teaching of this course Miss Valdez brings 12 years' experience as head of the management division of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA), which later became the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). The third outline, constructed by Mrs. de los Reyes and Fr. Lynch, could only have come from social anthropologists with considerable social-survey experience. Emphasis is on empirical field findings, on the one hand, and on the implications of these facts for existing agrarian-reform laws. The authors assume that facts contrary to legislators' assumptions about rice farms and farmers should lead to modification of even the most impressively compiled and beautifully styled Code.

These outlines illustrate just three of a multitude of possible approaches to the teaching or studying of agrarian reform. The experienced teacher will know how to use and ignore them as wisdom dictates, and how to mix one with the other where this seems appropriate. The watchword is flexibility.

## Outline One: An Emphasis on the Social and Moral Aspects of Agrarian Reform

ANTONIO J. LEDESMA

August 3, 1972

This 10-hour course emphasizes the social and moral dimensions of land reform; that is, the social philosophy and ultimate objectives of the Philippine land-reform program. After an historical introduction, attention is directed to these basic considerations, particularly in light of the social teachings of the Catholic Church. By way of rounding out the discussion, sessions are also devoted to the politics and prospects of Philippine land reform and to land reform in several other countries.

### SESSION ONE

*Historical Background of the Land Problem: Baranggay Society, Spanish Period and Philippine Revolution*

#### A. Baranggay society

1. Communal lands and usufruct rights
2. Debt peonage and sharecropping

#### B. Spanish period (1521-1898)

1. Encomienda system (late 16th and 17th centuries)
  - a. Nature and extent
  - b. Concept of the *realengas*
2. Individual ownership of land (mid-17th and 18th centuries)
  - a. Conflicts between natives and Spaniards
  - b. Development of caciquism
  - c. Beginnings of *kasamahan*
3. Rise of agricultural commerce (late 18th and 19th centuries)
  - a. Hacienda system
    - i. *Inquilinos* and *kasama*
    - ii. *Bugnós* and *canon*
  - b. Role of Chinese mestizos and the *pacto de retroventa*
  - c. Friar estates
  - d. Government monopolies

#### 4. Ways of acquiring land (in the 19th century)

- a. Purchase of *realengas* lands
- b. Royal grants
- c. *Pacto de retroventa* procedures
- d. Pioneer clearings by right of usufruct
- e. Registry of lands: 1880 and 1894

#### C. Philippine revolution (1896-98)

1. Causes of agrarian unrest
2. Malolos Congress: provisions on land tenure

Readings. *Required*: De la Costa 1965: 127-28, 147-49, 234-35; McLennan 1969, *Recommended*: Phelan 1959: 95-98, 113-18, 144-52; Cushner 1971: 212-14; Murray 1972.

### SESSION TWO

*Historical Background of the Land Problem: American Period, Commonwealth, and Republic*

#### A. American period (1898-1935)

1. Organic Law of 1902
2. Torrens system of homesteading
3. Sale of friar lands (1903-05)
4. Free trade and the development of export crops
5. Rice Share Tenancy Act (1933)



## B. Commonwealth period (1935–46)

1. Peasant revolts
2. Quezon's social-justice program
3. Japanese occupation

## C. Republic (1946– )

1. Roxas and Quirino administrations (1946–53)
  - a. R.A. 34: "70–30" rice sharing (1946)
  - b. Government agencies: RCPA, RPA, Lasedeco-NARRA
2. Magsaysay administration (1954–57)
  - a. Approach to the Huk problem
  - b. Agricultural Tenancy Act (1954)
  - c. Land Reform Act (1955)
3. Garcia and Macapagal administrations (1957–65)
 

The Agricultural Land Reform Code (1963)
4. Marcos administration (1966– )
  - a. Resurgence of agrarian unrest
  - b. Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (1971)

Readings. *Required*: Douglas 1970; Golay 1961: 266–93. *Recommended*. Pelzer 1948: 91–98; Jacoby 1961: 193–233; Ledesma 1967; Murray 1972; Richardson 1972; Kerkvliet 1971; Starner 1961.

## SESSION THREE

*Share Tenancy and Human Dignity: Objectives of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in the Light of Catholic Social Teaching*

## A. Abolition of share tenancy

1. Nature
2. Growth and extent
3. Feudalistic paternalism

## B. Human dignity

1. Person (Papal encyclicals, 1891–1967)
2. Equality and participation (*Octogesima Adveniens*, 1971)
3. Liberation from oppressive structures (Synod of Bishops, 1971)

## C. Christians and the Catholic church today

1. Bishops' pastoral letter on land reform (1968)
2. Task of Christians

Readings. *Required*: Salita 1963; Manglapus 1967: 3–19; Ledesma 1968: 84–91. *Recommended*: Takahashi 1969/1970: 66–81, 129–47; Gonzaga 1968; Five great social encyclicals 1967; Carroll and Keane 1970: 29–33; Montemayor 1970.

## SESSION FOUR

*Work and Private Property: A Re-examination of the Concept of Private Ownership of Land*

## A. Private property

1. Universal purpose of all created things
2. Natural right to own property
3. Stewardship in the use and ownership of property

## B. Work

1. Human dignity: right and duty to work
2. Christian vision of work
  - a. Co-creation
  - b. Effect of sin
  - c. Co-redemption
3. Primacy of work over private property

## C. Towards a theology of land ownership

1. Dynamic realities
  - a. Man and nature
  - b. Need and labor
  - c. History and society
  - d. Social justice: the common good
2. Four determinants for private property
  - a. Labor
  - b. Need
  - c. Nature of the property
  - d. Right to own

Readings. *Required*: John XXIII 1961: 240-44; Vatican II 1965: 275-82; Paul VI 1967: 233-35; Montemayor 1969: 15-36. *Recommended*: Mauri 1970; Avila 1971: 26-47.

#### SESSION FIVE

*Social Justice and Economic Productivity: The Twofold Objective of Land Reform*

##### A. Social justice

1. Constitutional provision
2. Catholic social teaching
3. Cultural factors

##### B. Economic productivity

1. Population increase
2. Farm mechanization
3. Industrialization and urbanization

##### C. Implementation of the land-reform program

1. Government agencies
2. Leasehold (first stage)
  - a. Fixed rental
  - b. Credit
3. Owner-cultivatorship (second stage)
  - a. Land bank funding for expropriation
  - b. Family-sized farms
4. Obstacles

Readings. *Required*: Montemayor 1969: 54-65, 97-108, 154-56; Ruttan 1966a; Jocano 1972: *Recommended*: Agricultural Tenancy Commission 1965: 51-113; Estrella 1970.

#### SESSION SIX

*The Politics of Land Reform: 1963 Debates and 1971 Amendments*

##### A. Interest groups

1. Landed interests
2. Peasant organizations
3. Student activism
4. Mass media
5. Political party campaign platforms

##### B. Issues in Congress (1963)

1. Abolition of share tenancy
2. Right of expropriation
3. Practicality
4. Just compensation
5. Maximum retention limit
6. Agricultural land tax

##### C. Amendments in 1971

1. Sociopolitical pressures
2. Salient amendments
3. Significant omissions

Readings. *Required*: Estrella 1972; Huizer 1972; Labayan 1972. *Recommended*: Manglapus 1967: 20-52, 70-108; Congress of the Philippines 1971 or Nolleto 1972.

#### SESSION SEVEN

*Field Trip to a Land Reform Area: Interview(s) with Small Farmers or Government Fieldmen or Landlords*

The student is encouraged to gain first-hand knowledge of the land-reform program by interviewing people actually affected by it.

A five-page written report will be expected after the field trip.

The following questions should be considered:

1. The interviewee's opinion of the land-reform program and his reasons for this opinion
2. Any benefits derived?
3. Any problems encountered?
4. Any significant changes in one's life and social surroundings since the implementation of the Code?
5. Any suggestions for improvements?

*Recommended Readings*. De los Reyes 1972; Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972; Fegan 1972a, 1972b; Takahashi 1972.

#### SESSION EIGHT

*Land Reform in Sugarland: Prospects for Plantation Economies*

- A. Unique position of the sugar industry
1. Extent of the industry
  2. U.S. market price and the sugar quota
  3. Exemption from land reform
    - a. Diversion of ricelands to sugarlands
    - b. Landgrabbing
- B. Social situation
1. Pattern of land ownership
  2. Hacienda system
  3. Overpopulation and excess labor
    - a. *Dumaan*
    - b. *Sacadas*
  4. Minimum wages and standard of living
  5. Current unrest: Bais, Victorias, La Carlota

- C. Some alternatives to land reform
1. Agricultural capitalism
    - a. Present system of uneven development
    - b. Block farming
    - c. Corporate ownership
  2. Cooperative ownership
  3. Security of tenure for sugar workers
- D. Similar plantation economies
1. Banana industry
  2. Pineapple industry

Readings. *Required:* Gerlock 1972; Jose 1972; Locsin 1971; Lynch 1970a, 1970b. *Recommended:* Ledesma *et al.* 1971; Guerrero 1972.

#### SESSION NINE

*Comparative Study of Land Reform Programs: Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Red China*

- A. Taiwan
1. Family-sized farms
  2. Role of the Kuomintang government

- B. Japan
1. Small-scale mechanized farming
  2. Relation to industrialization
- C. Israel
1. Moshav
  2. Kibbutz
- D. Red China
1. Collectivized farming
  2. Agricultural communes

Readings. *Required:* Bernal 1966; Hsieh 1966; Ranon 1966. *Recommended:* UNDP 1969; Ogura 1968; People's Republic of China 1972; Tuma 1965.

#### SESSION TEN

*The Future of Land Reform: A Study of Alternative Systems*

- A. What does the small farmer want?
1. Owner-cultivated family-sized farm
  2. Security of tenure and/or land ownership
  3. Historical and cultural factors
- B. The role of government
1. Infrastructure
  2. Social justice
  3. Economic planning
  4. Free enterprise or socialism
- C. Factors to be considered
1. Nationalism
  2. Christian values
  3. Democracy

Readings. *Required:* Bernas 1970; Flores 1970; Montemayor 1972; Valdepeñas 1970; Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972. *Recommended:* Aquino 1967; Indolos 1967.

## Outline Two: An Emphasis on the Economic Aspects of Agrarian Reform

VICTORIA V. VALDEZ

July 12, 1972

This nine-hour course in agrarian reform highlights the economic dimensions of the subject. Nonetheless it starts with an historical introduction, touches on some of the more general social, moral, and political questions involved, and closes with a final comparative view. Students are asked to relate to the economics of agrarian reform whatever appropriate judgments might be made on it from the vantage point of history, theology, sociology, psychology, political science, and other social sciences. Having seen the complexity of the economic problems presented by such a reform program, the student is also exposed to a set of values to assist him in thinking about the basic human requirements any such program must satisfy.

### SESSION ONE

#### *What is the Land Problem?*

In the Philippines, as in other developing countries, the land problem is a difficult one. Regardless of how it arose, it now consists of the concentration of landed wealth in the hands of a few, with poverty the lot of those without land. Ownership gives the landowner the privilege of dictating the terms of the work relationship. This in turn has led to the inequitable distribution of the products of the soil and a consequent loss of motivation on the part of the nonowner-cultivator. Low productivity in agriculture has been associated with this loss of motivation.

Readings. More detailed discussion of the problem is found in Montemayor's *Ours to share* (1966) and *Philippine socio-economic problems* (1969). Other readings on the topic are Manglapus, *Land of bondage, land of the free* (1967), and a symposium on land reform edited by Dillon (1968).

### SESSION TWO

#### *Historical Background of Agrarian Reform*

Readings. For a history of agrarian conditions in the Philippines one may read Murray's over-

view of the subject (1972) or the historical survey of Philippine land tenure by Douglas (1970). The Philippine chapter in Jacoby's *Agrarian unrest in southeast Asia* (1961) and chapter two of Golay's *The Philippines: Public policy and national economic development* (1961), while written earlier, go into the economic background in more detail.

### SESSIONS THREE-FOUR

#### *The Economics of Land Reform*

Readings. Valdepeñas' paper on "The culture of relative deprivation" (1970) is an analysis of the requirements of economic development. Flores (1970) examines the concept of land reform in relation to agricultural and socio-economic development. *Land tenure* (1956), edited by Parsons, Penn, and Raup, is a good general reference for these two sessions.

### SESSIONS FIVE-SIX

#### *Philosophical, Social, Political, and Related Aspects of Agrarian Reform*

Readings. The social and moral bases of agrarian reform are discussed in chapters three and five of Ledesma's Master's thesis, *Land reform in the*

*Philippines in the light of recent Catholic social thoughts* (1968). Other references are the encyclicals of John XXIII (*Mater et magistra*, 1961) and Paul VI (*Populorum progressio*, 1967) and the Vatican II document entitled *Gaudium et spes* (1965).

On the political, sociological, and psychological aspects of land reform several readings are especially recommended. De los Reyes' "Can land reform succeed?" (1972) and Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch's "Reluctant rebels" (1972) are both empirical studies of Nueva Ecija, the nation's showcase of land reform. Two articles in Sicat's *The Philippine economy in the 1960's* (1964) are also instructive: Ferry, "The constitutional and social aspects of land reform," and Ruttan, "Land reform and national economic development." Of more general consequence is Guthrie, *The psychology of modernization in the rural Philippines* (1970).

#### SESSIONS SEVEN-EIGHT

*The Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (R.A. 6389): Organization and Management*

During these sessions the most important provisions of the Code (R.A. 6389) are considered, along with problems in its implementation. Principal documentary references are the Code itself, the Law on Agrarian Reform Special Fund (R.A. 6390), and the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. 1199). Empirical studies of problems from the administrator's viewpoint are found in Medina's "Land reform implementation in the Philippines" (1969), B. N. De los Reyes' "Can land reform succeed?" (1972), and Fegan's "Between the lord and the law: Tenants' dilemmas" (1972a).

#### SESSION NINE

*Land Reform in other Countries: Outlook and Summary*

This is a brief summary of land reform in other countries. The basic reference is Tuma, *Twenty-six centuries of land reform* (1965). A recapitulation of previous sessions and an overall view of the land-reform program ends the course.

### Outline Three: An Emphasis on the Empirical Aspects of Agrarian Reform

ROMANA PAHILANGA-DE LOS REYES

FRANK LYNCH

August 15, 1972

This nine-hour course focuses on the rice farmer and agrarian reform as revealed by recent empirical studies. Students are led first to review the rice-production process and the life-styles of average farmers, then to seek the historical origins of these phenomena. The assumptions and provisions of recent and current agrarian-reform laws are summarized and questioned in the light of facts, an examination which leads to a re-thinking of how the latest Code (R.A. 6389) might be modified for the farmer's and the nation's benefit.

## SESSION ONE

*Patterns of Rice Production in the Philippines*

A. Major crop areas and farm population (see map entitled "Philippine Islands: Major crops and total cultivated land")

1. Rice
2. Coconut
3. Sugarcane
4. Abaca
5. Corn

B. Importance of the rice areas

1. In general (three-fifths of nation's area cultivated for food are planted to rice; staple food of three-fourths of population)
2. Relative to agrarian reform (these laws are applied primarily to rice farming)

C. Stages in the growing of lowland rice

See one or more of the following sources: Fegan 1972b; Huke 1963: 213-40; Kaut *et al.* 1956: 1305-18; Takahashi 1969/1970: 47-60.

D. Inputs and sequence required for rice production by traditional and modern techniques

1. Lowland (irrigated/nonirrigated) and upland
2. Single and double-cropping

E. Most common rice-farm work roles (also see Index to this volume)

1. Owner-cultivator
2. Landlord
3. Share tenant
4. Lessee
5. Encargado, *katiwala*
6. Landless farm worker

Readings. *Required:* (for Sections C and D) Fegan 1972b; Huke 1963: 213-40; Lewis 1971: 128-46; Wickham 1972; (for Section E) Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 16-23; Fegan 1972a; Lewis 1971: 119-27; Salita 1963. *Recommended:* (for Sections C and D) Lewis 1971: 49-77; Kaut *et al.* 1956: 1305-18; Takahashi 1969/1970: 47-60, 66-76; (for Sec-

tion E) Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 7-13; Dalisay 1937.

## SESSION TWO

*Socioeconomic Conditions Among Rice Farmers of Central Luzon: The Current Scene*

A. Nueva Ecija: The "showcase" province

1. The IPC/BAEcon study (1970-71)
  - a. Barrios surveyed
  - b. Rice farmer and landlord sample
  - c. Findings (background characteristics of rice farmers and landlords; landlords' holdings and farming agreements; rice farmers and formal organizations; indebtedness among rice farmers)
2. The PRRM survey (1967)
  - a. Barrios surveyed
  - b. Findings
  - c. Conclusions and recommendations

B. Elsewhere in Central Luzon

1. Laguna
2. Pangasinan
3. Bulacan

C. Generalizations: Definitions of the agrarian structure and agrarian reform

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 13-16, 23-27, 34-41; Murray 1972: 160-61; PRRM n.d.; (for Section B) Anderson 1962; Fegan 1972a, 1972b; Takahashi 1972; (for Section C) Lynch 1972; Murray 1972: 151-52; De los Reyes 1972: 80-81. *Recommended:* (for Section B) Hiwatig 1971; Takahashi 1969/1970: 32-47, 82-105; Rivera and McMillan 1954; BCS 1968; FHDO 1971: 63-201; Pal 1963 (for Negros Oriental); Vitorio 1972 (for Cotabato); (for Section C) Tuma 1965: 8-14.

## SESSION THREE

*The Agrarian Scene Through the American Period (1521-1935)*

A. Pre-Spanish baranggay society

1. Communal lands and usufruct rights
2. Debt peonage and sharecropping

#### B. Spanish period (1521-1898)

1. The *encomiendas*
2. Caciquism and individual ownership of lands: the beginnings of *kasamahan*
3. *Inquilinato* system and the friar estates and other 19th century haciendas acquired through purchase of *realengas* lands and royal grants; the *pacto de retroventa* and scattered holdings

#### C. American period (1898-1935)

1. Land ownership acquired through homesteading
2. Sale of friar lands
3. Public Act No. 4054 (1933)

Readings. *Required:* Murray 1972: 152-54; McLennan 1969; Douglas 1970: 65-72. *Recommended:* Phelan 1959: 95-98, 113-18, 144-52; Koone and Gleeck 1970: 4-7, 32-38.

#### SESSION FOUR

##### *The Agrarian Scene Since the Commonwealth (1935- )*

*Note:* In this session the subject is to be discussed as a series of events with little analysis of the politics (Session Five) or assumptions (Session Six) which are involved.

- A. Commonwealth period: peasant revolts and Quezon's social-justice program
- B. Roxas and Quirino administrations: stress on resettlement
- C. Magsaysay administration: approach to the Huk problem; Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A. 1199) and Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A. 1400)
- D. Garcia and Macapagal administrations: The Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844)

- E. Marcos administration: Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines of 1971 (R.A. 6389)

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) Richardson 1972; (for Sections A, B, and C) Douglas 1970: 71-79; (for Sections A, B, C, and D) Huizer 1972: 17-23; Murray 1972: 154-60; (for Section E) Murray 1972: 162-63. *Recommended:* (for Sections A, B, and C) Kerkvliet 1971; (for Sections A, B, C, and D) Starner 1961: 3-20; (for Section C) Golay 1961: 272-84; (for Section D) Koone and Gleeck 1970: 39-55.

#### SESSION FIVE

##### *The Politics of Agrarian Reform*

*Note:* This session's outline duplicates that of Ledesma's Session Six, above. The readings differ in part, however.

#### A. Interest groups

1. Landed interests
2. Peasant organizations
3. Student activism
4. Mass media
5. Political party campaign platforms


#### B. Issues in Congress (1963)

1. Abolition of share tenancy
2. Right of expropriation
3. Practicality
4. Just compensation
5. Maximum retention limit
6. Agricultural land tax


#### C. Amendments in 1971

1. Sociopolitical pressures
2. Salient amendments
3. Significant omissions

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) Huizer 1972: 23-32; (for Sections A and B) Manglapus 1967: 20-52, 70-108; Starner 1961: 127-99; (for Section A, B, and C) Koone and Gleeck 1970: 72-77; (for Section C) Nolleto 1972. *Recommended:* (for Section A) Estrella 1972; (for Section C) Labayen 1972.







## SESSION SIX

*Assumptions and Provisions of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines: A Review*

## A. Assumptions (to be discussed and questioned)

1. Theoretical (legal, philosophical, theological)
  - a. Human dignity: right and duty to work;
  - b. Wherever possible, land should be tilled by its owner;
  - c. Right of private property is not absolute;
  - d. The family-sized farm is ideologically desirable;
  - e. Towards a theology of land ownership (see Ledesma outline, above, Section C of Session Four);
2. Practical (economic, sociological, psychological, cultural)
  - a. Owners will produce more than tenants;
  - b. Tenants desire to own land;
  - c. Tenants are anxious to be freed of their landlords;
  - d. The family-sized farm is economically, psychologically, culturally desirable;
  - e. The average share tenant is capable of managing his farm so as to achieve economic independence.

## B. Provisions (including administrative machinery)

1. For rice-farming inputs: land, labor, tenure arrangements, infrastructure, animals, machines, tools, production divisible inputs (seeds, fertilizers, farm chemicals), legal and technical advice, credit, marketing facilities
2. For theoretically assumed needs
3. For practically assumed needs

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) Ruttan 1966a, 1966b; Ledesma 1968; Hardie 1952: v-x; Macapagal 1963; Jocano 1972; Nolleto 1972; (for Section B) Nolleto 1972; De los Reyes 1972: 81-87. *Recommended:* (for Sec-

tion A) Christenson 1972; Montemayor 1966: 1-81; Manglapus 1967: 2-19, 105-09; (for Section B) Montemayor 1966: 82-98; Manglapus 1967: 20-104.

## SESSION SEVEN

*Obstacles to the Full and Rapid Implementation of the Agrarian-Reform Program*

## A. Problems of implementation

1. Insufficient support
2. Faulty delivery
3. Questionable strategy

## B. Deficiencies in the law

1. From the administrator's viewpoint
2. From the landlord's and farmer's viewpoint

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) De los Reyes 1972: 87-88, 89-90, with subsequent comments by Christenson, Drlon, Takahashi, and Marom; Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 23-24, 25-26, 42-49; Fegan 1972a; Wickham 1972; (for Section B) De los Reyes 1972: 88-89; Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 33-34; Fegan 1972a, 1972b; Coward 1972. *Recommended:* (for Section A) Lopez 1971: 267-91; Medina 1971: 28-32.

## SESSION EIGHT

*The Minimum Essentials for the Survival of a Leasehold Convert*

## A. What the rice farmer wants

1. Ownership vs. security of tenure
2. Ownership vs. children's education
3. Full-time vs. part-time farming
4. Independence vs. dependence in making decisions

## B. Factors involved in a successful share tenant-lessee transition

1. Role of government institutions
2. Role of the landlord
3. Role of technicians and farmers' organizations

4. Role of the physical environment
5. Role of the farmer's personal characteristics

Readings. *Required:* (for Section A) Fegan 1972a, 1972b; Christenson 1972; Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 27-33, 41-42; Wickham 1972; (for Section B) Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 42-49; Christenson 1972; Murray 1972: 161-62; Fegan 1972a. *Recommended:* (for Sections A and B) Lopez 1971: 250-59, 273-82; (for Section B) FHDO 1971: 169-80, 227-74.

## SESSION NINE

*Alternative Solutions to the Agrarian Problem*

- A. Overseas analogies (see Ledesma outline, above, Session Nine)
  1. Nationalist China
  2. Japan
  3. Israel
  4. People's Republic of China
- B. Local alternatives
  1. The Code of Agrarian Reforms (as is)

2. The Code of Agrarian Reforms (but with amendments)
  - a. Greater emphasis on peasant organizations (corporate/cooperative farming)
  - b. Granting the landlord a positive role in leasehold conversion
  - c. Other changes

Readings. *Required:* Hsieh 1966; Ranon 1966; People's Republic of China 1972; (for Section B) Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch 1972: 47-49; Montemayor 1966: 99-122, 150-62; De Los Reyes 1972: 89-91. *Recommended:* (for Section A) Tuma 1965; Dillon 1968; (for Section B) Huizer 1972: 23-32.

*Note:* If at all possible, one or more field trips should be organized for students, to give them the opportunity to visit a rice-farming area. Here they may observe and/or discuss the rice-production process and talk with farmers, landlords, and technicians. These field trips will preferably be made in small groups - 12 or fewer going to a particular place at a particular time. For further discussion of field trips see the note on this subject earlier in this volume (Lynch and Pahilanga-de los Reyes 1972).

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## NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Pilipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters - a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters - b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the *abakada* represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *mga*, pronounced "manga"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (^). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Pilipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

(From p. 6)

### *Approaches Found in This Volume*

A review of the major contents of this volume establishes the appropriateness of its subtitle, "Empirical studies of rice farming and tenancy." For only one of the documents found in it (President Macapagal's message on the Agricultural Land Reform Code, pp. 247-62) can be called normative as we have defined that approach. All others are empirical.

Thus the lead article, by Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch (pp. 7-78), reports on a survey of over 1000 farmers and 73 landlords of Nueva Ecija, adding to the basically descriptive presentation a critical assessment that results in an *evaluative* approach. The same is even more clearly true of Basilio de los Reyes' review (pp. 79-91) of what the Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program accomplished in its first 18 months, and Fernandez's essay on the Narra community in Palawan (pp. 176ff). In a similar evaluative spirit are the research notes of Christenson (pp. 169-71) and Coward (pp. 171-76) and the Hardie report summary, mentioned earlier.

More purely descriptive, and therefore more closely approximating the *field-study* approach, are Wickham's survey of irrigation-related behavior, attitudes, and opinion (pp. 101-111), the Takahashi-Fegan exchange on the *kasamá*-lessee shift in Bulacan (pp. 129-41), Fegan's piece on tenants' dilemmas (pp. 113-27), and the selections from Lewis' *Ilocano rice farmers* (pp. 187-218). Featuring the empirical *historical* approach are the articles by Murray, who traces land reform to its pre-Spanish origins (pp. 151-68), and by Richardson, who restricts himself to the 20s and 30s of this century (pp. 143-50). This book is indeed a collection of empirical studies.

### *The Rationale of the Volume*

In assembling this volume on rice farming and tenancy in the Philippines, we had two objectives in mind. The first was to offer the reading public a selection of empirical studies on the subject matter, for such studies are in short supply. The second was to offer the teacher and student of the government-prescribed "Taxation and Land Reform" course (see p. 219) an organizing text with alternative outlines and review questions to make the land-reform portion of the course both more interesting and easier to negotiate.<sup>2</sup>

If these two goals have been achieved to some extent by the appearance of this publication, readers can thank the many contributors to this volume and the staff of the Ateneo de Manila University Press. Special thanks are due Brian Fegan, not only for his two articles, but also for the photographs and captions that gave us our plates and cover. Finally, it will be clear to the knowledgeable that a volume of this size (274 pages) is far beyond PSR's budget, even for a double issue. We can offer it to our subscribers at no extra cost because of the copublishing assistance of the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila. To all, our thanks.

### *Notes*

1. This threefold division was inspired by Tuma's (1965: 11-14), but departs from it in several ways.
2. In this connection let me suggest that students taking the land-reform course be urged to get individual copies of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines (R.A. 6389). Nolleco's newsprint edition (Manila, National Book Store) costs only three pesos as of this writing.

### *References*

- Tuma, Elias H.  
1965 Twenty-six centuries of agrarian reform: A comparative analysis. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- United Nations  
1951 Land reform: Defects in agrarian structure as obstacles to economic development. New York, United Nations Department of Economic Affairs.



## QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

*Note:* For the convenience of teachers, students, and the general reader who enjoys being quizzed on what he has read, we offer a selection of questions on the contents of the articles, research notes, sampler, and documents found in this volume. The questions were prepared by the Editor, not the authors, who have as a consequence every right to complain that the main points of their contributions are not all represented in the questions that follow.

A major function of this question-answer exercise is to stimulate the reader to distinguish as clearly as possible between supported and unsupported statements – both his own and those of the various authors.

Another suggestive source of questions, both more detailed (glossary entries) and more general (major index headings), is the Index and Glossary (pp. 262 ff, below).

■ Lynch, *Approaches to rice farming* (pp. 3–6, 236)

1. What is meant by the agrarian structure? By the rice-farming structure?
2. By means of subject matter and viewpoints describe six common approaches to the study of rice farming.
3. Which kind of viewpoint, the empirical or normative, is most commonly used in *View from the paddy*? Support your answer by enumerating and classifying the volume's contents.

■ Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch, *Reluctant rebels* (pp. 7–78)

1. What was the purpose of the study? When and where was it done? By what kind of social research?
2. Describe the average rice-farm landlord, owner-operator, share tenant, and lessee in terms of background characteristics.
3. What are the most common sharing arrangements currently used by landlords and tenants? How do they compare with provisions of law?
4. Are lessees as dependent on landlords as share tenants? Support your answer with evidence from the text.
5. What are the three most frequently mentioned expectations which the various kinds of respondents have respectively of landlords, share tenants, lessees, overseers, farm management technicians, and farmers' leaders?
6. What are the most commonly mentioned faults of each?
7. How are landlords and others rated and ranked by respondents?
8. Summarize what landlords and rice farmers say about share tenancy and leasehold status – the advantages and disadvantages they see in each.

9. How do landlords react to their share tenants' becoming lessees? Do they believe they will *stay* lessees? Why so?
  10. How do landlords say they feel about the land-reform program — its goals, likelihood of success, present and future benefits for themselves and for tenants?
  11. On whom are share tenants most dependent for loans — institutions, landlords, or kinsmen? What about lessees?
  12. From whom is the average share tenant or lessee most likely to get an *interest-free* loan — his landlord, a kinsmen who is not his landlord, or from someone else?
  13. Where interest is charged, who is likely to charge lessees and share tenants the lowest rate — landlords, kinsmen, or others?
  14. What are the authors' conclusions regarding the requisites for successful transition to leasehold status?
  15. How soon do the authors expect that R.A. 6389 will be implemented throughout the Philippines? What do they suggest?
- B. N. de los Reyes, *Can land reform succeed?* (pp. 79–91)
    1. What are the reasons for and against selective development of the farming population — that is, concentrating first on the larger farms?
    2. Describe the differences in Philippine agrarian reform before and after the 1960s.
    3. What are the goals of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844) as compared with those of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of 1971 (R.A. 6389)?
    4. What factors are essential for a transition from share tenancy to leasehold and from leasehold to ownership?
    5. What was accomplished by the NELRIDP between July 1970 and December 1971 relative to the two transitions mentioned in question 4?
    6. What appear to be the major defects in R.A. 6389 itself?
    7. What are the major problems in implementing R.A. 6389?
  - Christenson, *Comment on B. N. de los Reyes* (pp. 92–94)
    1. In Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, tenurial change has apparently stimulated increased production. How about in the Philippines — do owner-operators or lessees raise more rice than tenants? Why so? (See Pahilanga-de los Reyes and Lynch, pp. 8–9.)
    2. What are the three essential elements of a functional farmer-support system?
  - Drilon, *Comment on B. N. de los Reyes* (pp. 94–96)
    1. What can the success or failure of land reform in Nueva Ecija tell us about the prospects for land reform in the rest of the country?
    2. How do “changing environment, high expectations, and limited resources” relate to a realistic view of Philippine land reform?
  - Takahashi, *Comment on B. N. de los Reyes* (pp. 96–98)
    1. In successfully accomplishing land reform in Japan, factors other than the Allied Occupation Forces were of primary importance. What are they?

2. What is the significance of strong farmers' organizations in a land-reform program?
  3. What accounts for the rise of "subtenancy" on new lessees' farms?
- Marom, *Comment on B. N. de los Reyes* (pp. 98-100)
    1. What does the author see as the basic task in General Ricarte, Nueva Ecija (site of the moshav experiment)?
    2. What are the advantages of the moshav approach to farming?
    3. What is the importance of a "horizontal support system" where share tenants become lessees?
  - Wickham, *Sociological aspects of irrigation* (pp. 101-11)
    1. What are the major difficulties with gravity systems of irrigation, and how do recent technological developments in rice production compound these problems?
    2. What was the purpose of Wickham's study? When and where was it done? By what kind of social research?
    3. What were the author's findings regarding water-supply conditions under which farmers are most likely to cooperate?
    4. How does one explain the paradoxical conclusion that "the more the NIA provides sufficient water, the less willing farmers will be to pay irrigation fees"?
  - Fegan, *Between the lord and the law* (pp. 113-27)
    1. Describe the three ecological zones in San Miguel, Bulacan, and show how they affect aspirations for leasehold status.
    2. Fegan distinguishes the "patron" from the "broker" and shows how each will react differently to land reform. Explain what the author has to say on this question.
    3. Describe at least 10 ways in which (within the law) a landlord can harrass his tenants.
    4. What is usually the purpose of the harrassment mentioned in question 3.
    5. What are the realistic advantages and disadvantages which tenants see in remaining tenants? Consider Fegan's first case (on debt, pp. 121-23).
    6. How can the homelot be used as a weapon to keep tenants "in line"? Consider the cases on this subject (pp. 124-27).
  - Takahashi, *Peasantization of the kasamá* (pp. 129-33)
    1. Comparing what he had observed in 1963-64 and what he saw in 1971, what major change does the author conclude took place in Barrio Katulinan?
    2. How does he explain this change?
  - Fegan, *Jobs and farms* (pp. 134-41)
    1. Does the author think off-farm jobs are compatible with dedicated farming? Why so?
    2. How does the author distinguish proletarians from petty entrepreneurs?
    3. Whereas Takahashi sees the employment of family labor (as opposed to hired workers) as a mark of becoming true peasants, Fegan thinks otherwise. Explain Fegan's position.
    4. Review the major tasks involved in the rice-production process.

- Richardson, *Grass-roots action* (pp. 143–50)
  1. What are the major details of the Colorum uprising of March 1925, the Tayug uprising of 1931, and the Sakdal revolt of 1935?
  2. What government action followed each of the grass-roots actions mentioned in question 1?
- Murray, *Land reform in the Philippines* (pp. 151–68)
  1. Murray speaks of five recurrent themes in Philippine land reform. What are they, and how are they related to one another?
  2. What made the Hardie Report offensive to some Filipinos? Were its recommendations adopted?
  3. Compare the major provisions of R.A. 1199, R.A. 3844, and R.A. 6389.
  4. What are the pros and cons of the family-sized farm?
  5. Overall, how successful has land reform been to date in the Philippines? Consider its long-term and short-term goals.
- Christenson, *On the IPC/BAEcon study* (pp. 169–71)
  1. What are the author's three assumptions and on what are they based?
  2. What four key variables are likely to influence share tenants to become (or not become) lessees, and to go on (or not go on) to become owners?
  3. Is there any *firm proof* at present that, compared to share tenants, lessees or owners will be motivated to produce more rice per hectare?
- Coward, *Irrigation and organization* (pp. 171–76)
  1. What does the Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 6389) provide regarding ownership of permanent irrigation systems where the system was constructed by (a) the lessees, (b) the lessor, and (c) the government?
  2. What implicit assumptions does Coward challenge, and what is his main thesis?
  3. Describe and distinguish farmer-owned and joint irrigation systems found in the Philippines.
  4. Describe the functions of the ditchtender and the *tagakaón* in Cavite. What implications does the author see in the acceptance which farmers give the *tagakaón* – despite the *de facto* policy of the acting watermaster?
  5. In what ways should the irrigation provisions of R.A. 6389 be changed?
- Fernandez, *Blueprint, realities, and success in a frontier resettlement community* (pp. 176–86, 272–73)
  1. Describe the five-phase blueprint of the resettlement process at Narra, Palawan.
  2. For each phase, indicate the major problems (realities) encountered.
  3. What are the various conceptions of success at Narra, Palawan?  
What appears to be the basic strategy for success?
  4. On what grounds does Fernandez make his two suggestions in the final paragraph?

- Lewis, *Landlord and tenant* (pp. 187–97)
  1. Lewis states: “Landlord-tenant contracts between persons of unequal class or status position differ significantly from those between social equals.” Explain *how* they differ, making reference to the “basic” exchange which *may* be involved.
  2. According to the author, when does the landlord-tenant relationship become “morally impoverished”? How does this occur in Mambabanga and in Buyon?
  3. Is it possible for tenants to “exploit” their landlords? How?
  
- Lewis, *Irrigation societies* (pp. 198–218)
  1. What major differences are noted between *zangieras* in Ilocos Norte and those in Isabela?
  2. How does Lewis explain these differences? Refer especially to the roles played by Virginia leaf tobacco, political instability, and political organization.
  
- Hardie, *Land tenure reform* (pp. 243–46)
  1. The author states that “tenants seek to become owners of the land they cultivate.” Does this agree with recent empirical data?
  2. What are the nine causes of agrarian unrest mentioned by the author?
  3. Is resettlement likely to solve agrarian unrest? Why so?
  4. What five implications does the author see in the correction of the land-tenure problem?
  5. Summarize briefly the remedial action suggested by the author.
  
- Macapagal, *Message on R.A. 3844* (pp. 247–61)
  1. Does Macapagal explicitly raise the issues of both equity and production? If so, where?
  2. Does Macapagal assume that lessees and owners will produce more than tenants? If so, where? On what grounds?
  3. Review the major provisions of R.A. 3844.

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**Prefocus and Verbal Orientation in Sarangani Bilaan.** Mary Rhea  
**Current and Proto-Tagalic Stress.** R. David Zorc

**Judging Personality from Language Usage.** Casilda E. Luzares and Ma.  
Lourdes S. Bautista

**Phrase-Structure Rules of Cavite Chavacano.** Librada C. Llamado

**THE PHILIPPINE STATISTICIAN**

Volume XXI, Nos. 3 & 4, July - December 1972

**A Pilot Study in Sampling and Response Bias.** U. P. Statistical  
Center Faculty

An experimental study of various sampling designs which attempts to compare the precision/efficiency of the different factors that go with the sampling design. Variability of the urban-rural area was taken into consideration.

**Socio-Economic Rankings of the Philippine Provinces: Methodology and Applications.** Parel, C. P. and P. G. de Munter

Rankings of Philippine provinces according to economic, agricultural, social and industrial development using different kinds of indices.

**Robustness of the One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test when Independence is Not Assumed.** Lademora, E. M. Jr.

A Monte Carlo study of the Power and Robustness of the one sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test.

## Philippine Land Tenure Reform: Analysis and Recommendations

R. S. HARDIE

*Note.* The following document is the summary statement (pages v-x) of "The Hardie Report" (Manila: Special Technical and Economic Mission, United States Mutual Security Agency, 1952). The report is said to have influenced subsequent Philippine government action on agrarian reform.

*General:* This paper, an analysis of the land tenure situation in the Philippines, is divided into five parts: (I) A statement on the scope of the Report; (II) A compilation of certain selected facts which bear on the land tenure problem; (III) Conclusions, in which is discussed the implications of the problem and proposals, attitudes and official efforts respecting correction; (IV) Recommendations for remedial action; and (V) Appended supporting documents.

*The Philippine Land Tenure Problem:* In the Philippines, agriculture furnishes a livelihood to nearly three-fourths of the population and accounts for about three-fifths of the national income. The industry is plagued, however, by a pernicious land tenure system which thwarts all efforts for technological improvement in agriculture. Chronic poverty and unrest among tenants has culminated in open and violent rebellion which the Communists are exploiting to the full. That tenants seek to become owners of the land they cultivate is prima facie evidence against their adherence to, or their understanding of, the basic principles of communism. This knowledge affords little comfort, however, for the fact remains that misery and unrest among tenants is being used to advance the goal of communism in Asia. The problem is not a postwar phenom-

enon; it has been developing for years, deeply rooted in feudal customs.

*Causes of Agrarian Unrest:* The causes of rural poverty and consequent unrest are not far to seek. (a) The smallness of farms acts to limit potential gross income. As a national average, the tillable land area per farm is 3 hectares. Farms containing less than 2 hectares of tillable land, constituting more than 1/2 the total farms, occupy less than 1/5 the tillable land area. (b) Tenant frequency is high, averaging about 35% for the nation as a whole and soaring to more than 70% in those areas where unrest is greatest. (c) Farm rentals are oppressive. Most tenants pay 50% of the gross product (after planting and harvest costs) as rent. (d) Net family incomes derived from farm operations are woefully inadequate for a decent standard of living. Farm family income from outside sources is insignificant. (e) Interest paid by tenants on borrowed money is grossly onerous. Annual rates of 100% are common and rates of 200% and even higher are not unusual. The majority of small farmers borrow regularly from year to year. (f) A lack of adequate and economic storage, marketing and buying facilities forces farmers to sell in a low price market and buy in a high. (g) Guarantees against ruinous prices are non-existent. (h) The development of institutions conducive

to the growth and strengthening of democratic tendencies has long been neglected in the rural areas. (i) Other factors bearing on rural economic instability include minimum wages, taxation, and inheritance.

The thought that the solution to Philippine agrarian unrest is to be found in the settlement of underdeveloped areas is based on a false appraisal of the problem. Firstly, world experience proves that increases in population will alone serve to neutralize the planned effects of emigration. Secondly, the acquisition and settlement of such land by one in the status of a typical Luzon tenant requires cash reserves he does not have. Lastly, and most basic, is the fact that these newly developed areas are after all a part of the Philippines and subject to the laws and customs of the land. If not corrected, pernicious land tenure practices which have led to violent rebellion in Luzon will continue being transported to the newly developed area, thus spreading the misery and unrest. Land tenure reform is needed quite as much for Mindanao as for Luzon. Settlement of new areas is an imperative but it is no substitute for land tenure reform. Early accomplishment of both programs is vital to the nation's economic and political stability.

*Implications of the Problem:* The land tenure system affects every phase of the nation's social, economic, and political life. Its correction is a matter of vital importance to numerous interests other than those of tenant farmers alone. (a) Political Stability: Open and violent rebellion, rooted in and fed by tenant discontent threatens the very existence of the Republic. (b) Agricultural Production: Generally speaking, in the Philippines concentration of land ownership is inimical to maximum production: abilities and incentives for efficient management tend to decrease as the size of holdings increase; tenants grow indignant of the marginal effort when half the gains derived thereby accrue to the interests of others. (c) Industry: Development suffers so long as rentier wealth lies dormant in land and is thus denied to the needs of industrial investment. (d) Fiscal Management: Tax burdens mount with increasing costs for maintaining law and order while initiation of fiscal policies vital to the entire economy must be held in abeyance

for want of funds. (e) Morale: And then there are the effects of misery and unrest and violence on the individual citizen — his family — his church — which history will for many years continue to measure.

*The Problem Restated:* The existence of the agrarian problem thwarts agricultural improvement, inhibits the development of industry and the growth of stable and democratic institutions. The size of the ordinary farm enterprise in the Philippines so limits potential farm family income as to make the institution of tenancy inimical to the establishment of economic and political stability. Correction of the land tenure aspects of the agrarian problem is therefore basic. The need to eliminate landlordism, establish the maximum practicable number of owner-operators on family-sized farm units, and guarantee just and fair tenancy practices for those who will continue to operate the land as tenants is urgent and must be given top priority among measures to quell unrest and establish peaceful, prosperous and democratic life in the rural areas. But remedying the tenure problem — although basic — will not alone solve the whole agrarian problem. Other maladies require correction. Leading the list is credit. Since the landlord group is at present an important source of tenant credit, institution of land tenure reform will necessitate simultaneous action respecting provision for credit. The development of adequate marketing facilities, agricultural cooperatives, rural community activities, and improved production techniques, and the elimination of practices prejudicial to agriculture and farmers also require attention.

*Public Opinion Respecting Reform:* Public opinion appears appreciative of the land tenure problem as the root cause of rural unrest and possessed of a genuine desire to create an environment within which a peaceful and prosperous economy can develop. Among elements expressing an opinion are the Churches, private realty interests, and the press. The problem has received considerable recognition from abroad.

*Official Action to Date:* The Philippine Government, sensitive to unrest in rural areas, began as early as 1933 to enact legislation and frame resolutions designed, ostensibly, to protect



the interests of tenants and to aid tenants on landed estates to become owner-operators. Respect for this aim is specifically stated in the Constitution. The term "social justice" has seen much service in written and spoken form. But all such implementing laws are weak in structure and limited in scope. They have been rendered ineffective by legal tests for ambiguities, by judicial practices inspired by feudal culture, by lax enforcement, and through failure on the part of Congress to provide funds necessary for the accomplishment of stated aims.

Responsibility for the enforcement of existing legislation is scattered through several departments with little or no coordination of related interests. Administrators, strained by efforts to enforce ambiguous and piecemeal legislation, often appear to have adopted apathetic and indolent attitudes respecting remedial action.

*Remedial Action:* Remedial action necessary to satisfy land tenure objectives envisaged by the Bell Mission Report and the related Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Philippines conditioning extension of ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] assistance, as recommended herein, includes:

1. Establishment of a Land Tenure Authority with exclusive responsibility for drafting legislation, formulating operational procedures and administering a program designed to eliminate inequities in the Philippine land tenure system and to initiate such socio-economic patterns and practices respecting land tenure as are necessary for the creation and maintenance of a peaceful, prosperous and democratic agricultural economy. Specifically, the Authority would be directed to take action necessary to:

a. Abolish, insofar as practicable, the institution of tenancy.

b. Establish, to the maximum practicable degree, a rural economy based on owner-operated family-sized farm units.

c. Establish and guarantee fair tenancy practices for that portion of farmers who will continue to work the land as tenants.

d. Eliminate hindrances to the fruition of objectives set forth in a, b, and c above.

2. Establishment of a Land Commission system at national, provincial and local levels

through which the program would be administered; membership on individual commissions to be selected by and from among farmers at a ratio of three (3) landowners to two (2) owner-cultivators to five (5) tenants.

3. Repeal of existing law respecting acquisition by the government of privately owned agricultural lands, and the enactment of legislation providing for:

a. Purchase by the government of agricultural lands in certain specified categories, together with buildings, equipment, livestock, etc. relating thereto.

b. Acceptance by the government of responsibility for disposing of claims which may exist or be developed respecting prior ownership or rights to such properties.

c. Transfer, by sale, of clear and legal titles to properties so acquired by the government to bona fide cultivators in accordance with specified priorities.

d. Price determination, and methods and terms of payment for land so purchased and sold.

4. Amendment or repeal of existing law pertaining to the establishment, regulation, and litigation of a farm lease contract (inclusive of a contract of share tenancy), hereinafter called contract, and the establishment, within a single law of principles set forth below:

a. The law would apply to all contracts irrespective of crop or location of the undertaking.

b. A contract and parties thereto, should be accorded the same prestige and treatment as is accorded to any other contract or contractor under Philippine law. The landlord and tenant should each be considered as full and equal parties to the contract.

c. A contract should have singular and exclusive relation to rights and responsibilities respecting tenure.

d. The contract should be written and all principal provisions clearly specified.

e. Payment should be in cash only.

f. Assessments and/or fines, except when specifically provided for by contract, would be illegal.

g. Maximum rental on land should not

exceed 30 percent of the gross product except as specified by law.

h. The tenant should be compensated for improvements he has made to the property provided such improvements were authorized by the landlord.

i. All contracts, and any alterations or cancellations thereof, should be subject to approval by the Local Land Commission.

j. The Local Land Commission should act as arbiter in all landlord-tenant disputes.

5. Laws concerned with adjudication of landlord-tenant disputes should be repealed or modified as necessary to provide for:

a. A Court of Agrarian Relations, similar to but separate from the Court of Industrial Relations, with responsibility for adjudicating landlord-tenant disputes.

b. The Court should be authorized to act directly to effect enforcement of its decisions.

6. Establishment of procedures guaranteeing legal representation to litigants in landlord-tenant disputes who are unable to afford the service of private counsel.

7. Law respecting land title clearance, transfer and registration should be revised as necessary

to expedite land transfers during the reform.

8. Inheritance law respecting succession to agricultural properties should be so modified as to prevent:

a. Fragmentation of farm units through succession.

b. Development and perpetuation of debt burden in agriculture resulting from succession.

9. Amendment of Minimum Wage Law so as to provide that:

a. Any person employed in the production and/or the first stage of processing agricultural products who is neither an owner nor tenant operator (nor a member of the immediate family) of the enterprise in which he (she) is so employed would be defined as a farm laborer.

b. The law would apply to all farm laborers except those employed on farms operated by tenants or cultivating owners as defined in the laws recommended for enactment in paragraph 3, page viii [here, page 245].

c. Farm laborers, other than those excepted in paragraph b above, would receive a minimum wage equal to that established for other laborers of equal skill.

#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Filipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the *abakada* represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "manga"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "big" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (^). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Filipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## Legislative Message on Tenancy Abolition and Other Land Reforms

DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

President of the Philippines

Mr. Speaker and Members of the House:

A nation that flies from realities succeeds merely in postponing its own progress. The realities remain. The future belongs to those courageous enough to confront the necessary but disagreeable tasks of today.

For decades, our leaders have temporized with the problem of land reform. They have found all kinds of reasons for not daring to go forward. Somehow they always fell shy of the truth that the great stumbling block to our national progress, though certainly not the only one, was the antiquated land tenure system. We know, in our hearts, that any further steps forward would be possible, for this nation, only if this block were removed.

In our confrontation of this problem, the moment of truth has arrived for all. Suddenly a challenge of greatness is thrust upon the leaders of this nation, but especially upon the representatives of our people in this Congress.

I must impress upon you the importance of a decision vital to the development of the agricultural potentials of this nation. I find it my duty to rouse you into a new awareness of the problem, to appeal to you for support to a program designed to promote the general welfare, to ask you to take the bold but realistic steps which our economic situation demands. We cannot hope to build a strong and self-sufficient nation without strengthening its foundations.

Land is our most valuable resource; agriculture, the most important means of converting its potentials into the necessities of life. For all its national importance, agriculture in the Philippines has progressed so slowly that we must constantly race against population growth. Our production is low; it takes three families in the agricultural sector to produce the necessary food and fiber for themselves and one family in other sectors of our economy. Compare this rate with that of the American farmer who produces food for 23 Americans and three foreigners. Our

production is hindered by the very structure that should support it — the social structure through which we use our land. Although many of our people are engaged in agriculture, they fail to produce sufficient raw materials to develop our industries. This is not their failure, really, but ours, for we have not provided them greater opportunities.

Agricultural production in the Philippines is largely dependent on the efforts of small farmers. Forty per cent of our farmers do not own the land on which they were born and the land on which they will spend the rest of their lives. The land producing our staple crops of rice and corn and one of our most important export crops — sugar — is predominantly operated by tenants.

The poverty of our rural areas tends to increase in direct proportion to the incidence of sharecrop tenancy and its concomitant, absentee landlordism. In failing to change the status of tenant farmers, we set narrow limits to our own agricultural productivity; we abet poverty; we abet grave social injustices.

As a sop to our conscience, we have taken some halting and half-hearted steps to mitigate the tenancy problem. But such reluctant, stop-gap solutions no longer suffice. We have reached a stage in our national growth which makes genuine land reforms imperative. To go forward in social and economic development, we have first to recast the structure of agriculture to enable it to grow in productivity and give momentum to industrial progress.

Unfortunately, the common opinion toward land reform is that it is for the benefit of the poor and at the expense of the rich. On the contrary, land reform, by increasing production and income and by giving dignity to a large portion of our people, can be instrumental to general social and economic progress.

In our small farmers lies a great potential of energy for growth. Let us unleash these tremendous productive energies. Tied up in our land is a large amount of needed capital resources. Let us release these resources so that our business and industry may go forward. In the end, we can all look back to this day and recall with satisfaction that we had the courage to face the demands of reality and to take this challenging step for the delivery of our people from economic and social bondage.

### OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

Our minds and our will must come together to achieve this major change in the land structure, so that the land may be used more effectively for the direct benefit of the agricultural population and of the nation as a whole. More particularly, our Land Reform Program seeks the following objectives:

1. To replace share tenancy with agricultural leasehold system as an initial step in creating a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity and higher farm income.

2. To establish owner-operated family-size farms as the foundation of Philippine agriculture.

3. To increase farmers' productivity and income.

4. To enhance the complementary relationship between agriculture and industry.

These objectives must be weighed against the poverty, degradation, and insecurity in our farm areas, manifested by low incomes; low productivity; primitive farm methods; usurious practices; unemployment and underemployment; high birth rate; poor nutrition; endemic diseases; illiteracy; and sub-standard housing facilities.

These problems have defied every solution because none of the previous remedies have dared to change the social structure of the land. The government can go on voting huge sums for agricultural development and will go on wasting them so long as the present land tenure system remains unchanged.

There are four underprivileged groups in need of the opportunities provided in the Land Reform Program, namely:

1. The tenants, estimated at about one million families,
2. The settlers, who move from highly tenanted areas to newly-opened, undeveloped public lands,
3. The agricultural wage-earners, including migrant workers, and
4. The owner-cultivators of less than family-size farms.

Each of these four groups represents a corresponding group of problems at which we must aim the Land Reform Program. These are:

1. The sharecrop or "kasama" tenancy system, which deprives the farmer of a just share of the produce, makes his tenure

insecure; exposes him to usurious practices and to perpetual indebtedness; and forces him to be idle outside the four or five months spent on the farm.

2. The ineffective and haphazard resettlement system, which prevents settlers from congested and highly tenanted areas from taking up productive lives in public agricultural lands.

3. The helpless position of agricultural wage-earners, who have no access to the protection of the Magna Charta of Labor.

4. The lack of credit, irrigation, marketing, and information facilities among the small owner-cultivators, aggravated by the lack of organization among them.

Under this Land Reform Program, therefore, the share tenant will be provided with the initiative and challenge of assuming the responsibility for increasing agricultural production; we will give the settler every facility to begin a productive life in public agricultural lands; we will give the farm hand a chance to get organized with his fellow workers and bargain with management for better terms of work; and we will give the farmer an opportunity to purchase land, preferably of family-size, and to get the most from it.

Finally, we will help all four groups — making up the majority of our agricultural population — to increase their efficiency and their productivity, turning them into independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, a true source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

#### ABOLISHING SHARE TENANCY

Tenants, most of them share tenants, comprise approximately 40 per cent of our farmers but occupy only 25 per cent of our farm area. On the average, they operate 2.4 hectares; a great majority of them, however, operate farms too small to provide even minimum subsistence. Among all tenure groups, tenants employ the most primitive methods on the farm. They also have the lowest farm production and the lowest farm income.

The implication is inescapable: the tenure status of the tenant does not provide the necessary incentives for increasing production. His farm operations have to be sanctioned by the landlord who usually provides the credit. Any increase in yield through his extra effort is shared by the landlord. Increases in yield from the use of good seeds, fertilizer, and insecticides are shared by the creditor in the form of exorbitant interest rates. Thus

tenanted farm are pictures of stagnation and hopelessness; any attempt to improve their lot becomes only wishful thinking.

The Philippines, committed to the principle of social justice, makes these specific provisions in its basic law: "The State shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant and between labor and capital in agriculture." Despite a phalanx of laws, the tenancy problem has hardly been touched and the goal of equity in landowner-tenant relations continue to elude us. The reason is simple: All such laws, while striving for the ideals of equity and social justice, are at the same time premised on the perpetuation of share tenancy.

As an initial step in Land Reform Program, share tenancy will be abolished and agricultural leasehold system instituted in its place — preparatory to proprietorship. This will open to tenants a wider horizon for self-improvement and progress. It will likewise provide them the necessary incentive and challenge to increase production, for under this set-up they will also receive all the gains from better management and harder work.

On the other hand, the landlords will be guaranteed reasonable returns from ownership for they will now have farmers who are striving and working to get the most out of the land.

#### EQUAL PROTECTION FOR AGRICULTURAL WAGE EARNERS

A large portion of our people who depend on agriculture for a living are wage earners. They are hired laborers who depend on wages and their employer's frame of mind for their daily subsistence. Many of them are migrants workers in the sugar industry. Unorganized and unprotected by laws on labor standards, they receive a daily wage ranging between P0.56 to P4.00; they work from 6 to 11 hours a day; some of them live in quarters allowing no more than 1.2 square meters to a person; they derive their drinking water from open wells with soggy shoulders.

Inequality in income distribution is the result of inequality in bargaining power. The inferior position of labor in employment relations is the direct result of competition in the labor market, the superior legal assistance available to employers, the weakness of labor in individual negotiations, and the strength employers derived from their economic resources.

We propose therefore to give farmers their own "Bill of Rights" comparable to the Magna Charta for industrial workers.

The new Magna Charta for the farm laborer should contain provisions:

- 1) Guaranteeing him the right to egress and ingress in the haciendas for purposes of self-organization;
- 2) Giving him the right to self-organization;
- 3) Recognizing his right to engage in concerted activities including the right to go on strike;
- 4) Outlining procedure for certification election;
- 5) Enumerating acts which shall be considered unfair labor practices (in the case of the employers, unwarranted interference with unions);
- 6) Giving the Court of Agrarian Relations exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising from landowner-farm worker relationships.

Farm laborers should be given an equal chance for a better life. They should enjoy equal rights and be provided the same opportunities as workers in the industrial sector. They should also be given an equitable share of the products of their labor through an increased minimum wage—without however overlooking the limitations to the capacity of employers to absorb additional labor cost. In short, we propose to remove discrimination in the law against agricultural wage-earners.

#### EXPANSION OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS

Failure to appreciate the nature of the changing social structure may bring to the courts cases of disagreement. Delay in the adjudication of cases can only militate, in time and in cost, against farm workers. For a more efficient and expeditious administration of justice, the jurisdiction and operations of the Court of Agrarian Relations will be expanded, to provide an adequate judicial framework for a full implementation of the Land Reform Program.

The Court of Agrarian Relations is currently charged with only one main function: to decide and settle all disputes involving relationships between landlord and tenant. To this should be added the powers: (1) to hear and decide all expropriation cases for land reform; (2) to take cognizance of all land registration proceedings arising from the Land Reform Program, both of which are at present within the sole jurisdiction of courts of first instance. To further relieve the ordinary courts and the existing quasi-judicial agencies of the government of their



undue burden of pending cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations will be vested with the power to hear all types of disputes between agricultural wage-earners and landowners, including those arising from money claims and cases involving violations of labor laws.

#### EXTENSION AND OTHER TECHNICAL SERVICES

Essential to and implicit in the whole purpose of the Land Reform Program is the progressive improvements in the productivity of the farms and the farmers. Increase in agricultural productivity is the necessary force that will move the objectives of the program into reality. Lessees who have acquired independence in the agricultural process, therefore, have to be provided the necessary extension and other technical services to establish their status on firm ground and further develop in him the characteristics necessary for farm ownership.

Land reform should not only provide farmers with the opportunity for self improvement but should also have the requisites for carrying it through to completion. Incentive to increase productivity is of utmost importance but will not completely insure a sustained growth in agricultural production. We must make sure that our rapidly growing population will not only eat, but will eat better. We should therefore provide our farmers with the means of pursuing their aspiration for a better life.

Agricultural production in the Philippines has increased largely because of the increase in the size of our cultivated area. The time has come for us to increase the productivity of every hectare of land, of every man that tills the soil and every peso spent for production. We have a pool of knowledge which can be employed by our farmers. We should bridge the gap between knowledge and application so that our farmers can better assume the responsibilities of producing the food and fiber for our population and of preparing themselves for every step of the ladder toward land ownership.

To this end, and for the larger benefit of the whole economy, agricultural extension service should be strengthened and re-directed towards the goals of land reform. The extension service should have a sufficient number of properly trained personnel. The extension worker can impart to the farmers the dignity of the task of producing the vital needs of the nation, demonstrate improved farm techniques and methods, relay vital research information, secure for them the assistance of other agencies,

reorient them towards a market economy and guide them in the proper conduct of their farm business.

To lend greater strength to the farmers in buying their farm supplies and consumer commodities and in the marketing, including processing, of their crops; to promote wider ownership of equity capital in business enterprises; and thus to establish a broader foundation for private enterprise and progressive economic democracy, the promotion of agricultural cooperatives should be aggressively and intensively undertaken. One weakness of our past cooperative program is the fact that cooperatives were formed from the top. As a consequence, farmers lost the sense of participation in the ownership of cooperatives which had been formed for their welfare. The educational work of extension agents on the nature and operations of cooperatives will promote their formation from the grass roots level. Such a precondition is one of the necessary elements of success of the cooperative movement in the Philippines.

The basic function and activities of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission being essentially promotional, educational and informational, and share tenancy now being outlawed, this Commission should be abolished and its functions transferred to the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, which will be known as the Agricultural Productivity Commission.

To achieve the goal of increased national agricultural productivity along with the other objectives of the Land Reform Program, the Agricultural Productivity Commission shall also be responsible for implementing a land-use program designed to make the most efficient use of our land resources.

#### OFFICE OF AGRARIAN COUNSEL

Many of our farmers are not in a position to assume the cost involved in court cases. There is need to extend free legal assistance to agricultural lessees and owner-cultivators who cannot afford the services of private counsel. For this purpose, the Tenancy Mediation Commission will be abolished and replaced with the Office of Agrarian Counsel.

#### FARM CREDIT AND OTHER ASSISTANCE

The most immediate need of farmers who have acquired a new tenure status either as a lessee or owner-cultivator is a source of subsistence and production credit which was formerly

provided by landowners and users. The institution of the agricultural leasehold system which means the breaking of "paternalistic" bonds between the landlord and the tenant, places the entire burden of financing on the shoulders of the farmers. To firmly establish the tenure relation of the farmer to landowner, he must find a substitute source of credit. The problem is one of urgency; it will be necessary to use an existing agency which serves the credit needs of farmers without real estate collateral. The only institution which has this machinery is the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration. Its administrative machinery should therefore be reorganized and realigned to enable it to play its proper role in the whole scheme of land reform and rural development. Its financial structure and credit program should be placed on a sound basis and its administrative organization and management streamlined for maximum operational efficiency. Commensurate to its new task, the agency should be renamed the Agricultural Credit Administration.

An added feature of the new agency is the institution of supervised credit to provide for the effective use of credit by farmers and insure its collection. This program will be undertaken in cooperation with the Agricultural Productivity Commission.

The ACA shall still be responsible for financing all agricultural cooperatives but its function of promoting the organization of cooperatives shall be transferred to the Agricultural Productivity Commission.

The existing agricultural cooperatives, or Facomas, are even now being screened and their financial and management status is being audited and evaluated. The aim is to weed out those that have lost their usefulness or viability and select for fullest possible development and expansion those that are found clearly capable of revitalization. Organization of new cooperatives shall be undertaken with utmost care, particularly in the training of both members and management officials and in the setting up of their capital structure, to insure their success and healthy growth. The agricultural cooperatives — as fast as they can develop competent and dependable management — shall be the principal vehicle for coordinating and channelling material and technical assistance to the farmers.

#### ESTABLISHING A LAND AUTHORITY

The final stage of the Land Reform Program is the establishment of owner-operated family-size farms as the foundation

of Philippine agriculture. Farmers who have proven their determination and capacity to advance should be provided with the opportunity for land ownership. Land must therefore be acquired for them. The Land Tenure Administration and the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Administration should be merged into a single administrative machinery that will implement this phase of the program. This new body will be called the Land Authority.

Several essential elements required for the success of the Land Reform Program rest upon the Land Authority. The functions of the Land Authority are to:

1. Negotiate sale or initiate expropriation of private agricultural lands which are idle or abandoned, land owned by absentee landlords and operated by leaseholders, and land in excess of the statutory retention limits;
2. Subdivide acquired private lands into family-size farm units for resale to qualified farmers;
3. Assist owners of uneconomic-size units in obtaining family-size farms; and
4. Open alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for the resettlement of displaced tenants and other qualified farmers.

A systematic system of selection and redistribution of private agricultural land and resettlement of public lands will be instituted. Based on a land survey and classification system, which the Land Authority will undertake for its use and according to the needs of other agencies involved in land reform, the proper selection of areas to be acquired and the determination of the economic size of family farms will be made. Only areas which will be more productive when operated as family-sized farms will be acquired. Landholdings which are operated efficiently as large scale farms will not be expropriated, for this action will run against the objective of increasing national productivity.

Not only should good quality land be provided to new landowners but also land large enough to allow the efficient use of the labor and capital resources of the farm family and to produce an income sufficient to provide a modest level of living, payment of yearly installment on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.

The Land Authority will also be charged with the responsibility of undertaking measures which will insure the early

issuance of titles to farmers. From the legal standpoint, a title would serve to eliminate those protracted suits that must often confront the smallholder, a person neither sufficiently educated nor financially capable of bearing the cost of litigation. From the psychological standpoint, the assurance given by the title to the small landowner gives him the added incentive to improve his holding and production. From the social viewpoint, the curtailment of court suits and the assurance given the farmers would serve to dampen substantially the social unrest that would otherwise develop under a contrary setting.

The act of streamlining the land titling procedure and expanding the cadastral survey system actually poses no insurmountable technical problems. The Bureau of Lands has added considerably to its stock of improved land-survey equipment and techniques. The bureau could easily realign or supplement its present capabilities to meet the demand for a substantial addition in its expected output called for by the land reform program.

The Authority must not only apportion public lands into farm-size units but also assist the farmers settle in them and live productive lives. Thus, it must provide facilities such as roads and hospitals, transport settlers and their belongings to the areas reserved for them, grant them subsistence loans if necessary and assist them in securing equipment and supplies. In effect it must provide all the needed support in the farmers' search for higher income.

#### CREATION OF A LAND BANK

Indispensable to the success of the Land Reform Program is the role to be played by a new type of financial institution—the Land Bank of the Philippines. This institution will provide the instruments and the mechanisms necessary for adequately financing the acquisition of land from the present landowners and their resale by the government to the tillers.

The Land Bank is proposed for two reasons. First, the landlord must have sufficient inducement to sell his land voluntarily. Expropriation, by itself, is neither an effective nor expeditious way of getting the landlord to give up his holdings. Second, an appropriate financial instrument must be created for financing acquisition and redistribution of land. It is neither feasible, nor consistent with our country's monetary stability, to finance all these land transactions purely with cash.

In exchange for his holdings, therefore, the landowner will receive assets that are more attractive to hold than land. The Bank will be authorized to issue mortgage bonds against the landholdings which the government will acquire, and to issue its own shares of stock as an open-end corporation. To secure these two types of issues, the title to the land will be vested in the Bank until after the resale of the land to the tiller has been paid for in full. As added security to the Bank, the tiller-purchaser will amortize acquisition of his new farm at an interest rate of eight per centum per annum.

The government will subscribe to the Bank in the amount of ₱200 million. This subscription will be voting but non-earning. This in turn will be invested by the Bank in private corporate securities that have had a proven record of providing stable earnings as well as a reasonable amount of growth. On these investments, it will be possible for the Banks to get a return of about eight per cent as well as some growth. Since the subscription of the government is of the non-earning type, all the earnings from these investments will be channeled to the Land Bank shares which the former landowner will hold.

Of the total amount that the Bank will pay to the landowner for his land, 70 per cent will be in the form of land bonds and 30 per cent in the form of stocks to be issued by the Bank. This combination of mortgageable assets will give to the landholder the same security that he derives from his land but without the burdens of managing a cumbersome tenancy system and of paying taxes. It will also provide him with better returns than he has ever obtained from his land. Thus, for giving up his holdings, he will receive not only a just compensation but also a generous bonus. This type of financing makes our Land Reform Program both realistic and practicable—features which similar programs in the past did not provide.

This institution will also make it possible to finance the transfer of land to the tiller under terms which the tiller can meet. The new owner will amortize the cost of his family-size farm out of the productivity of the land. Since the Bank will hold on to the title until the land has been paid in full and, at the same time, collect interests at the rate of eight per cent, it will be able to maintain its own security and solvency for the benefit of all.

### JUST COMPENSATION TO LANDOWNER

The manner of payment to landowners will provide for "just compensation" and at the same time facilitate the transfer of ownership of business enterprises to landowners divested of their landholdings. It will also allow investment by these landowners in new commercial and industrial enterprises.

Valuation of land estates will be based on its income producing capacity rather than the usual fraction of its present market value. The value of the land will be calculated on the basis of the estimated income accruing to ownership capitalized at 6 per cent per annum.

Payment to landowners will consist of 30 per cent stocks and 70 per cent bonds of the Land Bank. Acceptance of bonds with maturity periods of more than 10 years will qualify landowners for exemptions from the payment of capital gains tax. Landowners holding Land Bank shares will be guaranteed a reasonable rate of return by the government and by the Land Bank itself through its business operations. Eventually, landowners will own the shares of profitable corporations which the Land Banks have purchased.

The Land Bank bonds which will have a guaranteed return of 6 per cent will not be immediately redeemable but will be negotiable. Ownership of Land Bank bonds would accord the same privileges as ownership of land because these bonds can be mortgaged in the same manner as land titles. Investment on new enterprises would thereby be made possible.

### LAND TAXATION

Land taxation is an integral part of the general design for the Land Reform Program because of its structural versatility, its indigency to agriculture, and, traditionally, its capacity to provide work and investment incentives, redistribute agricultural income, and raise revenue for use in the agricultural sector.

The land tax system, which will be instituted by the Land Tax Commission, will have a presumptive base, in accordance with a scientific classification and evaluation of land. The classification would be based on the soil characteristics as well as external characteristics such as climate, topography and availability of water. The assessment will be based on the presumptive rental income capitalized at 6 per cent per annum.

The presumptive rental income basis, because of its rigidity, will have the following advantages: (a) it will consider the productive potential of uncultivated lands; (b) it will provide incentive to farmers: Those deriving less than the full potential will be penalized by the tax, while those exceeding the rated potential will not be taxed on the excess; and (c) it will provide no opportunity for disincentives; the taxpayer-landowner cannot change the amount of the tax through a reduction of his actual production. Because of the fixity of the tax base the amount of revenue may easily be made to respond to the level of needs simply by adjusting the tax rates.

Another feature of the land tax is a progressive rate based on the total value of landholdings. This system will spare the small landowners from the heavy burden of tax payment.

#### MECHANICS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Because of the magnitude of the Land Reform Program and the numerous agencies that will participate in its implementation, cooperation and coordination of these agencies are required. A National Land Reform Committee will be created to develop a program of implementation and promulgate land reform policies, principles and procedures. The Committee will be composed of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Land Bank and the Administrator of the Agricultural Credit Administration as members, and the Governor of the Land Authority as Chairman. This Committee will have the power to declare certain areas as Land Reform Districts where Land Reform Projects will be implemented. All Land Reform Projects will be submitted to this Committee for approval.

Regional Land Reform Councils will be formed. They will be composed of the regional heads of the Land Authority, Land Bank, Agricultural Credit Administration and the Agricultural Productivity Commission. This Council will be charged with the responsibility of approving and implementing Land Reform Projects which will be developed and proposed by a Land Reform Team. A Land Reform Team will be composed of one representative from each of the agencies of the Regional Land Reform Council.

#### CONCLUSION

This is the Land Reform Program, as we have envisioned it. I have stressed the need for change, and sketched the means by which we hope to effect this change. The program calls for an



understanding and acceptance of the requirements of economic progress as well as a recognition of human needs and rights. It is a response to the need for justice. It is a source of strength for our democratic society. Most of all, it is a coming to terms with the demands of reality, a facing up to the fact that we cannot cling to past comforts and hope for future survival. The program suggests the machinery for land reform. All that is needed is the will to transform this machinery into reality—and set it in motion. The program has been geared to benefit owners and tenants alike, perhaps not immediately, but inevitably. It will provide a dynamic base for economic stability and growth that shall insure the well-being of all Filipinos.

The challenge before us demands unselfishness and devotion to the people we serve, demanding great courage and patriotism. Your decision in this Congress will be a matter of conscience and intelligence, individual and national. Let it not be said in the future that we defaulted at the moment of truth and greatness. Let it rather be said that we rose to the full height of our moral capabilities, that we gave our country new life and pushed it forward to a new day of hope and fulfillment.

Ladies and Gentlemen of Congress, the fate and future of the humble tillers of the soil, their redemption from social and economic freedom, the key to wider opportunities and greater income for big landowners, our only hope for increasing the productivity of our farms, are now in your hands.

#### NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY

Philippine language terms in this article are written using a 20-letter alphabet. The Romanized Filipino alphabet, or *abakada*, has five vowel letters — a, e, i, o, u (pronounced like the Spanish vowels) and 15 consonant letters — b, k, d, g, h, l, m, n, ng, p, r, s, t, w, y. Each letter of the abakada represents only one sound, with few exceptions, e.g., *ng*, which is pronounced "nang," and *nga*, pronounced "manga"; the letter *g* is always pronounced as in the English "bag" and "together," while "ng" (a digraph) is pronounced as in the English "ringing" and "singer."

An acute accent (´) on the final vowel of a word indicates a final syllabic stress; a grave accent (`) on the final vowel indicates a final glottal stop and a stress on the penult. If a word has a final syllabic stress and a glottal stop in final position, the acute (´) and grave (`) accents are combined into a circumflex accent (ˆ). A penultimate syllabic stress, which is the most common stress in Filipino, is not marked at all.

For simplicity, all accents on proper names have been eliminated.

## INDEX AND GLOSSARY

*Note:* We present, in all, three alphabetized lists. The first two compose the Index of Proper Names – persons, places, and organizations – while the third is the Subject Index and Glossary.

Included in the Index of Proper Names are the names of particular persons, places and organizations found in the volume. Because organizations are so often referred to by their short names, or acronyms, a special index of these alphabetical titles precedes the main list of proper names. In the Philippines, all acronyms which can possibly be pronounced as ordinary words are so pronounced; if they cannot be pronounced in this manner, the constituent letters are spelled out.

### LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACA Agricultural Credit Administration	NARRA National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
ACCFA Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration	NASSA National Secretariat for Social Action
ADB Asian Development Bank	NCTFLP National Congress of Tenants and Farm Laborers of the Philippines
ADC Agricultural Development Council, Inc.	NEC National Economic Council
AMT Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra	NELRIDP Nueva Ecija Land Reform Integrated Development Program
APC Agricultural Productivity Commission	NEPG Nueva Ecija Provincial Government
BAEcon Bureau of Agricultural Economics	NFAC National Food and Agriculture Council
CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere	NIA National Irrigation Administration
CUFA Committee on Un-Filipino Activities	NLRC National Land Reform Council
DANR Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources	NLSA National Land Settlement Administration
DAR Department of Agrarian Reform	NP Nacionalista Party
EDCOR Economic Development Corps.	NRAG National Rice Action Group
FACOMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association	OTAC Office of the Agrarian Counsel
FFF Federation of Free Farmers	PKP Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas
GAO General Auditing Office	PRRM Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
IIRR International Institute of Rural Reconstruction	RCA Rice and Corn Administration
IPC Institute of Philippine Culture	RCPCC Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council
IRRI International Rice Research Institute	SEADAG Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (of the Asia Society)
KMM Kapisanang Makabola Makasinag	SEARCA Southeast Asia Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture
KPMP Kalipunang Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas	USAID United States Agency for International Development
LA Land Authority	
LASEDECO Land Settlement and Development Corporation	
LP Liberal Party	
LTA Land Tenure Administration	
MASAKA Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka	

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de; Dibua, Z.; Narpayat, Z.; San  
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## Subject Index and Glossary

Indexed here are the contents and non-English terms found in *View from the paddy*. The latter entries generally follow this order: the form as it occurs in the text; the language to which it belongs; the word root from which it comes if this differs from the occurring form; the meaning of the word root; the meaning of the occurring form (the phrase, "here meaning . . ." is used to indicate this); the page(s) where the form is found.

The following abbreviations and symbols are used:

Amer.	American	Lat.	Latin
Chin.	Chinese	OTg.	Old Tagalog
Eng.	English	Sp.	Spanish
Ig.	Ilonggo	Tg.	Tagalog
Ilk.	Iloko	WR	word root
Kpm.	Kapampangan	<	'derived from'

Major published language source consulted was J. V. Panganiban, *Diksyunaryo-tesauro pilipino-ingles* (Quezon City, Manila Publishing Co., 1972).

**abasto** (Tg. < Sp. *abasto*, 'baggage'; here meaning 'a ration of palay or rice, especially for share tenants' families'), 18

**agad** (Tg., 'allowance granted especially to share tenants to harvest small amounts [legally, up to 10 percent] of the current palay crop for family consumption, prior to the regular harvest date'), 18

**Agrarian laws** (called Public Acts before the Commonwealth [1935], Commonwealth Acts during the Commonwealth period [till July 4, 1946], and Republic Acts since then. See Public Acts; Commonwealth Acts; Republic Acts.)

**Agrarian reform**, relation to grassroots action, 143-50 (esp. 149), 155; government wavering on, 148-49, 244-45, 247; place of radicals in, 148-49

**Agrarian structure**, definition of, 3; rice-farming structure and, 3-4

**Agrarian unrest**, leading to government remedial action, 143, 146-47, 147-48, 155, 244-45; in Spanish and early American periods, 143; *colorum* uprising in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, (March 1925), 144-45, 146; uprising in Tayug Pangasinan (January 1931), 146; Sakdal uprising in Laguna and elsewhere (May 1935), 147; causes of, 243-44; definition of, 243-244; implications of,

244. See also Hardie Report.  
**Akasia** (Tg. < Sp. *acacia*, 'acacia tree' [*Acacia* spp.], 125

**Alang-alang** (Tg., 'regard, esteem, respect, or deference'), 117

**ammuyo** (Ilk., 'cooperative exchange labor'; compare *bayanihan* [Tg.] and *bataris* [Kpm.], 189

**ani** (Tg., 'harvest'), 21

**anting-anting** (Tg., 'amulet'), 146

**aparceros** (Sp., 'tenants'), 154

Approaches to study of rice farming, 3-6, 236; normative, 5; empirical, 6; in this volume, 236;

**arawan** (Tg. < WR *araw*, 'sun; day'; meaning here, 'daily wage'), Pl. 9

**atis** (Tg., 'sugar apple, sweet sop' [*Annona squamosa*]), 125

**atarga** (Tg., 'share of crop paid to harvest gang for carrying out all tasks of dry-season harvest' [commonly 20 percent of crop in Central Luzon]), 136, 138, 139, 142 (note)

**bagos** (Ilk. < WR *bago*, 'new'; here meaning 'new ones'; and, particularly, 'recently Christianized Tinggian from Abra'), 210

**baknang** (Ilk., 'elite, prestigious'), 192, 193

**bakuran** (Tg. < WR *bakod*, 'wall, or fence'; here meaning 'premises' and, in particular, 'household'), 121, 131, Pl. 14

**baranggay** (Tg., 'village, community

of households'), 220, 226

**basag** (Tg. < WR *basag*, 'crack'; here meaning 'broken,' and, particularly, 'breaking up clods,' that is, first harrowing), 137

**basil** (Ilk., Tgl, 'claret-type wine from sugarcane'), 204

**basihan** (Tg. < WR *base* < Sp. *base*, 'basis, base'; here meaning 'base,' and, in particular, 'base-year's harvest'), 123

**bataris** (Kpm., Tg. < Kpm., *bataris*, 'guest, someone invited'; here meaning 'free group labor by pre-arranged number of workers, repaid by special foods'; compare *bayanihan* [Tg.] and *ammuyo* [Ilk.]), 138, Pl. 17

**bayanihan** (Tg. < WR *bayani*, 'hero, volunteer'; here meaning 'free emergency working bee open to all comers'; sometimes involves exchange labor; compare *bataris* [Kpm., Tg.] and *ammuyo* [Ilk.]), 174

**bilog** (Tg., 'round; full'; here meaning 'panicle inception, when palay stem swells with developing grain'), Pl. 11

**blower** (Tg. < Eng. *blower*, 'blower, fan'; here meaning 'a small gasoline-powered fan used for winnowing the wet-season harvest'), Pl. 15

**binatás** (Tg. < WR *batás*, 'decree, law'; here meaning 'brought under the law,' or 'brought to court'), 44

*bintang* (Ilk., 'share, or membership'), 214

*bugnós* (Tg., 'ration of palay or rice, especially for share tenants' families'), 18, 220

*bumabaho* (Tg. < WR *bajo* < Sp. *bajo*, 'bass'; here meaning 'making low, rhythmic grunts, like a bass'), Pl. 9

*bumatás* (Tg. < WR *batás*, 'decree, law'; here meaning 'come under the law'), 119, 123

*buwis* (Tg., 'taxi lease rental'; here meaning 'lease rent' or 'leasehold rent'), 136, 141

*cacique* (Sp. < Carib WR, 'petty chief'), 152, 153, 154

*caciquismo* (< *cacique*), 152, 220, 227

*cánon* (Sp., 'tribute'; here meaning 'leasehold rental'), 220

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formances, values, and goals become shared and systematized. Accordingly they become guides to future action (via emulation or rejection).

The performance, therefore, of successful settlers has feedback effects on the values and goals of others. Whether by intention or not, this behavior assists those fellow settlers who wish to stabilize and improve their life chances, but lack the skills to cope with the bureaucracy that ministers to their needs. Further, when successful settlers are not teaching by example they may act as creditors for selected settlers, but with this precaution: they supervise the expenditure and investment of the amounts they lend out taking no chances that an improvident debtor might default on his obligations.

#### Summary

The successful settler differs from his fellows above all by reason of his business-managerial ability; more particularly, by his superior social talent and business sense. He knows how to get what he needs and to use it profitably; he knows when it is profitable to rent, and when to buy, when to farm and when not to farm, when to lend and when to borrow; he knows the value of cooperative planning, farming and purchasing. Most of these talents, and the basic attitudes they express, he brought with him to Narra. Some shortcuts to success in the local context he probably learned from earlier arrivals, but he was, by and large, preadapted to coping with the Narra environment.

It is important to note that, contrary to official expectations, this settler may already be a recognized success before he has felled even one tree on his allocated parcel of land. Further, if he eventually titles his land, farming may be the least profitable and least engaging of his various business ventures. Titled land ownership is only one view of success among many.

#### Concluding Remarks

I have dwelt especially on the attributes of the successful settler, leaving for another day a comparable description of those settlers who by local standards, both official and nonofficial,

have not achieved as they might or should have. These latter are the great majority of Narra settlers who came to Palawan with backgrounds of tenancy, low educational attainment, limited technical skill, and a drab employment history. Sooner or later they revert to type in Narra, becoming as dependent as they ever were in the old setting, relating to the Agency employees and administrators as they formerly did to their landlords and overseers. In fact, it is not at all far-fetched to conceive of the Agency's administrators as surrogate landlords, and to see resettlement for most settlers as a process of transplanting the old way of life to a new setting.

If we assume that this discouraging view may be close to the truth of the matter, what can possibly be done to alter the situation? There is, I believe, little point in belaboring the ways in which the Narra blueprint has not been reduced to practice. There may be, and probably are, very good reasons why the preset plans and goals have not been followed and attained. More productive will be a review of various assumptions which underlie those plans and goals. Mentioned earlier were the ideals of the six-hectare, family-sized farm and of titled land-ownership. Now I would like to add a related assumption; namely, that settlers are a homogeneous lot, all of whom occupy and should occupy a totally dependent position in the Narra table of organization until they have repaid their loans and paid for their land.

The observations reported in the text of this preliminary statement suggest rather that successful settlers might be recognized for what they can be and in several cases are: private entrepreneurs capable of relieving the overtaxed Narra staff of responsibility for those groups of settlers whom these successful farm managers organize into cooperating units. If precautions are taken to assure the little man's retaining his land in the cooperative setting the chances are great that the otherwise unsuccessful settler will eventually become a titled owner, thanks to the interested tutoring he receives from his successful fellow-settler.

There is a broader implicit assumption that should be reconsidered. For if it is not true, the Narra personnel may be saved considerable grief

and frustration. Successful resettlement is assumed to be a terminal goal for settlers — at least this seems to be the Agency's position. But supposing resettlement is seen as one step or stage in the settler's quest for a better life. In this event, abandoned farms may not be a mark of failure but of success, provided the ex-settler has gone on to something he considers better — an off-farm job perhaps, or farming on private land. Thus resettlement is not a terminus, but part of a continuing process, a growth and development experience which takes place within or without the limits of an allotted piece of land, with or without the material and technical assistance of the Agency.

In brief, for the Agency's relief and consolation I make two suggestions: first, make successful settlers and cooperative farming key elements in a revision of the resettlement blueprint; second, take a more relaxed view of resettlement, seeing it for what it is — an alternative not meant for every settler who tries it.

#### Notes

This is the revised version of a paper presented at the SEADAG (Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group of the Asia Society) Population Panel Seminar held in San Francisco, California, July 6–8, 1972. The research on which it is based was done in two time periods. The first was December 1966 to August 1967, when the author was one of several researchers who collaborated in Homer G. Barnett's cross-cultural study of continuity and change in dislocated communities. The second study period was April–November 1971, supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the Ford Foundation's Southeast Asia Fellowship Program.

Mr. Fernandez, a candidate for the Ph.D. in anthropology at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), is currently a research associate of the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), Ateneo de Manila. He expresses his gratitude to Dr. Frank Lynch (IPC) and to Prof. Charles J. Erasmus (UCSB) for their counsel, encouragement, and assistance in the course of this study.

1. Resettlement should not be confused with *colonization*, the establishment in a foreign land of a foreign colony that remains subject to its parent state; *pioneering*, the opening of new lands in advance of others, usually done on an individual basis (also commonly labeled *squatting*); and *homesteading*, striking out on one's own and living in isolation on land legally set aside for such exploitation. "Resettlement connotes the government-sponsored and directed large-scale internal transfer of people or entire communities from one location to another" (Dow 1965: 11). The distinction between resettlement and the other activities

defined above is not always clear-cut. It is often the case that a resettlement scheme may include these others, may absorb them, or may co-occur with them.

2. Alvin Scaff (1955–63) made a similar observation regarding settlers on the Edcor farms in Mindanao. "Most of the settlers came from the flatlands of Central Luzon and from the coastal plains of Panay. Forests have been cleared from these areas for several hundred years. A folk culture of forest skills had long since disappeared from the lowlands, where generation after generation of farmers had only to plow and plant and harvest the neat, level rice paddies. Most of the settlers were ill-prepared for the tests that lay ahead."

3. Clifford Geertz (1963: 25–26) discusses in a most elegant and eloquent manner the delicate equilibrium of the swidden or slash-and-burn plot. "Given less than ideal conditions, [the swidden] is highly susceptible to breakdown into an irreversible process of ecological deterioration; that is, a pattern of change leading not to repeated forest recuperation but to a replacement of tree over altogether by the notorious *imperata* savannah grass which has turned so much of Southeast Asia into a green desert."

Three factors mentioned by Geertz contribute to the maladaptation of swidden cultivation: an increase in population which causes old plots to be recultivated too soon; prodigal or inept agricultural practices, which sacrifice future prospects to present convenience; brush and forest fires that burn off vast areas of both cleared and timber lands.

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(From p. 271)

*tungro* (Tg. < Ilk. WR *tungro*, 'stunted'; here meaning 'virus disease of rice spread by green leafhopper insects'; it spread widely in Central Luzon in 1971, causing abnormally low harvests), 139  
Tydings-McDuffie Ast (1934), 147

*utang na loób* (Tg. < WR *utang*, 'debt' plus *loób*, 'inside'; here meaning 'interior debt, debt of gratitude,' 82, 117; *walang utang na loób* (Tg. < WR *wala*, 'none, no' plus

*utang na loób*; here meaning 'without gratitude'), 117  
*utang a naimbag iti nakem* (Ilk. phrase meaning 'debt of honor,' literally 'debt of goodwill'), 193  
*ayon* (Ilk., 'measure of land - 0.16 - 0.25 ha. '), 203

*zangiera* (Ilk. < Amer. Sp. *zanja*, 'irrigation ditch'; here meaning 'irrigation society, or cooperative'), 172-73, 175, 187, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 213, 214

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
February 21, 1973

President Marcos has made agrarian reform the cornerstone of the "New Society". Impatient with the gradualism of the past, he has declared the tenant "deemed owner" of the land he tills. The entire government machinery is now in the middle of mobilizing itself in one great effort to implement the program, calling upon literally billions of pesos of its assets for funding.

With the best will in the world, however, given every peso that can be gathered, the agrarian reform program cannot be pushed through without the vital facts needed to guide policy and implementation.

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